Destroying Boko Haram Insurgency at Nigeria Borders

Boko Haram is the most significant threat to Nigeria, causing tens of thousands of deaths and millions of displacements. The neighboring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon have offered to cooperate with Nigeria to stop the progress of the militant group. The rise of Boko Haram is the result of deep religious and ethnic cleavages, political corruption, and inequality in Nigeria. The group started to radicalize between episodic clashes that took place between Muslims and Christians. The group's tactics include kidnappings, suicide bombings, and destruction of property, particularly schools.

1
Title: Destroy and end Boko Haram insurgency operations at the Nigeria borders.
- How can Nigeria work with neighboring countries: Niger, Chad, Cameroon to destroy
and end Boko Haram operations in those regions?

2
Introduction:
Boko Haram can be considered as the most significant threat to the most populous country of
Africa. As a result of the insurgency, which was led by this Islamist group, tens of thousands of
people have lost their lives and millions of people have been displaced during the recent years.
There are times when the violence spilled over the borders of Nigeria into other countries
situated in the Lake Chad Basin.1 According to certain experts the brutal campaign carried out by
Boko Haram, including the burning of villages, attacks on schools and a large number of
abductions, can be considered as a respond to the long-standing, religious tensions, widening
economic disparity and the political corruption in Nigeria.2 The heavy handedness of and the
police and counterterrorism tactics adopted by the government have also fueled the flame of the
group, according to the analysts.3
The government of Nigeria has been using its regional power and influence for controlling how
the Boko Haram features on African agenda and that of international security. However,
although reluctantly it has started to accept that it requires external assistance.4 With the spread
of insurgency by Boko Haram, the neighboring countries of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon
1 Al Jazeera (2016). “Buhari: Last Boko Haram base taken in Sambisa Forest”. December 24 2016.
2 Agbiboa, D., (2014) Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria, Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 37:41–67,
3 Agbiboa, D., (2013) (Sp)oiling Domestic Terrorism? Boko Haram and State Response, Peace Review: A Journal
of Social Justice, 25:431-438
4 Andzongo, Sylvain (2015). “Nigeria’s Buhari in Cameroon seeks closer partnership against Boko Haram”. Reuters
News, July 29 2015

3
have offered to cooperate with Nigeria to stop the progress of the militant group. The search for
regional solution achieved the momentum in May 2014.5
In October 2014, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) agreed regarding a plan for
deploying a multinational joint task force to deal with the activities of Boko Haram. According
to the terms of regional and global security governance related with the legitimate use of military
force, the proposal required form of authorization by the African Union and also by the UN
Security Council.6 Consequently, the African Union formally authorized the task force for an
initial period of 12 months. It also called on the Security Council for doing the same and also to
provide logistical and financial support to the task force.
What is Boko Haram: it is an Islamist group that is based in the North East of Nigeria. The group
was created by Mohammed Yusuf, who is an influential Islamist cleric from the Borno State, in
2002. The main objective of this group, which started as an offshoot of the Salafi movement,
which is a branch of Sunni Islam is the establishment of fundamentalist Islamic state that has
Sharia criminal courts.7 The followers of the movement were known as Yusuffiya comprise of
the northern Islamic students and clerics.8 However, they also include professionals has a lot of
5 Assanvo, William et al. (2016). “West Africa Report – Assessing the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko
Haram”. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Issue 19
6 Bodansky, Yossef (2014). “Boko Haram – A Serious Threat”. Institut für Strategie- Politik- und
Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW). ISPSW Strategy Series no. 275
7 BBC Monitoring (2015). “Is Islamic State shaping Boko Haram media?” March 4 2015.
8 Barkindo, Atta (2016). ”Boko Haram-IS Connection: Local and Regional Implications”. Counter Terrorist Trends
and Analysis, 8:6

