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Quest for Water Security in Singapore
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Chapter 4
Quest for Water Security in Singapore
Cecilia Tortajada and Cheryl Wong
Abstract For decades, the main goal of Singapore in terms of water resources has
been to become water-secure. As a result, water availability, accessibility, and
affordability have traditionally been decided at the highest political level.
Singapore’s overall development is linked to a great extent to ‘blue development’,
the amount of water available in sufficient quantity and quality and at affordable
prices for the growing number of uses and users in every sector. The city–state aims
to be water-secure, self-sufficient, and resilient by 2060, when water consumption
will be twice today’s level. An important global city, Singapore will continue
improving its economic and social conditions to match both local expectations and
global prospects. Trends indicate that it will become more urban, more industri-
alised, and more competitive, which will result in higher water demand. Known for
its key policies and innovations, Singapore will have to continue planning within a
long-term framework to become water-secure and achieve its overall development
goals.
4.1 Introduction
Singapore is a city-state of 719.2 km2 in Southeast Asia. It has a total population of
5.6 million and a population density of 7797 persons per km 2 (Singapore
Department of Statistics 2017a).
Singapore has to be considered within its own context: a small island, and thus
area-constrained, that has grown continuously only through land reclamation. It has
no natural resources and no hinterland to provide them, and a historical dependence
on outside sources of water, energy, and food. These seemingly serious limitations
have been overcome, however, with long-term comprehensive planning, key
C. Tortajada (&)
C. Wong
Institute of Water Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
e-mail: [e-mail]
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018
World Water Council (ed.), Global Water Security, Water Resources
Development and Management, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7913-9_4
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policies, and innovation in all the sectors, where the overall development of the
city-state, rather than the individual sectors, has been the main priority.
Since independence, when planning for water resources, water security (avail-
ability, accessibility, and affordability) has been a main consideration. To become
more water-secure, the city-state has developed forward-looking, comprehensive
strategies that have ensured that Singapore can meet present and projected
requirements (Tan et al. 2008). These strategies have included all aspects of water
resources policy, planning, management, development, governance, finance, tech-
nology, and most recently, consideration of societal behaviour. This has included
diversification of water supply sources within and outside of Singapore;
cleaning-up of rivers and waterways; protection of water catchments; water con-
servation measures; development of infrastructure; wastewater treatment and dis-
posal; production of high-grade reclaimed water for potable and non-potable
purposes (known as NEWater); and desalination. The last two have been planned to
supplement local catchment and imported water, and they have effectively
enhanced water security (Parliament of Singapore 2016a). All this is within a
regulatory and institutional framework that is modified and improved when and as
required (Tortajada et al. 2013).
The constraints of land area and competing land uses have added complexity to
water resources planning and implementation. The constant need to increase pro-
vision of water due to population growth and economic and social development
forces numerous trade-offs between land use (housing, commerce, industry,
defence, farming, fisheries, leisure activities, etc.) and water resources development.
In fact, land availability has been the main consideration when deciding on the
amount of land that can be converted into watersheds to collect water, and thus on
the size of the watersheds; the places where water and wastewater treatment plants,
as well as desalination plants, are built; which ones have to be built either under-
ground or on top of existing facilities in the most innovative ways; etc. This
balancing act continues until today (Ng 2018; Tortajada et al. 2013).
Water resources are strategic for Singapore. Johor, Malaysia, has historically
been an important source of water for the city-state, and about 50% of its water is
still imported from there. Several water agreements have been signed with this
purpose: in 1927 (no longer in force), 1961, 1962, and 1990. This paper will not
discuss the agreements or the related differences of opinion in different periods;
they have been discussed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Kog 2001; Long 2001; Kog
et al. 2002; Lee 2003, 2005, 2010; Ministry of Information, Communications and
the Arts 2003; National Economic Action Council 2003; Chang et al. 2005; Saw
and Kesavapany 2006; Sidhu 2006; Dhillon 2009; Shiraishi 2009; Luan 2010;
Tortajada and Pobre 2011; Tortajada et al. 2013).
