Crises and Crisis Management: Integration, Interpretation, and Research Development

This article proposes an integrative framework of crises and crisis management that draws from research in strategy, organizational theory, and organizational behavior as well as from research in public relations and corporate communication. It identifies two primary perspectives in the literature, one focused on the internal dynamics of a crisis and one focused on managing external stakeholders. The article reviews core concepts from each perspective and highlights the commonalities that exist between them. Finally, it uses the integrative framework to propose future research directions for scholars interested in crises and crisis management.

Journal of Management
Vol. XX No. X, Month XXXX 1 –32
DOI: 10.1177/0149206316680030
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Crises and Crisis Management: Integration,
Interpretation, and Research Development
Jonathan Bundy
Arizona State University
Michael D. Pfarrer
Cole E. Short
University of Georgia
W. Timothy Coombs
Texas A&M University
Organizational research has long been interested in crises and crisis management. Whether
focused on crisis antecedents, outcomes, or managing a crisis, research has revealed a number
of important findings. However, research in this space remains fragmented, making it difficult
for scholars to understand the literature’s core conclusions, recognize unsolved problems, and
navigate paths forward. To address these issues, we propose an integrative framework of crises
and crisis management that draws from research in strategy, organizational theory, and orga-
nizational behavior as well as from research in public relations and corporate communication.
We identify two primary perspectives in the literature, one focused on the internal dynamics of
a crisis and one focused on managing external stakeholders. We review core concepts from each
perspective and highlight the commonalities that exist between them. Finally, we use our inte-
grative framework to propose future research directions for scholars interested in crises and
crisis management.
Keywords: crisis; crises; crisis management; organizational wrongdoing; perception and
impression management
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Miles Zachary for comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript. We
are also grateful to associate editor Karen Schnatterly and two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable feedback
and guidance.
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Corresponding author: Jonathan Bundy, Arizona State University, P.O. Box 874006, Tempe, AZ 85287-4006,
USA.
680030 JOMXXX10.1177/0149206316680030Journal of Management Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management
research-article2016

2 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
An organizational crisis—an event perceived by managers and stakeholders as highly
salient, unexpected, and potentially disruptive—can threaten an organization’s goals and
have profound implications for its relationships with stakeholders. For example, BP’s Gulf
oil spill harmed its financial performance and reputation, and it redefined its relationship
with customers, employees, local communities, and governments. Similarly, Target’s con-
sumer data breach caused financial and reputational damage to the company, and the crisis
spurred large-scale changes in the way electronic records are now processed and stored.
Because of these implications, organizational research from a variety of disciplines has
devoted considerable attention to crises and crisis management, working to understand how
and why crises occur (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Perrow, 1984; Weick, 1993), and how
organizations can manage them to reduce harm (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Coombs, 2007;
Kahn, Barton, & Fellows, 2013). Organizational research has also considered a number of
important crisis outcomes, including stakeholders’ perceptions of organizational reputation,
trust, and legitimacy (Coombs, 2007; Elsbach, 1994; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; Pfarrer,
DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008), organizational learning and adaptation (Lampel, Shamsie,
& Shapira, 2009; Veil, 2011), and financial performance and survival (D’Aveni & MacMillan,
1990; Marcus & Goodman, 1991).
However, despite sustained interest across multiple disciplines, recent commentary on the
field suggests that “we have only just begun to scratch the surface in our understanding” of
crises and crisis management, and encourages further consideration of the theoretical mecha-
nisms at work (Coombs, 2010: 479; Pearson, Roux-Dufort, & Clair, 2007). Additionally,
research in this area has been criticized for its lack of theoretical and empirical rigor, given
that many of its conclusions and prescriptions are derived from case studies or anecdotal
evidence (Coombs, 2007; Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). Finally, many scholars continue to
lament a silo effect, noting that researchers from different perspectives often talk past one
another without capitalizing on opportunities to build cross-disciplinary scholarship (James,
Wooten, & Dushek, 2011; Jaques, 2009; Kahn et al., 2013). As such, there is little consensus
and integration across fields of study, numerous and sometimes conflicting prescriptions
abound, and debates continue regarding the relevant antecedents, processes, and outcomes
associated with crises and crisis management.
The purpose of this article is twofold: First, we review and integrate the literature on crises
and crisis management from multiple disciplines, including strategic management, organiza-
tion theory, and organizational behavior as well as public relations and corporate communi-
cation. Second, we contribute to scholarship by specifying a framework that incorporates two
dominant perspectives found in the literature. The first perspective is internally oriented
toward the technical and structural aspects of a crisis, while the second perspective is exter-
nally oriented toward managing stakeholder relationships. Our review reveals that these per-
spectives have developed largely independently, and we identify numerous opportunities for
integration. Ultimately, our framework serves as a foundation for future cross-disciplinary
research as well an effective tool for practitioners.
Method and Review Framework
To conduct our review, we performed an extensive and integrative search of articles pub-
lished in major organizational academic journals, with certain boundary conditions to make

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 3
the review pertinent to management and organizational scholars. Pearson and Clair’s (1998)
Academy of Management Review article has been a foundation of subsequent developments
in the literature; therefore, we used their article as our starting point. We cover the time
period from 1998 to 2015 with a few exceptions, primarily to reference seminal research.
Following the recommendations of Short (2009), we primarily focused our review on the
following journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies,
Organization Science, and Strategic Management Journal. To identify relevant articles from
these outlets, we conducted full-text searches on the terms crisis, crises, and crisis manage-
ment. We then identified and categorized critical themes to generate a set of articles for inclu-
sion. This involved removing articles that did not primarily focus on crises or crisis
management in their research questions, hypotheses, or propositions. We also extended our
methodology by searching the references of the articles identified in our initial search as well
as searching for research that cites these articles (cf. Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013;
Short, 2009). This led us to include a number of influential books, relevant articles in other
respected journals, and research from public relations and communication. Overall, we
sought to collect the work that is most relevant to management and organizational scholars.
Despite a diversity of perspectives and intellectual traditions, our analysis of the multiple
definitions of crises and crisis management over the past 20 years reveals convergence (see
Heath, 2012; James et al., 2011; Jaques, 2009; Pearson & Clair, 1998; and Sellnow & Seeger,
2013, for detailed definitional reviews). Drawing from this convergence, we define an orga-
nizational crisis as an event perceived by managers and stakeholders to be highly salient,
unexpected, and potentially disruptive. We also recognize that crises have four primary char-
acteristics: (a) crises are sources of uncertainty, disruption, and change (cf. Bundy & Pfarrer,
2015; James et al., 2011; Kahn et al., 2013); (b) crises are harmful or threatening for organi-
zations and their stakeholders, many of whom may have conflicting needs and demands (cf.
Fediuk, Coombs, & Botero, 2012; James et al., 2011; Kahn et al., 2013); (c) crises are behav-
ioral phenomena, meaning that the literature has recognized that crises are socially con-
structed by the actors involved rather than a function of the depersonalized factors of an
objective environment (cf. Coombs, 2010: 478; Gephart, 2007; Lampel et al., 2009); and (d)
crises are parts of larger processes, rather than discrete events (cf. Jaques, 2009; Pearson &
Clair, 1998; Roux-Dufort, 2007). Additionally, we recognize that crisis management broadly
captures organizational leaders’ actions and communication that attempt to reduce the likeli-
hood of a crisis, work to minimize harm from a crisis, and endeavor to reestablish order fol-
lowing a crisis (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Kahn et al., 2013; Pearson & Clair, 1998).
Definitional convergence aside, a number of scholars prior to and throughout our review
period have noted a lack of integration across disciplines and perspectives (cf. Jaques, 2009).
For example, Shrivastava (1993: 33) highlighted a “Tower of Babel” effect, arguing that
there are “many disciplinary voices, talking in so many different languages to different issues
and audiences” that it becomes difficult to build cross-disciplinary theory and policy guide-
lines. More recently, Pearson and colleagues (2007: viii) worried that the “virtual galaxy of
critical concepts” resulting from this lack of coordination not only may impede on the ability
to build theory and aid practice but also risks the “legitimacy and credibility” of the field as
a whole. James and colleagues (2011: 457) echoed this concern in their review of crisis lead-
ership, noting that “fragmentation has prevented a widely accepted understanding of, or com-

4 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
From our review of the literature, we have identified two primary perspectives that focus
on different aspects of crises and crisis management and that draw from different theoretical
traditions to answer distinct research questions. The first perspective, which we label the
internal perspective, focuses on the within-organization dynamics of managing risk, com-
plexity, and technology (e.g., Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Gephart, Van Maanen, & Oberlechner,
2009; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Perrow, 1984; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). For these scholars,
crisis management involves the coordination of complex technical and relational systems
and the design of organizational structures to prevent the occurrence, reduce the impact, and
learn from a crisis. In contrast, the second perspective, which we label the external perspec-
tive, focuses on the interactions of organizations and external stakeholders, largely drawing
from theories of social perception and impression management (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015;
Coombs, 2007; Elsbach, 1994; Pfarrer, DeCelles, et al., 2008). According to this perspective,
crisis management involves shaping perceptions and coordinating with stakeholders to pre-
vent, solve, and grow from a crisis.
While sharing a number of core assumptions and commonalities that we detail below, the
internal and external perspectives have largely evolved independently. Therefore, we frame
our review around these two dominant perspectives and highlight a number of opportunities
for integration. We present our framework in Figure 1, which categorizes the literature into
internal and external perspectives and is situated around three primary stages of a crisis: pre-
crisis prevention, crisis management, and postcrisis outcomes. The articles featured in our
review are outlined in Table 1, and more detailed tables are available in the online appendix.
We detail our model below while synthesizing commonalities among the perspectives and
offering directions for future research. First, we review the literature that has considered how
organizations can reduce the likelihood of a crisis, which we label the precrisis prevention
stage. In particular, we highlight research on organizational preparedness from the internal
perspective and research on stakeholder relationships from the external perspective. This
research is also summarized online in Tables 1a and 1b.
Second, we focus on the crisis management stage, which considers the actions taken by
managers in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. 1 From our literature review, we recognize
that the internal perspective focuses on crisis leadership, while the external perspective
focuses on stakeholder perceptions of the crisis. This research is also summarized online in
Tables 2a and 2b.
The final component of our model focuses on the postcrisis outcomes stage. The literature
from the internal perspective has highlighted the role of organizational learning following a
crisis, while the literature from the external perspective focuses on social evaluations as out-
comes (e.g., assessments of reputation, legitimacy, and trust). Although not pictured in Figure
1, we also note that both perspectives consider other tangible organizational outcomes, such
as turnover and performance. This research is also summarized online in Tables 3a and 3b.
Stage 1: Precrisis Prevention
Internal Perspective: Organizational Preparedness
Precrisis prevention research from the internal perspective generally draws from the work
of Perrow (1984) and others to highlight the inevitability of crises due to the complexity of

5
Figure 1
Internal and External Perspectives of the Crisis Process
Note: The dashed arrows represent understudied relationships and opportunities for future research.
at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on December 9, 2016jom.sagepub.comDownloaded from