4
them are struggling to find a job.9 However, it is difficult to exactly trace the size of Boko
Haram. But according to an estimate by the US intelligence officials, the hard-core militants are
anywhere between four and six thousand.10 However there are other analysts, according to whom
the membership of the group can be three times more. At this point, it also it should be noted that
a large number of the fighters of the group and also its victims are likely to be Kanuri Muslims,
who are the major ethnic group in Borno.11
Political and social economic background: according to a large number of analysts, it is believed
that the rise of Boko Haram was the result of deep religious and ethnic cleavages that have
troubled Nigeria for long. During the nearly half century tool of the British, various territories
and people having little in common, apart from geographic proximity have been merged. There
are nearly 350 ethnic groups in Nigeria, which include the Hausa and Fulani (29%), Yaruba
(21%) the Igbo (18%) the Ijaw (10%) and Kanuri (4%).12
Another significant thing that needs to be noted in this context is that the nation has been roughly
divided between the North dominated by the Muslims and the South, dominated by the
9 Barkindo, Atta (2016). “Understanding Boko Haram’s factional Structure”. HIS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency
Monitor, 16:6.
10 BBC News (2016). “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamist Group?”. November 24 2016
11 Botha, Anneli et.al. (2017). “Understanding Nigerian citizens’ perspectives on Boko Haram”. Institute for
Security Studies (ISS). ISS Monograph number 196
12 Ayodele, B., Olaniyan, A., Bamidele, O., (2014) "Seized by Sleaze: The Siege of Corruption and a Search for
Workable Options in Nigeria," International Social Science Review: Vol. 90: Iss. 1,

5
Christians.13 For decades, these two largest religious groups of the country have generally
followed an informal power rotation agreement regarding the presidency, even if political
friction is still a major factor in the present unrest in the country.14
Another factor that has significantly contributed to the rise of the group is the record of political
corruption and inequality in Nigeria. Although, Nigeria is the biggest economy of Africa, and it
is also the home to vast amount of natural resources, still Nigeria is one of the poorest
populations of the continent.15 Nearly half of the 200 million people of Nigeria live on less than
$1.90 per day. It is also worth mentioning that poverty is much higher in the northern regions
dominated by the Muslims. Oil also played a significant role in the creation of economic
inequality in the country. The reason is that and the oil revenues have been tightly held by a
small number of elites. The corrupt ministers of the government have also been charged with
embezzling tens of billions of dollars from the oil sector.
Therefore, analysts believed that the rise of Boko Haram also signifies the maturation of long
festering extremist impulses that were deeply present in the social reality of the northern part of
the country.16 They claim that Boko Haram in itself is in effect and not a cause. The group can be
13 Blanchard, Lauren Ploch (2016). ”Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions”. Congressional Research
Service. 4.
14 Hall, J., (2015) Boko Haram extremists 'agree to release 216 kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls in exchange for 16
brutal terror leaders, MailOnline, July 2015
15 Boyle, Joe (2009). ”Nigeria’s Taliban’ Enigma”. BBC News, 31 July 2009
16 Burke, Jason (2017). ”Rise and fall of Isis: its dream of a caliphate is over, so what now?”. The Guardian, 21
October 2017

6
described as a symptom of the failure of the government for decades and elite delinquency,
which finally resulted in to social chaos.17 After Nigeria gained independence in 1960, it have to
deal with a wave of instability, which included at least half a dozen coups, decades of rule by the
military and the Civil War (during 1967 to 1970). This war alone claimed nearly 2,000,000 lives
and a large number of people lost their lives as a result of the blockade induced famine.
The rise of the group: During the initial years of Boko Haram, Yusuf was critical of the northern
Muslims or they have participated in what he considered to be an illegitimate, non-Islamic
state.18 Therefore in context of northern Nigeria, Yusuf's vision was extreme, but not so extreme
that it may be considered as unrecognizable. In different ways, most of the Muslims in the
northern part of the country believe that Islam provides a framework that should be used for
shaping public life.19
The group started to radicalize between episodic clashes that took place between Muslims and
Christians. At the same time, security forces adopted very harsh measures against the suspected
militants.20 The flashpoint for Boko Haram was in 2009 when as a result of a police crackdown,
an armed uprising was set off in Bauchi State, and soon it spread throughout the Northeast. More
17 Byman, Daniel (2005). Deadly Connections. States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press
18 Cooper, Helene (2016). ”Boko Haram and ISIS are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Says”. The New York
Times, April 20 2016
19 Daily Mail (2017). “Boko Haram in deadly ambush on motorists in NE Nigeria”, January 30 2017
20 Chothia, Farouk (2015) “Boko Haram Crisis: How have Nigeria´s militants become so strong?” BBC News,
January 26 2015

