THE BOEING 737 MAX DISASTER

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BOEING 737 MAX DISASTER
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Table of Contents
Introduction..........................................................................................................................2
Design of Boeing 737 Max..................................................................................................2
Boeing has defended the design by making use of MCAS.................................................4
Factors contributing to disaster............................................................................................5
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................7
References............................................................................................................................8

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Introduction
Boeing stands out to be largest and leading manufacturer in the domain of commercial
space, system and service provider of airplane. This stands out to be as one of the biggest
manufacturing exporter and supporter of airline industry. It has been allied with most of the
government bodies located in 150 countries. Boeing products and tailored service are inclusive
of the military and commercial system (Johnston and Harris 2019). The generation of talented
Boeing employees helps in building the largest aerospace organization on global platform.
Boeing 737 max stand out to be fasted selling airplane in the history of Boeing which has around
5000 orders from more 100 customers on a worldwide platform. 737 max family has been
designed for providing great flexibility, efficiency and reliability in the current market (Vargas-
Hernández and Martínez 2019). Each of the airplane will have new Boeing sky interior which is
provided by current sculpted sidewalls.
In the coming pages of the report, the design of Boeing 737 max has been discussed. The
next part deals with the design process of MCAS. The last part deals with factors that contributed
to the disaster.
Design of Boeing 737 Max
737 Max model stand out to be the fourth generation of Boeing 737 which come up with
re-engined leap turbofans. Boeing 737 max stand out to be the fourth generation of Boeing 737
which is a narrow body airline (Bergstra and Burgess 2020). The company Boeing has been
found that it can build something better. The whole concept aims to be seen as a culture of
Boeing culture of improvement (Zhongda and Mingguang 2018). For most of the commercial

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airplane manufacturer like Boeing, the change in product is completely driven by the need for
developing marketing condition.
Boeing does not come up with new ideas, instead of pouring its resources into the
incremental design. The senior executives at Boeing already knew the point that the design
would not work in case of large engines (Cruz and de Oliveira Dias 2020). Boeing does not look
into the short-term risk in this new system implementation for long term gain. Boeing lacks any
plan of building an airplane right from scratch. Boeing did one of the safe things and
implemented the MCAS in the current 737 airplane. The whole airplane industry has
encountered a lack of innovation (Zhongda and Mingguang 2018). In the last 70 years, the basic
design of airplane has not changed. When innovation completely disappear, organization are
incentivized the kind of behavior that lead to 737 Max crash.
On March 2019, Boeing 737 max aircraft which is operated by Ethiopian Airlines
crashed soon after six minutes of launch. It was reported through the initial investigation that
incidents can draw no official conclusion with respect to Boeing aircraft or system. On through
investigation, Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System used in the Boing plan stand
out to be the main culprit (Bergstra and Burgess 2019). Proper investigation of two crashes and
problem in aircraft have ultimately resulted in the deployment of the MCAS system as the main
issue. Proper assessment and testing of different resources in the different investigation have
resulted in certain number of issues. It merely focused on the way in which Boeing is developed,
designed and lastly deployed using MCAS. In addition, improper training and education to pilots
and crew for system experience within the aircraft. Before the implementation of safety
certificate and release of 737 Max, Boeing chief pilot has warned its colleagues regarding MCAS

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system. The technical chief has clearly highlighted the issues which resulted due to post-crash
investigation.
Fig 1: Ethiopian Airlines crashed
(Source: Vargas-Hernández and Martínez 2019)
Boeing officials has clearly highlighted that the MCAS system was not designed for
activating the normal flight. It clearly highlighted that MCAS was developed for being engaged
in it (Nowacki and Olejniczak 2018). Boeing pilot even approached the Federal Aviation
Administration and requested to remove all MCAS from a different plane. This should be done
as the plane was operating the normal envelope (Yardla and Subijanto 2020). Boeing pilot even
proceeds to be engaged in an appropriate kind of disclosure in the FAA regulation for having
obligatory clearances.