6 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
Table 1
Summary of the Crisis and Crisis Management Literature
Context Perspective Research Design References
Precrisis
prevention
Internal
(organizational
preparedness)
Conceptual Weick, Sutfcliffe, & Obstfeld (1999); Ashforth & Anand (2003);
Roux-Dufort (2007); Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll (2009);
Greve, Palmer, & Pozner (2010)
Empirical Marcus & Nichols (1999); Bigley & Roberts (2001); Rudolph &
Repenning (2002); Schnatterly (2003); Vogus & Welbourne
(2003); Gittell, Cameron, Lim, & Rivas (2006); Madsen, Desai,
Wong, & Roberts (2006); O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley
(2006); Harris & Bromiley (2007); Roberts, Madsen, & Desai
(2007); Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin (2008); Bechky
& Okhuysen (2011); Wowak, Mannor, & Wowak (2015)
External
(stakeholder
relationships)
Conceptual Clair & Waddock (2007); Alpaslan, Green, & Mitroff (2009);
Lehman & Ramanujam (2009)
Empirical Ulmer (2001); Lind, Greenberg, Scott, & Welchans (2000); James
& Wooten (2006); Jacques, Gatot, & Wallemacq (2007); Mishina,
Dykes, Block, & Pollock (2010); Y. Kim, Park, & Wier (2012);
McDonnell & King (2013)
Crisis
management
Internal (crisis
leadership)
Conceptual Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe (2004); Howell & Shamir (2005);
James & Wooten (2005); Dane & Pratt (2007); Majchrzak,
Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead (2007); Mitroff (2007); Brockner &
James (2008); Frandsen & Johansen (2011); James, Wooten, &
Dushek (2011); Withers, Corley, & Hillman (2012); Kahn, Barton,
& Fellows (2013)
Empirical Pillai & Meindl (1998); Vaaler & McNamara (2004); Maitlis (2005);
Lin, Zhao, Ismail, & Carley (2006); S. Lee & Makhija (2009);
Dowell, Shackell, & Stuart (2011); Johansen, Aggerholm, &
Frandsen (2012); Mazzei, Kim, & Dell’Oro (2012); Mazzei &
Ravazzani (2015)
External
(stakeholder
perceptions)
Conceptual Elsbach (2003); Adut (2005); Coombs (2007); Pfarrer, DeCelles, et
al. (2008); Yu, Sengul, & Lester (2008); Gillespie & Dietz (2009);
Rhee & Valdez (2009); Veil, Buehner, & Palenchar (2011);
Fediuk, Coombs, & Botero (2012); Lange & Washburn (2012);
Mishina, Block, & Mannor (2012); Rhee & Kim (2012); Haack,
Pfarrer, & Scherer (2014); Poppo & Schepker (2014); Bundy &
Pfarrer (2015); Brown, Buchholtz, & Dunn (2016)
Empirical Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe (1998); Jones, Jones, & Little (2000);
Ahmadjian & Robinson (2001); Coombs & Holladay (2001,
2002, 2004, 2006); Brooks, Highhouse, Russell, & Mohr (2003);
Dean (2004); Schnietz & Epstein (2005); Coombs (2006); Rhee
& Haunschild (2006); Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin (2006);
Barnett & King (2008); Kang (2008); Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-
Greve (2009); H. Kim & Yang (2009); Love & Kraatz (2009);
Gutierrez, Howard-Grenville, & Scully (2010); Pfarrer, Pollock, &
Rindova (2010); Desai (2011); Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie (2011);
Hoffman & Ocasio (2011); Claeys & Cauberghe (2012); Decker
(2012); Elsbach (2012); Lamin & Zaheer (2012); Zavyalova,
Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro (2012); Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Wade, &
Quinn (2013); Utz, Schultz, & Glocka (2013); Wiersema & Zhang
(2013); Yue, Luo, & Ingram (2013); Bertels, Cody, & Pek (2014);
Diestre & Rajagopalan (2014); Gillespie, Dietz, & Lockey (2014);
van der Meer & Verhoeven (2014); Paruchuri & Misangyi (2015);
Petriglieri (2015); Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley (2016); Zavyalova,
Pfarrer, Reger, & Hubbard (2016)
Postcrisis
outcomes
Internal
(organizational
learning)
Conceptual Zahra & George (2002); Shepherd (2003); Vera & Crossan (2004);
Gephart (2007); Wilson, Goodman, & Cronin (2007); Beck &
Plowman (2009); Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira (2009); Starbuck
(2009); Veil (2011)

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 7
Context Perspective Research Design References
Empirical Amabile & Conti (1999); Haunschild & Sullivan (2002); Elliott &
Smith (2006); Baum & Bahlin (2007); J. Kim & Miner (2007);
Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick (2009); Madsen (2009);
Rerup (2009); Madsen & Desai (2010); Maguire & Hardy (2013);
Haunschild, Polidoro, & Chandler (2015)
External (social
evaluations)
Conceptual Hudson (2008); Pozner (2008); Devers, Dewett, Mishina, & Belsito
(2009); Tomlinson & Mryer (2009); Hudson & Okhuysen (2014)
Empirical Zyglidopoulos (2001); P. Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks (2004);
F. Lee, Peterson, & Tiedens (2004); Tomlinson, Dineen, &
Lewicki (2004); Sinaceur, Heath, & Cole (2005); Coombs &
Holladay (2007); Dardis & Haigh (2009); Jin (2010); Jin, Pang, &
Cameron (2012); Claeys & Cauberghe (2014)
Table 1 (continued)
the roles of organizational culture and structure in how an organization can prepare for a
crisis.
Organizing for reliability. One influential stream of research focuses on high-reliability
organizations (e.g., Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Gittel, Cameron, Lim, & Rivas, 2006; Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). The overarching thesis from this stream
is that organizations can orient themselves—via changes in culture, design, and structure—to
prevent system breakdowns that may lead to crises. In this sense, a high-reliability organi-
zation has the capability to manage unexpected events, which results from a cognitive and
behavioral process of collective managerial “mindfulness” (Weick et al., 1999: 37; Weick
& Sutcliffe, 2001). While often studied in volatile industries or environments (e.g., nuclear
power, military, NASA, air traffic control, SWAT teams, and emergency health care), “high
reliability” can apply to any organization interested in managing complexity and seeking to
avoid crises.
For example, Bigley and Roberts (2001) focused on three aspects of high-reliability orga-
nizations: mechanisms that allow for the alteration of formal structures, leadership support
for improvisation, and methods that allow for enhanced sensemaking. As the authors noted,
to the extent an organization has the capacity to implement preplanned organizational solutions
rapidly enough to meet the more predictable aspects of an evolving incident, potential reaction
speed is increased, depletion of cognitive and other resources is reduced, and the probability of
organizational dysfunction is limited. (Bigley & Roberts, 2001: 1297; also see Madsen, Desai,
Wong, & Roberts, 2006; Roberts, Madsen, & Desai, 2007)
Building on this premise, other scholars have focused on the factors that may limit an
organization’s ability to organize for reliability, such as managers’ emotional and cognitive
limitations (Kahn et al., 2013; Roux-Dufort, 2007), the number of organizational disruptions
(Rudolph & Repenning, 2002), the availability and use of organizational resources (Marcus
& Nichols, 1999), and the roles of practices and structures used to promote reliability (Lin,
Zhao, Ismail, & Carley, 2006; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003).
Organizational culture and structure. Research from the internal perspective has also

8 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
culture, governance, and compensation structure (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Greve, Palmer,
& Pozner, 2010; Harris & Bromiley, 2007; O’Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley, 2006; Pfar-
rer, DeCelles, et al., 2008; Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, Khanin, & Zhang, 2008; Schnatterly, 2003;
Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008). For example, Greve and colleagues (2010)
and Ashforth and Anand (2003) argued that an organization’s culture can be more accepting
of misconduct, often resulting from managerial aspirations or power contests. Similarly, in her
study of corporate governance structures, Schnatterly (2003) found that certain governance
practices—including the clarity of policies and communication—were more effective at pre-
venting white-collar crime than other governance structures, such as increasing the percentage
of outsiders on the board. Finally, research has also shown that certain executive compensa-
tion arrangements—including the use of out-of-the-money stock options—may encourage
financial fraud and risk taking to increase the likelihood of a crisis (e.g., Harris & Bromiley,
2007; O’Connor et al., 2006; Wowak, Mannor, & Wowak, 2015; Zhang et al., 2008).
Summary. Three elements emerge from the internal perspective’s focus on organiza-
tional preparedness: First, organizing for high reliability is often treated as a cognitive and
behavioral task. Second, numerous studies suggest that high-reliability organizations are
more capable of preventing crises. Third, other factors may influence the likelihood of a
crisis occurring, including organizational culture and structure. While not directly studied,
it can be assumed that the cultural and structural factors increasing the likelihood of a crisis
also make it more difficult to organize for reliability. Testing this assumption provides an
excellent opportunity for future research. For example, scholars could consider how differ-
ent compensation or governance structures influence the process of organizing for reliability.
We also note that research on high-reliability organizations specifically, and organiza-
tional preparedness in general, has been criticized for lacking specificity (Leveson, Dulac,
Marais, & Carroll, 2009). For example, Bigley and Roberts (2001: 1295) recognized the
“somewhat abstract” nature of their theory and suggested that a more “comprehensive and
detailed treatment” of high-reliability organizations is needed. Our review of the literature
suggests that this detailed treatment has yet to fully materialize. Additionally, most high-
reliability studies are case based and focus on atypical, highly volatile environments, limiting
their generalizability (Leveson et al., 2009). As such, examinations of more “typical” organi-
zations remain underdeveloped (cf. Vogus & Welbourne, 2003).
External Perspective: Stakeholder Relationships
In contrast to the internal focus on organizational preparedness, precrisis research from
the external perspective highlights the role of stakeholder relationships. We identified two
streams within this area that focus on positive and negative relationships, respectively.
Positive stakeholder relationships. Precrisis prevention research from the external per-
spective argues that maintaining positive relationships with stakeholders can reduce the
likelihood of a crisis (Clair & Waddock, 2007; Coombs, 2007; Pfarrer, DeCelles, et al.,
2008; Ulmer, 2001; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002). For example, Clair and Waddock (2007: 299)
proposed a “total responsibility management” approach, which focused on the importance
of recognizing an organization’s responsibilities to stakeholders in order to enhance crisis

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 9
detection and prevention (also see Alpaslan, Green, & Mitroff, 2009). Using similar logic,
Kahn and colleagues (2013) theorized how relational cohesion, flexibility, and open commu-
nication between internal and external stakeholders can help prevent crises (also see Ulmer,
Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011). Finally, Coombs (2015: 107) noted that “stakeholders should be
part of the prevention thinking and process,” and that stakeholders can help in both identify-
ing and mitigating the risks that may lead to a crisis.
Whereas research in this area is theoretically diverse, empirical investigations remain
limited. While some studies provide evidence that positive stakeholder relationships can
mitigate the potential damage from a crisis—including Ulmer’s (2001) examination of an
industrial fire at Malden Mills and Coombs and Holladay’s (2001) study of stakeholder rela-
tionships in accident crises—few have directly examined the link between positive relation-
ships and the likelihood of a crisis occurring. For example, future research could examine the
relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and the likelihood of a crisis. That
is, if CSP is an indicator of having positive stakeholder relationships, then organizations with
higher CSP scores should experience fewer crises, all else equal.
Negative stakeholder relationships. In contrast to the positive view detailed above,
other scholars have considered the negative side of stakeholder relationships. For example,
Mishina, Dykes, Block, and Pollock (2010) found that prior positive organizational perfor-
mance increases stakeholders’ expectations for future positive performance and that organi-
zations may engage in illegal behavior in order to meet these expectations (also see Lehman
& Ramanujam, 2009). Greve and colleagues (2010: 64) highlighted this social pressure as
an example of “strain theory,” which posits that “actors resort to misconduct when they are
unable to achieve their goals through legitimate means.” As such, the pressures associated
with meeting stakeholders’ expectations may encourage organizational behavior that can
lead to a crisis.
Additionally, scholars have also considered how negative relationships with stakeholders
may trigger a crisis in the form of retaliatory action, including protests, activism, boycotts, and
lawsuits (James & Wooten, 2006; Lind, Greenberg, Scott, & Welchans, 2000; McDonnell &
King, 2013). For example, James and Wooten (2006) considered negative relationships in the
context of discrimination lawsuits, and McDonnell and King (2013) studied the influence of
an organization’s positive and negative relationships in the context of consumer boycotts.
Summary. The external perspective’s focus on stakeholder relationships in the precri-
sis prevention stage suggests the following: Fostering positive stakeholder relationships is
essential, as negative relationships can cause or escalate crises. Positive relationships also
need to be founded on reasonable expectations and open lines of communication in order
to avoid the strain associated with untenable goals. Establishing such a foundation is likely
the responsibility of both organizations and stakeholders, as organizations must focus on
managing expectations and communicating transparently, while stakeholders need to be
mindful of inflated expectations and associated biases (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). Of course,
while managing expectations may help prevent a crisis, this may have negative implications
on organizational performance. For example, shareholders may perceive attempts to man-
age expectations negatively, particularly in the aftermath of positive performance. As such,
an opportunity for future research would be to investigate the potential tradeoffs that exist

