Electoral Violence in Nigeria

This assignment delves into the issue of electoral violence as a persistent challenge to democracy in Nigeria. It explores various factors contributing to this problem, including the involvement of state institutions like the military and police, biased media coverage, and the actions of political actors seeking power through illegitimate means. The document argues that addressing electoral violence requires comprehensive reforms encompassing institutional restructuring, media accountability, and international pressure on perpetrators.

INTRODUCTION
I. Background of the study
In a perspective work on African politics generally, Celestin Monga identified eight challenges
with African politics of which electoral violence prominently featured. In his words “the
weakness of political parties, overt and covert manipulation of electoral process, a narrow
political field, a constrained and restricted civil society, a controlled and biased press, the
absence of civility, institutionalized violence and politicized and privatized armies and disguised
international support for dictatorship”.
Glaringly, the most significant concomitant effect of violence on democracy generally is loss of
legitimacy that has characterized African elections; thereby making ridicule of elections as mere
political rituals. Most governments formed in Africa suffered from serious legitimacy
conundrum mainly because the elections were far from being free or fair due to electoral
violence, manipulations and gerrymandering generally.
No part of the world is immune to the venom of electoral violence, but the intensity and spread is
much pronounced in Africa and other third world countries. The etymology of the phenomenon
is however entrenched and daring in Africa. For instance, former President Arap Moi resorted to
political violence as a means of retaining power. Similarly, Mwai Kibaki who succeeded him
was guilty of daylight robbery and a civilian coup that took lives.
In Zimbabwe, Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off of 2008 in protest over political
violence; that took the lives of over 120 people and displaced thousands more. April 24, 2005
Togo presidential election triggered off political violence which resulted in the outflow of
refuges to the neighbouring states of Ghana and Benin Republic. The experience of Democratic
Republic of Congo was far from being palatable with millions displaced and over 200,000
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deaths. In most cases, voter turnouts are very low because prospective voters are sacred to the
marrow that they may be killed, maimed or intimidated by political thugs in a desperate attempt
to disrupt the process.
In Nigeria’s colonial and post-colonial eras, hardly could one recall an election devoid of
violence. It is sad that African democracies without any iota of doubt have become associated
with excessive bloodletting. Behaviourists have come to the conclusion that political violence is
a tool used by groups seeking power, holding power and those in the process of losing power. In
essence, most power seekers at all levels are involved in the unwholesome act.
It is pertinent to note that the uniqueness of African states is largely responsible for the spate of
violence in the body polity. For example, most African states are plural and deeply divided
societies with sharp cleavages in all ramifications. This contributes in exacerbating ethnic
politics in a very divisive manner. The boomerang effect is violence that is seen as a way of life,
coupled with this is the high rate of youth unemployment making them ready tools in the hands
of desperate politicians that like to foment trouble. Annually, tertiary institutions (universities,
polytechnics and collages of education) in Nigeria turn out thousands of graduates that cannot be
absorbed by both the private and public sectors of the economy.
An idle hand they say may become a devil’s workshop because unemployment creates a
potential pool of frustrated youths that can be mobilized for violent political activities. Elections
are the signpost of democracy; they also serve the purpose of peaceful transition in government
and confer political legitimacy on those in political authority. Viewed from this angle, elections
represent the expression of the sovereign will of the electorate. However, the conduct of
elections in plural and divided societies like Nigeria is usually fraught with animosities and
violence, failing in the process to satisfy the test of popular participation and legitimacy. At the
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core of this bitter contest is the struggle for power by factional elite groups perceived as
representing ethno religious and regional interest.
Electoral periods more than anytime else show the fragility and soft underbelly of the Nigerian
state. Nigeria’s electoral history and trajectory is replete with narratives of flawed, shoddy and
disputed election results due to violence, resulting in numerous fatalities thus reversing previous
attempts if any at democratic consolidation. The 2015 general election was unprecedented in the
annals of Nigerian history because for the first time surprisingly an entrenched and incumbent
party was defeated at the polls, and the state witnessed a peaceful change and transition of power
between contending political parties/blocs despite a highly tense atmosphere fuelled by ethnic,
religious and regional sentiments, thereby fulfilling one of the preconditions for democratic
consolidation
A tensed pre-election political atmosphere occasioned by the die-hard fanatical activities of the
terrorist group Boko Haram, that then and still controls a large swath of Nigeria’s territory and
has even currently expanded its operations to new territories and a fragmented/prebendalist elite
divided along primordial cleavages such as ethno-religious/regional lines foreshadowed the
election.
Shuttle diplomacy initiated by the then United States secretary of state under the President
Obama administration and the constitution of a novel association called ‘National Peace
Committee’ comprised of Kofi Anan; a former secretary general of the United Nations, past
presidents of Nigeria, leading clergymen and the postponement of the election date due to
security reasons by six weeks by the electoral management body all helped deliver an election
whose outcome despite some gray areas and some grumbling in some quarters was accepted by
the contending political parties and averting the prediction of an apocalyptic endgame.
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The history and trajectory of political development cum happenings in Nigeria has recorded the
growth of multi-dimensional and multi-faceted forms of violence due to the desperate bid of
power thirsty individuals and groups who want to attain and keep state power usually for selfish
gains. In recent times, Human Rights Watch revealed that over 2000 Nigerians lost their lives in
pre, during and post-election violence in the Nigeria specifically in northern Nigeria. The high
levels of electoral violence (pre, during and post) in the Fourth Republic in particular is linked to
the neo-patrimonial nature of the Nigerian state, the party politics being played, the weak
institutionalization of democratic architectures and structures and very corrupt and inefficient
electoral management body among others.
These were the factors that led to the fall or collapse of the first, second and third republics. In
every stable and credible democratic society, election remains the essential tool for transitory
process from one civilian administration to another. Elections have become an integral aspect of
representative democracy hence it prevails across the globe. In all; elections constitute a core or
vital component of democracy. The electoral process in Africa in general and Nigeria in
particular especially since the beginning of the 21st century is hugely characterized by violence,
manipulation, gerrymandering and vote buying.
Fundamentally, there is no iota of doubt the fact that electoral violence and other electoral vices
remain major sources of political instability in any democratic society with palpable threats of
increase. Nigeria, having seen decades of military dictatorship that was characterized by
despotism, violation of fundamental human rights, financial profligacy, brutal suppression of
dissent, ill thought out policies among others, finally returned to democratic rule on may 29,
1999, which culminated in the birth of the fourth republic.
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The democratic experiment, which commenced amidst great hope, excitement and expectations,
is yet to significantly convince majority of the Nigerian populace of its democratic success
especially with respect to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections devoid of election
violence (pre, during and post). International Foundation for Election Systems (2011) defines
electoral violence as “any violence (harm) or threat of violence (harm). These above definitions
of electoral violence typically espoused the deeper nature, types and stages of electoral violence
in Nigeria especially since the birth of the Fourth Republic in 1999. We cannot talk about
electoral violence in the Nigerian 4th Republic without looking at the evolution of this
phenomenon from the 1st Republic.
The first and immediate post independence electoral violence in Nigeria occurred during the
1964 general elections, the first election to be conducted after independence. The Northern
People’s Congress (NPC; a political party that had its support base in the northern part of
Nigeria) needed the elections to consolidate its colonial advantage bequeathed to it by Britain
and power at the centre. The Action Group (AG; a political party that had its support base in the
western part of Nigeria) also needed it in order to dislodge Chief S. L Akintola and his cohorts
from power in the West they were perceived by many in the western part of Nigerian as turn
coats.
The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC; a political party that had its support base in
the eastern part of Nigeria) on its own also wanted to improve and consolidate its bargaining
strength in the East. It became obvious that all the major political parties were anxious to
participate in the elections (Falola, 1991). This made them desperate; hence they resorted to
outright violence, intimidation, propaganda, vote buying, rigging and the use of any other illegal,
dishonest or uncivilized means to win.
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By the middle of 1964, two key political blocs cum alliances had emerged from all these
desperate manoeuvres, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the NNDP founded the
Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). The Action Group (AG) and the National Council for
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) constituted themselves into the United Progressive Grand Alliance
(UPGA). The 1964 federal election was contested between these major alliances (Ige, 1995).
Two key coalitions contested the elections: the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) consisting of
the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and some other minor parties; the United Progressive
Grand Alliance (UPGA) comprising the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), Action
Group (AG), Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and United Middle Belt Congress
(UMBC) (Falola, 1991). The campaigns by these coalitions stirred up much anger, hate,
bitterness, bad blood, acrimony and violence, especially in the west.
The elections which were said to have been massively rigged through different means leading to
widespread violence/conflicts across the country particularly in the west following the
announcement of results by the Chairman of Federal Electoral Commission. This argument could
be corroborated with the address of President Nnamidi Azikiwe and the then Inspector General
Police. The titular President Nnamdi Azikiwe in his dawn broadcast to the nation condemned
the way and manner the electioneering was conducted by the stakeholders and expressed his
disappointment.
The politicians in power have no right to employ instruments of power indiscriminately,
abusively and unconstitutionally in order to perpetuate their stay in office. The president cited
instances where Nigerian citizens were deprived their constitutional right to freedom of
association. In a similar view, the inspector general of police, made a nation-wide broadcast
reporting that incidents involving violence had reached alarming proportions. He appealed to the
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politicians to protect Nigeria’s enviable reputation as a bastion of democracy in Africa
(Anifowose, 1972).
As it was in the west, so also it went on in the Middle Belt (a geo-political term used to describe
six states that are found in the centre of Nigeria; they are predominantly Christian and made up
of many small ethnic groups referred to as minorities). A good example was the second Tiv riot
of 1964; the Tivs are one of the ethnic nationalities in the middle belt and had a history of
standing up to the invading Hausa-Fulani empire called the Sokoto Caliphate led by the Islamic
scholar Uthman Dan Fodio. There were three Tiv riots but the second was caused by electoral
manipulations (Anifowose, 1972).
The last straw that broke the camel’s back was the elections into regional assembly in western
Nigeria in October 1965. The announcement of the election results by the Federal Electoral
Commission, which led to the purported victory of S.L Akintola of the Nigeria National
Democratic Party (NNDP) as against the wishes of many people who expected that Adegbenro
of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) would emerge victorious led to large-scale
widespread sustained violence in the whole of western region on the grounds that there were
wide spread government backed irregularities in the election results.
The decision of the federal government to uphold the election results thus gave Akintola the
power to form a new government. This however made supporters of the United Progressive
Grand Alliance (UPGA) to embark on a spontaneous, continuous and violent demonstration
known as “operation wetie” a violent operation which required the spraying of houses, cars and
persons perceived to be members of the opposition with petrol and then setting fire to them (Ige,
1995).
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There were series of protests and demonstrations carried out by angry students, market women,
farmers and other groups in most towns and villages throughout the western region, and these
were accompanied by looting, arson, burning of houses, vehicles, shops and killing on an
unprecedented scale. Anti-governmental placards were displayed, party slogan- Awo! Awo! (a
slogan adopted by party and ethnic champions which is a shortened form of their leaders name
Awolowo) UPGA! UPGA! as well as war songs were openly chanted on the streets. In some
cases, the demonstration ended in clashes with anti-riot police squad, who did not hesitate to
shoot.
The violent manifestation of the past as cited in the last paragraph is still a fact till today. For
example The manifestation of violence associated with the conduct of ward congresses by the
ruling party the All Progressive Congress (APC) across the country cum earlier suspension of
gubernatorial primaries in the just concluded 2019 elections as a result of violence brings to the
fore once again that perhaps the greatest challenge to sustainable democracy in Nigeria is
electoral violence.
If media reports across the country vis-à-vis deaths, maiming, intimidation, harassment and brute
force associated with electoral contest in Nigeria are taken cognizance of; decent people may be
scared from taking part in partisan politics and or elections generally, this may not augur well for
the well being of the Nigerian polity. The party’s congresses witnessed large scale crisis in more
than two-thirds of the states, with as much as 24 state chapters conducting pararrel congresses for
ward, local government and gubernatorial sits which were marred by violence of all forms.
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It is imperative to emphasize the fact that the Nigerian democracy cannot be consolidated if the
people do not eschew violence. Between 1999 and now, the Nigerian politicians are expected to
have fairly imbibed the required needed political culture that could sustain democracy. But the
reverse is the case. The problem is that the so-called politicians who mouth themselves as
progressives that should encourage harmonization, consensus, issue base politicking and other
democratic cannons and ethos are or have since deviated badly from these norms. A key
phenomenon is that where vote buying is likely to fail violence comes in. Unpopular politicians
and money bags do inject a lot of money into the electoral process (Adetula, 2012).
But at times some voters do not collect money or cow from intimidation hence refusing to do the
bidding of the mercantile desperate politicians showing that votes cannot be bought. In Nigeria
politics is seen to be more profitable than legitimate business. A system with poor
reward/compensation where core professionals (academics, medical professionals, engineers,
technicians, lawyers, administrators etc) are pauperized and miscreants claiming millions as
legislators on monthly basis cannot but become harbingers of violence.
Desperation by Nigerian politicians to win elections because of the expected high rate of corrupt
returns cannot be ruled out of the mess. Not only that a number of these desperadoes (politicians
who are ready to do anything and everything to win elections no matter how despicable) do not
have any profitable job or had pursued successful careers in the past, hence, government has
become their only means of livelihood, hence the high rate of prebendalism in Nigeria.
For them to lose an election in a fair contest is nothing but to give up their only means of
survival. The problem is exacerbated by a weak state that cannot effectively combat the scourge
of electoral violence. With porous borders that has aided proliferation of arms and the
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concomitant effect of unwarranted militarization of the civil society, electoral violence has
become the order of the day (Yakub, 2010).
II. Statement of the problem
Electoral violence in Nigeria varies in scope, intensity and nature, and has taken immeasurable
toll on human lives, living many dead, maimed and numerous others displaced. The nature, scale
and dimension of these conflicts vary according to the particular elective office contested, the
location and the gladiators concerned. That is to say, electoral violence takes different forms
depending on their specific contexts.
The main way often advocated for avoiding electoral conflict include internal party democracy,
impartial electoral umpire, unbiased media, balanced policing and enforcement of rules, de-
emphases on monetization of the electoral process among others. The issues which cause
electoral violence in Nigeria are diverse and multifaceted for example, demands have centred on
issues of power sharing or rotation among geopolitical zones at all levels, religious divides and
ethnic groups, fight between god fathers and god sons, desperado exhibited by politicians etc.
This therefore means that the Nigerian democratic process which has been plagued by violence
from the 1ST republic may be one which may continue to defy the all advance postulation or
panacea to credible and violence free elections. It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to
examine the factors that make conduct of elections in Nigeria to be violent prone and undermine
attempts at institutionalizing a democratic tradition. The methodology is qualitative in approach,
relying on secondary data from books, journal articles and newspaper commentaries.
III. Research questions
It is based on these that the following research questions were sought in this study.
A) What is the extent of democratic practice in Nigeria?
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B) What are the nature and causes of electoral violence in the Nigerian democratic practice?
C) What are the impacts of electoral violence on Nigerian democracy?
D) What are the challenges of enthroning violence free democratic process in Nigeria?
1V. Objectives of the study
The broad objective of this study is to evaluate the implication of violence in the Nigerian
democratic process. The Specific objectives are:
A) To examine the extent of democratic practice in Nigeria?
B) To find out the nature and causes of electoral violence in the Nigerian democratic practice?
C) To analyze the impacts of electoral violence on Nigerian democracy?
D) To identify the challenges of enthroning violence free democratic process in Nigeria
V. Significance of the study
The study shall be relevant in the following ways: The study will promote electoral peace in
general since it would sensitize the people on how proper democracy practices. This study could
reawaken a consciousness on the political class that Nigeria is ours and we all have a collective
responsibility to build it and enthrone peace before, during and after elections.
The thesis will be of relevance to policy makers striving to address the menace of clashes of
interest in Nigeria and beyond through proper administration of democratic principles. Above all
the study will ensure social order in the area and thus promote sustainable development since no
society records any meaningful development under an atmosphere of chaos, the study will also
be of relevance to other researchers willing to embark on similar studies in future as it will serve
as reference point.
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Other significances of the work is to provide answers to questions raised in this study which is to
ascertain whether there has been electoral violence in the fourth republic and how has it affected
democracy in Nigeria. So that by the end of the work the study shall provide useful suggestions
by way of recommendations that will help in dealing with the challenges associated with
electoral violence in the politics of Nigerian Democracy.
Again, the Electoral Management Body in Nigeria, The Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC), will benefit immensely from this work because it will proffer
recommendations on how to monitor and prevent electoral violence in the country. The
Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) will further benefit greatly from this work as this
study is going to expose the commission to various ways of asserting its authority that it has
