English Legal System and Legal Skills
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This paper discusses the landmark precedent of Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation and the principles of interpretation of statutes. It covers the three rules of interpretation of Statue – the literal, the golden and the mischief rule and their impact on Parliamentary Sovereignty. The paper concludes with the impact of the judiciary's interpretation of statutes on the Parliament.
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Running head: ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
English Legal System and Legal Skills
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English Legal System and Legal Skills
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1ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
The case of Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation is the
landmark precedent where the Court of Appeal in its judgment said that it strives to fill in the gap
that a statute may have to which the Parliament intends to have an effect1. The judges opined that
Right to Compensation could be incorporated within the ambit of company property under
Corporations Law. In this case, Lord Denning held that the judges’ foremost duty is to ascertain
the intentions of the Parliament and execute them, even if it requires filling the gaps or lacunas of
the legislations. It was argued that courts should construe the substantive or procedural
meanings in a narrow way and should not try to rectify the shortcomings or wrongs made by the
legislature. It was also added that the court had limited power to interpret the words of the
legislature and has no right to fill the gaps of the statute. Disagreeing with Lord Denning, Lord
Simonds was of the opinion that filling the gap of the legislation would simple result in
interfering with the function of the legislature in the disguise of interpretation. The paper strives
to discuss the principles of interpretation of statutes and its impact on Parliamentary Sovereignty.
Lord Simonds opined that it is the duty of the judge to interpret the laws passed by the
parliament irrespective of the fact whether they are ambiguous or incomplete. Therefore, it may
not always be simple and straightaway grammatical in sense. The principles of interpretation of
statute helps the judges and other legal persons to comprehend and interpret the letters of the law
in the way the Parliament intended while making them. However, in Whitley v. Chappell, Lord
Hailsham stated that most of the cases dealt by the House of Lords and Court of Appeal
involves the use of the literal meaning of the words contained in the statutes.2 The Interpretation
Act of 1978 assists the judges to interpret the statutes and refrains them from acting on their
1 Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation [1951] 2 All ER 839, [1952] AC 189
2 Whitley v. Chappell [1868] 4 LRQB 147
The case of Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation is the
landmark precedent where the Court of Appeal in its judgment said that it strives to fill in the gap
that a statute may have to which the Parliament intends to have an effect1. The judges opined that
Right to Compensation could be incorporated within the ambit of company property under
Corporations Law. In this case, Lord Denning held that the judges’ foremost duty is to ascertain
the intentions of the Parliament and execute them, even if it requires filling the gaps or lacunas of
the legislations. It was argued that courts should construe the substantive or procedural
meanings in a narrow way and should not try to rectify the shortcomings or wrongs made by the
legislature. It was also added that the court had limited power to interpret the words of the
legislature and has no right to fill the gaps of the statute. Disagreeing with Lord Denning, Lord
Simonds was of the opinion that filling the gap of the legislation would simple result in
interfering with the function of the legislature in the disguise of interpretation. The paper strives
to discuss the principles of interpretation of statutes and its impact on Parliamentary Sovereignty.
Lord Simonds opined that it is the duty of the judge to interpret the laws passed by the
parliament irrespective of the fact whether they are ambiguous or incomplete. Therefore, it may
not always be simple and straightaway grammatical in sense. The principles of interpretation of
statute helps the judges and other legal persons to comprehend and interpret the letters of the law
in the way the Parliament intended while making them. However, in Whitley v. Chappell, Lord
Hailsham stated that most of the cases dealt by the House of Lords and Court of Appeal
involves the use of the literal meaning of the words contained in the statutes.2 The Interpretation
Act of 1978 assists the judges to interpret the statutes and refrains them from acting on their
1 Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation [1951] 2 All ER 839, [1952] AC 189
2 Whitley v. Chappell [1868] 4 LRQB 147
2ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
whims and fancies3. For example the provisions referring to a ‘he’, most necessarily cover a
‘she’ as well; similarly the provisions referring to a singular entity would definitely include
plural and vice versa4. The three rules of interpretation of Statue – the literal, the golden and the
mischief rule covers the entire method of interpretation of the laws by the court.
The Literal Rule
The literal rule or the grammatical rule of interpretation lays down the literal and ordinary
meaning of the words. It refers to the simple grammatical or dictionary meaning of the words
used in the statutes. It strictly follows the literal meaning that a man of ordinary prudence would
understand by going through the legislations to interpret the intention of the Parliament5.
