Can a State with Reservations Become a Ratifying Member of the Chemical Weapons Convention?

This article analyzes whether a state with reservations against the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention can become a ratifying member. It examines the relevant provisions of the convention and the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. The article concludes that a state with reservations against the provisions of the convention cannot become a ratifying member.

Running head: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL ECONOMY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL ECONOMY
Name of the Student
Name of the University
Author Note

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Introduction
The Chemical Weapons Convention deals with the prohibition of production, storage and
the use of chemical weapons in warfare. The ratifying states to the convention must observe the
duties and responsibilities incorporated into the same. Thus for a state to become a ratifying state
to the convention they must accept all prescriptions of the Convention and abide by the same.
The following paragraphs will seek to determine if a state can become a ratifying state to the
convention if it has reservations regarding the same which are disputes by existing ratifying
states.
Issue
Country “X” wishes to become a ratifying member of the Chemical Weapons Convention
as stated in the given set of facts and circumstances. The country has reservations against a few
provisions of the convention and its annexes. The reservations of the provisions of the
convention and annexes are refuted by a country called “Turmeric”. Another nation known as
“Clove” refutes “X”s reservations to the annexes to the convention. The other ratifying states do
not have any objection to the reservations. It is pertinent to note that “X” has also recently aided
in an act of war that involved the use of chemical weapons.
Rule
Article XIX to the Chemical Weapons Convention defines and regulates ratification to
the convention by states (Aust 2013). This article states that the states ratify the convention
through their own constitutional processes and is brought into effect by the states signatories.

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The preamble to the Convention states that the purport of the convention is to facilitate
disarmament and an elimination of all forms of weapons of mass destruction (Üzümcü 2014).
Article XXII of the convention defines and regulates the reservations against the
provisions of the convention and its annexes. Article XXII of the convention thus states the any
reservation against the provisions of the convention would not be allowed and thus in effect the
state would not be able to become a ratifying state (Blum and Mamidanna 2014). The article
states that any reservations against the annexes to the convention would only be allowed for a
ratifying state if the reservations do not go against the objects of the convention. Thus, in case of
such a reservation the state would not be applicable as a ratifying state.
Section 2 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties defines reservations against
provisions of a particular convention and determines the viability of such reservations in light of
becoming a ratifying state. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties states that
reservations against the provisions of a convention must be stated at the time of ratifying the
treaty and the same would only be allowed if it is permitted by the treaty, or if the reservation is
specifically endorsed by the provisions of the treaty and if the reservation is not against the stated
purpose of the treaty.
Article 1 of the convention defines the general obligations of ratifying states to the
convention. This article states that a ratifying state has an obligation to ensure that it undertakes
to not produce, develop, purchase or stockpile/store chemical weapons [Article I Section 1 (a)],
to not use chemical weapons [Section 1 (b)], be a party to the development of chemical weapons
[Section 1 (c)] and or to any participate in contraventions of the convention [Section 1 (d)]. Thus
a ratifying state engaged in any of the above circumstances would be in contravention of the

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provisions of the convention and would be in breach of its duties and obligations under the
agreement between the ratifying states.
Application
Under the given set of facts and circumstances we see that the country “X” has stated that
it has reservations against the provisions of the convention and its annexes. Further it has been
established that it has been engaged in acts of warfare that involved the use of chemical weapons
with the use of Chlorine and Sarin gas. Thus it was in breach of Article 1 of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) to the extent that it did have a store of chemical weapons as is
evident from the attacks it orchestrated on Tarragon. This was a breach of Section 1 (a) to Article
1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The use of the same in warfare was a breach of
Article 1 Section 1 (b) of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
As per Article 19 of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties embodied in section 2
of the convention a ratifying state can only have reservations against the provisions of a
convention it is a signatory to in the circumstances that are provided in the article. Thus for a
ratifying state to be a part of a treaty and hold reservations they must fall under the
circumstances stated in Article 19 (Kaczorowska 2015). However, Article 19 of the Vienna
convention on the law of treaties does not permit any reservations where the treaty itself does not
allow it (Gardiner 2015). Article XXII of the Chemical Weapons Convention states that no
reservation to the provisions of the convention is permitted. Thus holding reservations against
the provisions of such a treaty would not be permitted. Article XXII of the Chemical Weapons
Convention states that reservations against the annexes to the convention would be permitted
however the same would not be valid id it goes against the purport of the convention. Thus

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considering the objection held by the state of Turmeric, county “X” would not be allowed to
become a ratifying member of the convention due to its non compliance with the provisions of
the conventions and its breach of Article XXII of the convention. The state of clove objected to
country “X”s reservations against the annexes to the convention, the same would be permitted as
long as they are not against the purpose of the convention. However from the acts of country “X”
it may be inferred that it would be in breach of the provisions of the convention and would thus
not be permitted to become a ratifying state to the convention.
Conclusion
To conclude Country “X” would not be permitted to become a signatory to the Chemical
Weapons Convention due to its reservations against the provisions of the convention which is a
breach of the provisions of Article XXII of the convention and Article 19 of the Vienna
convention on law of treaties.

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Reference list
Aust, A., 2013. Modern treaty law and practice. Cambridge University Press.
Blum, M.M. and Mamidanna, R.M., 2014. Analytical chemistry and the chemical weapons
convention.
Gardiner, R.K., 2015. Treaty interpretation. Oxford University Press, USA.
Kaczorowska, A., 2015. Public international law. Routledge.
Mallard, W.G., 2014. AMDIS in the chemical weapons convention. Analytical and bioanalytical
chemistry, 406(21), pp.5075-5086.
Üzümcü, A., 2014. The Chemical Weapons Convention—disarmament, science and
technology. Analytical and bioanalytical chemistry, 406(21), pp.5071-5073.