Government Measures to Save Boeing

Running head- GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO SAVE BOEING
Government Measures to save Boeing
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Government Measures to save Boeing1
On the day of October 2018, nearly 189 fatalities were reported due to the Boeing 737
Max Lion Air flight crash in Indonesia, that was due to the sudden nosedive that the aircraft
faced and crashed into the sea after few minutes from the take-off. Another equivalent
incident occurred by the Boeing 737 Max Ethiopian Airline, in 2019, where the number of
fatalities was 157 and the crash was outside Addis Ababa. The collisions were reported due to
the software errors and disputes with the sensors, that was seen in both the flights that
crashed (Intereconomics 2018). The primary issue was with the Maneuvering Characteristics
Augmentation System (MACS), that was specially intended with the purpose to retain the
flight from any imbalances. The Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer of Boeing
rejected the accusations initially but later disclosed about the software breakdown of the
aeroplanes. This essay aims at analyzing the corporate governance failures that resulted in the
crash (Parker, Peters and Turetsky 2015). Further, it provides measures to prevent the
fatalities from happening that the Company might have taken at the first step to avoid such
risks.
The main factor for the fatality included the technical failure in the aircraft and the
lack of training that it failed to provide to the pilots that would have saved the aircraft from
crashing. The Boeing accidents are examples of the failure of a single sensor that led to such
a massive disaster (Nytimes.com 2020). The system that was made to ensure the safety of the
people backfired, and in turn, the result was disastrous. Addition to that the lack of
governance also includes the information that was not provided to the pilot, and the pilots
were unaware about the software that was installed to provide the information in cases of any
malfunction (Duppati, Scrimgeour and Stevenson 2018). However, the fact that they were
unaware about it, the pilots, we are unable to use it to ensure the safety. The Boeing aircraft
was designed in such a way that permitted for a strong command by the computer due to the
software that was installed that would trigger with a single faulty sensor (Fischer and Dov

Government Measures to save Boeing2
2014). Even though both the aircraft were installed with such software due to the lack of
training to the pilots they were utterly unaware of the sensor and were not able to use it in
time before they take off. The primary liability was not upon aircrew alone, and it was also a
responsibility of the Company to understand their choices and conduct proper governance as
it includes the loss of lives of many people that could have been avoided with proper
governing measures (Mallin 2014). The prime liability, comprised of the risky design
selections and the safety valuations that were noticed as faulty, contributes to the fatalities
and the mishap in the aircraft.
The crucial aspect that was detected was the mechanical issues of the aircraft that was
responsible for the catastrophe. Firstly, Boeing was building aircraft using modern
technologies since the year 2011 so with that there should have been proper training to the
crew to use such technical software. To achieve such levels of the usage of the technological
advances it equipped more engines that would be significant for the usage of such software,
it was positioned on a high level on the wings of the aircraft, these changes required changing
the entire aerodynamics of the plane. In order to stabilize the aircraft with the usage of the
new mechanisms, Boeing created new software that was known as the MCAS ( Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System). The key feature of the software was that it pushed the
plane to make the flying machines constant in various situations. However, it was evident
from both the crashes that in both the crashes the MCAS software that was installed crashed
within minutes before the take-off took place and despite the numerous attempts to start the
software the aeroplanes kept tumbling. Later reports showed that not only the fact that the
pilots were not trained about the usage of such software but they were also unaware of the
installation of the software. This shows that the first action required by the Company was
sufficient training. The other apprehension was due to the absence of information, as the
pilots flying the of the aircraft were not cognizant about the new software installations and