However, this rule sometimes create ambiguity, which leads the court to look for other ways to
interpret. In Whitley v. Chappell the defendant had voted by impersonating a dead person, while
the law said that it would be unlawful to impersonate ‘any person’ who is entitled to vote6.
Therefore, by applying the literal rule, the court acquitted the defendant, as a ‘dead person’ is no
person in literal sense and therefore has no right to vote. Similarly, in London and North Eastern
Railway Company v. Berriman it was held that compensation would be granted to the survivor of
the deceased only if the deceased died in the course of employment7. In this case, the deceased
was doing certain maintenance work on the railway track when he died, however the court held
that the deceased was not particularly ‘repairing or relaying’ the tracks as the requirement of the
employment and the relevant statute. In I. R. C. v. Hinchy, it was held that the court could only
understand the basic intention of the Parliament by interpreting the words of the statute by
3 The Interpretation Act 1978
4 London and North Eastern Railway Company v Berriman [1946] HL
5 Baude, William, and Stephen E. Sachs. "The law of interpretation." Harv. L. Rev. 130 (2016): 1079.
6 Whitley v. Chappell [1868] 4 LRQB 147
7 London and North Eastern Railway Company v Berriman [1946] HL
whims and fancies3. For example the provisions referring to a ‘he’, most necessarily cover a
‘she’ as well; similarly the provisions referring to a singular entity would definitely include
plural and vice versa4. The three rules of interpretation of Statue – the literal, the golden and the
mischief rule covers the entire method of interpretation of the laws by the court.
The Literal Rule
The literal rule or the grammatical rule of interpretation lays down the literal and ordinary
meaning of the words. It refers to the simple grammatical or dictionary meaning of the words
used in the statutes. It strictly follows the literal meaning that a man of ordinary prudence would
understand by going through the legislations to interpret the intention of the Parliament5.
However, this rule sometimes create ambiguity, which leads the court to look for other ways to
interpret. In Whitley v. Chappell the defendant had voted by impersonating a dead person, while
the law said that it would be unlawful to impersonate ‘any person’ who is entitled to vote6.
Therefore, by applying the literal rule, the court acquitted the defendant, as a ‘dead person’ is no
person in literal sense and therefore has no right to vote. Similarly, in London and North Eastern
Railway Company v. Berriman it was held that compensation would be granted to the survivor of
the deceased only if the deceased died in the course of employment7. In this case, the deceased
was doing certain maintenance work on the railway track when he died, however the court held
that the deceased was not particularly ‘repairing or relaying’ the tracks as the requirement of the
employment and the relevant statute. In I. R. C. v. Hinchy, it was held that the court could only
understand the basic intention of the Parliament by interpreting the words of the statute by
3 The Interpretation Act 1978
4 London and North Eastern Railway Company v Berriman [1946] HL
5 Baude, William, and Stephen E. Sachs. "The law of interpretation." Harv. L. Rev. 130 (2016): 1079.
6 Whitley v. Chappell [1868] 4 LRQB 147
7 London and North Eastern Railway Company v Berriman [1946] HL
3ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
interpreting them by using the literal rule and therefore, the courts sometimes avoid
implementing other rules, which involves critical analysis and consumes more time8.
Emphasizing on the same matter, Lord Reid stated in Jones v. DPP that there are limitations to
which a judge may interpret a statute using the literal rule. He said that the court must judiciously
decide the meaning of words that may reasonably have proximity with the particular statute
concerned9. The literal rule does not bear many advantages for the court to have a wider scope to
interpret statutes as it strictly follows the grammatical or dictionary meaning of the words,
respecting the sovereignty of the Parliament. This does not let the courts to enjoy an unlimited
power over interpretation of statutes. One of the biggest lacunas of this rule is the ambiguity of
meanings of the words as dictionaries have multiple meanings of a single word, therefore making
it confusing to choose. As Glanville Williams observed that the literalness of the words of
statute cannot be applied successfully all the time, as it tend to leave significant aspects behind
while following the literal meaning of the words stringently10. Lord Denning added that the
courts do not construe the literal meaning of the statutes by following the literal rule, but looks
deep into the objectives of the legislation and the particular case in question, and then interpret
the statute according to the need of the hour11. This paves the way for deviating from the
traditional and conventional way of interpreting statutes, giving an opportunity to the other rules
of interpretation.