10 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
between organizations’ attempts to manage stakeholders’ expectations, the likelihood of a
crisis, and financial performance.
Synthesizing the Perspectives
The internal perspective’s focus on organizational preparedness and the external perspec-
tive’s focus on stakeholder relationships share a number of commonalities. For example, orga-
nizing for reliability is a process of developing managerial mindfulness generally focused on
the internal operational environment. Similarly, research on stakeholder relationships empha-
sizes the importance of being mindful of relational expectations and obligations. Both per-
spectives also focus on identifying behavioral and social constraints that may interfere with
mindful organizing and relationship building (e.g., biases, limitations, and expectations).
Despite these commonalities, we found only limited evidence of research that considers
both perspectives together (cf. Clair & Waddock, 2007; Gittell, Cameron, Lim, & Rivas,
2006; Kahn et al., 2013; Jacques, Gatot, & Wallemacq, 2007; Pfarrer, DeCelles, et al., 2008;
Roux-Dufort, 2007). Thus, questions for future research remain. For example, how might
efforts to organize for reliability influence the way in which an organization manages its
external stakeholder relationships? We know that organizing for reliability requires a focus
on flexibility and core responsibilities (Weick et al., 1999). Both of these traits are also criti-
cal for positive stakeholder relationships (Clair & Waddock, 2007; Ulmer et al., 2011).
Therefore, it appears that organizing for reliability should enhance an organization’s ability
to foster positive external stakeholder relationships and that the presence of these positive
relationships would enhance an organization’s ability to organize for reliability.
An alternative possibility arises, however, when considering managers’ bounded rational-
ity and cognitive limitations (Cyert & March, 1963; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). Executives
focused on developing internal structures to manage complex systems may be limited in their
ability to foster a wide range of positive stakeholder relationships. Similarly, managers
focused on their various stakeholders may be unable to focus on managing complex internal
systems. As such, it is possible that a balanced focus on internal and external crisis preven-
tion may be difficult to accomplish in practice.
Stage 2: Crisis Management
Moving from the precrisis prevention stage, a significant portion of research from the inter-
nal and external perspectives has focused on the processes associated with the crisis manage-
ment stage (see Figure 1 and Table 1 as well as Tables 2a and 2b in the online supplemental
material). Before considering the differences between the internal and external perspectives,
we note that the factors that work to prevent a crisis, including organizational preparedness
and positive stakeholder relationships, may also facilitate crisis management after a triggering
event. As such, many of the manuscripts reviewed above are also applicable here.
Internal Perspective: Crisis Leadership
As Kahn and colleagues (2013: 377) noted, “traditional models of crisis management are
rooted in a classic engineering mandate: identify and fix the problems in inputs and opera-

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 11
beyond this mandate, the internal perspective continues to emphasize a “fix-the-problem”
approach, often by focusing on the factors that influence within-organization crisis leader-
ship. For example, James and colleagues (2011: 458) highlighted the importance of “crisis
handlers,” focusing not just on the “tactical aspects of management” during a crisis but also
on the “responsibilities of leading an organization in the pre- and post-crisis phases.” In par-
ticular, the authors emphasized the relationship between crisis perceptions and crisis leader-
ship, suggesting that leaders who frame crises as threats react more emotionally and are more
limited in their efforts, while leaders who frame crises as opportunities are more open-minded
and flexible (also see Brockner & James, 2008; Dane & Pratt, 2007; James & Wooten, 2005,
2010; Mitroff, 2007; Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewe, 2004; Vaaler & McNamara, 2004). Others
have focused on characteristics of the crisis leader—such as charisma—and how such char-
acteristics may influence internal cohesion during a crisis (Howell & Shamir, 2005; James
et al., 2011; Pillai & Meindl, 1998).
Scholars have also considered how leaders at high-reliability organizations manage a cri-
sis, recognizing that the ability to adapt and change mental models in an emergency situation
can enhance coordination and effective communication (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, &
Hollingshead, 2007; Roberts et al., 2007). This suggests that not only does organizing for
reliability help to prevent a crisis, but it can also enhance leadership efforts in the event that
one occurs.
Conditional factors on crisis leadership. Research has also considered a number of
conditional factors that may affect internal leadership during a crisis. For example, With-
ers, Corley, and Hillman (2012) suggested that a quality board may reduce the impact of a
crisis and enhance leadership efforts. Similarly, Dowell, Shackell, and Stuart (2011) found
that organizations with independent and smaller boards, which are more capable of enacting
dynamic change, were less likely to experience failure following a crisis. The authors also
found that more powerful CEOs, who are better able to make rapid decisions, reduced the
likelihood of failure.
Moving beyond governance factors, Lin and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that the
complexity of an organization’s structure and task environment combines to influence crisis
management efforts, both positively and negatively. S. Lee and Makhija (2009) emphasized
the role of strategic flexibility in crisis management, which, like organizing for reliability,
can enhance leadership efforts. Others have considered how more tangible aspects of an
organization, such as size and age, influence crisis management, the greater of which may
inhibit leadership efforts during a crisis (Lange & Washburn, 2012; Rhee & Valdez, 2009).
Finally, researchers in corporate communication and public relations have recently begun to
focus on the role of internal crisis communication, showing the negative effects of neglecting
employees during a crisis (Mazzei & Ravazzani, 2015) as well as the positive effects of
engaging with them (Mazzei, Kim, & Dell’Oro, 2012), including the possibility of employ-
ees becoming outspoken defenders of the organization (Frandsen & Johansen, 2011;
Johansen, Aggerholm, & Frandsen, 2012).
Summary. The internal perspective suggests that leaders are critical to the crisis man-
agement process and that a number of factors influence their ability to lead. However,
much like the research on organizational preparedness, research on crisis leadership is

12 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
often criticized for its lack of specificity. Indeed, attempts to empirically examine the rec-
ommendations of this literature, such as the development of organizational structures to
aid with information processing and resource allocation, have not found strong support (cf.
Lin et al., 2006). As Lin and colleagues (2006: 611) noted, “more exploration is needed to
extend current organizational theories” of crisis management, and “the way in which orga-
nizations should be designed to encourage adaptation” needs to be reconsidered (2006:
614). In their critique, they highlighted that critical and specific questions about how orga-
nizations should structure and coordinate to enhance crisis leadership remain unanswered
(Lin et al., 2006).
Additionally, how different internal factors combine to influence crisis management also
remains unclear. For example, as we noted above, research suggests that both a strong board
(Withers et al., 2012) and a powerful CEO (Dowell et al., 2011) should enhance internal
crisis leadership. However, strong boards may work to curb CEO power, and powerful CEOs
often seek to reduce board impact (Shen, 2003). Furthermore, research also shows that pow-
erful CEOs may take more risks (Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005), which may enhance the
likelihood of a crisis (Mishina et al., 2010). Thus, the factors that lead to more effective
internal crisis management may also paradoxically lead to more crises.
External Perspective: Stakeholder Perceptions
In contrast to the focus on internal crisis leadership, a great deal of research from the
external perspective has focused on how stakeholders perceive and react to crises and how
organizations influence these perceptions. Below we consider multiple elements of this
research.
Crisis response strategies. Numerous studies captured in our review focus on how orga-
nizations use crisis response strategies, or the “set of coordinated communication and actions
used to influence evaluators’ crisis perceptions” (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015: 346). Much of this
literature draws from attribution theory, which states that individuals are motivated to search
for the causes of unexpected and negative events, and these attributions of responsibility can
invoke negative emotions and reactions (Weiner, 1986). Utilizing this logic, Coombs’ situ-
ational crisis communication theory (SCCT) argues that the more responsibility stakeholders
attribute to an organization for a crisis, the greater their negative perceptions (Coombs, 1995,
2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Experimental research confirms this premise (Coombs &
Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2006; Dean, 2004), and a number of management studies have
drawn from the tenets of attribution theory and SCCT to consider the role of crisis attribu-
tions (e.g., Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Mishina, Block, & Mannor,
2012; Withers et al., 2012).
While attributions are critical for understanding stakeholders’ perceptions of a crisis,
research also recognizes that attributions are “a negotiated feature of crisis management, and,
therefore, subject to social influence” (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015: 352). Thus, an organization’s
response strategy plays a central role in this process. Scholars have developed a number of
typologies to capture organizations’ responses (e.g., Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 1995, 2006;
Elsbach, 1994, 2003; James & Wooten, 2006; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Marcus & Goodman
1991; Pfarrer, DeCelles, et al., 2008; Sutton & Callahan, 1987; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, &

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 13
Given their similarities, a useful way to integrate them is along a continuum from defen-
sive to accommodative. As highlighted by Bundy and Pfarrer (2015: 352), “response strate-
gies that accept less responsibility—generally labeled defensive—attempt to [reduce] an
organization’s perceived association with a crisis,” while “strategies that accept more respon-
sibility—generally labeled accommodative—[acknowledge] an organization’s causal role in
a crisis.” Examples of defensive strategies include denial, defiance, and scapegoating.
Examples of accommodative strategies include apologies, expressions of sympathy, and
promises of corrective actions. Examples of strategies in the middle of the continuum—
which emphasize limited organizational responsibility—include decoupling and reducing
offensiveness via justifications and excuses.
Research has also considered the effects of timing and the source of the crisis response.
For example, research has empirically shown that negative perceptions are reduced when the
organization is the first to release crisis information (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012; Pfarrer,
Smith, et al., 2008). Other scholars have shown that organizations may engage in anticipatory
response strategies to soften negative reactions, including bundling negative news with more
positive information (Elsbach, Sutton, & Principe, 1998; Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011;
Graffin, Haleblian, & Kiley, 2016). Still others have focused on stage models that feature an
organization’s response strategy as a central element for reintegration (cf. Bertels, Cody, &
Pek, 2014; Brown, Buchholtz, & Dunn, 2016; Elsbach, 2012; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009;
Gillespie, Dietz, & Lockey, 2014; Pfarrer, DeCelles, et al., 2008; Poppo & Schepker, 2014;
Rhee & Kim, 2012).
Finally, it is important to recognize that crisis response strategies can involve functional
communication and actions, including information that helps stakeholders avoid harm, in
addition to more symbolic management efforts that attempt to manage the organization’s
public image (cf. Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Coombs, 2015; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Despite
this recognition, however, we see little research that has considered an organization’s behav-
ioral response in combination with its verbal response (James & Wooten, 2006; Ulmer,
2001). Instead, the vast majority of researchers, particularly those using quantitative empiri-
cal designs, focus only on crisis communication or on organizational actions directed at
stakeholders. Additionally, we note that much of the research in this domain has not consid-
ered how stakeholders’ biases, heuristics, and emotions influence their perceptions and the
effectiveness of response strategies. This, however, is beginning to change. For example, Jin
and colleagues (Jin, 2010; Jin, Pang, & Cameron, 2012) showed that stakeholders respond
with different emotions that may influence the effectiveness of a response strategy (also see
Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2014; Coombs & Holladay, 2007; Sinaceur,
Heath, & Cole, 2005).
Crisis type. One of the critical factors influencing stakeholders’ perceptions is the type
of crisis being experienced (Coombs, 2007). As Bundy and Pfarrer (2015: 351) argued, indi-
viduals categorize crises into types as part of a “heuristic simplification process in which
evaluators intuitively combine past experiences and expectations to reduce the complex nature
of a crisis into easier-to-understand cognitive schemas.” Like with response strategies, this
recognition has given rise to numerous typologies that focus on the situational characteristics
of the crisis, including its perceived controllability, severity, undesirability, and intentionality
(e.g., Brown et al., 2016; Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; James & Wooten, 2006; Lange & Washburn,

14 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
2012; Mitroff, Pauchant, & Shrivastava, 1988; Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & Miglani, 1988).
For example, SCCT classifies crises into three categories based upon perceived crisis respon-
sibility: victim crises (weak crisis responsibility), accidental crises (moderate crisis respon-
sibility), and preventable crises (strong crisis responsibility). Empirical findings confirm that
stakeholders make these types of judgments (Coombs & Holladay, 2004).
Endowed positive evaluations. Another factor influencing how stakeholders react to
crises is an organization’s endowment of positive evaluations (e.g., reputation, legitimacy,
status, celebrity, social approval, and trust). Research has argued and shown that positive
evaluations can act as either a “buffer” to reduce negative perceptions or as a “burden” to
increase negative perceptions (cf. Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Hol-
laday, 2006; Dean, 2004; Decker, 2012; Jones, Jones, & Little, 2000; H. Kim & Yang, 2009;
McDonnell & King, 2013; Mishina et al., 2012; Pfarrer, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; Rhee
& Haunschild, 2006; Rhee & Valdez, 2009; Schnietz & Epstein, 2005; Zavyalova, Pfarrer,
Reger, & Hubbard, 2016: 255-256). In the case of a buffer, stakeholders’ affinity toward an
organization may cause hesitation in attributing responsibility or may dampen negative per-
ceptions. In the case of a burden, stakeholders’ heightened attention and expectations may
cause negative perceptions when those expectations are violated.
Empirical evidence on the buffer-versus-burden argument is equivocal. Some research
supports the argument that favorable social evaluations can buffer organizations from
negative perceptions. For example, Coombs and Holladay (2001, 2006) found a negative
correlation between stakeholders’ perceptions of crisis responsibility and an organiza-
tion’s endowed reputation, and Pfarrer and colleagues (2010) found that high-reputation
and celebrity organizations suffered fewer market penalties than other organizations fol-
lowing a material negative earnings surprise (also see Love & Kraatz, 2009; McDonnell
& King, 2013). However, other empirical research has found that reputation and other
social evaluations may act as a burden (Brooks, Highhouse, Russell, & Mohr, 2003; Dean,
2004; Graffin, Bundy, Porac, Wade, & Quinn, 2013; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Wade,
Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006). For example, Rhee and Haunschild (2006) found that
high-reputation automobile manufacturers were punished more than other organizations
following a product recall.
These conflicting findings can be explained in a number of ways. The most plausible expla-
nation is that the relationship is conditional, with different social evaluations acting as both a
burden and a buffer depending on certain factors, such as the magnitude or type of crisis
(Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Graffin et al., 2013; McDonnell & King, 2013), an organization’s
response strategy (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Dean, 2004), an organization’s crisis history
(Coombs, 2007; Pfarrer, DeCelles, et al., 2008), and heterogeneity among stakeholders (Lamin
& Zaheer, 2012; Mishina et al., 2012). For example, Rhee and Haunschild (2006) found that
reputation was a burden in the context of automobile recalls. However, their findings held only
with “severe” recalls “representing significant hazard” to consumers (Rhee & Haunschild,
2006: 106). Perhaps the severity of the crisis enhanced the likelihood that reputation would act
as a burden. In contrast, Pfarrer and colleagues (2010) found that reputation acted as a buffer
in the context of earnings surprises. In this case, perhaps reputation acted more as a buffer for
investors, who perceived the violation as less severe. In addition, neither study considered the
organization’s response strategy, which may have exerted an endogenous influence on the

