Criminal Law Mooting Moot Proforma Case Study 2022

CRIMINAL LAW MOOTING - MOOT PROFORMA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
BETWEEN
R Appellant
-And-
Waitrose
Respondent
SKELETON ARGUMENT
ON BEHALF OF THE LEAD/JUNIOR COUNSEL FOR THE
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
Name:
Student Number:
Moot judge:
First ground of appeal:

Could the jury use the principle of defence of necessity to evaluate and justify the actions by
Charles Waitrose?, if so, do the three conditions for the defence as set out in A (Children)
allow the jury to consider the respondent's reasonable belief, or are they distinctively
objective?
Submission(s) on the first ground of appeal:
It is submitted that the defence of necessity should be available to the cases of murder
outside the certain situations that arose in A (Children). Whether the necessity can be used as
a defence for murder has always been a very controversial topic in the Anglo-American law.
In Queen v. Dudley and Stevenson1, it was determined that defence of necessity is not always
accepted by court. By sacrificing the lives of others to protect themselves or to exchange for
more people's survival behavior, the court refused to accept the necessity to defend it, and
elaborated on the reasons for refusing to defend. However, Waitrose case is unique. Charles
Waitrose seeks to rely on the necessity-type of defence by arguing that he should not be
convicted of a criminal offense because his conduct was justifiable that he did more good
than harm in suffocating her daughter Florence Waitrose with a pillow when he or her
daughter could no longer cope with the painful situation Florence’s terminal illness. Charles
Waitrose situation allows Jury to consider the defendant’s reasonable belief through
understanding the nature of his conduct, how the defendant arrived at a rational decision and
how he exercise self-control.
The pain and suffering of both Charles Waitrose and her daughter Florence due to the
terminal illness affected the defendant so much that he lost self-control and decided to
suffocate her daughter Florence. The defendant’s loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger
and qualifies to make the defence of necessity available to the defendant.
1 . (1884) 14 QBD 273

It is apparent that Charles Waitrose, Florence's father, had a feeling that they could no
longer cope her pain and suffering. The feeling made him to develop trauma like symptoms2.
Such symptoms of trauma characterized by irritability and hopelessness are known to cause
increased arousal and hence leading to the victim discharging violence and murder especially
given the fact the Charles Waitrose perceived the suffering as most likely to affect his
personal health condition and a threat to his health safety. In short Charles Waitrose suffered
from Trauma and the condition was likely to make him react in a wholly disproportionate
manner to the threats caused by his daughter’s condition to his personal well-being.
As presented in Queen v Dudley and Stevenson3, the reason for supporting murder is
mainly to say that under the persecution of the living environment, in order to let most people
survive, some people must make sacrifices. The defendants considered sacrificing one life to
save three. Therefore, the overall benefits gained are the highest! Therefore, killing Parker is
correct4. This logic of judging whether a behavior is moral or not is in line with the
"utilitarianism" theory put forward by Bentham, a British political philosopher in the 18th
century. Bentham believes that whether a behavior is correct and fair depends only on the
outcome of this behavior, whether it brings the greatest happiness and the least pain. With the
sum of happiness, minus the sum of pain, and getting "utility", any behavior, as long as it can
maximize "utility", is moral. Against the murderous voice, the same voice: murder is murder!
The act of killing is always wrong. No one has the right to control the lives of others in their
own hands. When people eat people, even if they increase the "utility" of society, the
behavior itself is not morally sufficient. Everyone has an innate right to life5.
Authorities:
1. R v Janiszewski (2012) EWCA Crim 2556
2 Michael J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law (13th Edition, Oxford 2015)
3 (1884) 14 QBD 273
4 (2012) EWCA Crim 2556
5 [1989] 1 W.L.R. 740

