Agency Costs in Corporate Governance: Analysis of Different Scenarios
Investigate the concept of agency cost and shareholder exploitation in modern corporations based on the works of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kim and Sorenson (1986), and Coffee et al. (2018).
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Added on 2023-06-04
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This article discusses the extent of agency costs in different corporate governance scenarios and the measures required to minimize the risk of financial fraud. It highlights the importance of independent non-executive members in the board composition. The article also emphasizes the strengthening of the disclosures mechanism and internal controls through maintenance of independence.
Agency Costs in Corporate Governance: Analysis of Different Scenarios
Investigate the concept of agency cost and shareholder exploitation in modern corporations based on the works of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Kim and Sorenson (1986), and Coffee et al. (2018).
Added on 2023-06-04
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