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 15
findings (among other potential factors). Therefore, research that considers the multiple condi-
tions that influence stakeholders’ perceptions is needed.
Stakeholder identification. Stakeholders’ level of identification with an organization
has also been shown to influence their perceptions of a crisis (Zavyalova et al., 2016). For
example, stakeholders’ high identification with an organization can lead them to “circle the
wagons,” while low identification can lead stakeholders to point the finger at an afflicted
organization (Zavyalova et al., 2016: 271). However, the benefit of high identification has
been shown to reduce as a crisis intensifies (Zavyalova et al., 2016). Others have focused more
on processes related to identification. For example, Gutierrez, Howard-Grenville, and Scully
(2010) detailed a process of split identification in their study of the Catholic Church, which
allows stakeholders to remain normatively committed to an organization while simultane-
ously criticizing its practices and structures. Petriglieri (2015) identified a related process in
her study of the BP Gulf oil spill in which organizational members reassess their relationship
with a crisis organization in detailed pathways toward reidentification or disidentification.
Finally, Lange and Washburn (2012) considered how stakeholders’ identification with either
the affected parties or the implicated organization can influence attributions, and Withers and
colleagues (2012) examined identification in predicting how directors react to a crisis.
Powerful stakeholders and the media. Research has argued and shown that powerful and
active stakeholders play a role in influencing the perceptions of other stakeholders (Pfarrer,
DeCelles, et al., 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012). For example, stakeholders can use their posi-
tions to sway public opinion via boycotts and protests, and “social control agents,” such as
regulatory agencies, can influence other stakeholders’ crisis perceptions (Greve et al., 2010:
56; McDonnell & King, 2013; Yue et al., 2013). The media also play a central role in how cri-
ses are interpreted (Adut, 2005; Greve et al., 2010; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Rhee & Valdez,
2009; Wiersema & Zhang, 2013). For instance, Graffin and colleagues (2013) showed how
the media were important for the public in making sense of a scandal. Additionally, research
is beginning to consider the influence of social media on an organization’s crisis management
efforts (cf. Utz, Schultz, & Gloka, 2013; Veil, Buehner, & Palenchar, 2011).
Crisis spillover. Finally, several scholars have also focused on crisis spillovers, or when
an innocent organization is contaminated by a crisis due to shared characteristics, such
as industry membership (cf. Barnett & King, 2008; Greve et al., 2010; Haack, Pfarrer, &
Scherer, 2014; Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009; Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008). For
instance, Zavyalova and colleagues (2012) found that innocent organizations received more
negative press following toy recalls by competitors, and Barnett and King (2008) found that
chemical spills from one organization contaminated stakeholders’ perceptions of other indus-
try participants. Defensive and ceremonial actions can limit this spillover effect (Desai, 2011;
Zavyalova et al., 2012), as can the presence of strong governance and self-regulatory institu-
tions (Barnett & King, 2008; Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015). However, organizational similar-
ity can exacerbate this effect, including via director interlocks, shared organizational forms,
high association, and geographic overlaps (Desai, 2011; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2014; Kang,
2008; Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015; Yu et al., 2008). Research has also shown that stakehold-
ers’ crisis perceptions may be mitigated by the regularity of occurrence within an industry

16 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
or the broader environment. This dampening effect has been found with downsizing (Ahm-
adjian & Robinson, 2001; Love & Kraatz, 2009), options backdating (Wiersema & Zhang,
2013), product recalls (Zavyalova et al., 2012), and financial restatements (Scholz, 2008).
Summary. Several takeaways emerge from the literature on stakeholder perceptions dur-
ing the crisis management stage: First, stakeholders’ perceptions are largely predicated on their
attributions. Second, research has argued and shown that an organization’s response strategy
can influence stakeholders’ perceptions. Third, a number of additional factors influence crisis
perceptions (including the crisis type and endowed social evaluations, among others).
As with other segments of the literature, this area has been criticized because many of the
studies are either theoretical or case based, and those that are empirical typically consider
only one or a few of the factors discussed above. Therefore, our understanding of the “big
picture” remains incomplete. This research has also been questioned from a normative point
of view, such that (a) a focus on managing perceptions may distract from more functional
aspects of crisis management, like finding and correcting the underlying problems, and (b)
this focus may also encourage organizational defensiveness (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). We
consider both of these issues in our Future Research Development section below.
Synthesizing the Perspectives
The internal and external perspectives share commonalities in the way they approach
crisis management. For example, a key conclusion from both perspectives is that managers’
and stakeholders’ cognitive capabilities are reduced in a crisis. In addition, both perspectives
have emphasized the emotional reactions that accompany a crisis, which may induce pessi-
mism, defensiveness, feelings of trauma and betrayal, ignorance, and grief (Kahn et al., 2013;
Mitroff, 2007; Roux-Dufort, 2007; Vaaler & McNamara, 2004). Such reactions make crisis
management more difficult, exacerbating internal and external coordination efforts.
In sum, the internal and external perspectives focus on different factors that may influence
sensemaking during a crisis. A key difference between the perspectives, however, is that the
internal view focuses on managers’ sensemaking efforts to resolve the crisis, and the external
view focuses on stakeholders’ sensemaking and perceptions. Yet, like with the precrisis pre-
vention stage, we see only limited attempts at integration (cf. Frandsen & Johansen, 2011;
Johansen et al., 2012; Kahn et al., 2013; Mazzei et al., 2012; Mazzei & Ravazzani, 2015;
Petriglieri, 2015). Thus, a number of opportunities exist. For example, crisis response strate-
gies are likely more effective when paired with sincere internal efforts to remedy the prob-
lems that led to the crisis (Gillespie & Dietz, 2009; James & Wooten, 2006; Pfarrer, DeCelles,
et al., 2008; Rhee & Kim, 2012). Moreover, effective leadership of external stakeholders is
also likely to translate into effective leadership of internal audiences, and vice versa (cf. Bies,
2013). For instance, an organization that communicates compassion to crisis victims may
provide a source of motivation and pride to its employees (Seeger & Ulmer, 2002). We con-
sider these and additional opportunities in our Future Research Development section below.
Stage 3: Postcrisis Outcomes
Moving from the crisis management stage, we now consider postcrisis outcomes (see

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 17
Research from the internal perspective has focused primarily on organizational learning,
while the external perspective has focused primarily on social evaluations. As mentioned
above, it is important to recognize that the factors associated with the previous stages can
also influence crisis outcomes. As such, many of the manuscripts reviewed in Stages 1 and 2
are also applicable here.
Internal Perspective: Organizational Learning
As part of its focus on reliability and leadership, the internal perspective emphasizes orga-
nizational learning as a critical crisis outcome. For example, James and colleagues (2011)
highlighted the importance of moving beyond the status quo to generate new competitive
opportunities by learning from a crisis. Ulmer and colleagues’ (2011: xiii) discourse of renewal
theory also emphasizes the “potential for opportunity, renewal, and growth” as an outcome of
crisis management. Below we consider several elements of this literature.
The learning process. Lampel and colleagues (2009) described learning as a deliber-
ate and an emergent process that can focus both on the event itself and also on developing
organizational capabilities beyond the crisis event. However, learning from crises presents
a challenge. On the one hand, crises can trigger a focus on building new knowledge (cf.
Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2009). For example, Madsen and Desai (2010)
concluded that crises can increase motivation and probabilistic search for causes and solu-
tions, and Zahra and George (2002) argued that crises can increase individuals’ absorptive
capacity and ability to learn. Relatedly, Madsen (2009) showed that prior experience reduces
the likelihood of experiencing a crisis in the future.
On the other hand, because crises are unexpected and rare, they may lead to “erroneous
inferences” and resistance to learning (Lampel et al., 2009: 840). For example, a crisis may
induce a reliance on prior beliefs and cognitive rigidity, which may reduce innovative think-
ing and creativity (Amabile & Conti, 1999; Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980; D’Aveni
& MacMillan, 1990; Starbuck, 2009; Veil, 2011). Similarly, Shepherd (2003) discussed how
business failure, as a form of crisis, could prompt grief, which interferes with the ability to
learn from the event. Finally, Haunschild, Polidoro, and Chandler (2015) showed that crisis
learning may focus on certain aspects (such as safety) at the expense of others (such as inno-
vation), and that the effects of learning decline over time.
Conditions on the learning process. While research remains somewhat equivocal on the
ability of organizations to learn from a crisis (e.g., Lampel et al. 2009), there is evidence
that learning is highly conditional. For example, Madsen and Desai (2010) argued that the
magnitude of a crisis may serve as a source of motivation to increase learning. Using airline
accident data, Haunschild and Sullivan (2002) showed that crises with heterogeneous causes
led to better searches for causality and helped avoid simplistic attributions. Baum and Dah-
lin (2007) showed that performance farther from aspirations induced more learning after a
crisis, while performance near aspirations led to less. Rerup (2009) argued that attention-
focused organizational designs increased learning (also see Veil, 2011). Finally, others have
considered how public inquiries and discourse influence learning (cf. Elliott & Smith, 2006;
Gephart, 2007; Maguire & Hardy, 2013).

18 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
Research also suggests that learning is a multilevel phenomenon. For example, Wilson,
Goodman, and Cronin (2007) theorized about group dynamics in the learning process (also
see Brockner & James, 2008; Vera & Crossan, 2004). Similarly, Beck and Plowman (2009)
highlighted the role of middle managers in the learning process, and Kahn et al. (2013)
argued that learning is achieved only through effective multilevel relational management.
Vicarious learning. Finally, a number of scholars have focused on vicarious learning that
results from crises experienced by peer organizations. For example, J. Kim and Miner (2007)
showed that vicarious learning was more effective when peer organizations were in the same
geographic market. Similarly, Madsen (2009) showed that vicarious learning was possible
but that this type of learning depreciates with time, and Baum and Dahlin (2007) showed that
vicarious learning was a function of aspirations and social relationships. Given the similari-
ties between vicarious learning and industry spillovers, we see their interplay as an excellent
area for integration. For example, scholars could consider whether learning is facilitated in
cases of spillover, as organizations seek to help each other remedy core problems, or whether
learning is diminished, as organizations distance themselves from peer offenders to avoid a
negative association.
Summary. Postcrisis research from the internal perspective shows that learning from a
crisis is possible, subject to conditions that may influence the types of lessons learned and
the degree to which lessons are internalized. As a “relatively new” topic (Lampel et al., 2009:
835), there are a number of opportunities for future research. One opportunity could examine
the contingencies simultaneously, perhaps in a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
model (an idea to which we return in our Future Research Development section below).
Lampel and colleagues also suggested that research in this space is “confined almost entirely
to the task environment in which these organizations operate” (2009: 843). To get beyond
within-organization processes, they suggested that more research needs to embrace broader
group, industry, and institutional processes of learning.
External Perspective: Social Evaluations
Much of the research from the external perspective considers an organization’s social
evaluations as key outcomes of a crisis, including assessments of organizational reputation,
legitimacy, and trust. The general consensus is that crises hurt social evaluations (cf. Love &
Kraatz, 2009; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2012;
Zyglidopoulos, 2001). However, as we alluded to above, there is variance in the findings, and
a number of researchers have considered conditions that might influence the degree of dam-
age. Research in management and communication has particularly focused on the influence
of an organization’s crisis response strategy, which we consider next.
Crisis response strategies and social evaluations. Research has argued and shown that
stakeholders’ negative perceptions are minimized when an organization’s response strat-
egy matches stakeholders’ attributions of responsibility for the crisis (Bundy & Pfarrer,
2015; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2014; Coombs, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 2004). For
example, when stakeholders perceive high crisis responsibility, an organization is advised