The Golden Rule
8 I. R. C. v. Hinchy [1960] AC 748
9 Jones v. DPP [1962] 46 Cr App R 129
10 Duku, Moses George, and Jessica Guth. "ATH Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law." (2014): 133-135.
11 Pepper v. Hart [1993] HL
interpreting them by using the literal rule and therefore, the courts sometimes avoid
implementing other rules, which involves critical analysis and consumes more time8.
Emphasizing on the same matter, Lord Reid stated in Jones v. DPP that there are limitations to
which a judge may interpret a statute using the literal rule. He said that the court must judiciously
decide the meaning of words that may reasonably have proximity with the particular statute
concerned9. The literal rule does not bear many advantages for the court to have a wider scope to
interpret statutes as it strictly follows the grammatical or dictionary meaning of the words,
respecting the sovereignty of the Parliament. This does not let the courts to enjoy an unlimited
power over interpretation of statutes. One of the biggest lacunas of this rule is the ambiguity of
meanings of the words as dictionaries have multiple meanings of a single word, therefore making
it confusing to choose. As Glanville Williams observed that the literalness of the words of
statute cannot be applied successfully all the time, as it tend to leave significant aspects behind
while following the literal meaning of the words stringently10. Lord Denning added that the
courts do not construe the literal meaning of the statutes by following the literal rule, but looks
deep into the objectives of the legislation and the particular case in question, and then interpret
the statute according to the need of the hour11. This paves the way for deviating from the
traditional and conventional way of interpreting statutes, giving an opportunity to the other rules
of interpretation.
The Golden Rule
8 I. R. C. v. Hinchy [1960] AC 748
9 Jones v. DPP [1962] 46 Cr App R 129
10 Duku, Moses George, and Jessica Guth. "ATH Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law." (2014): 133-135.
11 Pepper v. Hart [1993] HL
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4ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
The Golden rule comes as a solution the absurdity and ambiguity of the literal rule. In
support of the golden rule, Lord Wensleydale in the case of Grey v. Pearson held that it is
important to adhere to the ordinary sense of the words; however, in terms of ambiguity of
meanings the ordinary sense can be deviate from to an extent, which does not destroy the essence
of the word12. In the case of R v. Allen, the court held that the term ‘married’ is to be read and
considered as ‘been through a ceremony of marriage’ as it is not possible to be married twice.
The court held the defendant for breaking the law by applying the golden rule, which otherwise
would not have been possible with the literal rule13. According to Professor Zander, the golden
rule acts as a safety valve that helps to escape the absurd and ambiguous effects of the literal
rule14. Therefore, it provides more scope and power to the judges to make a better interpretation
of the statutes, exploring the intention of the Parliament.
The Mischief Rule
The Mischief or Hayden’s rule talks about the four factors: (a) before the statute, what
was the law, (b) what is the mischief or lacuna that the common law failed to check, (c)what is
the remedy that the Parliament is trying to provide, and (d) why is the remedy required. These
factors govern the mischief rule and helps the court to interpret statutes in a much more efficient
manner. Voicing against the decision in Royal College of Nursing v. DHSS, it was claimed by
Lord Wilberforce and Edmund Davies that the court is ‘rewriting’ the legislation instead of
interpreting it15. In this case, the concerned statute implied that ‘registered medical practitioner’
that excludes the nurses, should carry out abortions. The court interpreted that to ensure safety
12 Grey v. Pearson [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61
13 R v. Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
14 Zander, Michael. The law-making process. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.
15 Royal College of Nursing v. DHSS [1981] 2 WLR 279
The Golden rule comes as a solution the absurdity and ambiguity of the literal rule. In
support of the golden rule, Lord Wensleydale in the case of Grey v. Pearson held that it is
important to adhere to the ordinary sense of the words; however, in terms of ambiguity of
meanings the ordinary sense can be deviate from to an extent, which does not destroy the essence
of the word12. In the case of R v. Allen, the court held that the term ‘married’ is to be read and
considered as ‘been through a ceremony of marriage’ as it is not possible to be married twice.