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Boeing has defended the design by making use of MCAS
Boeing has completely defended the processes behind its MCAS design decision. Boeing
did not accept any kind of blame in this disaster. The sole responsibility behind the two plane
crash was Boeing Corporation (Pasztor et al. 2019). In the year 2012 testing, 737 max
completely gathered the transonic wind tunnel for testing the aerodynamics by making use of a
large scale of the model along with wingspan comparable to an eagle. During the testing, the
approaching airflow allowed the engineers to focus on how airplane dynamics can handle
extreme maneuvers. After receiving the data from the testing, it was clearly mentioned that there
no issues to address. Engineers noticed that the nose of the plane is pitch upward at the time of
maneuver. The solution to which they arrived is a piece of software that is MCAS (De Bruyne
2019). The system stands out to be very much powerful in controlling the tail to push the
airplane nose in a downward direction.
Boeing in the very first case designed the MCAS with a simple scope which was altered
in the late plane development for expansion of power and purpose. In the safety analysis of
Boeing that there is only little risk in case of MCAS failure due to FAA assumption approval.
The pilots can easily make response to any unexpected activation in just interval of three seconds
(Sgobba 2019). This revised design even allows MCAS to easily trigger the inputs received from
a single sensor instead of two factors. Both FAA and 737 Max moved towards the production
which limited the testing of MCAS design (Gailagista et al. 2018). They agreed to inform the
pilots regarding the MCAS manual. Considering the two crash, Boeing has completely defended
the process behind the design of MCAS.

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Fig 2: Boeing 737 Max
(Source: Bardell and Yue 2018)
During the flight test for plane certification, it is the duty of pilot to fly safely through the
extreme maneuver. A banked spiral known as wind up completely turns up for bringing the flight
through stall. As per FAA rule, there is a need for a plane to be handled with respect to smooth
changing stick forces (Zhongda and Mingguang 2018). The angle of attack can be defined as
angle in between wing and upcoming air flow. G-force is the acceleration of plane in vertical
directions. Two people are merely involved in the beginning design of plan for MCAS and the
main target is reduce the effect of system. 0.6-degree limit has been embedded in the
organization system for review of present system (Vargas-Hernández and Martínez 2019).
MCAS has even triggered the maximum authority and moved the horizontal stabilizer.

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In case of any hazardous event, there is need for one sensor expect the normal flight.
Pilots of flight testing has come up with another problem. There was lack of smooth forces faced
in low speed flights. To tackle this particular issue, engineers come up with the concept of
expansion of scope and powering MCAS (Bardell and Yue 2018). Low speed for control surface
needs to be deflected and tends to have much similar effect. The biggest issue on the design of
MCAS is dependency on single angle of attack sensor. There are two kind of sensor located on
either side of fuselage. The whole concept behind the two angle-of attack sensor is that if either
fail then the whole system will not work.
Factors contributing to disaster
There are large number of factors which contributed to the disaster of Boeing 737 Max
like
Independent escalation channel: Boeing come up with a development team for 737 Max
who does not have an idea regarding the issues of MCAS (KONERT 2019). It is not clear
whether the reporting mechanism which existed for team for reporting issues does not have
oversight resources (Zhongda and Mingguang 2018). The knowledge of complete disaster
MCAS failure was there in Boeing prior to delivery to the customer.
Independent Safety Oversight: Boeing completely lacked as an independent organization
who duty is to ensure overall safety of product. Organization like Boeing which is manufacturing
aircraft that have the potential in event failure (Yardla and Subijanto 2020). Overall success of
each unit should not be completely based on products sales but also should be based on the
product of sale.