Total water demand in Singapore is projected to double by 2060. Long-term
water security strategies towards this time horizon include continuing to aug-
menting supply from local sources and increasing the production capacities of
NEWater and desalination. Already, two-thirds of Singapore can be considered
water catchment areas where stormwater is collected.
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There are plans to increase this proportion to 90%. Regarding NEWater and
desalination, PUB (Singapore’s National Water Agency) plans to double their
production capacities by 2030. By 2060, the two sources are expected to supply up
to 85% of Singapore’s water requirements. This water portfolio will be decisive to
ensure that water is available for all uses and also to reduce vulnerability to
climate-related uncertainties (Parliament of Singapore 2016b). Figure 4.1 is a map
of Singapore, its water resources and also the water sales figures in 2016.
Climate change is likely to add constraints in terms of water security, and
Singapore is already planning for it. Extreme weather events, including heavy
rainfall and prolonged dry periods, are projected to occur more frequently, not only
in Singapore but across Southeast Asia (Chow 2017). This has been a concern for
Singapore for several decades. To develop unconventional sources of water (re-
cycled wastewater and desalination) that do not depend on climate, major invest-
ments were made in the 1970s in research and development to support
technological developments such as membrane technology and reverse osmosis.
The construction of the Marina Reservoir, the most urbanised reservoir on the
island, for drinking purposes and flood control, was conceived in the same decade.
Four decades on, all these initiatives have been realised (Parliament of Singapore
2010).
In 2014, Singapore experienced a two-month drought, the worst in many dec-
ades. February 2014 was the driest month since 1869, with near-zero rainfall. In
Fig. 4.1 Map of Singapore’s water resources and water sales figures Source Buurman et al.
(Forthcoming)
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neighbouring Malaysia, water rationing was implemented in Johor (from where
Singapore imports water), Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Kuala Lumpur, and Putrajaya.
In Thailand, 20 provinces were declared drought disaster areas. But in Singapore
there was no rationing; in fact, water consumption increased by 5% (Parliament of
Singapore 2017a). This has been taken as a sign that Singapore’s strategies are on
the correct path. But even so, there have been comments that this drought presented
an opportunity to implement water conservation strategies (Salleh 2014) that was
not realised (Tortajada 2016).
Therefore, within a framework of water security, planning and investment in
water resources ahead of time have become even more relevant (Parliament of
Singapore 2017c), as has the participation of the population and commercial and
industrial sectors in using water more efficiently. The more involved the economic
and social sectors are in water conservation, the more secure the city-state will be in
the longer term.
Singapore has not followed any specific paradigm that has been prevalent
internationally at any time. On the contrary, given its specific characteristics, it has
searched for its own most appropriate alternatives, looking for solutions that will be
cost-efficient in the long-term. Priorities have changed with time: from water
availability to self-sufficiency, then to security and, finally, to resilience. This
analysis presents a historical review of the decision-making, policies and practices
that have contributed to Singapore’s water security. It discusses some of the
trade-offs that have been made at different times in terms of land use, energy, and
food to develop water resources. In this land-constrained city-state, it has been
essential to use land as efficiently as possible and for as high-value uses as possible.
This explains many of the decisions taken.
The analysis extensively refers to discussions in the parliament. The objective is
to show that water security, trade-offs, and related decisions have been a constant
concern for the leadership.
4.2 Water Security: Development of Water, Energy,
and Food Resources in Land-Constrained Singapore
The interlinkages and interdependencies among the water, food, and energy sectors
in land-constrained Singapore are not intuitive. While in general water is needed for
energy and food production, this is not the case in the city-state, which imports
nearly 100% of its energy, 90% of its food, and 50% of its water resources. This
means that water resources are not necessary to produce energy and that only a
small percentage is used for local agriculture. On the other hand, energy is needed
to pump, treat, recycle, desalinate, and distribute clean water, especially for pro-
duction of NEWater and desalinated water. The development of the various sectors,
and how they have affected each other when this has been the case, are presented in
the following sections.
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4.2.1 Development of Water and Energy Resources
The limited land in Singapore means that any land that is available has to be put to
the best and most productive possible uses. To make sure that Singapore would
have the necessary land for development, it introduced the Land Acquisition Act
(Parliament of Singapore 1966b). The act gave the government the power to acquire
land for public development. The impacts of this act have been much discussed. In
terms of development, because the demand for land was high and escalating due to
increasing and competing uses, control of land prices was necessary to ensure that
the cost of public projects could be met, including those related to water resources.
