Libya's Oil Policy and Economic Development

This assignment discusses the importance of a successful oil policy in Libya, including revenue sharing, cash transfers to citizens, and dampening separatist tendencies. It also highlights the need for grassroots democracy and the prevention of corruption that was a hallmark of Qaddafi's regime. The document references various studies and reports on Libya's economic development and state building, providing a comprehensive overview of the challenges and opportunities facing the country.

Running head: CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
Corruption and Oil industry: Libya
Name of the Student
Name of the University
Author Note

1CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
Introduction
Corruption is perceived as a significant impediment to all the companies that are carrying
out their business operations in Libya. Every sector in the Libyan economy usually suffers from
widespread corruption amongst which the oil industry and public procurement sector are affected
the most. For the past several decades, the oil sector of the country has been subjected to abuse
caused by small elite surrounding Gaddafi. Corruption and conflict generated within the oil
industry had recently resulted into falling of one government threatening to tear the nation apart.
Being the ninth-largest oil reserve in the world and largest reserves in Africa, Libya’s oil sector
has had three detrimental outcomes1. Firstly, it intends to make authoritarian regime more
durable; secondly, it kept the Gaddafi regime in power for more than forty years and lastly,
resources intend to enhance accelerate corruption.
In recent years, unstable and poor nations have become a significant source of energy and
minerals which has stimulated strong economic growth in certain developing countries but
consistency in such growth has been frequently impede owing to the prevalence of corruption
and instability in such resource-rich nations that acts as impediments to consistent growth2.
Corruption was widespread under the Gaddafi’s rule and the situation had deteriorated
during the post-revolution period. The institutional framework to overcome corruption is
ineffective and the rule of law is challenged by violence and instability3. Libya is in a state of
disorder where the nation is not prepared to restore the oil industry particularly under
circumstances, where the government lacks unity and competes for power to exercise control
1Mahbob, Mohamed. The Impact of the Oil Sector and Political Conflicts on the Libyan Economy. Diss. Western
Illinois University, 2017.
2 Mahdavi, Paasha. "Institutions and the ‘resource curse’: Evidence from cases of oil-related bribery." (2017).
3Etelawi, Abdulrazag Mohamed, Keith A. Blatner, and Jill McCluskey. "Sustainability and Depletion Accounting: A
Case Study of Oil in Libya." Environment and Natural Resources Research 7.1 (2017): 34.

2CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
over the basic oil infrastructure. Even if the political actors unanimously come to an agreement,
the National Oil Company [NOC] persists to experience technical challenges while the UN-
backed Libyan Government of National Accord [GNA] must exhibit that it has capable of
managing the oil revenues effectively4.
The country witnessed a power struggle for controlling the oil industry of Libya, which
has threatened to intensify the splits within the nation and weaken the frail authority of the UN-
backed Libyan Government of National Accord [GNA]. This power struggle has left the
politically neutral chairperson of the Libyan National Oil Corporation [NOC] to notify the GNA
about its transgression of authority. The GNA is alleged to have attempted to invade some of the
responsibilities carried out by the NOC by closing the oil ministry5.
The Libya Constitution Drafting Assembly is still under process of writing the
Constitution, which ultimately incorporate laws that have been set out in the Constitutional
Declaration, enforced after ousting of Gaddafi. The research paper focuses its discussion in the
prevalence of corruption within the oil industry, being the biggest revenue source of the country.
It shall further highlight about the various tools that have been implemented to uproot and the
inefficacy of such apparatus caused by corruption that has ultimately, undermined the
enforcement of the laws within the nation6. The exercising of control over the natural resource
wealth usually permits dictators to hold on to the power by making payments to political cronies,
terrorizing people and rigging elections. Based on the present scenario, it is understood that
presence of transparency in the management of the natural resources of the country is imperative
4 Hove, Mediel. "Post-Gaddafi Libya and the African Union: Challenges and the road to sustainable peace." Journal
of Asian and African Studies 52.3 (2017): 271-286.
5Ayub, Zainal Amin, et al. "State of Libya." Higher Education in the Middle East and North Africa. Springer,
Singapore, 2016. 107-126.
6Heydemann, Steven. "Civil War, Economic Governance & State Reconstruction in the Arab Middle East." Dædalus
147.1 (2018): 48-63.

3CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
to eliminate corruption. It is understood that a transparently managed oil sector might provide the
mechanism with the necessary stability and growth in Libya.
In order to reduce the potential counter-revolutionary influence of the tribes and the tribal
sections that had come into existence under the monarchy in 1970, Qadafi abolished the legal
authority of tribes and reconfigured the traditional administrative boundaries into mixed tribal
zones. For filing up the lacunae that generated after abolition of the tribal system, Colonel
Qadhafi established the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1971 as the sole political party in the
country which served as the primary link between the regime and the people7. The ASU lacked
the authority to mobilize Libyans towards a political participation. Qadhafi’s regime was
incapable of procuring human resources and authority as sources of political power and resorted
to using coercion and veto to implement political authority.
Similar to the ASU, the committee system of people failed to generate spontaneous
popular participation, given that majority of Libyans remain indifferent to the Qadhafi’s system
of popular democracy. Colonel Qadhafi criticized the resistance to people’s committees as it
weakens the goals of rebellion, but in case of the Libyan people, the ostensible democratic
committee system was simply cosmetic, given the real authority vested within the Libyan leader.
This situation demonstrates the division of the formal administrative/political institutions and
extra-legal revolutionary mechanisms of political control became a continuing feature of Libyan
political life and persist even today8.
This phenomenon is commonly known as the resource curse, which affects both the
producing as well as the consuming nations. It not only leads to poverty but also paves a way to
7 Idris, Iffat. Libyan Political Economy. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1385). Birmingham, UK, 2016.
8 Lacher, Wolfram. "Libya’s local elites and the politics of alliance building." Mediterranean Politics 21.1 (2016):
64-85.

4CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
terrorism thus, empowering dictators and autocrats such as Gaddafi, thus, affecting the global
petroleum markets9. Regional and ethnic divides have long played a fundamental role in the
petrol politics of Libya. The eastern region of the nation produces a majority of oil in Libya and
includes 80 percent of its reserves. However, the region was neglected under Qaddafi and the
situation remained the same in Libya post ousting of Gaddafi irrespective of the fundamental role
that they played in the revolution to overthrow the former regime. On the south of the county,
minority Toureg and Tebu tribes have experienced cultural and political discrimination that was
caused by majority of the Arabs. In 2012, the grievances of the labors were not addressed
effectively due to the negligence of the government, which resulted in oil blockades and labor
strikes that ultimately affect the oil industry of Libya.
In Libya, areas that process and produce oil should receive a portion of revenues that are
produced by the local oil operations. It is important to ensure that population and their need must
be taken into consideration assuring that areas with more people suffering from poverty must
receive more resources10.
Constitution
Constitution is said to vary from one nation to another, however, only in terms of forms
and types of constitution. The main objective of every Constitution is common which is to
address the fundamental issues of a nation. Such issues are related to the economic and political
establishment of the nation and include the freedom rights that are guaranteed to every citizen of
the concerned country. In case of Libya, it had no unified and permanent Constitution, however,
since 1969 several constitutional proclamations and acts have been introduced that has the
9 Sizer, Lydia. "Libya’s Terrorism Challenge." (2017).
10 Elwerfelli, Ali Hassan. "The role of Oil in Economic Development-The case of Libya (1970-2010)." (2016).

5CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
impact of a Constitution. A constitutional proclamation was introduced in 1969 that repealed the
previous Libyan Constitution that was in force formerly. Later, in 1977, several essential
legislations and documents were issued which included the Promotion of Freedom Act no. 20 in
1991. These legal documents and legislations including the Constitutional Proclamation in 1969
were perceived as Constitutional Acts that were in force until 2011.
However, under Article 37 of the Constitutional proclamation stated that this
proclamation should also be treated as temporary until a permanent constitution has been issued.
Nevertheless, the Proclamation is still in effect. In order to reduce the potential counter-
revolutionary influence of the tribes and the tribal sections in 1970, Qadhafi abolished the legal
authority and reconfigured the traditional administrative borders into mixed tribal zones.
Moreover, local officials were replaced and dismissed by new local administrators. In order to
fill the lacunae left by the closure of the tribal system, Colonel Qadhafi established the Arab
Socialist Union [ASU] in 1971 as the sole political party in Libya for serving as the primary link
between the regime and the people.
Statutes
Under the monarchy, the legal system was fundamentally secular with the sharia law that
is used to deal with personal issues. Qadhafi’s confrontation with ulama began during 1970s
with the ‘Cultural Revolution’ that intend to replace all the existing sharia law. Qadhafi
introduced the Third Universal Theory [TUT] as a common-sense interpretation of Islam that
incorporated new set of laws that are based on the re-interpretation of the Quran that would be
beneficial to human kind.

6CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
The official separation between revolutionary and political authority was announced at
the General People’s Congress [GPC] and replaced the RCC to be the highest decision-making
authority in Libya. The GPC was the Libyan equivalent of Parliament that is presided by a
Secretary and comprise the secretaries of the BPCs, unions and professional association. The
GPC was responsible for criticizing and discussing about the issues that has the force of law and
acted as means to ratify the decision of the Colonel. From the perspective of Gramscian sense,
the Colonel authority imposed the GPC on the Libyan population as while it pretended to be an
institution of consensual decision-making, the private reality was that it served the Qadhafi
regime assisting hi to persist his domination.
Rules/ Regulations
In the absence of a permanent constitution in place, the Constitutional Declaration
introduced in 2011 has become a current supreme law after the ruling regime had fallen down.
The Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly has not yet finished incorporating provisions
relating to elimination of corruption from the system of the country11. As is well-known that the
country relies on the Libyan Criminal Code and a specialized anti-corruption law in the absence
of the a general anti-corruption law in place. The High Commission on the Application of
Standards of Patriotism and Integrity established the High Authority for the Application of
National Standards of Integrity, which was enforced after the post-revolution period.
Bribery, nepotism, abuse of office and embezzlement are commonly practiced despite
amounting to criminal activities. However, the Libyan government seems to have failed to
11 Pradella, Lucia, and Sahar Taghdisi Rad. "Libya and Europe: imperialism, crisis and migration." Third World
Quarterly 38.11 (2017): 2411-2427.

7CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
implement any anti-corruption law in an effective manner. This inefficacy is an outcome of the
inefficiency that exists within institutional framework that is actually accountable for the
enforcement of the anti-corruption laws within the country12. Moreover, the country lacks
institutional safeguards that are required to prevent corruption and exercise financial control
along with effective integrity mechanisms. In addition, the government officials fail to adhere to
the disclosure laws and instead are themselves involved in corruptive activities. Lack of
transparency in budget planning and implementation is not subjected to any independent audits,
thus, demonstrating lack of government accountability.
Public Procurement Sector
The public procurement sector carries out a very high fraud risk for companies that tend
to perform business in Libya. As is well known that favoritism is widely prevalent amongst the
procurement officials, it is also common that public funds are often diverted to individuals and
companies because of corruption13. Furthermore, irregular bribes and payments are common
practices within the procurement sector. There have been concerns relating to the capability of
the Libyan government to uphold the public procurement contracts that have concluded before
Gaddafi was ousted.
Nevertheless, the state-owned firms govern the domestic market, which provides ample
of opportunities for bribery and corruption. In addition, the Privatization and Investment Board
of Libya has made progress in transforming nationalized enterprises into privately owned
companies. Although foreign companies are permitted to take part in tenders, but the biding
12 Ali, Issa, and Charles Harvie. "OIL PRODUCTION REHABILITATION, FISCAL POLICY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN LIBYA: A FUTURE VIEW." (2015).
13Vandewalle, Dirk J. "5 LIBYA." Isolate Or Engage: Adversarial States, US Foreign Policy, and Public Diplomacy
(2015): 140.

8CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
criterion and the investment processes lack precision. Thus, it makes difficult if the foreign
companies are subjected to discrimination while opposing with local enterprises14.
Natural Resources
The high levels of corruption in all the other sectors suggest that the extractive industries
and natural resources in Libya are also subjected to corruption. The state-owned companies
dominate the gas and oil industry in Libya where the management of Libyan government of the
oil revenues lacks transparency15. In addition, the National Oil Corporation rejected the request
to release a report regarding its oil deals and transactions demonstrating its non-compliance with
the disclosure laws in 2013. Further, during mid-2014, the government established first oil
corruption committee of the country that has been conferred with the responsibility to investigate
the administrative and financial corruption within the oil industry.
As mentioned earlier, that the unstable countries have become a significant source of
minerals and energy especially for developed and developing worlds as is evident from the fact
that the Sub-Saharan African oil exports have developed by 40 percent since 2000 and Europe
receives a significant percent of its imported oil from Africa16. This has led to acceleration in the
economic growth in certain developing nations but their economic growth is often impeded due
to the instability and corruption prevalent in the resource-rich nations. It is often observed that oil
money that has been intended for the poor people within a nation is spent either on showcase
projects or ultimately on end up in the pockets of the rich instead of being used in a productive
investments.
14 Idris, Iffat. Libyan Political Economy. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1385). Birmingham, UK, 2016.
15 Mahdavi, Paasha. "Institutions and the ‘resource curse’: Evidence from cases of oil-related bribery." (2017).
16 Windsor, Duane. "7 A theory of public–private sustainable development partnerships." Corporate Responsibility
and Sustainable Development: Exploring the Nexus of Private and Public Interests (2015): 151.

9CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
Protection of Property Rights
Qaddafi’s populist economic model permeated the Libyans with a concept that they have
a strong ownership over their oil capital and raised their hope regarding the manner in which the
oil wealth would be disseminated amongst the population. Libyan property rights are intricate
owing to the former governmental policy actions and a weak regulatory environment. The
regulatory system of Libya lacks transparency, clarity with respect to the responsibilities and
function that are to be carried out by the Libyan government institutions. The Libyan
government eliminated all private property rights in 1978 along with all the private businesses
later within the same year17. A lack of coordination and harmony between the different bodies of
law and restricted institutional capacity with poor transparent procedures along with absence of
effective monitoring procedure makes it difficult to address the issues prevalent in the extractive
industry.
In the event of such vagueness associated with the property rights require the government
to develop a policy to include a new framework for property rights within the nation, given that
the former governmental approach to the enforcement, policy and law was not consistent. After
the ouster of the Qaddafi’s regime, the ambiguity in the property rights may be addressed by
implementing conflict-mediation measures apart from the other measures. In order to develop or
execute such measures, it is important that the country refer to the post-socialist regimes, post-
conflict situations or measures that have been adopted by former owners to deal with the issues
pertaining to restitution of property.
Despite the measures in place, a failure to consult and identify or share information with
new stakeholders in the extractive industry can be attributed to the ineffective planning and
17Ayub, Zainal Amin, et al. "State of Libya." Higher Education in the Middle East and North Africa. Springer,
Singapore, 2016. 107-126.

10CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
communication process results in restricted ability to identify the various interests within the
nation. Consequently, the national policies have failed to include the rights and practices with
respect to the extractive industry and natural resources18. In order to deal with these deficiencies,
the new government in position is expected to ensure transparent and equitable measures are in
place that must guarantee equal accessibility rights to public funds and petroleum contracts.
Conclusion
The Libyan regulatory system lacks clarity and signifies an absence of transparency with
respect to the responsibilities and function of the Libyan government institutions. Although the
legal framework provides criminal penalties against official corruption, the government had
failed to implement such law in an effective manner and the officials themselves have engaged
themselves in corrupt practices with impunity. Lack of transparency is evident in the government
management of oil revenues, security force and national economy. Despite being a signatory to
the UN Anti-corruption Convention, Libya is not a party to the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
Corruption persists to exist virtually in all the economic sectors, particularly within the oil sector
and government procurement.
Despite the prevalence of corruption and conflict within the oil sector that has split the
country between several parties that are contending for control, Libya’s future persist to depend
on the oil industry, generating significant amount of government revenue. The death of Gaddafi
has opened the door to political open-to-all ISIS and warring militias. In the middle of such
18Sawani, Youssef Mohammad. "Security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militias:
the challenges for state building in Libya." Contemporary Arab Affairs 10.2 (2017): 171-186.

11CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
political conflict, some have attached their expectations on the greatest natural resource: oil
sector.
Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s rule over the country has instilled the oil industry with a
mixture of socialist and capitalist personality that has become difficult to manage since he has
been removed from his reign. Under his rule, Libya developed as a typical petro-state in which
Qaddafi and his family were significantly responsible for playing a crucial role in benefitting
from and overseeing the oil wealth of the nation19. Qaddafi’s populist economic model
permeated the Libyans with a concept that they have a strong ownership over their oil wealth and
raised their hope regarding the manner in which the oil wealth would be disseminated amongst
the population. Under the Qaddafi rule, oil wealth of the country was usually distributed through
bloated public sector and sponsored basic commodities.
The transactional oil-distribution system along with the low levels of productivity
signified that the existing legal framework and the government failed to establish sophisticated
institutions of a varied economy or state institutions that could turn this wealth into greater
value20. Again, the lack of an effective bureaucracy within the nation has attributed to the
Qaddafi’s highly personalized hold on state affairs. Hence, his removal from power was a strike
at the very foundation of the system, thus, giving rise to competing armed groups and political
forces that intends to challenge, control or replace the mechanisms in which the oil wealth of the
people is disseminated. The oil sector became central to the power struggles as the militias
smuggle for oil for profit, disenfranchised communities blocking the energy infrastructure to
extort their share of wealth or new political forces seek regional control over wealth distribution.
19Lacher, Wolfram. "Libya’s local elites and the politics of alliance building." Mediterranean Politics 21.1 (2016):
64-85.
20Elwerfelli, Ali Hassan. "The role of Oil in Economic Development-The case of Libya (1970-2010)." (2016).

12CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
However, the NOC was successful in recovering from the above hindrances to regain
control over the nation by adopting several measures that would restrict oil smuggling and
prevent blocking of energy infrastructure, which includes community and mediation
engagement, public-shaming, threats, and exercising international influence. Nevertheless, the
NOC regained its jurisdiction over the oil sector of Libya, the entity itself started competing for
exercising control over Libya amongst the various other militia groups and political players in
the nation.
The UN and others from the international community have been supporting the nation for
the past two years by attempting to arbitrate between the military groups to reach at some sort of
political arrangement. However, an attempt to arrange for some kind of oil instead of a political
arrangement would have an appropriate. This would imply some sort of agreed and fair revenue
sharing formula of the oil wealth, given oil money is fundamental to the Libya crisis21.
The allegations of corruptive practices being prevalent within the nation have become a
significant concern that increase in oil production might enhance the loss of national wealth. This
further threatens to further incentivize the rise in oil profits and inflame instability as various
communities follow other means to defend their economic interests. In regards to the economy of
the country, Libya’s oil revenue is facing a deficit as expenditure exceeded the oil revenue of the
country. This economic reality signifies that a more effective system is required to ensure that oil
revenue is leveraged into greater value22.
21Windsor, Duane. "7 A theory of public–private sustainable development partnerships." Corporate Responsibility
and Sustainable Development: Exploring the Nexus of Private and Public Interests (2015): 151.
22Venables, Anthony J. "Using natural resources for development: why has it proven so difficult?." Journal of
Economic Perspectives 30.1 (2016): 161-84.

13CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
In regards to the security of the nation, the trusted central authority that has been
established to distribute oil wealth has also failed to create zero-sum competition amongst the
armed group, given that controlling the oil wealth implies controlling the nation. The
transparency in the distribution of wealth and the need for a central decision-making body shall
be effective to deal with the wealth management issues. To ensure longer-term stability,
significant portions of the oil wealth collected by the NOC must be divided to contribute them in
investments, particularly in the crumbling oil infrastructure, thus, ensuring persisting capacity of
sustainable production23.
Revenue sharing is based on four essential principles, namely, derivation, equity,
population and need. The adoption of these principles is effective as is evident from the progress
in Indonesia and Mexico. Indonesia implemented these principles in 2001 to decentralize the
advantages of oil wealth, thus, contributing to the democratization process adopted by the nation
after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Similarly, Mexico uses a resource revenue-sharing scheme as a
result of which the oil revenues of the country were disseminated in the Mexican system
throughout all the states equally along with a small additional distribution made to the oil-
producing municipalities in the form of a reward. In Libya, areas that process and produce oil
must receive a share of revenues that is generated by the local oil operations.
Libya has very weak civil society traditions; however, the post-revolution period
demonstrates a flourishing civil society and several NGOs have dedicated their work to advocate
transparency especially within the energy industry24. Nevertheless, after the disintegration of
political leadership in 2014, several attempts have been made to promote transparency, which
23Lacher, Wolfram. "Libya’s local elites and the politics of alliance building." Mediterranean Politics 21.1 (2016):
64-85.
24 Eregha, P. B., and Ekundayo Peter Mesagan. "Oil resource abundance, institutions and growth: Evidence from oil
producing African countries." Journal of Policy Modeling 38.3 (2016): 603-619.

14CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
has often resulted in legal proceedings as well. Consequently, the NGOs are left to operate at the
local level. This signifies that the attempts made by the civil society to eliminate corruption have
been subjected to restrictions.
Further, there remains a scope for seeking assistance from international community as
some of the individuals associated with this corruption reside or invest in European capitals and
by attempting to restrict their activities might result in eliminating the feelings of distrust
amongst the Libyans25. Further, the international community must ensure that NOC in Libya
remain independent and secure the foreign investment that is required to assure production from
the oil fields in Libya remain sustainable and viable. Although it is a fact that these measures
does not guarantee to eliminate the security challenges but will definitely assist in supporting
decentralized country to become stabilized.
If Libya can reorganize the management of its natural wealth, there are possibilities that
the country might transform oil from a divisive force into a tie that holds the people and regions
of the country together. In the event of failure to manage the oil wealth properly, an unfortunate
downward twist of ethnic conflict, illegal violence and economic stagnation is predictable26. A
successful oil policy in Libya shall include revenue sharing, cash transfers to citizen, dampen
separatist tendencies, nurture grassroots democracy and demonstrate that the new democratic
government is capable of delivering economic and social expectations. The policy must ensure
that it is capable to guard against the corrosive corruption that was considered as the hallmark of
Qaddaffi’s regime.
25Furness, Mark. "Priorities for International Co-operation with Libya: A Development Perspective." Mediterranean
Politics22.4 (2017): 545-552.
26 Vandewalle, Dirk J. "5 LIBYA." Isolate Or Engage: Adversarial States, US Foreign Policy, and Public Diplomacy
(2015): 140.

15CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA

16CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
References
Ali, Issa, and Charles Harvie. "OIL PRODUCTION REHABILITATION, FISCAL POLICY
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LIBYA: A FUTURE VIEW." (2015).
Ayub, Zainal Amin, et al. "State of Libya." Higher Education in the Middle East and North
Africa. Springer, Singapore, 2016. 107-126.
Elhuni, Redha M., and M. Munir Ahmad. "Key Performance Indicators for Sustainable
Production Evaluation in Oil and Gas Sector." Procedia Manufacturing 11 (2017): 718-724.
Elwerfelli, Ali Hassan. "The role of Oil in Economic Development-The case of Libya (1970-
2010)." (2016).
Eregha, P. B., and Ekundayo Peter Mesagan. "Oil resource abundance, institutions and growth:
Evidence from oil producing African countries." Journal of Policy Modeling 38.3 (2016): 603-
619.
Etelawi, Abdulrazag Mohamed, Keith A. Blatner, and Jill McCluskey. "Sustainability and
Depletion Accounting: A Case Study of Oil in Libya." Environment and Natural Resources
Research 7.1 (2017): 34.
Furness, Mark. "Priorities for International Co-operation with Libya: A Development
Perspective." Mediterranean Politics22.4 (2017): 545-552.
Heydemann, Steven. "Civil War, Economic Governance & State Reconstruction in the Arab
Middle East." Dædalus 147.1 (2018): 48-63.

17CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
Hove, Mediel. "Post-Gaddafi Libya and the African Union: Challenges and the road to
sustainable peace." Journal of Asian and African Studies 52.3 (2017): 271-286.
Idris, Iffat. Libyan Political Economy. GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1385). Birmingham,
UK, 2016.
Lacher, Wolfram. "Libya’s local elites and the politics of alliance building." Mediterranean
Politics 21.1 (2016): 64-85.
Mahbob, Mohamed. The Impact of the Oil Sector and Political Conflicts on the Libyan
Economy. Diss. Western Illinois University, 2017.
Mahdavi, Paasha. "Institutions and the ‘resource curse’: Evidence from cases of oil-related
bribery." (2017).
Pradella, Lucia, and Sahar Taghdisi Rad. "Libya and Europe: imperialism, crisis and
migration." Third World Quarterly 38.11 (2017): 2411-2427.
Sawani, Youssef Mohammad. "Security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of militias: the challenges for state building in Libya." Contemporary Arab
Affairs 10.2 (2017): 171-186.
Sizer, Lydia. "Libya’s Terrorism Challenge." (2017).
Vandewalle, Dirk J. "5 LIBYA." Isolate Or Engage: Adversarial States, US Foreign Policy, and
Public Diplomacy (2015): 140.
Venables, Anthony J. "Using natural resources for development: why has it proven so
difficult?." Journal of Economic Perspectives 30.1 (2016): 161-84.

18CORRUPTION AND OIL INDUSTRY: LIBYA
Watanabe, Lisa. "Libya's Future: Uncertain, Despite a Political Agreement." Middle East
Policy 23.4 (2016): 114-122.