7
than 800 people were killed by the government forces.21 These included a large number of
suspected members of the group in the ensuing protests. After the uprising, Yusuf was murdered
when he was in police custody.22
Evolution of Boko Haram: after the death of Yusuf, Boko Haram was divided into at least two
factions. Today, one section is headed by Abubakar Shekau. This section appears to be focused
on fighting with the government of Nigeria in the Northeast.23 On many occasions, a claim has
been made by the military of Nigeria that Shekau had been killed, but the videos of the leader
can also be seen as recently as 2018.24
On the other hand, the second faction of Boko Haram has been led by Yusuf's son, Abu Musab
al-Barkawi for the last two years. It is said that this section has similar ultimate goals like the
Shekau, but it has less strict view regarding what amounts to apostasy. According to some
analysts, the increasing grisly nature of the atrocities committed by Boko Haram has resulted in
the divide within the group. According to the Nigerian security officials and Boko Haram
analysts, varying assessments can be offered regarding the links of the group with other Islamist
21 Cave, David (2016) ”Strategy and adaptation in counterinsurgency: Lessons for the Australian Defence Force
from the defeat of the Tamil Tigers” Australian Army Journal, 13(2):23-45
22 New African, (2015) How Boko Haram can be defeated, New African, January 2015
23 Ewi, M and U. Salifu (2016). “Money Talks – A key reason youths join Boko Haram” . Institute for Security
Studies (ISS). Policy Brief 98
24 Jackson, R., Sørensen, G., (2013) Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches, Oxford
University Press, Fifth Edition

8
militant groups.25 These include Al Qaeda, and also the self proclaimed Islamic State. In 2015
the group declared its allegiance to the IS, proclaiming itself to be the West African Province of
the Islamic State. According to some experts, by focusing on the affiliation to these groups, the
context in which Boko Haram emerged has been downplayed. On the other hand, according to
some others, ignoring the evidence of the links of Boko Haram with other Islamist militant
groups may obstruct the understanding regarding the insurgency.26
Tactics of Boko Haram: a large number of activities of the group are the ones that are typically
related with terrorism. These include kidnappings, suicide bombings, destruction of property,
particularly the schools. During the recent years, the group has increased its attacks on soft
targets or places that are relatively unprotected.27 More human and children are being used as
suicide bombers by the group. Moving ahead of Nigeria, most of the activities of the group are
taking place in northern Cameroon, Chad and Niger.28
The name of Boko Haram is taken in context of the death of more than 37,000 persons since
2011. The figures have been affirmed by CFR's Nigeria Security Tracker, monitoring the quality
of violence taking place in the nation. Nearly half of the persons killed were being suspected as
25 Farge, Emma (2016). ”Hundreds of Boko Haram fighters surrender in Chad”. Reuters, November 12 2016
26 Newman, E. (2006) Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:749–772
27 Freedman, Lawrence (2013). Strategy. A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 91-92, 205-208
28 Hill, J., N., C., (2013) Religious Extremism in Northern Nigeria, Past and Present, The Round Table, 2013 Vol.
102, No. 3, 235–244

9
the militants of Boko Haram while around 45 percent of those killed were civilians and the rest
of the 5% were the members of security forces.29
Response of Nigerian government: With the help of its neighboring states, including Niger,
Chad, Cameroon, the security forces of Nigeria have been successful in making significant gains
against Boko Haram. However, it appears that the momentum to effectively deal with the
insurgent group has somewhat slow down during the recent years.30 The result is that the
community is present in the Northeast region of the country are still beleaguered.
Pres. Goodluck Jonathan initiated a major offensive against the insurgent group in 2013. He also
declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. Even if the security forces
of the country claimed to achieve some success in pushing the militants of Boko Haram, out of
the cities, the attacks by the militants still take place with regularity in the rural areas. At the
same time, the government troops have also been accused of the violation of human rights which
includes extrajudicial killings.
During 2014 into the 15 the attacks by Boko Haram increased considerably. This raised the
suspicions regarding the progress made by the government in containing the militant group. The
operations of Boko Haram were particularly brazen, and it claimed a bombing of Abuja bus
station in which around 100 persons were killed on April 14, 2014. This was the same day when
29 Osumah, O., Aghedo I., (2012) The Boko Haram Uprising: how should Nigeria respond? Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 33, No. 5, 2012, pp 853–869
30 Freeman, Colin (2015). “South African mercenaries’ secret war on Boko Haram”. The Telegraph. May 10 2015