through the constitution and the electoral acts. In addition, this study shall be relevant to the
general public who may want to acquire knowledge on electoral violence in Nigerians
democratic experience. The last categories of beneficiaries are the students who can use this
study as a source of secondary data when and if they are writing on a similar area of study.
VI. Justification of the study
This study is justified on the fact that literature wise it will deviate from the usual emphasis on
conflict generally but rather focus on electoral violence in the 4th Republic. This study is also apt
because of the upcoming Nigerian elections in 2023 which have already began to show signs that
it will be violence prone and nothing different from the previous elections, according to various
media commentaries and international institutions.
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VII. Scope and limitations of the study
The boundaries of this study are as follows; in terms of variables covered, the germane ones are
democracy, elections, violence and republic. In terms of the population of study it is the entire
population of Nigeria. The period covered is the 4th Republic which covers the era 1999- the
present. This research focuses on the 4th Republic, covering the period of 1999-2019. But the
study will also cover the general elections of 1959, 1964, 1979, 1985-1993(mainly to support
historical antecedents), 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 to show a comparative analysis of
violence in these elections.
This work is not looking at all the federation wide general elections rather this work is looking at
and concentrating on the federal elections (Presidential and legislative). Although reference will
be made to other segments of the election, such as the gubernatorial/state legislative elections
and local council elections, the study shall be concentrating on the Federal poll
(Presidential/legislative) which will give the study a vivid generalization of electoral violence in
Nigeria.
The limitation of the study include distance, time and money constrains, these factors made it
impossible to transverse the length and breadth of the nation to actually get the views of
respondents with respect to the issues under study. This will affect the outcome of the study in
terms of spread and coverage of the phenomenon under study to address this limitation the
researcher is going to use secondary data that covers the issues under study across board that
means the study will be qualitative in nature.
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VIII. Definition of Terms
A) Electoral violence: This is a type of conflict that deals specifically with the conflict
perpetuated by political actors before, during and after election in order to grab power; these
actors could be state actors or non-state actors.
B) Nigerian 4th Republic: The Nigerian 4th Republic is the period from may 29 1999 till the
present date, this date represents the date political power was handed over to democratically
elected politicians at all tiers of government in Nigeria after many years of uninterrupted military
rule starting from 1983 when the military took over power and imposed draconian and dictatorial
rule in Nigeria.
IX. Organization of work
This study is broken down into four parts the introduction comprising the background to the
study, the statement of the problem, the objective of the study, the significance of the study, the
scope and limitations of the study and the operational definition of terms. The chapter one which
is the literature review comprises of the conceptual framework and empirical study. The chapter
two is the research methodology comprises of the research design, population of the study,
method of data collection, and method of data analysis. The chapter five comprises of the
summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations.
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CHAPTER ONE
LITERATURE REVIEW
I. Conceptual clarification
A. Electoral violence: Amate (1986) defined electoral violence as all and any act or threat of
coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect or influence an electoral process or
that comes up in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral
process, violence may be employed to influence the process and or outcomes of elections such as
efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll and to determine the outcomes of winners in competitive
races for political office or in extension to secure approval or disapproval of referendum
questions.
Akuchiou (1997) pointed out in his own argument that the concept is considerably broader than
the presence or use of physical violence; it is the range of activities or actions aimed at
subverting the will of the citizens or voters to freely exercise their choice. On his own part Anber
(1967) argued that it is a sub-type of political violence in which actors utilize coercion in an
instrumental way to advance and propagate their interests or achieve specific political objectives.
Similarly, societies prone to experiencing election-related violence are usually vulnerable to
broader kinds of political violence; in some instances, electoral violence is embedded and
perpetuated in a broader, often continuing context and scenario of deep-rooted social conflict.
Electoral violence includes acts, such as assassination of opponents or spontaneous fisticuffs
between rival groups of supporters, use of threats, coercion, and intimidation of opponents/
voters, or election officials.
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Threat, intimidation, and verbal abuse or denigration are forms of coercion that is just as
powerful as any acts of violence can be. Indeed, a major objective of acts of terrorism such as
throwing an explosive device into a crowd of rival supporters is an act systematically designed to
create fear and to intimidate (e.g., to suppress mobilization or voting by that group). Violent acts
can be targeted against people or things, such as the targeting of communities or candidates or
the deliberate destruction of campaign materials, outdoor media, vehicles, offices, or ballot
boxes.
Electoral violence is more than just the physical violence aspect of it; it is the purpose and
motive behind violence, and the oscillation between physical violence and psychological
violence. It could be regarded or seen as elections induced crisis used to alter, change or
influence by force or coercion, the electoral behaviour of voters or voting outcome or possibly
change electoral decision in favour of specific individual, groups or group. It could be seen as
any harm or threat of harm that is aimed at any person or property involved in the election
process, or at disrupting partially or significantly any part of the electoral or political process
during the election period (International Foundation for Election Systems, 2011).
Electoral violence could be before the election, thus involving all such activities that inflict any
form of injury or loss to the democratic system and its constituents and could be during voter
registrations, campaigns and actual voting. Such violence could also be a post-election
phenomenon which comes consequent on the manipulation of election result, rejection of result
etc. Ladan (2006) opined that it could be categorized into physical and psychological. Physical
election violence includes physical attack, resulting in assault, battery, grievous bodily harm or
death, disruption and other campaign, use of abusive language and other forms of violence
inflicted on individuals and groups.
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Psychological election violence include indiscriminate pasting of campaign posters, chanting
slogans (particularly the use of local poets and singers to attack and abuse opponents),
intimidation of public servants and businessmen for opposing the status quo or the incumbent
administration, use of the media (especially state owned) to inflict psychological violence on the
opposition and the denial of access to such media by the opposition parties, reckless driving by
those in a procession to campaign rallies, which intimidate other road users and the use of
traditional rulers to intimidate the masses into electing particular preferred candidates.
B. Theoretical framework
A system is defined as "a group of things or parts working together as a whole" by Hornby
(1998). The system theory, which is attributed to Ludwing Bertalanffy, posits that a system is a
normally a complex element, made up of many units that are both complex and dynamic in
nature. According to the system theory, systems as well as their components are in constant
interaction with the ecology within which the system operates; this interaction entails the making
of demands from the environment on the system and the reaction of the system to the demand
which take the form of feedback.
Within the framework of this interaction between the system and its ecology, the environment
influences the system largely and vice versa. According to the system theorists, for a system to
survive and enjoy continuity, it must strive to address demand emanating from the society or its
environment; it must also maintain a balance within the system.
The system maintains and retains its balance by absorbing and looking into the stress placed on it
by the excessive demands, through efficient use of the gatekeeper whose job is to filter and if
necessary, stop, unnecessary demands from entering the system. When a system cannot cope
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with the high demands coming from the environment, it will eventually become stressed, at this
stage; the system either collapses or evolves to accommodate the demand. Systems are generally
characterized by the following features;
i. Every system is a complex whole, a contribution of many sub-units functioning as a whole.
ii. Every system is made up of functional sub units parts
iii.Every systems is a self-regulatory entity with the ultimate aim of survival.
iv. Every system is in constant interaction with its environment and each influences the other.
v. Survival for every system is only attained when the demands and expectations of the
environment is fulfilled
vi.Every system strives to maintain a balance using inbuilt mechanism.
vii.Systems die or evolve when they are unable to cope with the demands of the society, this
makes them dynamic.
One of the biggest alterations of the system theory came from David Easton, who transplanted
the theory in the political science and other scholars followed suit. In the second theory which is
the Elite Theory. "Elite Theory" developed to jettison the Marxian School of thought that a
"classless society" having an egalitarian structure could be achieved after a class war in every
society. It gives credence to Marxism as an ideology rather than an objective analysis of social
system.
According to Elite theory man can never be free from the strangle hold of an elite structure. The
term elite in the view of Hornby (1998) refers to a set of people in the society who are powerful
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and have a lot of influence because they are wealthy, intelligent and want to maximize
advantage. The elite concept is based on the view that societies are divided into classes. Thus
according to an Italian sociologist, Gaestano Mosca (1858—1941).
In all societies two classes of people appear a class that rule and a class
that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all
political functions, monopolies power, and enjoys the advantages that
power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class is directed and
controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, more or
less arbitrary and violent (cited in Adrain 1975; 11).
In the same vein, Marxism notes that the history of all human society is the history of the
emergence of classes in the struggle. Society as a whole is constantly splitting into two
belligerent camps; the bourgeoisie and proletariat (Marx & Engel, 1977). The class of the
bourgeoisie emerged because of their ability to appropriate and maximize the surplus produced
by the labour of the proletariat. The relationship between them is through exploitation. The
bourgeoisie often called the capitalist or upper class, seen as the elite, monopolizing and
controlling resources (production distribution and allocation), power and capabilities. The elite
belong to an organized minority group and are found in virtually all sectors of the society where
there is hierarchy of power and leadership. Due to the fact that they are an organized group it is
very hard for the unorganized majority of the have not to confront and take power from them.
The features of the elite theory are;
a. The society is divided into two; the organized upper echelon who direct and control the
production, distribution and allocation of values in the society as against the unorganized
masses of people that lacks the wherewithal to appropriate same.
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b. Movement into the elite group is restricted; those that penetrate the system must not go
against the system.
c. Elitism functions for the sustenance of the entire system
d. They influence and dictate for most of the population, with an insignificant reversal
influence from the masses on them.
Elite theories were postulated by Vilfredo Pareto (1984-1923). Gaetano Mosco (1985-1941) and
Robert Michaels (1887-1936). These are all classical theorist who focused on the inevitability of
a set of powerful "elites" in all big societies, giving a radical critique of two contending
theoretical and ideological lines of thought; democratic theory (government of the people by the
people for the people" in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address) and the Marxist vision of class conflict
leading to revolution and egalitarian socialism. In contract with both these ideologies, the elite
theories proffered an inescapable classification between dominant minorities (called "elites"
"ruling classes" "political class" "oligarchies" "aristocrats: e.t.c) and the dominated majority of
the "mass" (Omodia, 2009).
C. The applicability of elite theory to the topic under discussion: The Nigerian Political
System is dominated by the elite right from the formation of political parties through when these
parties are registered; money is not made available until such party gain registration. So the
question is who prepares and fund the movement before its status as a political party, it is the
"money bags" who may later acquire such political party as their personal property.
Take the case of Chikwa Okorie of United Peoples Party, Bola Ahmed Tinubu of Action
Congress that later became Action Congress of Nigeria, Chris Okotie of Fresh Democratic Party
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and even the present Peoples Democratic Party that came from those elite that called themselves
G34 (a group of 34 eminent elder statesmen) and a host of other examples that will be referred to
as the work progresses, this means that these money bags being what they are will certainly
resort to violence to secure their investments.
Looking at the elite theory from power perspective politics is seen to be about might rather than
right, this might concept creates the unusual quest to use force or violence to achieve political
ends irrespective of the consequences. Examples will be made; in Nigeria the former president
Olusegun Obasanjo had during a rally in 2007 told his audience and the whole country that that
elections was a “do or die affair” in another rally he was reported to have told his audience that
the elections was a “fight to the finish”.
His statements are not an aberration but a norm, because they are made by various politicians, his
made headlines because he was the president. Recently a governor in one of the northern states
called El-rufia clearly threatened international monitors during the 2019 general elections, by
stating clearly that he will put them in body bags. His statement drew a lot of flanks from the
opposition but the sitting president Muhammadu Buhari who coincidentally is of the same
political party, and his party chairman Adams Oshimole and other chieftains in his party
supported his statements and actions openly by making statements to justify his gaffe.
In political science, might is seen as de facto right because the seizure of power leads to the
establishment of authority. It is concerned with which groups or persons dominate, get their own
way or are best able to pursue their own interests in societies. Deploying violence to secure
electoral victory, from power perspective, can be seen as the might that politicians possess.
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Instead of the popularity through electioneering campaign, a candidate could use violence or the
threat of its use to secure electoral victory; thereby having the political authority.
The after effect of this is that credible leadership will be eluded and this have a spill-over effect
of negating development or softly putting it, the so-called democratic dividend will never be
provided since violence have been used by the candidate directly or through it political
godfather. Politics at this juncture due to the use of violence which can only be sustained and
funded by the elites becomes a big business for the political elites.
The elite theory is a theory of the state which seeks to describe and explain the power
relationship in a contemporary society like the Nigerian fourth republic. The theory posited that
small minority, consisting of members of economic elite and policy-planning networks, holds the
most power and that this power is independent of a state's democratic elections process. It was
developed as an alternative paradigm to pluralism. It rejects the pluralist view concerning the
distribution of power in society. It is based on this that Mosca argued that it is a minority group,
as against the pluralist perceptive, which perform all political functions, monopolizes power and
enjoys the advantages that power brings.
As minority group within the society, the elite have so many manipulative devices that they use
against the masses, the majority. They use manipulative skills including oratory, persuasion and
playing upon the sentiment of the people in order to perpetuate themselves or their political
"godson" in power. As a result, power is concentrated in the hands of the few. Therefore, these
few occupy the strategic command posts within the social structure. Power elites constitutes a
self-conscious class whose members help each other on the basis of mutual understanding,
tolerance and cooperation in other to strengthen each other's power and position.
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This is why politics in the 4th Republic has become synonymous with violence, election in Nigeria
within these period is more of "might" if you have the fund to sustain a local militia or thugs you
carry the day, it is a conundrum, although there could be exception but the use of violence in
politics have been largely present and used to undermine due and credible electoral process in
Nigerian political system throughout the countries democratic experiment.
II. Empirical review
A. An overview of electoral process: Rae (1971) saw electoral systems as a set of guidelines
that spell out how electoral processes are carried out and in extension how their outcome is
determined. These guidelines govern all aspects of the voting process such as when elections
occur, those allowed to vote, those allowed to stand as candidates, how the ballots are processed
cast and counted, limits on campaign financing and spending, and other factors that can influence
and or determine the outcome of the electoral process.
Political electoral systems are clearly specified and defined by statutes, are conducted by
electoral bodies set up by law, and can adopt different variants of elections for different offices.
Some electoral systems elect a single winner to a unique position, such as prime minister,
president or governor, while others elect many winners, such as members of the legislature.
There are variations in electoral systems, but the most common systems are first-past-the-post
voting, the two-round (runoff) system, proportional representation and ranked or preferential
voting. Some electoral systems, such as mixed systems, attempt to combine the benefits of non-
proportional and proportional systems. The study of electoral methods is known as social choice
theory or voting theory, and this study can take place within the field of political science,
economics, or mathematics, and specifically within the subfields of game theory and mechanism
design.
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B. Types of electoral systems: There are many variations of electoral systems such as plurality
systems; Taagapera & Shugart (1989) were of the view that plurality voting is one where
candidate(s) with the highest votes cast wins, with no need to get a majority of votes. The second
type is the majoritan system; Hermens (1994) defined it as where candidates have to secure a
majority of the votes cast to be elected. The third type is the proportional representation; Lijphart
(1994) argued that it is the most utilized electoral system for legislative elections, with the
parliaments of over eighty countries elected by various forms of this particular system.
The fourth type is the mixed system; Hagele & Pukelsheim (2001) held that several states use the
mixed systems to elect the legislature i.e parallel voting and mixed-member proportional
representation. The fifth type is the primary elections; Solgard & Landskoener (2000) were of
the opinion that this variation reduces the risk of voters splitting their vote by making sure a
single party candidate emerges. The sixth type is the indirect elections; Mowbray & Gollman
(2007) argued that some elections feature an indirect electoral system, due to the fact that there is
either no popular vote, or the popular vote constitutes only one stage of the election; in these
systems the final vote is usually done by an electoral college.
C. Overview of elections in Nigeria: The Federation of Nigeria formally gained its nominal
independence from Britain and joined the Commonwealth of Nations (CON) on October 1,
1960. On October 1, 1960, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, one key member of the Northern People’s
Congress (NPC), was elected as prime minister (head of government) of the Federation of
Nigeria. Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons (NCNC), was elected as Governor-General (representative of Queen Elizabeth II, the
Nigerian head of state) on November 16, 1960. The Federal Republic of Nigeria was established
24