At the time of independence in 1965, there were three reservoirs: MacRitchie
(formerly Thomson Road Reservoir), Lower Seletar, and Lower Peirce. However,
population growth in both urban and rural areas, along with industrialisation,
resulted in higher demand for water and electricity.
To develop local capacity for water resources, several projects and reservoirs
were built in the 1960s and 1970s. These include the Jurong Industrial waterworks,
expansion of Upper Seletar Reservoir, Kranji-Pandan scheme, Chestnut Avenue
waterworks, and Murai, Pandan, Poyan, Pulau Tekong, Sarimbun, and Tengeh
Reservoirs (Tsang and Perera 2011). Regarding electricity, Phase I of the Pasir
Panjang Power Station was completed in 1965, adding 120 megawatts of generating
capacity (Parliament of Singapore 1965). The added energy also supported the
government’s ongoing Rural Electrification Scheme, which brought electricity to
155 kampongs (villages) (Parliament of Singapore 1965).
Two pump houses were built in Pontian and Tebrau, in Johor, Malaysia
(Mohamad 2015). Approximately at the same time, a booster station was built to
increase the pumping capacity of MacRitchie Reservoir (Parliament of Singapore
1965).
The average water consumption of 32 million gallons per day (MGD) in 1949
had increased to over 80 MGD by 1965 (Parliament of Singapore 1965). In August
1969, Seletar Reservoir opened (Parliament of Singapore 1970). It impounded
water not only from its own catchment, a protected area where development has not
been allowed historically, but also from eight neighbouring streams: the
Sembawang, Sembawang Kechil, Simpang Kiri, Bukit Mandai, Mandai, Mandai
Kechil, Pang Sua, and Peng Siang. Water from these streams had to be pumped into
the reservoir because all eight were at lower elevations (Parliament of Singapore
1970).
Energy was increasingly needed for sewage pumping stations and treatment
plants (Parliament of Singapore 1966a). This resulted in the construction of a
sewage pumping house in Ulu Pandan (Parliament of Singapore 1967b). The
government had the long-term objective to provide sewerage services to the entire
island, including urban and rural areas, to prevent water resources being polluted
with sewage. However, given the limited human and financial resources, the
development of the sewerage scheme was carried out in phases and according to
priorities. For example, the developed areas of Toa Payoh, Jurong, Kallang Basin,
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and other similar big new towns, where new projects were already taking place,
were given highest priority so that facilities would be ready in time for population
when they moved to the new housing (Parliament of Singapore 1967a).
The sewerage system was continuously expanded, and by 1969 it served over
half the population, a significant increase from a quarter of the population in 1949
(Parliament of Singapore 1969).
To serve industrial development, more power stations were built. The power
station in Jurong was built to provide electricity for the Jurong Industrial Complex,
west of the island. Stage I of the Jurong Power Station was completed in March
1971, with a generating capacity of 120 megawatts. With the increasing demand for
power for both housing and industry, construction of Stage II had to start imme-
diately after (Parliament of Singapore 1971). In mid-1974, Stage II was completed,
and three more 120 MW units were commissioned (Parliament of Singapore 1975).
This was followed by the building of the Senoko Power Station, completed in 1976
(Senoko 1976).
As generating capacity expanded, substantial investments were made to extend
the network for transmission and distribution, including to the rural areas
(Parliament of Singapore 1966c). In the third quarter of 1974, PUB’s 10-year rural
electrification programme (Energy Market Authority 2017a) was completed.
Through this programme, electricity was provided to rural areas and newly built
public housing (Energy Market Authority 2017b). It included approximately 500
projects in 18 stages of implementation. Electricity was now available to all parts of
the island, except remote rural sites earmarked for redevelopment (Parliament of
Singapore 1975). A 230 kV underground transmission network was constructed to
transmit power from Senoko Power Station to load centres on the island (Senoko
1976).