10
the group abducted more than 200 schoolgirls from the northeastern town of Chibok. However,
the latter attacks resulted in international response and many people severely criticized the slow
response of the government of Nigeria at the time.31
In 2015, the elected president of the country, Muhammadu Buhari introduces some modest
reforms with a view to improve the effectiveness of the government forces against Boko Haram.
In this regard, it needs to be noted that Buhari was a former military dictator during 1983 to
1985. He had moved the headquarters of the military from Abuja to Maiduguri and also
increased funding for conducting operations in that area. He also appointed new leadership for
the military.
Support provided by neighboring countries: in order to deal with Boko Haram, Nigeria military
support from its neighboring countries, including Chad, Niger and Cameroon. These countries
are also increasingly suffering attacks during the upsurge of Boko Haram. . Consequently after
2015, Niger, Chad and Cameroon deployed a large number of troops as a part of the
multinational force that has been authorized by the African Union. Credit goes to the coalition
for helping the military of Nigeria in retaking most of the territory that was claimed by the
militant group and also in reducing violence associated with the group to the same level as before
2014.32
31 Frisch, Ethan (2011). ”Insurgencies are Organizations Too: Organizational Structure and the Effectiveness of
Insurgent Strategy”. Peace and Conflict Review, 6:1
32 Sampson, I., (2015) Between Boko Haram and the Joint Task Force: Assessing the Dilemma of Counter-
Terrorism and Human Rights in Northern Nigeria. Journal of African Law, 59, pp 25-63

11
It also needs to be mentioned in this regard that security partners from beyond Africa have also
offered their help to Nigeria. For example, Boko Haram has been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization by the United States in late 2013.33 However at times, military assistance has been
withheld by Washington as a result of the concerns regarding the counterterrorism strategy
adopted by Nigeria and its alleged abuse of human rights. After the abductions that took place in
Chibok, the United Kingdom, France and the United States also pledged additional support to
Nigeria, which included equipment and intelligence support. The assistance provided by the
United States amounted to more than $400 million by early 2016. In the same way, in early
2018, Donald J. Trump, the US president posts and nearly $600 million deal for selling a dozen
Super Tucano aircraft to Nigeria for the purpose of supporting its counterterrorism activities.34
It also needs to be mentioned that on its part, the UN Security Council also introduce economic
sanctions and arms embargo against Boko Haram in 2014. According to the analysts, this move
was however, mainly symbolic. The reason was that the financial assets and movements of the
militants of Boko Haram are not easy to track.35
33 Gaffey, Conor (2017). ”War on Boko Haram: Nigeria is hunting Africa’s most wanted terrorist, but will killing
him end the conflict?” Newsweek July 29 2017
34 Taylor, L., (2014) Boko Haram Terrorism, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 21:1 2014
35 Gaffey, Conor (2017) “Boko Haram Factions ‘Cannot Pay Fighters’ Salaries’ UN Report” Newsweek, February
8th 2017

12
Wider risks to the region: as a result of the activities of Boko Haram. There has been instability
across the Lake Chad Basin. This unrest resulted in displacement of millions of people and they
were also both at the risk of starvation, education and health services were jeopardized, humanity
in aid efforts were stalled and the government authority in Nigeria was undercut within the
country and abroad. As a result of the activities of Boko Haram, the international investors were
also scared off.36 This is particularly true in case of Nigeria where it adds to a list of threats,
including other militant groups.37 The target of these groups is the oil infrastructure in the Niger
Delta and the sectarian conflict taking place in the middle belt of the country. The result is that
since 2011, the inflow of foreign direct investment has decreased significantly. It fell from a high
of nearly $9 billion to $3.5 billion in 2017.
A signal is provided by the recent attacks and addictions that even if the militants of Boko
Haram have been pushed into remote areas, but still, the insurgent group is likely to continue
with the destruction of development of the region for some time.38 It can be said in the end that
Boko Haram represents an ugly paradox. While the ideas of the group have limited appeal, but it
has considerable staying power although it is possible to crush the militant group with the help of
military but the violence committed by the state fuels the narrative of victimhood of the group.
36 Haruna, Abdulkareem and Agency Report (2016). “After losing Sambisa, Boko Haram fighters surrender to Niger
Republic authorities”. Premium Times Nigeria, December 28 2016
37 George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennet. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005, 205-232.
38 Gaffey, Conor (2016) “Boko Haram, 76 starving members surrender to Nigerian military”, Newsweek, March 3
2016