on October 1, 1963, with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as prime minister (head of government) and
Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe as president (Adetula, 2012).
Enefe (2015) writes that President Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe dissolved the House of
Representatives on December 8, 1964, while Parliamentary elections were held on December 30,
1964 and March 18, 1965, and the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) won 162 out of 312 seats
in the House of Representatives. The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) won 84
seats in the House of Representatives. The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA)
boycotted the parliamentary elections citing political manipulations by the party in power.
Legislative elections were held according to Levah & Utah (2010) on July 14, 1979, after a long
period of military rule and civil war, and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) won 168 out of
449 seats in the House of Representatives. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) won 111 seats in
the House of Representatives. Shehu Shagari of the NPN was elected president with 34 percent
of the vote on August 11, 1979, and he was inaugurated as president on October 1, 1979.
According to Orji & Uzodi (2012) President Shagari was re-elected for a second term with 48
percent of the vote on August 6, 1983, and he was inaugurated on October 1, 1983.
The National party of Nigeria (NPN) secured 13 out of 19 state governorships in elections on
August 13, 1983. Legislative elections were held on August 20-27, 1983, and the National Party
of Nigeria (NPN) secured 60 out of 96 seats in the Senate and 306 out of 450 seats in the House
of Representatives. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) secured 16 seats in the Senate and 51
seats in the House of Representatives. On May 16-18, 1992 legislative elections were held on
July 4, 1992, and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) secured 314 out of 593 seats in the House
of Representatives. The National Republican Convention (NRC) secured 275 seats in the House
25

