Risk Engineering Case Study: The Collapse of the Quebec Bridge

This case study examines the collapse of the Quebec Bridge, a major engineering disaster. The study delves into the background of the project, the nature of the structural failure, and the chronology of events leading to the collapse. It provides a scientific analysis of the incident, including the role of excessive loads, poor judgment, and design flaws. The assignment also includes a risk matrix that identifies various risks, such as technical, management, commercial, and external risks, along with their potential consequences and control measures. The study proposes improvements, emphasizing the importance of proper design, funding, experienced personnel, and adherence to timelines. In conclusion, the case study highlights the significance of infrastructure, particularly bridges, and the need for robust organizational practices, experienced personnel, and financial stability to prevent structural failures and ensure safety.

Running Head: COLLAPSE OF THE QUEBEC BRIDGE 1
Title
Author’s name
Institutional affiliation

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Collapse of the Quebec Bridge
Introduction
Transport is an important aspect of society (Mukherjee, 2017). Government bodies,
institutions, and different agencies have been working hard to ensure that the sector grows to be
efficient every other day. The economy of a place improves with efficient transport systems.
Individuals can easily communicate with easy transport. Traveling becomes much easier. The
19th century came with the various demands in regards to the transport needs. The world
population significantly grew and individuals were widespread. The resources were also
widespread and had to be accessed by the people. As a result, various transport features had to be
set to make life easy. Quebec is one place that did experience growth. The transportation needs
for Quebec have been growing every other day. The area is connected to St. Lawrence River,
hence people coming from the place had to go past the river before attending to their needs
(Majorowicz, 2012). Crossing the river has been a challenge in the previous past, a case that had
to be addressed by building a bridge. Hence, the start of the process to come up with the Quebec
Bridge. The bridge had unique traits associated with it such as being the longest cantilever
structure. The bridge length was to be extremely long, approximately 548.6 meters long. The
bridge features meant that lots of finances had to be pumped in the project for coming up with an
efficient structure. The funds were to be used in seeing that the design process is done smoothly.
Apart from that, the finances will ensure that a few setbacks are experienced through the
construction process (Choi, 2018).
Background
In 1887, entrepreneurs came to Quebec City and saw the need to increase business traffic
in the area (VARGHESE, 2018). The businessmen came together and formed a company,

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Quebec Bridge Company and obtained a charter of incorporation to erect a bridge, which is a
few miles upstream from the historic city next to the mouth of Chaudière River. But a problem
arose, there were insufficient funds, and therefore the project did not occur until 1900 when the
company received some financial support from the provincial federal, county government. The
Quebec Bridge company, therefore, gave the contract to Phoenix Bridge Company to build the
structure. The government guaranteed a bond issue to help pay the work on the project (Li,
2018).
Nature of the case
The incident was a structural case. The structure of the bridge failed leading to the
collapse. The material for construction was found to be far heavier in weight after construction
than was initially estimated before the construction and thus could not support its weight. Apart
from that, structural inability is proved by the failure of the member forces as the south anchor
arm was not well constructed thus falling deep down into the water beneath it. The members
were not well matched before the full strains were brought upon them.

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There were too were multiple structural assumptions an example being the assumption
that an increase in the weight would not affect the bridge safety but that was not the case as it
failed. A different claim was that splices between some of the lower chords on the south anchor
bent. One of the lower chords was also misaligned while others went completely out of line.
Chronology of the case
Phoenix company decided to have a cantilevered bridge that would be 150 feet high
above the high-water mark; the cantilevered would be attached to piers on each side of the river
by use of anchor arms of 500 feet each and a span of approximately 1,600 feet (Simkovic,
2019).
Theodore Cooper was selected as the project’s consulting engineer. This was so because
he was a well-known bridge designer and only a few people could match his capabilities. He
only increased the length of the center span from 1,600 to 1,800 from the design (Cooper, 2012).

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In February 1906 after construction had begun, cooper after looking at the details of the
building, he realized that the actual weight exceeded the measured weight before construction
but the project continued.
Cooper later fell sick and could not make it to the site. He relied on McLure for reports.
In juke 1907, McLure reported that some of the lower chords on South anchor were corrected by
jacking them into line.
In August, McLure reputed on the bent splices on the south anchor, and misalignment of
one of the lower chords, which were very noticeable. Cooper wrote a telegram to order the
stopping of further construction until the problem was solved but it continued without his
knowledge.
On August 29th the bridge collapsed killing 75-86 workers injuring around 16.