13

14
Bibliography
Al Jazeera (2016). “Buhari: Last Boko Haram base taken in Sambisa Forest”. December 24
2016.
Agbiboa, D., (2014) Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in
Nigeria, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37:41–67,
Agbiboa, D., (2013) (Sp)oiling Domestic Terrorism? Boko Haram and State Response, Peace
Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 25:431-438
Andzongo, Sylvain (2015). “Nigeria’s Buhari in Cameroon seeks closer partnership against
Boko Haram”. Reuters News, July 29 2015
Assanvo, William et al. (2016). “West Africa Report – Assessing the Multinational Joint Task
Force against Boko Haram”. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Issue 19
Bodansky, Yossef (2014). “Boko Haram – A Serious Threat”. Institut für Strategie- Politik- und
Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW). ISPSW Strategy Series no. 275
BBC Monitoring (2015). “Is Islamic State shaping Boko Haram media?” March 4 2015.
Barkindo, Atta (2016). ”Boko Haram-IS Connection: Local and Regional Implications”. Counter
Terrorist Trends and Analysis, 8:6
Barkindo, Atta (2016). “Understanding Boko Haram’s factional Structure”. HIS Jane’s
Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor, 16:6.
BBC News (2016). “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamist Group?”. November 24 2016

15
Botha, Anneli et.al. (2017). “Understanding Nigerian citizens’ perspectives on Boko Haram”.
Institute for Security Studies (ISS). ISS Monograph number 196
Ayodele, B., Olaniyan, A., Bamidele, O., (2014) "Seized by Sleaze: The Siege of Corruption and
a Search for Workable Options in Nigeria," International Social Science Review: Vol. 90: Iss. 1,
Blanchard, Lauren Ploch (2016). ”Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions”.
Congressional Research Service. 4.
Hall, J., (2015) Boko Haram extremists 'agree to release 216 kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls in
exchange for 16 brutal terror leaders, MailOnline, July 2015
Boyle, Joe (2009). ”Nigeria’s Taliban’ Enigma”. BBC News, 31 July 2009
Burke, Jason (2017). ”Rise and fall of Isis: its dream of a caliphate is over, so what now?”. The
Guardian, 21 October 2017
Byman, Daniel (2005). Deadly Connections. States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
Cooper, Helene (2016). ”Boko Haram and ISIS are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Says”.
The New York Times, April 20 2016
Daily Mail (2017). “Boko Haram in deadly ambush on motorists in NE Nigeria”, January 30
2017
Chothia, Farouk (2015) “Boko Haram Crisis: How have Nigeria´s militants become so strong?”
BBC News, January 26 2015

16
Cave, David (2016) ”Strategy and adaptation in counterinsurgency: Lessons for the Australian
Defence Force from the defeat of the Tamil Tigers” Australian Army Journal, 13(2):23-45
New African, (2015) How Boko Haram can be defeated, New African, January 2015
Ewi, M and U. Salifu (2016). “Money Talks – A key reason youths join Boko Haram”. Institute
for Security Studies (ISS). Policy Brief 98
Jackson, R., Sørensen, G., (2013) Introduction to International Relations, Theories and
Approaches, Oxford University Press, Fifth Edition
Farge, Emma (2016). ”Hundreds of Boko Haram fighters surrender in Chad”. Reuters,
November 12 2016
Newman, E. (2006) Exploring the “Root Causes” of Terrorism, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
29:749–772
Freedman, Lawrence (2013). Strategy. A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 91-92,
205-208
Hill, J., N., C., (2013) Religious Extremism in Northern Nigeria, Past and Present, The Round
Table, 2013 Vol. 102, No. 3, 235–244
Osumah, O., Aghedo I., (2012) The Boko Haram Uprising: how should Nigeria respond? Third
World Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2012, pp 853–869
Freeman, Colin (2015). “South African mercenaries’ secret war on Boko Haram”. The
Telegraph. May 10 2015

17
Frisch, Ethan (2011). ”Insurgencies are Organizations Too: Organizational Structure and the
Effectiveness of Insurgent Strategy”. Peace and Conflict Review, 6:1
Sampson, I., (2015) Between Boko Haram and the Joint Task Force: Assessing the Dilemma of
Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights in Northern Nigeria. Journal of African Law, 59, pp 25-63
Gaffey, Conor (2017). ”War on Boko Haram: Nigeria is hunting Africa’s most wanted terrorist,
but will killing him end the conflict?” Newsweek July 29 2017
Taylor, L., (2014) Boko Haram Terrorism, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
Vol. 21:1 2014
Gaffey, Conor (2017) “Boko Haram Factions ‘Cannot Pay Fighters’ Salaries’ UN Report”
Newsweek, February 8th 2017
Haruna, Abdulkareem and Agency Report (2016). “After losing Sambisa, Boko Haram fighters
surrender to Niger Republic authorities”. Premium Times Nigeria, December 28 2016
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennet. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005, 205-232.
Gaffey, Conor (2016) “Boko Haram, 76 starving members surrender to Nigerian military”,
Newsweek, March 3 2016