of Representatives. Moshood K. O. Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was elected
president with 58 percent of the vote on June 12, 1993.
The military dictatorship of Babangida nicknamed the evil genius by the Nigerian media
annulled that election leading to nationwide anti-military government activities (Okokon,
2012). Election-related violence, unfortunately has been an inherent characteristics since the start
of Nigerian democratic experience in 1959, elections in Nigeria are usually high-stakes, winner-
take-all contests. With so much on the line, they are often, if not always, accompanied by
violence directly and indirectly. Politicians are all too willing and ever ready to deploy and
exploit simmering ethnic, religious, and regional divisions to gain even the slightest political
advantage.
They usually stoke and inflame community tension and target their rivals and their supporters.
Not only do average or common Nigerians bear the brunt of such violence, the knock-on effects
to the credibility of Nigeria’s political processes is hard to understate. Election-related violence
typically includes clashes between political party supporters, violence incidents that take place at
campaign events, and attacks on existing or aspiring politicians (Nwokoye, 2009).
For most developing and or emerging democracies of the Third World especially, Nigeria,
electoral violence is not only a recurrent decimal in its body polity, its frequency, trajectory,
character and dimension is what is frightening. It has now become a national character of the
Nigerian state in such a way that both the Nigerian state and her citizens are held hostage by this
smashing negative political reality in which they are both unfortunate willing conspirators. From
independence to date, electoral violence in Nigeria has improved in sophistry and reach.
According to IFES Report (2007); an acronym for International Foundation for Electoral
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systems, there were 967 incidents of electoral violence in the 2007 elections alone, this is an
astonishing figure.
Cases of abduction, kidnapping, murder, killing ̧ protest, disruption, intimidation, physical attack
and poster defacing all featured in the reported incidents. 300 people were killed on issues
relating to the 2007 general elections. Deadly election-related violence in northern Nigeria
following the April 2011 Presidential voting left more than 800 people dead most of them were
southerners and Christians perceived to have supported the incumbent who is a Christian
southerner. With the benefit of hindsight and after a pain-staking research, CLEEN Foundation
(an NGO formerly known as Centre for Law Enforcement Education), in its 'Third Security
Threat Assessment' projected that electoral violence was most likely to occur in 15 Nigerian
most volatile and high security risk states during the 2015 general elections (CLEEN in Ibe,
2014).
Interestingly, most of the violence linked to elections is perpetrated by the youth who are not
only employed as thugs temporarily by politicians but financed on a semi permanent basis as
bodyguards so long as they do their biddings. With the benefits of their energy and vigour,
seeming lawlessness and lackadaisical attitude to the Nigeria Project because of failed
leadership, the youth are willing and ready instruments in the hands of the politicians who think
very little of the development of the Nigerian state and more of their selfish and parochial
interests. Little wonder why the recurrent destruction of the state through electoral violence is of
little or of no concern to them.
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D. Specific incidence of electoral violence in Nigeria
1. 1959 elections: One key issue that has featured in all elections in Nigeria is violence (Adetula,
2012). Electoral violence has had long histories in Nigeria and therefore entrenched. It has been
argued that there had never been any election conducted in Nigeria which has not been heavily
tainted by one form of severe manipulation coupled with electoral violence (Jinadu & Edo,
2010). Beginning with the 1959 elections to those after political independence in 1960, the level
and rate of electoral violence has only increased and become entrenched over time. The
incidence of electoral violence in Nigeria is as diverse perpetuated at all levels as they are
intimidating.
Electoral violence in Nigeria's since the 1st Republic showcased a nation in an absolute hostage
and helpless situation. The NIPSS report (National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies) in
Ibrahim (2007) showed that the 1959 elections took place with fewer incidences of systematic
rigging and outright direct violence. Due to the fact that the election was held in the presence of
a strong arbiter, the colonial state that was not a direct participant and desired some semblance of
peaceful and less rancorous elections even though they wanted to plant their stooges in power so
they can continue their agenda of neo-colonalization after independence in 1960.
The 1959 general elections may not have been characterized by high incidences’ of pronounced
violence when compared to recent elections; there were still pockets of violence and numerous
electoral vices. Many Nigerians are also of the view that several political problems of Nigeria are
traced to this election as several notable academics have accused the British of manipulating this
election using sophisticated rigging such as gerrymandering, unequal and lopsided allocation of
seats to favour the North as against the south (Smith in Achebe 2012). To buttress this on the
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1959 elections specifically, former Governor of Northern Nigeria Mr. Bryan a British colonialist
confessed in is memoir that he was involved in its manipulations so that the Northern Peoples'
Congress a political party that enjoyed tremendous support in the north of Nigeria and was pro
British could win 90% of the votes (Okonjo in Iyayi, 2008).
2. 1964 elections: The 1964 and 1965 elections saw a dramatic upsurge in electoral misconduct
as violence, manipulations and malpractices became the norm. Election results were violently
contested, leading to the popular uprising in western Nigeria known as “Operation Wetie” in
which hundreds of people were killed or maimed. Western Nigerian regional elections of 1965
were worse than the 1964 elections. The NNDP (Nigerian National Democratic Party) which was
in power perfected its rigging strategy in such a way that Returning Officers deserted their posts
after accepting nomination papers from government candidates. Despite all these manipulations
an opposition candidate won, the results were simply reversed and the government and NNDP
backed candidate was announced on the government owned radio as the winner, this triggered
huge post election violence (Osinbajo, 2009).
The most notorious example of this travesty was the case of a candidate who won the election in
one of the Owo (Owo is a constituency in western Nigeria) constituencies. His Nigerian National
Democratic Party (NNDP) opponent was declared the victor. He thereupon announced after
consultations and advice that he had decided to join the Nigerian National Democratic Party
(NNDP). A few days after his announcement, the Electoral Commissioner declared him the
successful candidate citing some bureaucratic mistake and quietly dropped his opponent (Arikpo
in Osinbajo, 2009).
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During the 1964 general elections in Nigeria apart from rigging on an individual basis
accompanied and occasioned by violence, the major political parties, the Northern People's
Congress (NPC) the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), the Action Group (AG) and
the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), formed political alliances through which
they perfected and consolidated their use of violence to consolidate and further entrench their
strangle hold in their perceived strong areas often determined by ethnicity or religion.
Based on this need for alliances to outwit their opponents the Action Group (AG), the National
Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and the Northern Peoples Forum (NPF) formed the United
Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) on June 3, 1964 while the Northern People's Congress
(NPC), the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the Movement for Democratic Front
(MDF) formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) on August 20, 1964 (Olaoye, 2013).
The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) as pointed out above was a combination of several
political parties they returned most of their candidates unopposed in places where they upper
hand through outright voter intimidation, UPGA forcefully and violently prevented NNA from
making nominations to vie for positions in its domains (Mackintosh, 2006). Also, elections into
the Western House of Assembly on October 11, 1965 ended in arson as a result of widespread
use of violence to discrete the outcome of the election. On January 15, 1966, the military took
over power in a bloody coup citing electoral vices and corruption as reasons, putting an end to
the first republic.
3. 1979 elections: in the case of 1979 elections the same military were accused serially by almost
everybody who lost out to have rigged the elections using troops to favour a particular political
party and its candidates, so that election had its own problems (Yaqub, 2010). Under the
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supervision of the military, the 1979 elections witnessed a lot of electoral manipulations and
violence. The heat and confusion caused by litigations against it gave rise to the infamous legal
interpretations of 2/3 percent of the 19 states of the federation by the Supreme Court.
The political parties; especially the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was eager on
misinterpreting and misrepresenting the constitution to its favour, unfortunately the Judiciary
was a willing participant so long as the price was right. The second republic was arguably worse
in-spite of the series of cautions taken both to ensure that political parties were "national" in
structure, outlook and in the makeup of their executive committees and in spite of the lengthy
and clearly spelt out registration, campaign, electoral laws and guideline that were made
available, the political parties still resorted to the use of violence of unimaginable proportions
during that election (Jinadu & Edo 2010).
Even the state institutions of coercion such as the police and the military were variously accused
of aiding and abetting the perpetration of electoral violence and vices” (Ofonagoro, 1981), of the
five political parties that contested the August 11, 1979 Presidential Election (Unity Party of
Nigeria, National Party of Nigeria, Great Nigeria Peoples Party, Nigerian Peoples Party and
Peoples Redemption Party), three (Nigerian People Party, Unity Party Nigeria and Great Nigeria
Peoples Party) rejected the August 16 declaration of Shehu Shagari as the first executive
president elect of Nigeria. He is the first executive president because Nigeria in 1979 changed
from parliamentary system to presidential system tailored after the United States model.
Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) challenged the outcome of the results through the
election tribunal up to the Supreme Court when the case was finally decided in favour of
Shagari's National Party of Nigeria (NPN) on September 26, 1979 (Mackintosh, 2006). The
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legitimacy and moral vacuum that was created by that action eventually created problems for the
Shagari administration. That Republic referred to as the 2rd Republic ended in a military coup on
December 31, 1983 the military top brass who were willing participants to all the electoral vices
turned round to cite same reasons and corruption as reasons for their take over.
4. 1983 elections violence: Through its 'landslide Victory' slogan, the ruling National Party of
Nigeria (NPN) taught their political opponents in the 1983 elections the bitter lessons of power
of incumbency through the outright manipulation of voter registration/registers, purchase of
voters' cards, intimidation, monumental rigging, and the introduction of bizarre deportation of
citizens for example Shugaba, a strong opponent of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was
deported from the country by the government on grounds that he was an illegal alien which was
untrue to create chance for Nigeria Party of Nigeria (NPN) to concretize its return bid.
Iyayi (2008) adds that in Modakeke, a suburb of Ife, south-west Nigeria, voter registration was
hiked from an original 26,000 voters to 250,000 thereby, making the voting population in that
enclave more than the voting population of the whole of Ife. In the early 1980s, the old Anambra
State, made up of the present Anambra, Enugu and Ebonyi states became very competitive with
the return to the country of the former Biafran leader, Emeka Odimegwu Ojukwu, (Biafran
Republic was a short lived independent state that seceded from Nigeria due to the ethnic pogrom
against the Igbo’s in 1966-1967, the secession led to a three years bloody civil war).
The concerted attempts by the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) at the federal level to
recapture the state from the ruling NPP (National Peoples Party) at the state level created the
scenario for violent conflict. Jim Nwobodo was the state governor while Nnamdi Azikiwe one of
the most popular Nigerian nationalist and politician was the party's National Leader and
Presidential Candidate. First, it became a war of words, eloquence and rhetoric’s due to the
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calibre of the personalities involved all of them Cambridge/Harvard trained scholars but later
degenerated into indescribable battles fought at various fronts: Nnamdi Azikiwe was repeatedly
taunted and insulted by the Alex Ekwueme's (Alex Ekwueme was the incumbent Vice President
to Shagari and an alley to Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu who was running for the senate but
overwhelmingly popular and worshiped in the east because of his outstanding heroic role in the
civil war;1967-70) cohorts in the NTA (Nigerian Television Authority), a federally owned news
media that in other climes should cater for the well-being of generality of its citizens irrespective
of political affiliations.
Governor Jim Nwobodo was also taunted as “Ochomma I of Igbo land” (a derogatory term
which means number one fashion governor of Igbo land). Not to be outdone, Nwobodo created
the Anambra State Broadcasting Service (ABS) and used it to fire back at his opponents.
Christian Onoh was called “ono okpa” (a derogatory term which means loud mouthed buffoon)
and Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu was called “edi afu onu” (a derogatory term which means goat
beard, due to his beard), all these are considered culturally/socially derogatory and
democratically indecent.
The politics of 2nd Republic in Anambra state was devoid of any form of decency; vulgarity was
the norm. Physical and verbal attacks were the other of the day. Nwobodo's marital status as a
divorcee was made a campaign issue. His political adversaries were saying that “if he could not
rule his family, how could he superintend over a state, even when Nwobodo had shown in his
first term that he could administer the state (Nwokoye, 2009). With the formation of the Jim
Vanguard and Ikemba Front, the battle became more violent as mayhem was visited on the state
and its people, prominent of which was the famous political battle at Nkpor Junction in which
many lives were lost, people maimed and property destroyed.
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5. 1985-1993 elections: Between 1985 and 1993, the third republic witnessed a series of political
contraption under the regimes of Ibrahim Babangida and Abacha. “There were many cases of
electoral violence cum malpractices but the worst accusation of Babangida's and Abacha
dictatorship were the brutal assassination, and the locking up of politicians with one of the
highest form of state intimidation taking place under these military regime when the Babangida
regime specifically failed to install its stooge it annulled the presidential election on June 12,
1993” clearly won by the business mogul Abiola; the military cited unseen forces as those
behind the annulment that was how low the Nigerian state had been reduced by these politicians
in khaki (Oshun, 2009). On June 23, 1993, the Federal Military Government announced the
annulment of the Presidential election in an unsigned paper that was circulated by the Press
Secretary to the Vice President Nduka Irabor. That event set the stage for a long and bitter
struggle for the safe guard of democracy in Nigeria as democracy advocacy groups, professional
associations, students bodies, market women, the international community, academics e.t.c began
a long-drawn battle against the dictatorial regime whose leadership was at the centre of an
ethnically hatched agenda for the self-succession bid of Ibrahim Babangida nick named by the
local Nigerian media as “evil genius or Maradona”, the "Son of the Niger" and leader of the
Northern dominated military” (Oshun 2009).
E. The fourth republic proper
1. 1999 elections: The fourth republic was birthed with the signing into law the 1999
constitution by the military regime of Abdulsalami Abubakara, who also co-coordinated the
registration of three political parties to contest the general elections that immediately followed.
These parties according to Otite & Umukoro (2013) were Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All
People Party (APP) and Alliance for democracy (AD). The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)
34