2. R v Johnson (Christopher) [1989] 1 W.L.R. 740
3. Coroners and Justice Act 2009 c. 25
4. R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273
Second ground of appeal:
Could defendant be defended on basis of foresight virtual certainty as provided in House of
Lords decision in R v Woollin6
Submission(s) on the second ground of appeal:
It is submitted that where the charge is murder jury is not expected to make inferences
unless the jury feel sure that serious bodily harm or death was a virtual certainty that bars
some unforeseen interventions due to defendant’s actions. What level of foresight is
considered an indirect intention? The following cases explain this:
R v Moloney 7
In this case, judge concluded that if the defendant can foresee his behavior and make
death "a possible outcome," even if he does not wish to have this result, he has a criminal
intent8. As a result, the accused murdered. Two questions guide the determination of the
criminal intent (1) The natural consequences of death and real serious injury or not? (2) Does
the defendant understand that death and genuine serious injury are the natural consequences
of his actions? Positive answer implies criminal intent.
R v Hancock & Shankland9
During the strike of the miners, the defendant and another person threw some
coagulated triple-body blocks from the bridge to the road below, in order to block the road
and prevent a ride. One of the blocks hit the windshield of the taxi and the driver died. In the
murder trial, the judge cited the guidelines used by Lord Bridge in the Moloney case10.
6 [1999] AC 82
7 [1985] 1 AC 905
8 Montoro, Arielle, ‘People V. Dubarry - an Exploration into the Complexities of Charging a Defendant with
Both Intentional Murder and Depraved Indifference Murder,’ (2017) 33 Touro Law Review 489
9 [1985] 3 WLR 1014
10 [1985] 1 AC 905

However, the House of Lords overturned the murder of the lower house and changed the
manslaughter. The judges ruled that the guidelines used in the Moloney case had
shortcomings because they did not lead the jury to consider the possibility of things going on;
the jury should be guided to ask: (1) the natural nature of death and the actual serious injury
or not possible consequences?11 (2) Does the defendant realize that death and real serious
injury are the natural and possible consequences of his actions?12
R V Woollin
Charles Waitrose admits that such was the case as interpreted in A (children) and it is
consistent with the earlier house of lords decision in R V Woollin13. In this case, Woollin was
convicted of murdering his three-month-old child. The prosecution claimed that Woollin was
out of control and threw his three-month-old son on a hard ground, and his son died as a
result of the skull rupture. The prosecution accepts that Woollin may not be eager for the
death or serious physical injury of his son while acting, but has the intention of causing
serious harm to his son. In his defense, Woollin denied these intentions and claimed that he
never thought about the consequences of his actions when he threw his son, and claimed to be
provoked. The judge guided the jury on the basis of Lane's latest guidance model in the
Florida Bar v. Nedick 14. However, he continued to tell the jury that he should be convicted of
murder if he is satisfied that he understands and understands that his actions are "significantly
dangerous" and can cause serious bodily harm when he throws his son. The jury finally
sentenced Woollin to murder. The defendant refused to accept the appeal but was dismissed;
he continued to appeal to the House of Lords on the grounds that the trial judge did not
follow the Nedrick case and misled the jury. The House of Lords overturned the murder
ruling, changed the manslaughter, sent the appeal court to sentence, and criticized the trial
11 Andrew Ashworth & Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th Edition, Oxford 2013)
12 [1985] 3 WLR 1014
13 [1999] AC 82
14 [1992] 603 So. 2d 502

judge for guiding the second half of the jury to quote "significant danger" is wrong, deviating
from Nedrick's guidelines, and obscuring "intention" and "recklessness".
Bundle of Authorities:
1. R v Woollin [1999] AC 82
2. R v Moloney [1985] 1 AC 905
3. R v Hancock & Shankland [1985] 3 WLR 1014

References
Andrew Ashworth & Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th Edition, Oxford 2013)
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 c. 25
Mannheimer, Michael J. Zydney, ‘Not the Crime but the Cover-Up: A Deterrence-Based
Rationale for the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula,’ (2011) 86 Indiana Law Journal 879
Michael J. Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law (13th Edition, Oxford 2015)
Montoro, Arielle, ‘People V. Dubarry - an Exploration into the Complexities of Charging a
Defendant with Both Intentional Murder and Depraved Indifference Murder,’ (2017) 33
Touro Law Review 489
R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273
R v Hancock & Shankland [1985] 3 WLR 1014
R v Janiszewski (2012) EWCA Crim 2556
R v Johnson (Christopher) [1989] 1 W.L.R. 740
R v Moloney [1985] 1 AC 905
R v Woollin [1999] AC 82
The Florida Bar v. Nedick [1992] 603 So. 2d 502
Yetter, Michael J., ‘Gutierrez V. Smith, a Curious Case of Depraved Indifference Murder,’
(2014) 77 Albany Law Review 1201