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The incurred losses of approximated to1.5 million dollars. Reconstruction began in 1913.
In September the same year, the bridge collapsed again killing around 13 people (ZHEBIN,
2016).
Scientific Analysis of the Case Incident
Excessive load quickened the collapse of the Quebec Bridge. The bridge support had
been weakening gradually. The additional load led to the immediate collapsing of the bridge; its
absence would mean the bridge would have held out for several days. Poor judgment was done
during the final crisis, a role that was played by John Deans. The responsible Engineer, Edward
Hoare, had a mere understanding of the constriction process of the bridge. The Engineer was
appointed by Quebec Bridge Company, a show of a particular degree of complacency within the
company. Szlapka, the personnel responsible for the design of the bridge was inefficient in his
working (Ebrahimy, 2019). The designers assumed the dead loads when carrying out the
calculations. The few included dead load values were significantly low. Theodore Cooper, on the
other hand, went ahead and approved the design to be used in constructing the dam despite the
substantial errors present. There was no additional reinforcement for the second Quebec Bridge
since the completion of the construction process despite it being two and half times heavier than
the previous ill-fated bridge.

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The error led to the prefabricated central span falling into the river during the raising of
the bridge, 11 people dying in the process. The final checking of the bridge before raising was
done with minimal keenness. The present individuals helping in the construction had little
understanding of what defines a well-built bridge. As a result, they could not recommend any
changes after the construction had been approved (Wang, 2014).
Risk Matrix
RBS LEVEL 0 RBS LEVEL 1 RBS LEVEL 2 Explanation
0.QUEBEC
BRIDGE
PROJECT RISK
1. Technical Risk 1.1 Safety The workers were not stopped
from working thus leading to
loss of lives among them
1.2 Member failure Calculation of the members
on the spline was not well

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aligned and thus leading to
failure and collapsing of the
south anchor
2. Management
Risk
2.1 Ignorance The weight of the materials
during construction was found
to be more than one
determined before the
construction began and
therefore, but it was assumed
2.2 Communication The main contractor ordered
the stop of construction but it
was not effected
3. Commercial
risk
3.1 Excessive loss of
money
After the first and second
collapse of the bridge, there
was massive loss of money
3.2 Changing
Contractors
There was the changing of
contractors leading to lack of
consistency in idea flow
4. External risk 4.1 Government There was a drift in
suggestion between the
government and the main
contractor for choice of who
should measure the weight of

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materials.
Risk Assessment
RISK ASSESSMENT (QUEBEC BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION SITE)
ACTIVITY HAZARD
IDENTIFICAT
ION
LIKELIFO
OD
L
CONSEQUE
NCE
C
RISK
SCO
RE
L*C
CONTRO
L
MEASU
RES
NEW
RISK
LEV
EL
CONSTRUCT
ION
Safety 0.5 20 10 Stop the
workers
from
working
L
Member
Failure
0.5 50 25 Proper
Calculatio
n of the
members
on the
spline
L
MANAGING
OF
CONSTRUCT
ION
ACTIVITY
Ignorance o.5 30 15 Ensure
the
weight of
materials
are well
L

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calculated
Communicatio
n
9 50 450 All order
have to be
implemen
ted during
a
constructi
on
activity.
L
Proposals for Improvement
Proper construction calls for ensuring that the preliminary designs are done excellently
and the construction is done with the needed order. The designs are costly, as a result, sufficient
funds have to be provided to cater for the whole process. Before a contractor is issued with a
bridge construction task, the management has to ensure that they are well funded before they are
given the assignment. The management has to be keen to see to it that independent designers are
issued with particular assignments. Their effectiveness and efficiency are rated highly as they
will be accountable for the work at the end of the day. Excellent work will push for a rise in their
ratings. On the other hand, poor ratings will make their ratings drop in terms of field
performance. The timeline needed for the construction of a bridge has to be keenly observed.
The nature of the bridge will tell the timeline needed for a successful construction to be
achieved. The timeline for construction of the Quebec Bridge was abnormal considering that it
was to be the longest cantilever bridge. Sufficient allocation of time has to be done for the

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diverse stages to be handled. The significant stages calling for substantial timelines are the
design, fabrication of components, shipping of materials to the site and finally erecting the
needed structure. Experience has to be highly considered in the coming days. The Chief Engineer
of a particular project has to be conversant with the construction nature before being issued with
the contract. The management in charge of a contract has to be keen on studying an engineer and
establishing all the relevant details before allowing the progress of the construction (Dolinajová,
2013).
Conclusion
The growth of society is dependent on certain infrastructure such as roads. Roads are
highly significant in ensuring the economic stability of an area in addition to the proper
communication. Business traffic gets to increase with proper road networks. Bridges boost the
efficiency of road networks. The bridges have to be structured under a well-organized
environment. The financial capability of a project will influence the level of organization to be
embraced through the working. Proper organization will mean excellent designs and construction
processes will be embraced. Bridges support many in society and have to embrace such a process
to eliminate frequent structural failures. The failures are seen primarily when the bridges collapse
citing an imbalance of the loads. Dealing with the challenge will call for the management to
ensure that experienced personnel front the construction process of any project. Well established
companies have to be offered the major projects as they have the capability to source funds that
will ensure excellent working (Kamaitis, 2013).

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