The court held the defendant for breaking the law by applying the golden rule, which otherwise
would not have been possible with the literal rule13. According to Professor Zander, the golden
rule acts as a safety valve that helps to escape the absurd and ambiguous effects of the literal
rule14. Therefore, it provides more scope and power to the judges to make a better interpretation
of the statutes, exploring the intention of the Parliament.
The Mischief Rule
The Mischief or Hayden’s rule talks about the four factors: (a) before the statute, what
was the law, (b) what is the mischief or lacuna that the common law failed to check, (c)what is
the remedy that the Parliament is trying to provide, and (d) why is the remedy required. These
factors govern the mischief rule and helps the court to interpret statutes in a much more efficient
manner. Voicing against the decision in Royal College of Nursing v. DHSS, it was claimed by
Lord Wilberforce and Edmund Davies that the court is ‘rewriting’ the legislation instead of
interpreting it15. In this case, the concerned statute implied that ‘registered medical practitioner’
that excludes the nurses, should carry out abortions. The court interpreted that to ensure safety
12 Grey v. Pearson [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61
13 R v. Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
14 Zander, Michael. The law-making process. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.
15 Royal College of Nursing v. DHSS [1981] 2 WLR 279
5ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
during emergencies, nurses’ participation in the abortive surgery cannot be considered as
unlawful. Such arguments against the wide scope of mischief rule has been claimed by many
jurists over the passage of time stating that such wide deviation from the statute does not imply
interpretation but alteration of it. It proves that the court has gained power and authority in terms
of interpretation with the growing number of cases that have its own peculiarity.
The rules of interpretation have a heavy impact on the sovereignty of the Parliament
that is applied by the court to understand the statutes, their purpose and application in a wider
sense. In Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council, it was observed that the
court did not obliged with the decision of the elected body of the country whose sole purpose is
to make laws, instead the court choose to interfere with the purpose and function of such elected
body16. It is evident by the conduct of the court that it would chose to deviate from the letters of
the law on every instance or chance it gets. The court tend to constantly interferes with the
function of the Parliament by altering the statutes in the name of ‘interpretation’, thus violating
the theory of Separation of Power postulated by Montesquieu17. The Dworkin’s theory claims
that the judges tends to travel outside the ambit of the intention of the Parliament and develop a
theory of their own highlighting the strictness and technicalities they are dealing with while
interpreting a statute18. The courts claims that their hands are tied when they are bound to deviate
from the literal meaning of the word and reshape it as per the necessity of the case. They held
that it is not their primary intention to depart from the literal meaning that the statute construe,
but they must deliver for the best interest of the petitioners and aggrieved parties. This paves the
16 Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768
17 Shackleton, Robert. "Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and the separation of powers." Charles-Louis de Secondat,
Baron de Montesquieu. Routledge, 2017. 405-418.
18 Mackie, John L. "The third theory of law." The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers. Routledge, 2017. 173-
186..
during emergencies, nurses’ participation in the abortive surgery cannot be considered as
unlawful. Such arguments against the wide scope of mischief rule has been claimed by many
jurists over the passage of time stating that such wide deviation from the statute does not imply
interpretation but alteration of it. It proves that the court has gained power and authority in terms
of interpretation with the growing number of cases that have its own peculiarity.
The rules of interpretation have a heavy impact on the sovereignty of the Parliament
that is applied by the court to understand the statutes, their purpose and application in a wider
sense. In Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council, it was observed that the
court did not obliged with the decision of the elected body of the country whose sole purpose is
to make laws, instead the court choose to interfere with the purpose and function of such elected
body16. It is evident by the conduct of the court that it would chose to deviate from the letters of
the law on every instance or chance it gets. The court tend to constantly interferes with the
function of the Parliament by altering the statutes in the name of ‘interpretation’, thus violating
the theory of Separation of Power postulated by Montesquieu17. The Dworkin’s theory claims
that the judges tends to travel outside the ambit of the intention of the Parliament and develop a
theory of their own highlighting the strictness and technicalities they are dealing with while
interpreting a statute18. The courts claims that their hands are tied when they are bound to deviate
from the literal meaning of the word and reshape it as per the necessity of the case. They held
that it is not their primary intention to depart from the literal meaning that the statute construe,
but they must deliver for the best interest of the petitioners and aggrieved parties. This paves the
16 Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768
17 Shackleton, Robert. "Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and the separation of powers." Charles-Louis de Secondat,
Baron de Montesquieu. Routledge, 2017. 405-418.