polled 18,738,54 Alliance for Democracy (AD); 11,110,287, invalid votes 431,611 with total
votes cast 30,280,052 for the presidential elections.
Legislative elections were held on February 20, 1999, and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
won 206 out of 360 seats in the House of Representatives. The All People’s Party (APP) won 74
seats in the House of Representatives, and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) won 68 seats in the
House of Representatives. Olusegun Obasanjo of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) defeated
Olu Falae of the All Peoples Party (APP) by a margin of 63 percent to 37 percent to win the
presidential election on February 27, 1999. This election according to popular opinion was
heavily manipulated to ensure the preferred candidate of the ruling military junta Obasanjo who
incidentally was also an ex military head of state won.
2. 2003 elections: Ezeife (2012) pointed out that 20 political parties participated with the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP) winning 25 states plus the Federal Capital Territory, the Peoples
Democratic Party polled (PDP) 24,456,140, All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP); 12,710,022, All
Progressive Grand Alliance; 1,297,445, ANPP; 169,606 with minor numbers for the other
political parties, and total votes cast 42,018735 in the presidential elections. Legislative elections
were held on April 12, 2003, and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won 76 out of 109 seats
in the House of Representatives, and the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) won 27 seats in the
House of Representatives. President Olusegun Obasanjo was re-elected with 62 percent of the
vote on April 19, 2003. The election was widely condemned by the international and local
observers as massively rigged and full of state and individually sponsored violence.
At the state level there were several cases of electoral vices for example the deadly
confrontations between the erstwhile Anambra Peoples Forum (APF) led by the multibillionaire
politician, Emeka Offor and the government of Chinmaraoke Mbadinuju of Anambra State.
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Different violent confrontations and clashes were recorded, as the government was almost
grounded. Rallies and the government's programmes were disrupted by the APF which almost
ran a parallel government. All efforts by Mbadinuju to secure a return ticket were violently
punctuated and dangerous weapons indiscriminately brandished and used (Olaoye, 2013). The
mayhem unleashed by rival political thugs on Anambra State following the 2003 elections in
which Chris Ngige, a serving governor was kidnapped and almost all the strategic government
buildings in the state set ablaze, with focus on cities like Awka, Onitsha and Nnewi (Edike,
Ojeifo, Anayo & Okoli, 2004).
Groups of political miscreants embarked on rampage, torching and bombing public buildings
such as the state governor's office, deputy governor's office, the State Independent Electoral
Commission (ANSIEC) building, the Anambra Broadcasting Service (ABS) facilities, the State
Education Commission and several cars parked within the premises of these buildings. They
were said to have swooped on the city from the Onitsha end of the Enugu-Onitsha Expressway
armed with explosives suspected to be pipe bombs, pump action guns, axes, cutlasses and other
lethal weapons (Vanguard Newspaper 2014).
3. 2007 elections: Wader & Akpan (2011) pointed out that 19 political parties participated in the
general elections with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) winning in 28 states. In the
presidential elections the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) polled 24,638,063, All Nigeria
Peoples Party (ANPP); 6,605,299, Action Congress (AC); polled 2,637,848, Progressive
People’s Alliance (PPA); polled 608,803, in the presidential elections. Legislative elections were
held on April 21, 2007, and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) secured 260 out of 360 seats in
the House of Representatives. The All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) secured 62 seats in the
House of Representatives. Umaru Yar’Adua of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) was elected
36