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 19
negative reactions (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Coombs, 2007; Dardis & Haigh, 2009).
Research in management has also considered the influence of crisis response strategies on
specific social evaluations. For example, Pfarrer, DeCelles, and colleagues’ (2008) four-
stage process focused on how an organization restores its legitimacy and reintegrates with
stakeholders following a crisis, while Zavyalova and colleagues (2012) focused on the crisis
management strategies an organization used following a toy recall to mitigate losses to its
media reputation and social approval. Lamin and Zaheer (2012) found that the efficacy of
a response strategy depends on the audience, either Wall Street or Main Street. Similarly,
Mishina et al. (2012) argued that the effectiveness of a response strategy is contingent on the
nature of the reputation assessment, recognizing that organizations have different reputa-
tions with different stakeholders.
Research on stakeholders’ perceptions of trust also reveals some important contingencies
of response strategy effectiveness. For example, P. Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks (2004)
showed that more accommodative strategies were most effective for repairing trust after com-
petence-based violations, while more defensive strategies were most effective after integrity-
based violations (also see Brown et al., 2016; Gillespie et al., 2014; Gillespie & Dietz, 2009;
P. Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004; Tomlinson &
Mryer, 2009). Focusing on reputation, Mishina and his colleagues (2012) extended this logic
to the organizational level of analysis. Relatedly, research in public relations and communica-
tion has recognized that stakeholders’ emotional reactions to a crisis affect their cognitive
appraisals and shape their social evaluations of an organization (Coombs & Holladay, 2007;
Jin, 2010; Jin et al., 2012; Sinaceur et al., 2005). In particular, this research suggests that stake-
holders’ emotions are heightened when they perceive a crisis as more severe, which makes it
more difficult for the organization to repair it relationship with these stakeholders.
Summary. Two primary takeaways emerge from the research investigating social evalua-
tions as postcrisis outcomes: An organization’s response strategy can be critical for managing
social evaluations, and the more responsibility for a crisis that is attributed to the organiza-
tion, the more damage can be expected.
While interest in this area is growing, there remain a number of opportunities. For exam-
ple, even in the presence of a well-executed crisis response strategy, organizations are likely
to experience negative social evaluations (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). However, in rare
instances, a well-handled crisis can improve social perceptions (cf. Ulmer, 2001).
Unfortunately, research has yet to systematically identify how and under which conditions
social evaluations might improve after a crisis (cf. Ulmer et al., 2011). In other cases, a crisis
can lead to stigmatization, a perception that an organization possesses a fundamental, deep-
seated flaw (Devers, Dewitt, Mishina, & Belsito, 2009; Pozner, 2008). Again, however, it is
not clear under which conditions a crisis may be more or less stigmatizing. We recommend
that examining extreme positive or negative social evaluations may provide critical insight to
the literature.
Synthesizing the Perspectives
Like with the research on precrisis prevention and crisis management, we see little inte-
gration between the internal and external perspectives in the postcrisis outcomes literature.

20 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
social judgments—we see potential in looking at them in combination. For example, con-
sider an organization that willingly shares its lessons learned with other organizations. Such
an effort may foster goodwill and increased participation from external audiences, who are
likely to perceive this behavior as a genuine act of penance (cf. Gephart, 2007; Pfarrer,
DeCelles, et al., 2008).
Future research could also consider the role of learning when an organization successfully
limits damage to its social evaluations following a crisis. In this case, an organization may be
less motivated to learn from the crisis, thereby increasing the likelihood of crisis reoccur-
rence. Alternatively, research has suggested that crises can increase feelings of anger or
resentment among stakeholders (Mitroff, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2005). Such feelings
may cause stakeholders to be more obstructionist in their reactions to a crisis, focusing on
seeking justice and assigning blame as opposed to promoting opportunities for growth
(Bertels et al., 2014; Pfarrer, DeCelles, et al., 2008). Given that stakeholder participation is
crucial to the learning process (cf. Gephart, 2007), such a response is likely to hinder organi-
zational learning.
Additionally, the investigation of crises’ more tangible outcomes may provide an excel-
lent opportunity for integration of the internal and external perspectives in the postcrisis
stage. For example, much of the research on board and managerial turnover is externally
oriented and considers how the removal of leaders is an act of organizational penance that
resonates with stakeholders (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Connelly,
Ketchen, Gangloff, & Shook, 2016; Cowen & Marcel, 2011; Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook,
2016; Gomulya & Boeker, 2014; Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Pozner, 2008; Wiersema & Zhang,
2013; Withers et al., 2012). Incorporating an internal perspective, it would be valuable to
consider the influence of board and managerial turnover on both organizational learning and
social evaluations. For example, while turnover may improve reputation, learning may suf-
fer, given the loss of key sources of knowledge and insight.
Finally, crisis management research continues to focus on financial and social perfor-
mance as well as organizational survival as critical tangible outcomes (Diestre &
Rajagopalan, 2014; Dowell et al., 2011; Lamin & Zaheer, 2012; F. Lee, Peterson, & Tiedens,
2004; Madsen, 2013; Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015; Pfarrer et al., 2010; Zyglidopoulos,
2001). Even when the performance implications of a crisis are not directly studied, they are
often considered via other outcomes of interest that influence performance, including orga-
nizational learning and social evaluations. Despite this recognition, we believe a model that
simultaneously considers the influence of a crisis on learning, social evaluations, and per-
formance would be valuable.
Future Research Development
As our review has explicated, crises have substantive implications for organizations and
stakeholders. However, fragmentation persists in the literature, and our review revealed that
researchers continue to focus on disparate perspectives with limited attempts to build more
integrated and generalizable scholarship. To address these issues, we developed a compre-
hensive framework of the crisis process (Figure 1), provided detailed tables of the literature
associated with each perspective (Table 1 and Tables 1a through 3b available online), offered
a summary and synthesis of the internal and external research in each stage of the crisis pro-

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 21
Over the course of our review, we also recognized that several main categories emerged
as key areas of opportunity for future research. First, future scholars can focus on integra-
tive opportunities, not only by integrating the internal and external perspectives but also by
considering how macro-organizational, micro-organizational, and other disciplinary
research (including research from public relations and communication) can be integrated.
Second, our framework can serve as a foundation for future scholars to conduct more mul-
tilevel research on crises and crisis management, focusing on how individual-, organiza-
tional-, and environmental-level factors interact to influence the crisis and crisis
management process. Third, our review revealed a number of contingent factors that influ-
ence the processes associated with crises and crisis management. Despite empirical chal-
lenges that have led researchers to examine these factors mostly in isolation, we believe
that future research should consider more complex theoretical and empirical models in
which multiple factors are considered together.
Integrative Opportunities
Our review indicates that research on crises and crisis management continues to exist in
silos, focusing on either an internal or an external perspective. Therefore, as noted through-
out our review, a number of opportunities remain for future research to integrate these per-
spectives. We identified several potential research questions, including the following: How
does organizing for reliability influence an organization’s external relationships? Can exter-
nal crisis response strategies improve internal leadership efforts, and vice versa? Does
increasing the transparency of an organization’s learning efforts help with defending an orga-
nization’s reputation? How does turnover simultaneously influence the ability to learn and
improve reputational assets?
Another integrative opportunity for future research involves recognizing that crisis man-
agement “best practices” may be invisible to scholars who focus only on crisis failures,
regardless of which perspective they employ (Bierly & Spender, 1995; Pearson & Clair,
1998). Researchers could advance crisis management scholarship by studying organizations
that have proactively averted crises, perhaps by focusing on perspectives that emphasize both
organizational resilience and stakeholder management. Research should also consider empir-
ical opportunities beyond case study designs. For example, an empirical approach could use
propensity score matching techniques (Guo & Fraser, 2010) to longitudinally compare orga-
nizations that experienced a crisis with similar organizations that did not. Significant differ-
ences between the two groups—in terms of predicting the likelihood of crisis—could shed
light on the organizational and relational characteristics that help prevent crises while also
being sensitive to endogeneity issues.
Additionally, research can build on elements of organizational learning and renewal to
consider the factors that may make a crisis a positive phenomenon. As Pearson and col-
leagues (2007: vii) noted, “over time, many organizations have learned that optimally man-
aged crises can bring positive recognition and enhanced stakeholder value, while poorly
managed crises can short-circuit organizational viability.” Examples include Malden Mills’
handling of an industrial fire (Ulmer, 2001) and Johnson & Johnson’s handling of Tylenol
product tampering (Snyder & Foster, 1983). However, it is not yet clear how different tech-
nical, structural, relational, and cognitive factors align to create such opportunities (see

22 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
circumstances, or is there something more systematic going on? What can we learn about
these outcomes by broadly considering the different internal and external elements at play?
Integrative crisis management research also has the opportunity to consider additional
theoretical frames. For example, to our knowledge, crisis management research has yet to
systematically explore the real-time discourse and information exchange that occurs between
an organization and its stakeholders as they make sense of a crisis. A discursive lens (e.g.,
Phillips & Oswick, 2012), combined with advanced content analysis techniques (Duriau,
Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007)—including quantitative narrative analysis (Franzosi, 2010) or statis-
tical natural language processing (Manning & Schutze, 1999)—could shed light on these
exchanges. For example, research on crisis response strategies has examined how stakehold-
ers are influenced by organizational responses but has not robustly considered how stake-
holders influence organizations’ response choices. Similarly, research has not robustly
considered the influence of switching response strategies or organizational attempts to deliver
multiple strategies to distinct audiences at different points in time (cf. Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015;
Massey, 2001). Alternatively, research could look at social networks (Scott, 2012) and how
existing organization–stakeholder relationships influence crisis interpretations and reactions
(Desai, 2014; Zavyalova et al., 2012).
A number of related theoretical frames also remain largely untapped in the crisis and crisis
management literature. For example, few scholars have considered the role of resource
dependence in crisis situations. Resource and power differentials may constrain the way in
which stakeholders or partners respond to a crisis. Research on strategic actions and pro-
cesses may also inform research on crisis management. For example, a number of strategic
management concepts are often framed using language that evokes a crisis (including corpo-
rate turnarounds, succession events, and mergers and acquisitions). How do the strategies
used to manage such events differ from the strategies used to prepare for, manage, and learn
from a crisis (cf. Connelly et al., 2016; Graffin et al., 2011)? Others might consider the role
of dynamic capabilities in crisis situations (Teece, 2007), particularly given the literature’s
focus on “organizational learning, adaptation, and performance” (Hodgkinson & Healey,
2011: 1501). For example, how do organizational decision-making processes, routines, and
other “best practices” influence crisis management effectiveness?
Finally, we encourage more integrative research that considers the normative and ethical
implications of crises and crisis management (cf. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013). Crises raise a num-
ber of issues related to responsibility, fairness, trust, and justice. Organizational research gener-
ally takes an instrumental approach to crisis management, focusing on efficiency and
effectiveness as opposed to moral and normative obligations. Indeed, it seems only a handful of
authors have built theory around normative obligations (cf. Koehn, 2013; Ulmer et al., 2011).
Therefore, future research should consider both instrumental and normative perspectives to
better understand crises and the crisis management process. The potential for conflict is clear,
particularly when considering that efficiency concerns may diverge from moral and normative
guidelines (cf. Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). Future research can investigate how such conflicts
occur and how managers work to resolve them while being sensitive to different stakeholders.
Multilevel Opportunities
Multilevel theorizing and related empirical studies also remain a fruitful area for future