18 Mackie, John L. "The third theory of law." The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers. Routledge, 2017. 173-
186..
6ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
way for the judiciary to be more coherent and have a clear direction to function. It makes the
courts more efficient and flexible yet complex and controversial.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the judiciary has been enjoying a supremacy over the
Parliament in terms of the interpretation of statute. The judiciary has been deviating and
interfering with the function of the Parliament to alter a statute, giving rise to unnecessary
controversies and violating the theory of Separation of Power. As Lord Denning claimed that, the
court do not tamper with the ‘language of the Parliament and make nonsense out of it’. He
argued that the judges take the responsibility to fill the lacunas and gaps that the Parliament
leaves behind in a statute in order to deliver justice efficiently. Lord Denning is of the opinion
that such filling of the gaps by applying the rules and aids of interpretation enable them to make
an appropriate sense out of the enactments, which otherwise fails to serve the need at times.
However, there will always be strict criticism pertaining to the interpretation of statute by the
courts as political leaders and jurists do not prefer the tendency of the court to violate the clear
distinction of the organs of government and destroy the watertight compartment, as demanded by
Montesquieu.
way for the judiciary to be more coherent and have a clear direction to function. It makes the
courts more efficient and flexible yet complex and controversial.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the judiciary has been enjoying a supremacy over the
Parliament in terms of the interpretation of statute. The judiciary has been deviating and
interfering with the function of the Parliament to alter a statute, giving rise to unnecessary
controversies and violating the theory of Separation of Power. As Lord Denning claimed that, the
court do not tamper with the ‘language of the Parliament and make nonsense out of it’. He
argued that the judges take the responsibility to fill the lacunas and gaps that the Parliament
leaves behind in a statute in order to deliver justice efficiently. Lord Denning is of the opinion
that such filling of the gaps by applying the rules and aids of interpretation enable them to make
an appropriate sense out of the enactments, which otherwise fails to serve the need at times.
However, there will always be strict criticism pertaining to the interpretation of statute by the
courts as political leaders and jurists do not prefer the tendency of the court to violate the clear
distinction of the organs of government and destroy the watertight compartment, as demanded by
Montesquieu.
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7ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
References
Baude, William, and Stephen E. Sachs. "The law of interpretation." Harv. L. Rev. 130 (2016):
1079.
Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768
Duku, Moses George, and Jessica Guth. "ATH Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law."
(2014): 133-135.
Grey v. Pearson [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61
I. R. C. v. Hinchy [1960] AC 748
Jones v DPP [1962] 46 Cr App R 129
London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman [1946] AC 278A
Mackie, John L. "The third theory of law." The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers.
Routledge, 2017. 173-186.
Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation [1951] 2 All ER 839,
[1952] AC 189
Pepper v Hart [1993] HL
References
Baude, William, and Stephen E. Sachs. "The law of interpretation." Harv. L. Rev. 130 (2016):
1079.
Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council [1983] 1 AC 768
Duku, Moses George, and Jessica Guth. "ATH Smith, Glanville Williams: Learning the Law."
(2014): 133-135.
Grey v. Pearson [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61
I. R. C. v. Hinchy [1960] AC 748
Jones v DPP [1962] 46 Cr App R 129
London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman [1946] AC 278A
Mackie, John L. "The third theory of law." The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers.
Routledge, 2017. 173-186.
Magor and St Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation [1951] 2 All ER 839,
[1952] AC 189
Pepper v Hart [1993] HL
8ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL SKILLS
R v. Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
Royal College of Nursing v DHSS [1981] 2 WLR 279
Shackleton, Robert. "Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and the separation of powers." Charles-Louis
de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. Routledge, 2017. 405-418.
The Interpretation Act 1978
Whitley v. Chappell [1868] 4 LRQB 147
Zander, Michael. The law-making process. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.
R v. Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367
Royal College of Nursing v DHSS [1981] 2 WLR 279
Shackleton, Robert. "Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and the separation of powers." Charles-Louis
de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu. Routledge, 2017. 405-418.
The Interpretation Act 1978
Whitley v. Chappell [1868] 4 LRQB 147
Zander, Michael. The law-making process. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015.
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