president with 70 percent of the vote on April 21, 2007 he was subsequently inaugurated as
president on May 29, 2007.
The 2003 elections were no different from the previous elections; a key unique nature of the
violence that characterized this particular election was the assassinations of most of the
prominent opposition politicians most of these assassinations took place before the general
elections. The various media outlets argued quite extensively that if the government in power did
not bring the alleged killers to book then they were the ones perpetuating this orgy of violence.
Over 100 targeted assassinations took place within this period across the nation (Orji & Uzodi,
2012).
4. 2011 elections: Enefe (2015) pointed out that 20 political parties participated in that year’s
elections with the total vote cast at 39,469,484, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) polled
22,495,000, Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) polled 12,214,850, Action Congress of
Nigeria (ACN) polled 2,079,000, in the presidential elections. Legislative elections were held on
April 9, 2011, and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) secured 199 out of 360 seats in the
House of Representatives. The Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) secured 69 seats in the House
of Representatives. Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP was elected president with 59 percent of the
vote on April 16, 2011.
Nigeria held three rounds of elections; legislative on April 9, presidential on April 16, and
gubernatorial on April 26. Human Rights Watch researchers monitored the human rights
dimension of the elections, including freedom of assembly, expression, and association, during
each round; Bauchi and Benue states during the legislative elections, Katsina and Oyo states for
the presidential round, and Akwa Ibom and Kaduna states for the gubernatorial voting expressed
37

their dismay on the very high levels of violence perpetuated by all the parties involved
(Guobadia, 2012).
The Independent National Electoral Commission, under its new chairman in 2010 Attahiru Jega;
significantly improved the conduct of the elections, creating a new voters' register, improving
transparency in reporting results, and publicly pledging to hold accountable those who broke the
rules. Elections were held in most areas of Nigeria in a peaceful atmosphere, with fewer reported
incidents of violence or blatant police abuses than in previous elections. There is need to throw
more light on this election because Nigerians and the international observers adjudged it one of
the most despite these significant and noticeable improvements, though, there were still incidents
of violence, hijacking of ballot boxes by party thugs, and reports of police misconduct,
particularly in certain areas called key states and the volatile Niger Delta region.
The major violence in that election were linked to party primaries and campaigns these attacks
left at least 165 people dead since November 2010 (Okokon, 2012). Other noticeable incidents in
an election dubbed peaceful according Nigerian standards include the assassination of opposition
gubernatorial candidates in Borno State was in January 2011, bombings in four states of Bayelsa,
Borno, Kaduna, and Niger left dozens dead, and clashes between opposing party supporters or
attacks by party thugs during the campaigns killed dozens of others. The elections were also
marred by allegations of vote buying, ballot-box stuffing, and inflation of results, most
noticeably throughout Nigeria, official results in the presidential election in some rural areas
recorded close to 100 percent voter turnout, an unprecedented feat achievable only through
manipulations.
On the eve of the National Assembly elections held on 9 April 2011, a bomb attack at the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) office in Suleja, Niger State killed at least
38

10 people and injured several others (Punch 2012). There were also multiple bomb explosions in
the Northern city of Maiduguri, Borno State, where the Boko Haram Islamic militant group is
most active (Bello 2011). A few months before the 2011 general elections, over 200 persons had
lost their lives in communal unrests in Plateau State (Amnesty International 2011). Furthermore,
there were also reports of many politically-related assassinations of politicians and their
supporters, and numerous clashes between party supporters (Orji & Uzodi, 2012).
Sobechi in Adele, (2011) aptly reported that in Izzi Local Government of Ebonyi State suspected
thugs loyal to a political party unleashed terror on St. Stephen's Catholic Church, Iziogo in the
local council. What however snowballed into the violence was that an All Nigerian Peoples Party
(ANPP) Chieftain and the Senatorial Candidate for Ebonyi North Senatorial District, Fidelis
Nwankwo went to St. Stephen's Catholic Church on that Sunday in company of his colleagues,
the parties’ governorship candidate and Emma Uguru, the House of Representatives candidate
for Izzi/Abakaliki Federal Constituency. The thugs broke into the home of the Catechist, burnt
his motor cycle, destroyed the yam barn and inflicted cuts on one person. In all, five motorcycles
were burnt (Sobechi, in Adele, 2011).
Enugu witnessed attack targeted at opponents of the state government. Such attacks by members
ranged from disruption of meetings and gatherings, destruction of posters and billboards of
aspirants. Former aspirant to Enugu West Senatorial Zone of the Peoples Democratic Party
(PDP) O. A. U Onyema and Anayo Onwuegbu severally had their billboards and posters
destroyed by their opponents. In another development, in the build-up to the battle to control the
soul of the PDP between Chime and his opponents, former Military Administrator of old Imo
state, Commodore Anthony Oguguo and former Adviser on Local Government Affairs to
Chimaroke Nnamani, Sam Ejiofor had their homes burnt by political thugs (Adele, 2011). These
39

detailed incidents are meant to show the high levels of political violence, if an election
considered peaceful could record such anomalies then imagine what the other elections look like
in practical terms.
5. 2015 elections: Osagie (2015) pointed out that 26 political parties took part in the general
elections with only 11 presenting candidates for the presidential elections. The APC polled
15,424,921, PDP; polled 12,853,162, in the presidential elections. Four opposition political
parties had earlier merged to form the All Progressive Congress (APC) on February 6, 2013.
The prelude to this election was marred by electoral violence for example in 2012, two
commissioners and an Advisor to Ebonyi State's governor barely escaped an assassination
attempt when they were attacked at a petrol station by gunmen; a bystander was not so lucky and
was killed in the gunfire (Aoav & Nwgav, 2013).
The 4th Republic in a summary; the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) presidential candidate
Olusegun Obasanjo won the maiden election in 1999 against Olu Falae of Alliance for
Democracy (AD); and was re-elected in 2003. The subsequent four presidential elections in
Nigeria between 1999 and 2011 were consistently won by the PDP. Muhammadu Buhari
contested three times and lost all three times, twice under the platform of All Nigerian People’s
Party (ANPP) and once under the Congress for Progressive’s Change (CPC). It was against this
background that the 2015 election was held, with two dominant parties (Peoples Democratic
Party and All Progressive Congress). Goodluck Jonathan, the then incumbent president was the
flag bearer of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) while Muhammadu Buhari was the flag
bearer of the All Progressive Congress (APC). It was this fourth attempt that saw him winning
the presidential race against an incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan of the (PDP).
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F. Causes of electoral violence in Nigeria
In their classical submissions on the 'current incentives to electoral violence in Nigeria' Inokoba
& Maliki (2011) aptly summarized, thus: State institutions encourage violence, there is a culture
of impunity in the Nigerian society, political leaders at all levels perpetrate electoral violence
without regards to its implications, the absence of institutional and legal solutions against
electoral violence, poor documentation of electoral violence, poor public knowledge of the
dangers of a manipulated electoral process and prebendal politics are the basis for electoral
violence.
On his own part Edoh (2016) contends that electoral violence in Nigeria is caused by the
following factors: Hate Campaigns, rigging of elections, thuggery, abuse of power, electoral
corruption and fraud. Harrow & Miller (2009) in their study identified some key factors which
include. Political reasons, Administrative reasons, Psycho-cultural and structural reasons.
1. Political Reasons: The Political reasons for the use of violence in the democratic process
include the fact that Nigerian politician’s see democracy and democratic process in general as a
form of "self-interest" and "short term struggle for power" rather than an avenue that can be
utilized to fast track nation building in a heterogeneous society like Nigeria. The political class in
Nigeria focus solely on the immediate gains and result of power politics over and above the long-
term benefits of a stable, democratic system. Thus, focus is usually but wrongly placed on
winning elections by any means and at whatever cost, a situation that makes election "do-or-die"
affair, this makes rigging, violence and other electoral vices attractive to those who perpetrate
these acts.
2. Administrative Reasons: In other to occupy the administrative arm of government,
politicians h do everything possible often illegally to occupy such executive position with the
41

aim of determining who gets what, how and when. Connected to this is the "Winner-takes-all"
mentality in Nigerian politics. Because the state is the most visible and viable institution in the
third world (Nigeria inclusive), to win elections in these countries is to control all the state
resources and to lose elections is to forfeit political patronage and all connections to influence
the determination of state policy. Incumbents, therefore do everything to retain their positions
even if it means using violence to perpetrate electoral fraud, rigging and at elimination of
political opponents. Examples are the assassination of Bola lge. Harry Marshal, Funsho Williams
and a host of others for electoral reason(s)
3. Psycho-Cultural and Structural Reasons: electoral violence in Nigerian politics is
exacerbated by the twin challenges of mass abject poverty and illiteracy, coupled with the
unchecked and excessive use of state coercive institutions in elections. Majority of Nigerians are
so poor that they easily be induced to become thugs for politicians.
G. Analyzing electoral violence in Nigeria
Although monetization of elections became popular as a form of electoral manipulation in
Nigeria, it has been in existence since the colonial era when the major political parties in Nigeria
adopted all means to gain electoral advantage or control of what they regarded as their "natural"
electoral domains. During this embryo stage apart from ethnic consideration, violence and
intimidation were used as key motivational factors in mobilising support to or withdrawing it
from political parties or candidates. It operated mainly by a combination of open threats and
actual violence, often interlaced with appeals to primordial sentiments such as ethnicity and
religion, and ultimately; these factors were responsible for the death of most of the republics
such as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd republics in Nigeria (Olaoye 2013).
42