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 23
either the internal or the external perspective, we also find fragmentation in terms of levels
of analysis. Many scholars focus on individual, organizational, or environmental effects but
not on how these effects may interact. This is despite the fact that research from both the
internal and external perspectives generally position both crises and crisis management as
collective phenomena (cf. Morgeson & Hoffmann, 1999; Morgeson, Mitchell, & Liu, 2015).
As such, we encourage future research to consider the interactions among individuals,
groups, organizations, and institutions that influence crises and crisis management. For
example, future research could examine how employees and middle managers respond to
upper management’s use of crisis response strategies. It is possible that an organization’s
official response contradicts what individual employees perceive. Such inconsistencies
between public response strategies and private knowledge may lead to employee withdrawal
or counterproductive behaviors. In contrast, managers that respond with compassion may
encourage more empathy and enthusiasm from internal stakeholders (cf. Goodstein,
Butterfield, & Neale, 2016; Muller, Pfarrer, & Little, 2014). As mentioned above, this may
also encourage better and more effective learning and perhaps improve an organization’s
ability to organize for reliability.
Additionally, for many stakeholders, crises and crisis management may represent more of
an individual-level experience. For example, how a procurement manager responds to a crisis
might be more influential to his or her clients than how an organization responds in the media.
In this case, an individual manager’s efforts to maintain relationships may directly influence
an organization’s performance and reputation following a crisis. Similarly, an additional
opportunity for multilevel theorizing is the influence of social media on the crisis management
process (Utz et al., 2013). For instance, it would be interesting to consider how different com-
munications—from the organization itself, from those within the organization, and from vari-
ous stakeholders—interact to influence crisis perceptions (cf. Jacques et al., 2007).
A final multilevel opportunity is to consider the dynamic nature of crisis management
within and across organizations, stakeholders, and levels of analysis. For example, research-
ers could employ latent growth modeling techniques (Duncan, Duncan, & Strycker, 2013) to
examine temporal changes in how organizations and stakeholders respond to crises over
time. Future work could use similar techniques to examine cross-level differences in crisis
perceptions to isolate the influence of individual managers on crisis response strategies and
organizations on field and industry-level outcomes.
Opportunities to Study Contingent Effects
In their review of the crisis and crisis management literature, Pearson and Clair noted,
“The crisis management literature, although replete with speculation and prescription, has
undergone scant empirical testing” (1998: 73). Unfortunately, this trend has largely contin-
ued. While we do see the presence of more rigorous inductive empirical work, we found only
a limited amount of large-scale empirical tests of the many theoretical prescriptions found in
the literature. This may simply be a function of the phenomena in question. For example,
Pearson and Clair also noted that “organizational crises are, by definition, infrequent events.
When they do occur, organizations are reluctant to open current or past ‘wounds’ to external
examination and speculation” (1998: 74). Additionally, many of the factors related to crises
and crisis management are difficult to empirically capture (e.g., reliable organizations and

24 Journal of Management / Month XXXX
Despite the empirical difficulties, we note that many of the factors that are influential in
the study of crises and crisis management have yet to be tested simultaneously in large-scale
and longitudinal empirical settings (cf. Goodstein, Butterfield, Pfarrer, & Wicks, 2014).
While recent research has endeavored to include more factors (e.g., Lamin & Zaheer, 2012;
Zavyalova et al., 2012, 2016), the empirical examination of multiple factors remains elusive.
We believe that this elusiveness makes such an examination an excellent opportunity for
future scholars.
In particular, we suggest that a configurational approach offers an excellent opportunity
for future research to empirically consider the influence of these multiple factors (cf. Fiss,
2007; Greckhamer, Misangyi, Elms, & Lacey, 2008). Rather than asking if a certain factor
influences crisis outcomes—as in traditional approaches—a configurational approach asks
how different factors combine to influence crisis outcomes. For example, future research
could use qualitative comparative analysis (cf. Fiss, 2007; Greckhamer et al., 2008) to con-
sider how the crisis type combines with an organization’s endowed reputation, crisis history,
response strategy, and other elements to influence organizational outcomes. Another oppor-
tunity is to consider how multiple factors combine to influence the likelihood of a crisis
occurring, given that many of the studies in this space focus on the influence of a single fac-
tor. For example, a culture of misconduct based on managerial aspirations may be mitigated
by appropriate governance structures.
Using this same approach, future research could also consider the conditional interdepen-
dencies that may exist between crisis stages. For example, scholars could simultaneously
examine the different factors that influence crisis learning, including the cause of the crisis,
its magnitude, the influence of vicarious learning, and the roles of leaders and other organi-
zational members. Alternatively, research has yet to empirically consider an organization’s
crisis response strategies as dependent variables (for theoretical treatments see Bundy &
Pfarrer, 2015; Joshi & McKendall, 2016). As of yet, we do not fully understand why manag-
ers choose to be more defensive or accommodative. We believe that a configurational
approach offers an opportunity to consider the factors that influence this decision.
Finally, research may also be able to use a configurational approach to consider multilevel
factors. For example, research has shown that individual managerial characteristics—such as
hubris and narcissism—may encourage risk taking that can lead to a crisis (Chatterjee &
Hambrick, 2007; Hiller & Hambrick, 2005), and other scholars have shown that narrow-
minded or reactive managers increase the likelihood of crisis (Sheaffer & Mano-Negrin,
2003). Considering these individual factors simultaneously with different organizational fac-
tors on a range of crisis outcomes (including learning, reputation, and performance) may
reveal important sets of conditions that are critical to the processes associated with crises and
crisis management.
Conclusion
Despite its implications for organizations and stakeholders, research on crises and crisis
management remains fragmented. We have integrated research from multiple perspectives to
bring coherence to this literature, and we have developed a holistic framework to better
understand the crisis process. We have offered a number of future research directions and a
comprehensive research agenda for scholars interested in crises and crisis management.

Bundy et al. / Review of Crises and Crisis Management 25
Note
1. As noted above, we recognize that the term “crisis management” broadly captures managers’ behaviors in all
stages of a crisis. However, and consistent with its colloquial use, for the remainder of the paper we use the term to
reference the actions taken in the immediate aftermath of a crisis.
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1
Table 1a: Literature on Pre-Crisis Prevention – Internal Perspective: Organizational Preparedness
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concept(s) Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Weick et al., 1999 THEORY Various examples Organizing for
reliability
Developed a cognitive process of mindful organizing for high reliability. Crisis Leadership;
Organizational Learning
Bigley & Roberts, 2001 QUAL Emergency services Organizing for
reliability
Certain organizational structures, forms, and processes promote reliability. High
reliability organizations are characterized by mindfulness in their organizing.
Crisis Leadership
Rudolph & Repenning,
2002
QUAL &
QUANT
Tenerife air disaster
& USS Vincennes
Organizing for
reliability
An over-accumulation of interruptions (crisis or crisis-like events) can shift an org.
system from resiliency to fragility.
Crisis Leadership
Vogus & Welbourne, 2003 QUANT Software IPOs Organizing for
reliability
Applied tenants of high reliability organizations to "reliability-seeking"
organizations, with a focus on innovation.
Gittell et al., 2006 QUANT Airlines post-9/11 Organizing for
reliability
Airlines who made layoffs post 9/11 experienced slower financial recover. Layoffs
resulted from a lack of financial and relational reserves pre-crisis.
Crisis Leadership;
Stakeholder Relationships
Madsen et al., 2006 QUAL Pediatric ICU Organizing for
reliability
Designing processes for reliability can be difficult, especially if they differ from
institutionalized models. Ongoing maintenance is necessary.
Crisis Leadership
Roberts et al., 2007 QUAL Emergency services Organizing for
reliability
Described the sensemaking practices used to prevent crises, including early model
adoption, model migration and resetting, and having a "bubble."
Crisis Leadership
Roux-Dufort, 2007 THEORY Various examples Organizing for
reliability
Conceptualized crisis as a process and focused on a "psychodynamic perspective"
of managerial ignorance and cognitive limitations.
Crisis Leadership
Leveson et al., 2009 THEORY Various examples Organizing for
reliability
Introduced a systems approach for understanding high reliability organizations and
normal accidents theory.
Crisis Leadership;
Organizational Learning
Bechky & Okhuysen, 2011 QUAL SWAT team & film
production crews
Organizing for
reliability
Individuals within organizations that regularly deal with surprises engage in
constant organizational bricolage.
Crisis Leadership
Marcus & Nichols, 1999 QUAL Nuclear power Org. culture &
structure
Orgs. can drift toward disaster if they fail to maintain adequate resources and
knowledge dedicated to disaster avoidance.
Crisis Leadership;
Organizational Learning
Ashforth & Anand, 2003 THEORY Various examples Org. culture &
structure
Identified three pillars that normalize corruption within organizations
(institutionalization, rationalization, socialization).
Schnatterly, 2003 QUANT White collar crime Org. culture &
structure
Traditional measures of governance had little impact on the likelihood of white
collar crime. Operational governance practices reduced the likelihood.
O'Connor et al., 2006 QUANT Financial
restatements
Org. culture &
structure
CEO stock options reduced the likelihood of financial fraud, unless accompanied
by CEO duality or board stock options, in which case fraud increases.
Harris & Bromiley, 2007 QUANT Financial
restatements
Org. culture &
structure
CEO stock options increased accounting misrepresentation, and low levels of
social relative performance enhanced the effect.
Zhang et al., 2008 QUANT Financial
restatements
Org. culture &
structure
Out-of-the-money stock options increased restatements, stock ownership decreases
restatements. Organizational performance and tenure enhanced these relationships.
Greve et al., 2010 THEORY Various examples Org. culture &
structure
Reviewed organizational misconduct specifically highlighting the role of org.
culture and "strain theory" among other concepts.
Stakeholder Relationships;
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Social Evaluations
Wowak et al., 2015 QUANT Product recalls Org. culture &
structure
Stock options promoted risk taking and increased the rate of product safety
problems. CEO characteristics moderated this effect.

2
Table 1b: Literature on Pre-Crisis Prevention – External Perspective: Stakeholder Relationships
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concept(s) Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Ulmer, 2001 QUAL Malden Mills
industrial fire
Positive
stakeholder
relationships
Establishing strong communication channels and positive relations with
stakeholders can help prevent a crisis or facilitate crisis management.
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Social Evaluations; Crisis
Leadership
Clair & Waddock, 2007 THEORY Various examples Positive
stakeholder
relationships
Developed a "total" responsibility management approach to crisis prevention and
management, focusing on recognizing responsibilities to stakeholders.
Crisis Leadership
Jacques et al., 2007 QUAL Simulated chemical
spill
Positive
stakeholder
relationships
Developed a multilevel understanding of the cognitive processes involved in the
evolution of a crisis, specifically focusing on communication and language.
Crisis Leadership
Alpaslan et al., 2009 THEORY Various examples Positive
stakeholder
relationships
Developed a stakeholder theory of crisis management stressing the intrinsic value
of all stakeholders, and proposed that stakeholders can aid with crisis prevention
and management.
Crisis Leadership;
Stakeholder Perceptions
Kim et al., 2012 QUANT Financial
restatements
Positive
stakeholder
relationships
Organizations high in CSR were less likely to pursue aggressive earnings
management strategies and less likely to be investigated by the SEC.
Lind et al., 2000 QUANT Wrongful
termination lawsuits
Negative
stakeholder
relationships
Effective human resources practices can help prevent wrongful-termination claims
(employees were motivated to sue by perceived unfair treatment).
James & Wooten, 2006 QUAL Discrimination and
harassment lawsuits
Negative
stakeholder
relationships
Organizations adopted similar, rigid responses to discrimination lawsuits. The
presence of external and mobilized constituencies leaded to more sweeping
changes.
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Crisis Leadership
Lehman & Ramanujam,
2009
THEORY Various examples Negative
stakeholder
relationships
Considered selectivity in rule violations, highlighting managerial attention,
perceptions of risk, contextual characteristics, and rule characteristics.
Mishina et al., 2010 QUANT Corporate illegality Negative
stakeholder
relationships
Performance above social aspirations increased the likelihood of corporate
illegality and performance below social aspirations decreased the likelihood of
corporate illegality. These relationships are particularly true for prominent
organizations.
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Social Evaluations
McDonnell & King, 2013 QUANT Boycotts Negative
stakeholder
relationships
Organizations used expressions of their commitment to socially acceptable norms
(prosocial claims) in response to boycotts. Reputation and threat magnitude
influenced this effect.
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Social Evaluations