As industrialised and populated land area expanded, more energy was required
for water treatment. Water from the Pandan Reservoir initially flowed through an
industrialised and populated area and was prone to pollution. To make it safe for
human consumption, the water had to undergo more advanced treatment
(Parliament of Singapore 1976b). A wastewater treatment plant was also con-
structed to treat the liquid effluents of the petrochemical complex in Pulau Ayer
Merbau.
In 1977, the Ministry of Environment conducted a survey to identify all sources
of pollution affecting rivers and water catchments. The main sources of pollution
were found to be pigs and ducks, trade and backyard industries, rundown urban
areas, squatter pockets, street hawkers, and riverine activities. A programme was
developed to coordinate the efforts of the ministries to eliminate such pollution.
Together with a clean-up programme, premises would be connected to sewers,
reducing the number of premises served by over-hanging latrines and nightsoil
buckets. These were phased out by 1987 (Tan et al. 2008).
In rural areas where houses were not due for clearance within the next two years,
population had to install their own onsite wastewater treatment systems to treat the
wastewater (Parliament of Singapore 1982b). Street hawkers (food sellers) were
relocated to proper markets and food centres with treatment facilities. All but one of
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the pig farms in the Kallang River catchment were relocated. Later, they were
phased out or encouraged to change to a different activity. The overall objective was
to prevent pollution of the reservoirs (Parliament of Singapore 1982b).
To this end, in 1981, a comprehensive plan was issued to clean up the Singapore
River, Kallang Basin, and water catchments by 1987 (Tan et al. 2008; Tortajada
et al. 2013; Joshi et al. 2012a, b). This enormous effort was carried out together
with the redevelopment of Singapore.
Until the 1990s, Singapore’s power stations relied entirely on imported oil to
generate electricity (Parliament of Singapore 1981). In response to the oil crises of
1973 and 1979, which affected the world economy, the government came up with a
policy to tap alternative sources of energy (Parliament of Singapore 1982a). Power
stations were modified so that they could use different types and grades of fuel oil
(Parliament of Singapore 1981). In addition, an 80 MW gas turbine was constructed
at the Pasir Panjang Power Station to supplement the power supply during peak
hours and emergencies (Parliament of Singapore 1981). PUB (then responsible for
water, gas, and electricity; now the National Water Agency) converted five boilers
at Senoko Power Station to burn gas rather than oil (Parliament of Singapore
1990a). Its 250 MW boilers were modified to use both natural gas and fuel oil
(Senoko 2014).
Between 1982 and 1984, the demand for water rose at an increasing rate: in
1982, by 3.5%; in 1983, by 5.1%; and in 1984, by 7.2%. Discussions in the
Parliament (Parliament of Singapore 1985b) noted that if Singapore continued
consuming water at the current rate, in 15 years, it would need more water than was
available in all the reservoirs in Singapore, in addition to the water imported from
Johor.
The development of more reservoirs and projects followed. The Western
Catchment scheme and Choa Chu Kong waterworks were completed in 1981, and
Sungei Seletar, Bedok Scheme, and Bedok waterworks in 1986. Since at that time
almost half of Singapore was a catchment area from where rainwater was collected
(Parliament of Singapore 1985a), PUB started looking to develop further water
resources outside the island. It developed three schemes in Johor to draw the water
resources Singapore was entitled to: the extension to the Scudai waterworks, the
extension to the Johor waterworks, and the Johor River pipeline (Parliament of
Singapore 1985a). Singapore recognised that the scope for further development of
surface water resources was seriously constrained. If the rapid growth in con-
sumption continued, more expensive solutions, such as desalination, would be
necessary. Desalinated water was calculated to be more than 10 times as expensive
as water from the local catchments (Parliament of Singapore 1985a, 1986).
In 1990, Singapore and Malaysia signed a new water agreement as a supplement
to the 1962 Johor River agreement. The new agreement allowed Singapore to build
a dam across Sungei Linggiu (a tributary of the Johor River) to facilitate the
extraction of water from the Johor River (Parliament of Singapore 1989, 1990b).
During negotiations between the two countries, it was also agreed that Malaysia
would supply Singapore with gas on a long-term basis (Parliament of Singapore
1989).
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