The military intervention in 1966 was precipitated by gross electoral malady, political
recklessness, electoral violence and monetization of the entire political cum electoral system.
The political environment in Nigeria’s 1st republic (1960-1966) specifically created room for the
politicking to be centred on key notable personalities who were at best ethnic and religious
champions. These individuals had enormous grassroots appeal and fanatical base, coupled with
the introduction of an alien political system and structure the people were not used to (modern
democracy) and the struggle for ethnic domination which is a prominent and reoccurring feature
in Africa generally, made political violence inevitable (Anuchamba, 2019).
The second republic (1979-1984) re-enforced and further exposed these fault lines, the only
difference was in 1959 general elections the British who conducted the elections cleverly and
subtly manipulated the electoral system scientifically through gerrymandering by ensuring that
the ethnic group they felt were more sympathetic to their hegemonic traits and or tendencies
emerged victorious. For example in that election which was parliamentary in nature the parties
that had the highest number of votes (NCNC/AG) had few seats compared to the party (NPC)
that had far lesser votes.
Table 1; 1959 federal election results
Political party Votes recorded Percentage of votes Seats won
NCNC 2,594,577 34.6 81
AG 1,992,364 26.1 73
NPC 1,922,179 25.2 134
NEPU 509,050 6.7 8
Others - 7.4 16
7,626,847 100 312
Source; Nohlen & Thibaut (1999).
43

Afro-centric scholars like Anuchamba (2019), Orji & Uzodi (2012) among others have argued that
the British did this deliberately to ensure that the north their favoured region which was
educationally less developed, feudalistic and had campaigned that the British remain as against the
south who did the opposite became the new political leaders in post colonial Nigeria. The National
Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and Action Group (AG) were predominantly
southern/Christian parties with well read notables who had championed the exit of Britain through
various platforms from not only Nigeria but from west Africa while the Northern People’s Congress
(NPC) was a predominantly northern/Islamic party they had vehemently argued that Nigeria was not
ripe for independence.
The military regime that oversaw the 1979 elections unlike the British in 1959 manipulated the
electoral process openly and in very crude ways, using outright military fiat, force, rigging, violence
and intimidation (Inokoba & Maliki, 2011). That election results were bitterly contested at various
levels, further creating more divisions. In the 1984 elections conducted some months before the
military struck again the ruling party conducted a very bizarre election that was straight out of the
horror movies, the elections saw them win landslide victories even in opposition strong holds
despite their abysmal performance in governance generally. The widespread violence and crisis that
accompanied the announcement of the election results, multiple court cases etc created the needed
room and excuse for the same military who willingly and actively collaborated in the sham of an
election to return themselves to power citing electoral manipulation, excessive corruption and a
collapsing economy.
The short lived 3rd republic in 1992 became a classic case and watershed for everything wrong with
the Nigerian political system; this election highlighted all the ills this study has been discussing.
This assertion by the researcher is held because despite the international community certifying the
44

election as free and fair with a winner already partially announced and the loser had called to
congratulate the said winner and a relatively peaceful poll, coupled with high voter turnout very
unusual by Nigerian standards, the military top brass dominated by northern/Muslim cabals
cancelled the elections citing national interest.
The winner MKO Abiola was quickly arrested, for breaching the public peace and declaring himself
president elect, he eventually died in military custody after some years in detention in very
questionable circumstances with the military still in power. The fallout of his death in 1998due to
international pressure forced the military top brass to conduct a massively rigged election in 1999.
They ensured a former military ruler (Olusegun Obasanjo) who was in jail for alleged coup plot
against another previous military regime was brought out from prison, pardoned and made
president, according to Jinadu & Edo (2010) to ensure their interests was protected.
The 1999 elections ushered in the 4th republic which has lasted till date. Today, electoral violence in
Nigeria has become a national political malaise as both electorates and officials of the national
electoral body are daily inundated by threats or actual acts of violence to alter either their decisions
about the party and candidate to vote for or to make them not vote at all. With the growing
pervasiveness of the influence and use of thugs, the use of state instruments of coercion by
politicians in power, electoral violence has assumed a catastrophic dimension. Thus, it has
degenerated very quickly into political god-fatherism, a situation in which the political space
becomes shrinked because few private individuals attempt to annex the state as part of their vast
business empire, by so doing they attempt to determine the outcomes of politics in their favour
through the use of violence (Osita 2014).
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Many have questioned the high incidence of violence recorded during electoral periods
especially during the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 general elections, including the collusion and
widespread participation by state agents especially the electoral officials, police and the military.
Most post-election review workshops and commentaries drew attention to the urgent need to
arrest this trend, (Guobadia 2012). There are allegations that, merit was not the main criterion for
winning party nominations, most candidates were required to pay thugs who were employed to
scare voters away from polling areas; some candidates were sponsored by the rich and powerful
individuals the so-called "godfathers" who in return for their sponsorship wanted government
favours; huge amounts were expended in securing the services of professional election riggers
who came in droves to polling stations to harass voters or to influence poll officials to change
results to favour them.
Most times Nigerian politicians are paid by criminal interests to support their campaign efforts
by assassinating or kidnapping opponents, they in return when in office were to protect the
criminal interest from the persecution when caught (Guobadia 2012). Public perception in
Nigeria appears to support the view that the influence of electoral violence in politics not only
make the electoral playing field uneven for all contestants; it also excluded all those, who though
qualified and wished to participate could not afford professional body guards or engage their
own thugs as a counter measure or deterrent.
In comparative terms Anuchamba (2019) was of the view that nothing had changed, the electoral
system pre-4th Republic and what obtains in the 4th Republic remains largely the same. The
violence, the rigging, the monetization, voting along primordial sentiments, god-father syndrome
and the use of state intimidation had continued unabated. Okereke (2019) in his own assertion
46

held that the difference between the pre 4th republic and the 4th republic proper is in the level of
sophistication with the 4th republic been more sophisticated in terms of electoral vices.
47

CHAPTER TWO
REASEARCH METHODOLOGY
I. Research method
This research method is concerned with the systematic plan adopted for any research work
Rozakis (2007). The study is qualitative and non statistical in nature. The qualitative method will
allow the in-depth exploration of ideas, thoughts and experiences through the use of secondary
data. The qualitative nature of the research presupposes that this study will rely on literature
review gotten through secondary data.
II. Research design
Research design is a set of methods or procedures normally adopted when collecting and
analyzing specific variables in the research problem (Snelson, 2016). It is also the overall
strategy that is used to link up all the different areas of a research to ensure synergy and
coherence which ultimately helps researchers do justice to the research problem raised and in
extension answer the research questions posed, thereby ensuring that the research aims are
achieved beyond reasonable doubt. The research design will ensure the research is efficient by
giving maximum information with minimal expenditure of resources and also ensure the
reliability of the results and or findings obtained. The research design for this study is the review
design (literature review)
III. Location of the study
The Federal Capital Territory was selected as the location of this study due to its peculiar nature
of having both rural (Abaji, Bwari, Kwali) and urban (AMAC, Kuje, Gwagwalada) areas and is a
melting pot of sorts of all ethnic nationalities and religion. Considering the multi-economic,
political, social and media activities going on in Abuja, the choice of the FCT provides a
48

population that represents the diverse voting strata in the Nigerian society. Again most
importantly the choice of FCT offers the researcher easy access to appropriate data from key
institutions required for valid conclusions.
IV. Population of the study
The population of the study will be drawn from the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The Federal
Capital Territory is made up of six (6) Area Councils and sixty-five wards. From available data,
electoral activities took place across sixty-five (65) wards/districts.
Because we cannot use the overall population of the Federal Capital Territory as population of
study due to certain constrains like the accuracy of the figures and the sheer magnitude of the
numbers, there is therefore the need to narrow it down to a manageable figure. To this end since
the topic and variables are political; it is therefore credible to use additional information from the
existing political delineations in the Federal Capital Territory such as the sixty-five (65)
wards/districts in the FCT.
V. Method of data collection
Secondary data; secondary data used in the study already exist in several categories of printed
text and the internet these include official INEC documents, other similar publications, reports
by multilateral organizations, journals, newspapers, text books and reports by committees of
inquiry will be utilized and analyzed.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Table 1. Data on number of persons killed as a result of electoral violence between
2006-2014
SN VARIABLES FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE
1 Plateau 850 21%
2 Kaduna 653 16%
3 Nasarawa 258 6.5%
4 Rivers 181 4.6%
5 Kano 152 3.8%
6 Delta 142 3.6%
7 Oyo 110 2.7%
8 Benue 109 2.7%
9 Kogi 107 2.7%
10 Bayelsa 93 2.3%
11 Akwa Ibom 91 2.3%
12 Niger 86 2.1%
13 Borno 84 2.1%
14 Edo 83 2.1%
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15 Lagos 80 2%
16 Bauchi 63 1.6%
17 Taraba 61 1.5%
18 FCT 59 1.4%
19 Osun 59 1.4%
20 Ondo 55 1.3%
21 Cross River 54 1.3%
22 Kwara 53 1.3%
23 Ogun 51 1.2%
24 Adamawa 49 1.2%
25 Imo 45 1.1%
26 Anambra 38 0.9%
27 Katsina 37 0.8%
28 Gombe 33 0.7%
29 Ekiti 31 0.7%
30 Yobe 29 0.7%
31 Zamfara 26 0.6%
32 Enugu 24 0.6%
33 Kebbi 23 0.5%
34 Abia 23 0.5%
35 Ebonyi 22 0.5%
36 Sokoto 11 0.2%
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37 Jigawa 10 0.2%
38 Total 3,934 100%
Source: field study, 2020.
Note the researcher did not input the decimals after the first or approximate, so the percentage
when calculated will not be up to 100% but above 96.5%.
4.2 Some specific records of electoral violence in Nigerians 4th republic across the 36 states.
a.South East Zone: Imo, Anambra, Enugu, Abia, Ebonyi States.
This geopolitical zone recorded the lowest number of deaths related to electoral violence, with a
total of 45 fatalities in 2006. Notwithstanding, Imo State incidents involve the use of ‘political
thugs’ and point to the influence of godfathers. Most of the cases reported had to do with
kidnapping, assault, and group attacks
i.14/4/2007, Imo state in Njaba local government area: Njaba PDP thugs killed an INEC official
and took away the ballot boxes.
ii.14/4/2007, Imo state in Ikeduru local government area: The Ikeduru House of Assembly
aspirant, Marcus Ebeziem, escaped assassination, but gunmen killed his gateman.
iii.30/10/2010, Imo state in Ehime Mbano local government area: Gunmen stormed the place of
Chairman of Nwangele LGA, Chief Chukwukere, killing him and five other persons. The
Chairman had cash to distribute during elections.
b. South South Zone: Cross River, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Bayelsa, Edo and Delta States.
i. 4/9/2011, Delta state in Isoko South: At least eight persons died in attacks that targeted PDP
chieftains. Churches are razed and some rioters were killed by police. The state government
imposed a curfew.
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ii.12/2/2011, Rivers state in Port Harcourt City: twenty supporters of governors and President
Goodluck Jonathan during the campaign for the south/south zone died in a stampede at the venue
of the rally, after security operatives refused to open the gate for those who wanted to leave the
arena during the speech of the President. The situation became worse when a policeman shot in
the air to disperse the crowd. The victims were mainly women.
iii.1/2/1999 in Bayelsa state in Yeneagoea local government area: Nineteen individuals were
killed in political violence in the Niger Delta region on February 1, 1999.
iv. Some 12,000 individuals fled as refugees as a result of ethnic/political violence in the
Nigerian Delta region, including the town of Warri, in May 2003.
c. North West Zone: Kano, Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina, Kebi, Sokoto, Zamfara.
i.2014 Kano state in Kano City: Thugs attacked the electoral officer, who was saved by police.
Five people were shot dead.
ii. In April and May 2011, many people also died following the inflammatory declarations of the
main opponent, General Muhammadu Buhari, who had lost the Presidential elections. Human
Rights Watch reported approximately 800 killed after this election, mostly from protests by
opposition parties which claimed the results were falsified and rigged.
iii. Six individuals were killed in local election-related violence in the state of Kano.
iv.17/4/2011 Kaduna state: The presidential election divided the country along ethnic and
religious lines. As election results trickled in on April 17, and it became clear that Buhari had
lost, his supporters took to the streets of northern towns and cities to protest what they alleged to
be the rigging of the results. The protesters started burning tires, and the protests soon turned into
riots. The rioting quickly degenerated into sectarian and ethnic bloodletting across the northern
states. Muslim rioters targeted and killed Christians and members of ethnic groups from southern
53