3
Table 2a: Literature on Crisis Management – Internal Perspective: Crisis Leadership
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concept(s) Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Pillai & Meindl, 1998 QUANT Healthcare Crisis leadership A greater sense of crisis and stress among followers is associated with reduced
perceptions of leader charisma.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Sayegh et al., 2004 THEORY Various examples Crisis leadership Developed a model of managerial decision-making under crisis highlighting the
role of emotions and intuitive decision processes.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Vaaler & McNamara, 2004 QUANT Credit rating
agencies
Crisis leadership Even experts made biased decisions in crises, influenced by feelings of pessimism,
and particularly under conditions of social pressure and rivalry.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Howell & Shamir, 2005 THEORY Various examples Crisis leadership Proposed that different follower qualities will influence responses to crises and
attitudes towards leaders.
Stakeholder Perceptions
James & Wooten, 2005 THEORY Various examples Crisis leadership Identified six competencies for crisis leadership, including building a foundation
of trust and displaying courage.
Organizational Preparedness;
Organizational Learning;
Social Evaluations
Maitlis, 2005 QUANT Orchestras Crisis leadership Developed a model of sensemaking and sensegiving in a variety of organizational
situations, including crisis. Argued that certain factors, crisis-induced pressures,
may fragment or restrict sensemaking efforts.
Stakeholder Evaluations
Dane & Pratt, 2007 THEORY Various examples Crisis leadership Developed a theory of intuitive decision making. Suggested that, within a crisis,
decision making (and learning) is enhanced when attention is focused on the entire
event (as opposed to deciphering more minute causes and effects).
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Organizational Learning
Majchrzak et al., 2007 THEORY Various examples Crisis leadership Developed a model for organizing emergent, impromptu groups in response to
crises and disasters. Focuses on sensemaking processes and group structure.
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Organizational Preparedness;
Organizational Learning;
Mitroff, 2007 THEORY Product tampering at
Rural Books; other
various examples
Crisis leadership Considered the psychological effects of crises, focusing on feelings of denial,
trauma, and betrayal. Suggested that individual defense mechanisms can inhibit
crisis management efforts, both internally and externally.
Organizational Preparedness;
Stakeholder Perceptions
Brockner & James, 2008 THEORY Various examples Crisis Leadership Provided an organizing framework for when executives may view crises as
opportunities versus threats, and considered the benefits and consequences of each.
Organizational Preparedness;
Organizational Learning;
Social Evaluations
James et al., 2011 THEORY Various examples Crisis leadership Reviewed research on crisis leadership and detailed the role crisis handlers play in
the multiple stages of a crisis. Positioned crises as "deviant" events and considered
the role of leader framing (crisis as threat versus opportunity).
Organizational Preparedness;
Organizational Learning;
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Social Evaluations
Kahn et al., 2013 THEORY Various examples Crisis leadership Introduced a relational perspective on crises, focusing on the repair and
transformation of internal relational systems. Suggested the theory is also
applicable to other stakeholders.
Stakeholder Relationships;
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Organizational Learning
(continued)

4
Table 2a (continued)
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concept(s) Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Lin et al., 2006 QUANT Various examples Conditions on
crisis leadership
Demonstrated the benefit of adopting an organizational design approach to
preventing and managing crises.
Organizational Preparedness
Lee & Makhija, 2009 QUANT Economic crises Conditions on
crisis leadership
When significant economic crises occur, international investments can provide
organizations with flexibility to adapt to new environmental conditions.
Dowell et al., 2011 QUANT Financial distress Conditions on
crisis leadership
Corporate governance can impact survivability following crises. As financial
distress increases, organizations benefited from having higher proportions of
independent directors.
Frandsen & Johansen, 2011 THEORY Various examples Conditions on
crisis leadership
Developed an integrative framework for internal crisis communication drawing
from research focused on external crisis management strategies.
Organizational Preparedness;
Organizational Learning;
Stakeholder Perceptions
Mazzei et al., 2012 QUAL Industrial accident Conditions on
crisis leadership
Positive communication activities and quality relationships can lead to improved
employee communication behaviors during crisis.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Johansen et al., 2012 QUANT Various crisis types
(survey)
Conditions on
crisis leadership
Organizational characteristics, such as size, impact which internal crisis
communication tactics are pursued and understood. Face-to-face communication is
considered a very important management tactic.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Withers et al., 2012 THEORY Various examples Conditions on
crisis leadership
Highlighted the role of directors in crises and the factors that might influence
director turnover, including director identity.
Social Perceptions; Social
Evaluations; Organizational
Learning
Mazzei & Ravazzani, 2015 QUANT Global financial
crisis
Conditions on
crisis leadership
Surveyed companies' internal crisis communication strategies and found that most
under-utilize specific strategies but others effectively motivate positive behaviors.
Stakeholder Perceptions

5
Table 2b: Literature on Crisis Management – External Perspective: Stakeholder Perceptions
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concept(s) Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Elsbach et al., 1998 QUAL Hospital billing Crisis response
strategy
Developed a grounded theory of anticipatory impression management used by
organizations to distract attention and reduce challenges to negative practices.
Social Evaluations
Elsbach, 2003 THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy
Reviewed research on perception management. Highlighted importance of org
perceptions, symbolic actions/tactics, organizational spokespersons, and org.
audiences (internal/external).
Stakeholder Relationships;
Social Evaluations
Coombs & Holladay, 2004 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Crisis response
strategy; Endowed
evaluations; crisis
type
Reported results from a series of experiments that show: 1) stakeholders
categorize crises into types based on attributions of responsibility; 2) crisis history
increases attributions; 3) a matched response strategy reduces negative reactions.
Social Evaluations
Dean, 2004 QUANT Product harm crises
resulting in death
Crisis response
strategy; Endowed
evaluations
Crisis response strategies are deemed more appropriate when matched with
attributions of responsibility. Appropriate responses to crises are more important
for well-regarded organizations, suggesting a burden of reputation.
Social Evaluations
Coombs, 2006 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Crisis response
strategy
Crisis response strategies cluster into "deny," "diminish," and "deal" categories,
based on how they treat crisis responsibility.
Coombs, 2007 THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy; crisis
type
Detailed SCCT theory, including the role of crisis response strategies, crisis
attributions, and reputation as an outcome
Social Evaluations
Pfarrer et al., 2008a THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy; Powerful
stakeholders/media
Built a stage model for reintegration following corruption. Highlighted the need to
discover and explain the facts, while serving penance and engaging in
rehabilitation.
Social Evaluations;
Stakeholder Relationships
Gillespie & Dietz, 2009 THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy
Developed a multilevel framework for trust repair at the organization level.
Highlighted several stages including immediate response, diagnosis, efforts to
reform, and evaluation.
Crisis Leadership;
Organizational Learning;
Social Evaluations
Kim & Yang, 2009 QUANT Racial
discrimination
(experiment)
Crisis response
strategy; Endowed
evaluations
Found that attributions of crisis responsibility were negatively related to corporate
reputation, and that stakeholders' emotional reactions lead to greater damage to
reputation.
Social Evaluations
Graffin et al., 2011 QUANT CEO succession Crisis response
strategy
Organizations released additional "noise" at the time of CEO successions,
particularly when successors do not have prior experience or comes from a less
well-regarded organization.
Veil et al., 2011 THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy
Reviewed the nascent literature on social media in crisis situations and offered a
set of best practices for crisis communication.
Stakeholder Relationships;
Social Evaluations
Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Crisis response
strategy
Being the first to release information reduced the need for a crisis response
strategy. Releasing information later requires more effort.
Social Evaluations
Elsbach, 2012 QUANT Apple iPhone 4
issues
Crisis response
strategy
Considered organizational responses over the life of a controversy (multiple
related events over time), paying specific attention to the timing, valence, and
sequence of events and responses.
Social Evaluations
Fediuk et al., 2012 THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy
Built a model of crisis from the receiver perspective, focusing on stakeholders'
affective responses including moral outrage.
Social Evaluations
Lamin & Zaheer, 2012 QUANT Sweatshop labor Crisis response
strategy
The general public and investors evaluated organizations’ crisis response
strategies in different ways.
Social Evaluations
(continued)

6
Table 2b (continued)
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concept(s) Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Rhee & Kim, 2012 THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy
Detailed a behavioral theory of reputation repair that considers both substantive
and superficial solutions and the conditional effects of org., stakeholder, and crisis
characteristics.
Social Evaluations
Zavyalova et al., 2012 QUANT Toy recalls Crisis response
strategy; Crisis
spillover; Powerful
stakeholders/media
Provided an analysis of media responses to industry and organization-specific
wrongdoing; offered best practices for when organizations should perform
ceremonial versus technical actions as crisis management tactics.
Social Evaluations
Utz et al., 2013 QUANT Disaster scenario
(experiment)
Crisis response
strategy
Crisis communication through social media can protect reputation better than via
newspaper, but it can also lead to a stronger emotional response for some types of
crises.
Social Evaluations
Bertels et al., 2014 QUAL Suncor environment
violations
Crisis response
strategy
Considered the influence of institutional intervention and creative sentencing in
the process of reintegration and rehabilitation following misconduct.
Organizational Learning;
Social Evaluations
Gillespie et al., 2014 QUAL Severn Trent fraud
and data
manipulation
Crisis response
strategy
Longitudinal case study of utility fraud to examine themes of reintegration.
Confirmed several themes presented in prior models, and added three additional
themes, including a focus on identity, turnover, and cultural reforms.
Organizational Learning;
Social Evaluations
Poppo & Schepker, 2014 THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy
Considered trust repair in response to competence and integrity violations.
Focused on institutional reforms, the role of controllability, and public
communication.
Social Evaluations
van der Meer &
Verhoeven, 2014
QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Crisis response
strategy
Considered the influence of emotion within an organization's crisis response
strategy. Showed that the presence of emotions (shame and regret) combines with
formal response strategy (in terms of responsibility) to influence reputation.
Social Evaluations
Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015 THEORY Various examples Crisis response
strategy; Endowed
evaluations
Argued that org's with high levels of social approval may be held less responsible
for crises (a buffering effect), but that a mismatched response strategy will be
more damaging (a burdening effect).
Social Evaluations
Graffin et al., 2016 QUANT M&A
announcements
Crisis response
strategy
Showed that org. leaders offset potentially negative expectancy violations by
releasing positive information ahead of events.
Social Evaluations
Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001 QUAL Various crises in
U.S. chemical
industry
Crisis type;
Powerful
stakeholders/media
Non-routine events are attention grabbing, and event salience determines whether
they will be attended to. Crisis management tactics are influenced by how orgs.
and their leaders impose schemas and causal maps onto situations.
Crisis Leadership
Coombs & Holladay, 2002 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Crisis type Stakeholders classified crises into types based on perceived organization
responsibility. Negative perceptions increased as attributions of responsibility
increase.
Social Evaluations
Lange & Washburn, 2012 THEORY Various examples Crisis type;
Stakeholder
identification
Presented a model conceptualizing how corporate social irresponsibility
attributions occur for individual observers of organizations. Focused on effect
undesirability, corporate culpability, and affected party noncomplicity.
Stakeholder Relationships;
Social Evaluations
Brown et al., 2016 THEORY Deepwater Horizon
oil spill & Subway
“footlong” scandal
Crisis type; Crisis
response strategy
Argued that increasing moral salience of a negative event requires increasing trust
repair in the form of goodwill. Prior levels of goodwill can reduce crisis-induced
damage.
Jones et al., 2000 QUANT Stock market crashes Endowed
evaluations
Good corporate reputations can buffer companies from market decline in times of
economic turmoil, except in panic situations.
Social Evaluations
(continued)

7
Table 2b (continued)
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concept(s) Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Coombs & Holladay, 2001 QUANT Accident crisis
(experimental)
Endowed
evaluations
Prior negative relationships and a history of crises increased perceptions of crisis
responsibility. Reputation negatively correlated with crisis responsibility.
Stakeholder Relationships;
Social Evaluations
Brooks et al., 2003 QUANT Series of
experiments using
Fortune 500
organizations
Endowed
evaluations
Familiarity can breed admiration and contempt depending on the context
surrounding the organization.
Social Evaluations
Adut, 2005 THEORY Oscar Wilde scandal Endowed
evaluations;
Powerful
stakeholders/media
Developed theory for how scandals influences observers and predicted how
scandals may arise within various social systems. Highlighted the role of the
media.
Social Evaluations
Schnietz & Epstein, 2005 QUAL 1999 Seattle WTO
failure
Endowed
evaluations
Reputations for social responsibility provided tangible financial benefits for
organizations during the 1999 Seattle WTO ministerial meeting failure.
Social Evaluations
Coombs & Holladay, 2006 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Endowed
evaluations
Prior reputation acted as a buffer in crisis, shielding organizations from certain
negative outcomes. The buffer was limited for organizations with highly favorable
prior reputations.
Social Evaluations
Rhee & Haunschild, 2006 QUANT Automobile recalls Endowed
evaluations
Organizational reputation negatively impacted the market response following
disclosure of recalls. Only holds for "severe" recalls.
Social Evaluations
Wade et al., 2006 QUANT Financial World
CEO of the year
awards
Endowed
evaluations
Award winning CEOs received high pay when performance is high, but lower pay
when performance is low. Suggests a burden of celebrity in negative
circumstances.
Social Evaluations
Love & Kraatz 2009 QUANT Organizational
downsizing
Endowed
evaluations; Crisis
spillover
Downsizing negatively influenced year-to-year reputation change. Prior reputation
mitigated this effect, as did the prevalence of downsizing.
Social Evaluations
Rhee & Valdez, 2009 THEORY Various examples Endowed
evaluations;
Powerful
stakeholders/media
Built a model considering an organization’s perceived capability to cope with a
negative event. Argued that endowed reputation increased capability perceptions,
except when the event was directly related to the specific dimensions of reputation.
Also suggested that organizational age and media coverage make repair more
difficult.
Social Evaluations
Pfarrer et al., 2010 QUANT Earnings surprises Endowed
evaluations
High reputation organizations are protected from negative material earnings
surprises, but are also less likely to generate positive material earnings surprises.
Social Evaluations
Decker, 2012 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Endowed
evaluations; crisis
response strategy
Negative publicity following crises is less harmful to organizations with high
reputations (in terms of perceived trustworthiness and expertise). Also showed that
silence reflects guilt.
Social Evaluations
Mishina et al., 2012 THEORY Various examples Endowed
evaluations
Argued that organizational reputation is composed of assessments of capability
and character. Also argued that prior assessments impact how individuals perceive
and react to negative information.
Social Evaluations
Graffin et al., 2013 QUANT 2009 British
Parliamentary
Scandal
Endowed
evaluations;
Powerful
stakeholders/media
Showed that status acts as a burden, but only after a certain magnitude of violation.
Status also attracts additional media attention, which can lead to negative
outcomes.
Social Evaluations
(continued)