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Monitoring of Employee Communication: The point was not clear that Boeing need to
place monitoring of employee communication. There is need for monitoring of employee
communication coupled along with general policy and enforcement program (Bergstra and
Burgess 2020). There is a requirement for monitoring of employee communication in real-time
by Boeing compliance group that can alert senior management.
Oversight reporting of regulatory affairs: There was a long debate on the point whether
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) has fallen as regulatory capture to Boeing. It stands out
to be important for the success, proper management of risk which has been highlighted by
organization personnel for regulation (Cruz and de Oliveira Dias 2020). The mere focus on
centralized and streamline of single-source like internal unit for analyzing affairs. It is important
for organization to easily manage the official position with respect to issues of regulatory. This
can easily provide consistent messaging from different personnel who are associated with this.
The organization can easily do this in the eye of the regulator, customer and investors. The
general public can easily little claim the power for governing the employees (Bergstra and
Burgess 2019). 737 max did not serve a complete line of defense against the Boeing liability for
the failure of aircraft.
Conclusion
It can be concluded that this report is all about Boeing 737 max. In the first part of the
report, an argument has been provided regarding the point that the design of Boeing 737 max is
an incremental or radical change. The second part deals with MCAS design which was used in
the model. The last part deals with factors which contributed to the disaster. 737 Max come up
with a new automated system that allows Boeing to have the basic structure. It comes up with the

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installation of heavy fuel efficient engines that creates much efficient plane required by airline
industry. The system has been designed in such a way that it requires much less training efforts
for pilot. The new system that has been implemented is maneuvering characteristics
augmentation system. The system has been designed in such a way that it can balance the new
weight of engine.

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References
Bardell, N.S. and Yue, H., 2018, December. A discussion about how efficiently the major US
airlines are using their domestic fleets of Boeing 737-800 aircraft. In Australasian Transport
Research Forum (ATRF), 40th, 2018, Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia.
Bergstra, J.A. and Burgess, M., 2019. A Promise Theoretic Account of the Boeing 737 Max
MCAS Algorithm Affair. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.01543.
Bergstra, J.A. and Burgess, M., 2020. Candidate Software Process Flaws for the Boeing 737
Max MCAS Algorithm and Risks for a Proposed Upgrade. arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.05690.
Cruz, B.S. and de Oliveira Dias, M., 2020. CRASHED BOEING 737-MAX: FATALITIES OR
MALPRACTICE?. GSJ, 8(1).
De Bruyne, J., 2019. Crash Boeing 737 Max toont belang van certificering. De
Juristenkrant, 2019(388), p.16.
Gailagista, A., Rahma, Z., Charles, A.N., Suparman, A. and Irenita, N., 2018. Is It Worth
Replacing B 737-800 NG with B 737 Max 8?. Advances in Transportation and Logistics
Research, 1(1), pp.97-104.
Johnston, P. and Harris, R., 2019. The Boeing 737 MAX saga: lessons for software
organizations. Software Quality Professional, 21(3), pp.4-12.
KONERT, A., 2019. AVIATION ACCIDENTS INVOLVING BOEING 737 MAX: LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES. Ius Novum, p.119.

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Nowacki, M. and Olejniczak, D., 2018. Analysis of boeing 737 MAX 8 flight, in terms of the
exhaust emission for the selected flight. Transportation research procedia, 35, pp.158-165.
Pasztor, A., Tangel, A., Wall, R. and Slider, A., 2019. How Boeing’s 737 MAX Failed. The Wall
Street Journal (Mar. 2019)(cit. on p. 11).
Sgobba, T., 2019. B-737 MAX and the crash of the regulatory system. Journal of Space Safety
Engineering, 6(4), pp.299-303.
Vargas-Hernández, J.G. and Martínez, M.G.H., 2019. THE REPUTATION OF THE
AEROSPACE COMPANY BOEING AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS IN THE MEXICAN
MARKET. EFFECT OF THE CRISIS DUE TO ACCIDENTS IN 2019. Dr. Sandeep Marwah,
p.14.
Yardla, Y. and Subijanto, S., 2020. ANALISA KERUSAKAN IGNITION EXCITER APU TIPE
TCN-1031 PADA PESAWAT BOEING 737-300 PK-MBP. Jurnal Industri Elektro dan
Penerbangan, 6(1).
Zhongda, Y. and Mingguang, L., 2018, October. Maintenance differences between 737MAX and
320neo. In IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering (Vol. 423, No. 1, p.
012059). IOP Publishing.