This document is a motion to suppress evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure. It discusses the defendant's right to privacy, derivative evidence, and the failure of the officers to read Miranda warnings. Read more on Desklib.
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1 Motion to Suppress Name: School name: Course title and section: Instructor’s name: Date:
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2 Motion to Suppress Illegal Search and Seizure The defendant, Mr. Dexter Dirtbag, wishes to rely on section 1538.5 of the California Penal Code to enable him move a motiontoexclude any evidence which was obtained as a result of a search and seizure which was unlawful and the returning of the property which was seized illegally (Penal Code 1538.5). The search was unlawful because there was no search warrant to legalize the search and the search was also unreasonable. The California Constitution (Article 1, s. 13) and the U.S. Constitution Fourth Amendment provide the right to all citizens to be free from unreasonable seizures and searches. The defendant strongly holds that he had a reasonable expectationof privacyin the searchedmotel roomandhis seizeditems. This is because the motel room booked and occupied by the defendant qualified for a place that is designed to protect the inhabitant from the view of the public (People v. Hughston2008). Mr. Dexter also wishes to raise the issue of derivative evidence. He wishes to move a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as an indirect result of the illegal search (Wong Sun v. U.S.1963). The officers had gone into the motel room to confirm that Prudence, the defendant’s girlfriend was fine. A further search by the officers in the room where they obtained the Gock automatic pistol needed them to have a search warrant. Having conducted the search without any warrant, the court must not give regard to the evidence that they
3 obtained from their warrantless search and the defendant wishes to get back his licensed pistol. There are exceptions that may allow a warrantless search and the circumstances to result to a warrantless search must by imperative (State v. Allison1979). These exceptions include exigent circumstances where the police officers have reasonable belief that evidence may be destroyed before a search warrant is obtained. There was no such intention by the defendant because he was conducting his errands normally until the officers interrupted his stay in the motel. Another exception is a search that is incident to a lawful arrest. There was no warrant for the arrest of Mr. Dexter and therefore any search to his property ought to have been warranted. It was not a consent search as the law enforcement officers did not seek the consent of Dexter before they conducted their search. The motel room booked by the defendant was not an open field where it was lawful for the police officers to conduct a search without a warrant. Additionally, this was not a plain view scenario because the officers were not at the right place at the right time when they obtained the evidence against the defendant. They violated the defendant’s right to privacy without any warrant and this illegal and unacceptable. The defendant is a common United States citizen and not some sort of a foreign spy. This means that it was not a matter of national security to prompt the officers to implement a warrantless search against the defendant. Failure by the Officers to Read Miranda Warnings to the Defendant The Miranda warning applies where police officers conduct investigations against the defendant and the suspect is in the custody of the officers. Another requirement is that the questioning must be for the purposes of interrogation. All these three requirements were fulfilled in the defendant’s case because Captain Furillo and his junior officers, Hill and Renko had subjected Mr. Dexter to custody in the motel room where measures were put in
4 place to ensure that there was no interference from unauthorised personnel and back-up as well as crime scene investigators had been requested for. However, they did not apply the doctrine of Miranda warning and this therefore made their detention of the suspect illegal and unlawful. Firstly, the defendant did not voluntarily participate in the interrogation because when he stood to go towards the door, Captain Furillo blocked him and pushed him back and he did not have an option but to be in the custody of the officers. Mr. Dexter’s freedom of movement was restricted by the officers, which meant that they were obliged by the law to read him his Miranda rights. The suspect did not initiate any contact or physical altercation with the officers. When he was blocked by Furillo, he did not press any further to try to have his way out of the motel room. The police were coercive as well as deceptive. They prevented the defendant from leaving the room and blackmailed the defendant that they would strike a deal with the DA if the defendant cooperated. This is why the defendant admitted that he was merely the driver and did not take part directly in the robbery and murder case. However, being that the officers did not read him his Miranda rights the defendant’s admission was inadmissible and must not be relied upon by the court as part of the evidence. The defendant’s motel room was dominated by police officers and they arrested him after finishing their questioning. This satisfies the fact that the defendant was in custody and failure by the officers to read him his Miranda rights was illegal and unlawful. We strongly believe that the court should not rely on any of the evidence obtained by the officers from their warrantless search and detention without reading the Miranda warnings to the defendant.
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5 References California Penal Code 1538.5. People v. Hughston(2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1070-71. State v. Allison(1979). 298 N.C. 135, 257 S.E. 2d 417.