Seven Masterpieces of Philosophy
Added on 2022-09-13
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Running head: HUME ON LIBERTY AND NECESSITY
Hume On Liberty and Necessity
Student’s name
University
Author’s note
Hume On Liberty and Necessity
Student’s name
University
Author’s note
HUME ON LIBERTY AND NECESSITY1
Q.1) The problem of free will and determinism has yielded several series of debates and
altercations among the philosophers since the early era of philosophical discourses.
Subsequently, the debate also led to the issues related to moral responsibility, sin, deliberation,
persuasion, prohibition etc. It is generally accepted that rational individuals has the ability or at
least the freedom to act on their will. Some thinkers conceive free will as the ability to choose
the outcome of the actions, which are not determined by the past events. Contrary to the
advocates of free will, determinism suggests that there is only one possible course of action in
this world order, and that has been effectively determined by the past events. However, the soft
determinists, or the compatibilists seek after a common ground to reconcile the extremes of free
will and determinism, where they try to establish these two aspects as mutually compatible, not
contradictory (Franklin, 2017).
Among all modern philosophers, David Hume, the renowned Scottish philosopher of the
Enlightenment era, has perhaps provided the most significant account of compatibility. In the
second book of his seminal work An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume opens
his argument for a compatible account of free will in connection to his theory of causation and
necessary connection. However, Hume had a different approach towards the theory of causation,
or the causal relation, which was essentially unlike the traditional view of causal relation. Hume
categorizes the entire stock of human knowledge into relation of ideas and matters of fact. The
former, according to Hume, are the mathematical truths that cannot be negated without
contradiction. Matters of fact, on the hand, are the truth involving more common facts that we
come to know about empirically, through our sense experiences. Further, Hume notes that we
arrive at our understanding regarding matters of fact based on the principle of causality. To
Q.1) The problem of free will and determinism has yielded several series of debates and
altercations among the philosophers since the early era of philosophical discourses.
Subsequently, the debate also led to the issues related to moral responsibility, sin, deliberation,
persuasion, prohibition etc. It is generally accepted that rational individuals has the ability or at
least the freedom to act on their will. Some thinkers conceive free will as the ability to choose
the outcome of the actions, which are not determined by the past events. Contrary to the
advocates of free will, determinism suggests that there is only one possible course of action in
this world order, and that has been effectively determined by the past events. However, the soft
determinists, or the compatibilists seek after a common ground to reconcile the extremes of free
will and determinism, where they try to establish these two aspects as mutually compatible, not
contradictory (Franklin, 2017).
Among all modern philosophers, David Hume, the renowned Scottish philosopher of the
Enlightenment era, has perhaps provided the most significant account of compatibility. In the
second book of his seminal work An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume opens
his argument for a compatible account of free will in connection to his theory of causation and
necessary connection. However, Hume had a different approach towards the theory of causation,
or the causal relation, which was essentially unlike the traditional view of causal relation. Hume
categorizes the entire stock of human knowledge into relation of ideas and matters of fact. The
former, according to Hume, are the mathematical truths that cannot be negated without
contradiction. Matters of fact, on the hand, are the truth involving more common facts that we
come to know about empirically, through our sense experiences. Further, Hume notes that we
arrive at our understanding regarding matters of fact based on the principle of causality. To
HUME ON LIBERTY AND NECESSITY2
elucidate, we identify events and objects as the cause and effect of one another, such that the
experience of one object or event invariably leads us to assume an unobserved cause. However,
the relation of cause and effect, as observed by human experience, is not infallible or indubitable
Hume maintains that the relation between cause and effect is not a necessary connection, one
event or object does not necessitate another. This rejection of necessary connection is not
contradictory since, as Hume points out, causality is relation of ideas. Rather, it is a matter of
fact, which is essentially not a subject of reason. Besides, with the limitation of our knowledge,
we cannot justify any assumption about the future unless there is a law to support the relation
between them. Since reason cannot support that, Hume argues we tend to assume such relation
based on habit. He maintains that observing constant conjunctions of two events or objects lead
us to assume a causal relationship between them, and nothing beyond this conjunction appears to
be validated by our experience. Hence, Hume defines causal relation as the assumption of
necessary connection based on the experience of constant conjunction (Copleston, 1960).
Based on his theory of causation, Hume proceeds to establish his idea of necessity in the
physical systems. In his Enquiry, he states “It is universally allowed that matter, in all its
operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely
determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could
possibly have resulted from it.” (II:VIII:64). There are evidences from experiences that lead us to
believe necessary connections between two physical events. There are certain regularity and
uniformity in the nature of events that compel us to expect one when we experience the other.
And if there is any evidence of randomness or deviance from the uniformity, the laws of nature
are not suspended; we merely assume that there must be some unobserved forces that guide them
elucidate, we identify events and objects as the cause and effect of one another, such that the
experience of one object or event invariably leads us to assume an unobserved cause. However,
the relation of cause and effect, as observed by human experience, is not infallible or indubitable
Hume maintains that the relation between cause and effect is not a necessary connection, one
event or object does not necessitate another. This rejection of necessary connection is not
contradictory since, as Hume points out, causality is relation of ideas. Rather, it is a matter of
fact, which is essentially not a subject of reason. Besides, with the limitation of our knowledge,
we cannot justify any assumption about the future unless there is a law to support the relation
between them. Since reason cannot support that, Hume argues we tend to assume such relation
based on habit. He maintains that observing constant conjunctions of two events or objects lead
us to assume a causal relationship between them, and nothing beyond this conjunction appears to
be validated by our experience. Hence, Hume defines causal relation as the assumption of
necessary connection based on the experience of constant conjunction (Copleston, 1960).
Based on his theory of causation, Hume proceeds to establish his idea of necessity in the
physical systems. In his Enquiry, he states “It is universally allowed that matter, in all its
operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely
determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could
possibly have resulted from it.” (II:VIII:64). There are evidences from experiences that lead us to
believe necessary connections between two physical events. There are certain regularity and
uniformity in the nature of events that compel us to expect one when we experience the other.
And if there is any evidence of randomness or deviance from the uniformity, the laws of nature
are not suspended; we merely assume that there must be some unobserved forces that guide them
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