8
Table 2b (continued)
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concept(s) Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Haack et al., 2014 THEORY Transnational
governance
arrangements
Endowed
evaluations; crisis
spillover
Argued that the general public uses heuristics and intuition to assess the legitimacy
of lesser known actors, particularly by considering network affiliates.
Social Evaluations
Gutierrez et al., 2010 QUAL Abuse allegations in
the Catholic church
Stakeholder
identification
Showed that identification is processual and that it can be recrafted and split as a
coping mechanism in crisis situations.
Crisis Leadership;
Organizational Learning;
Petriglieri, 2015 QUAL 2010 Deepwater
Horizon Gulf of
Mexico oil spill
Stakeholder
identification
Developed a process for organizational reidentification following crisis events.
Showed that identification is repaired when employees have opportunities to be
part of the response effort.
Zavyalova et al., 2016 QUANT NCAA violations Stakeholder
identification
Introduced organizational identification to explain stakeholder responses to crises;
High reputation can function as a benefit or a burden, and is ultimately bounded by
the degree of organizational wrongdoing.
Social Evaluations
Wiersema & Zhang, 2013 QUANT Stock option
backdating
Powerful
stakeholders/media;
Crisis spillover
Media attention and the pervasiveness of a scandal influenced executive turnover.
Less turnover when less media and more pervasiveness.
Yue et al., 2013 QUANT New York Clearing
House Association
Powerful
stakeholders/media
Found that elite organizations used their position to protect themselves in the event
of a crisis while the rest of the market suffered. This, in turn, caused the elite
organizations to suffer.
Ahmadjian & Robinson,
2001
QUANT Downsizing Crisis spillover Social and institutional pressures against downsizing diminished overtime due to a
safety-in-numbers effect.
Social Evaluations
Barnett & King, 2008 QUANT U.S. chemical
industry
Crisis spillover Showed that industry spillover occurs and self-regulatory institutions can help
protect organizations from spillover.
Kang, 2008 QUANT Financial
restatements
Crisis spillover Showed that financial fraud has negative consequences for director-interlocked
organizations, particularly if the directors are chair of audit or governance
committees. Good governance mitigates this effect.
Social evaluations
Yu et al., 2008 THEORY Various examples Crisis spillover Developed a model of crisis spillover, arguing that characteristics of the
organization, other organizations, and the industry influence the degree of
spillover.
Jonsson et al., 2009 QUANT Skandia AB mutual
fund scandal
Crisis spillover;
Endowed
evaluations
An organization’s violation of social norms can lead to withdrawal of business
from similar organizations. Status of the related organization enhances the effect.
Social Evaluations
Desai, 2011 QUANT Railroad accidents Crisis spillover Following crises, organizations engaged in efforts to defend their field from
scrutiny. Prior levels of scrutiny, accident history, and lower levels of similarity
enhance this effect.
Diestre & Rajagopalan,
2014
QUANT Chemical accidents Crisis spillover Similarity in organizational inputs (rather than outputs) had a significant and
positive effect on spillover. Also some evidence that geographic similarity
increases spillover.
Paruchuri & Misangyi,
2015
QUANT Financial misconduct Crisis spillover Found that when interpreting financial misconduct, investor cognitive processes
spread guilt to the industry as a whole, but in a heterogeneous manner.

9
Table 3a: Literature on Post-Crisis Outcomes – Internal Perspective: Organizational Learning
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concepts Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Amabile & Conti, 1999 QUANT Downsizing Learning process Organizational downsizing can impact long-term team creativity, largely because
of negative changes in the work environment.
Zahra & George, 2002 THEORY Various examples Learning process Crises function as triggers to influence an organization's absorptive capacity to
learn. More intense crises will trigger a greater investment in learning.
Organizational Preparedness
Shepherd, 2003 THEORY Business failure Learning process Higher levels of grief after a business failure may lead to less learning. Suggested
that emotions can hinder internalization of lessons.
Organizational Preparedness
Christianson et al., 2009 QUAL 2003 roof collapse at
Railroad Museum
Learning process Offered a process-based perspective on organizational learning following rare
events. Specifically focused on role of routines and organizational identity.
Organizational Preparedness;
Crisis Leadership
Lampel et al., 2009 THEORY Various examples Learning process Introduced a framework for comparing and analyzing how rare or unexpected
events impact organizational learning. Focused on the types and process of
learning.
Crisis Leadership
Madsen, 2009 QUANT U.S. coal mining Learning process;
Vicarious
learning
Organizations are less likely to experience disasters as their disaster experience
increases—including prior experience with minor accidents, and vicarious
experience with disasters within other organizations.
Organizational Preparedness;
Crisis Leadership
Starbuck, 2009 THEORY Various examples Learning process Conceptualized the role of prior beliefs and cognitive biases on reactions and
learning outcomes following disasters and other rare events.
Veil, 2011 THEORY Various examples Learning process Detailed a process of learning from focused on developing a mindful culture. Also
highlighted barriers to learning, including routines and trained mindlessness.
Organizational Preparedness
Maguire & Hardy, 2013 QUAL Canadian
categorization of
chemical substances
Learning process Showed that objects and situations can become risky and safe in different ways;
stabilized meanings of risk are less established than we may realize, suggesting
that our interpretation of risk is amenable.
Organizational Preparedness
Haunschild et al., 2015 QUANT NASA space shuttle
accidents
Learning process Showed that organizations' focus on safety and non-safety-related behaviors varies
over time in a systematic way. This variance is predicted by serious errors and how
recent these errors occurred.
Organizational Preparedness
Haunschild & Sullivan,
2002
QUANT Airline accidents Conditions on
learning
Organizations learned more from accidents with heterogeneous causes than with
homogeneous causes. Accidents with heterogeneous causes encourage further
understanding of crisis characteristics.
Vera & Crossan, 2004 THEORY Various examples Conditions on
learning
Offered a model that theoretically links strategic leadership with organizational
learning, theorizing the advantages of leaders who can function in transformational
and transactional modes.
Crisis Leadership
Elliott & Smith, 2006 QUAL UK soccer industry Conditions on
learning
Despite crisis-related experience, organizations may reject evidence and fail to
learn. This failure may stem from a "mindset of invulnerability," and requires
cultural readjustments to overcome. Institutional and regulatory involvement can
help overcome this mindset.
Crisis Leadership
(continued)

10
Table 3a (continued)
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concepts Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Baum & Dahlin, 2007 QUANT Railroad accidents Conditions on
learning;
Vicarious
learning
Considered the conditional role of aspiration-performance feedback in learning.
Showed that when accident rates deviate from aspirations, vicarious learning is
more effective than experiential learning.
Gephart, 2007 THEORY Various examples Conditions on
learning
Reviewed and integrated the literature on public inquiry, highlighting the various
perspectives used including narrative analysis and rhetoric.
Wilson et al., 2007 THEORY Various examples Conditions on
learning
Clarified the construct of group learning and suggested that learning from crisis
may be better when conducted by a groups.
Crisis Leadership
Beck & Plowman, 2009 THEORY Various examples
provided (focus on
Columbia disaster)
Conditions on
learning
Middle managers—by facilitating clear communication—can help organizations
make sense of and learn from rare and unusual events.
Crisis Leadership
Rerup, 2009 QUAL Novo Nordisk
insulin crisis
Conditions on
learning
Emphasized the limitations of standard learning processes; suggested the value of
learning from weak environmental cues. Introduced idea of attention triangulation.
Organizational Preparedness;
Crisis Leadership
Madsen & Desai, 2010 QUANT Orbital launch
industry
Conditions on
learning
Found that experiencing major failures and observing others’ failures is more
effective at preventing future mistakes than observing successes.
Organizational Preparedness
Kim & Miner, 2007 QUANT Bank and thrift
failures and near
failures
Vicarious
learning;
Conditions on
learning
Learning spillovers depended on industry and geographic market characteristics;
vicarious learning is greater when within the same geographical market. Vicarious
learning also may be better from near-failure rather than outright failure.

11
Table 3b: Literature on Post-Crisis Outcomes – External Perspective: Social Evaluations
Reference Research
Design Setting Core Concepts Findings/Propositions Cross Reference
Zyglidopoulos, 2001 QUANT Industrial accidents Social
evaluations
Focused on reputation for social performance. Found that accident severity and
media attention did not impact reputation, but environmental damage severity and
accident complexity did impact reputation.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Hudson, 2008 THEORY Various examples Social
evaluations
Detailed a theory of core-stigma and distinguished from event-stigma. Also
considered organizational outcomes and responses to stigma.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Pozner, 2008 THEORY Various examples Social
evaluations
Proposed that actors involved with organizational misconduct face labor market
consequences; misconduct can stigmatize actors and harm their market value.
Devers et al., 2009 THEORY Various examples Social
evaluations
Detailed a theory of org. stigma by identifying the conditions under which stigma
arises, how this process unfolds, and the consequences of stigma.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Hudson & Okhuysen, 2014 THEORY Various examples Social
evaluations
Argued that there are structural barriers to studying stigma, including the
stigmatization of stigma researchers and the difficulty in accessing data.
Kim et al., 2004 QUANT Competence- and
integrity-based trust
violations
Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Showed that trust was repaired more when apologies were used in response to
competence violation, but when denials were used in response to integrity
violations.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Lee et al., 2004 QUANT Company downturns
and negative events
Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Found organizations that admitted responsibility following negative events were
considered more in control and benefitted financially from their admission.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Tomlinson et al., 2004 QUANT Policy capture
scenario of trust
violation
Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Following violations of trust, timely and sincere apologies helped to restore trust,
as did having prior positive violations. Violation magnitude negatively moderated
these effects.
Stakeholder Relationships;
Stakeholder Perceptions
Sinaceur et al., 2005 QUANT Mad-cow disease Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Showed that stakeholders react emotionally to crises, particularly in the presence
of emotional language, such as "Mad Cow."
Stakeholder Perceptions;
Crisis Leadership
Coombs & Holladay, 2007 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Showed that anger moderates the relationship between crisis responsibility and
negative outcomes.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Dardis & Haigh, 2009 QUANT Product-harm crisis Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Reducing the offensiveness of a product-harm crisis consistently led to higher
reputation perceptions of organizations than did denial, evading responsibility,
corrective action, or mortification.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009 THEORY Various examples Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Proposed different avenues to trust repair through social accounts, including
denials, excuses, apologies, and justifications.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Jin, 2010 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Stakeholders respond to crises with different emotions (anger, sadness, fear,
anxiety), which require different response strategies to manage.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Jin et al., 2012 QUAL Various crisis types
(case based)
Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Showed that anxiety is the natural emotion felt by stakeholders in response to
crises. Other emotions are a function of crisis type. When stakeholders experience
emotions they expect the organization’s assistance for coping.
Stakeholder Perceptions
Claeys & Cauberghe, 2014 QUANT Various crisis types
(experimental)
Response
strategies and
social evaluations
Found that crisis response strategies are more effective when matched according
to stakeholders' crisis attributions when the message framing is rational. Emotional
message framing reduces the effectiveness of the match.
Stakeholder Perceptions

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