Nigeria, who were perceived to have supported the ruling party, burning their churches, shops,
and homes. The rioters also attacked police stations and ruling party and electoral commission
offices. In predominately Christian communities in Kaduna State, mobs of Christians retaliated
by killing Muslims and burning their mosques and properties.
v. According to the Christian Association of Nigeria, the umbrella organization representing the
majority of Christian churches in Nigeria, at least 170 Christians were killed in the post-election
riots, hundreds more were injured, and thousands displaced. The organization also reported that
more than 350 churches were burned or destroyed by the Muslim rioters across 10 northern
states. In the predominately Christian towns and villages of southern Kaduna State, including
Zonkwa, Matsirga, and Kafanchan, sectarian clashes left more than 500 dead. vi. Human Rights
Watch estimates that in northern Kaduna State, at least 180 people, and possibly more, were
killed in the cities of Kaduna and Zaria and their surrounding suburbs.
vii. A lecturer at a college on the outskirts of Zaria described an attack on the college: "When
you see the mob, they were not in their senses," he said. "The students ran away but the mob
pursued them into the staff quarters and they had nowhere to go. The mob beat them to death and
hit them with machetes. Four Christian students and a Christian lecturer were killed." The
specific areas most affected in Kaduna State, include Zonkwa, Matsirga, and Kafanchan, that
resembled war zones with entire neighbourhoods razed to the ground.
viii.17/4/2011 in Kaduna state: A mob of youth chanting pro-Buhari slogans cornered four
Christian students and a Christian lecturer in the staff quarters of the campus and beat them to
death with sticks, clubs, and machetes on April 17.
ix.17/4/2011 in Kaduna state: Christians and Muslims who found themselves on the wrong side
of the Kaduna river during the riots were bludgeoned to death by marauding mobs. Churches and
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mosques were torched in the city. Civil society leaders said that Christian travellers were
dragged out of their vehicles by mobs of Muslims and killed on the main road leading north of
the city. Mobs of Christians also torched vehicles on the expressway leading through the city's
southern neighbourhoods, killing Muslim motorists.
x.18/4/2011, in Kaduna state in the town of Maraba Rido on the outskirts of the city of Kaduna:
Dozens of houses and shops were razed to the ground, and the main mosque was torched, with
anti-Islamic graffiti and the inscription "Jesus is Lord" inscribed on the burned-out walls of the
mosque. According to Muslim leaders, 28 Muslims were killed, while hundreds of others fled the
area and as a result were unable to vote in the gubernatorial elections.
xi. 18/4/2011, Kaduna state: Men from the predominately-Christian Bajju ethnic group in the
town of Zonkwa burned six of the town's mosques, as well as the homes, shops, and vehicles of
Muslim residents. Witnesses said that violence began late in the afternoon of April 18 and
continued throughout the night. By mid-morning on the following day, the Bajju men had killed
or displaced nearly the town’s entire Hausa-Fulani resident’s in retaliation for the killing of
Christians. One of the district heads acknowledged publicly" The boys here made it total. They
would not relent."
xi.19/4/2011 in Kaduna state: 311 Muslims, nearly all of them men, were buried in a mass grave
in Zonkwa while the remains of 24 others, many of their corpses charred beyond recognition,
were buried in one of the town's wells. Christian leaders in Zonkwa also said that 10 Christians
had also been killed in the town and surrounding communities.
xii.19/4/2011 in Kaduna state in Kafanchan local government area: clashes between Muslim and
Christian youth continued unabated throughout the night of April 18. Christian and Muslims
leaders told Human Rights Watch that by the next morning at least 20 Christians and 34 Muslims
55

had been killed. The mobs torched hundreds of homes, shops, and vehicles, and razed to the
ground the central market. Twenty-six mosques and four churches were burned or destroyed.
One of the leaders from the Igbo ethnic group, the vast majority Christians from south eastern
Nigeria, told Human Rights Watch that 11 Igbo residents were killed in Kafanchan, while 224 of
their houses and 837 shops, many of them in the central market were burned.
d. North Central Zone: Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau, Abuja, Kogi, Niger, Kwara.
i.10/2/2011, Nasarawa state in Lafia local government area: Youths protested the arrest of a
gubernatorial candidate of CPC, Umaru Tanko Al-Makura. He was accused of complicity over
the defacing of the campaign posters and billboards of President Goodluck Jonathan and
Governor Aliyu Akwe Doma. Four persons were killed during that protest, including three
children, hit by stray bullets shot by anti riot policemen and soldiers.
ii. Three individuals were killed in a bombing at a political rally near Abuja on March 3, 2011.
iii. Six individuals were killed in a bombing of an office of Nigeria’s election commission in
Suleja on April 8, 2011.
e. North East Zone: Adamawa, Bornu, Yobe, Taraba, Bauchi, Gombe.
i.2011, February Bauchi State in Bauchi local government area: 32 Christians were killed and 72
churches were burnt over presidential election results in April 2011. The attackers were mainly
Hausa thugs encouraged by Muslim preachers, even if the official Islamic umbrella body in the
North, Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), claimed no responsibility for the violence. Kaduna and
Plateau are also very much affected by such killings: most electoral
ii. 25/1/2007, Bauchi state in Bauchi local government area: The convoy of the gubernatorial
candidate of the ACN, Senator Baba Tela, was attacked by thugs sponsored by PDP stalwarts.
Seven persons were killed.
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iii.19/3/2011, Bauchi state: Aliyu S. Bello, a poly student of the Department of Food Science and
Technology, was killed by hired political thugs.
iv.16/4/2011, Bauchi state: At least 32 Christians were killed by Hausa thugs, including 11 corps
members. A total of 72 churches were burnt in the state over presidential elections results.
v.2014, Bauchi state: Thugs killed a schoolteacher during rivalries between PDP Governorship
candidate Alhaji Nadada Umar and his ANPP counterpart Malam Isa Yuguda.
vi. 25/4/2011, Brono state: At least three individuals were killed in bombings in Maiduguri due
to electoral related dispute.
vii.7/5/2011, Bauchi state: At least 16 individuals were killed in an attack on a predominantly
Christian village in the state of Bauchi on May 7, 2011, due to the announcement of the
presidential elections results.
viii. April 2011, Bauchi state: Some 800 individuals were killed, and some 65,000 individuals
were displaced following the April 2011 elections.
ix.17/4/2011, Bauchi State, Giade community: rioters targeted members of the National Youth
Corps Service, who served as ad-hoc election staff. The youth corps members, who were from
southern Nigeria, ran to the local police station to seek refuge, but the rioters stormed the police
station. The mob killed the police officer on duty and burned down the police station, the
journalists said. They raped two of the female youth corps members then hacked them to death
with machetes, along with five male youth corps members. In total, rioters killed ten youth corps
members in the state.
x. Following the re-election of incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, in 2011, a Christian from the
Niger Delta in the south, who was the candidate for the ruling People's Democratic Party. The
protests degenerated into violent riots or sectarian killings in the northern states of Adamawa,
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Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara.
Relief officials both government and NGOs estimated that more than 65,000 people were
displaced.
4.3 Some examples of State orchestrated electoral violence:
i. 19/11/2013Anambra in Awka South local government area: Two women were killed when
policemen shot into a crowd of women protesting the conduct of the Anambra election.
ii. 4/9/2011, Edo state in Benin City: With the complicity of the police, a former leader of Irri
community, AIG Joshua Uturu of Zone 5 Benin City, killed 26 people over political leadership
issues.
iii. 12/8/2000 Abia state in Ohiafia local government area: Police shot two people dead at a PDP
Governor Theodore Orji campaign rally in contest with Chief Orji Kalu of PPA. One of the
governor’s supporters died on the spot; another died on the way to hospital.
iv.2014, Benue state: Violence over the annulment of the results of the state House of Assembly,
which announced Dr. Ayar Gwer winner before reversing its decision and favouring Asema
Achado. Mobile policemen were held responsible for the deaths.
v.Human Rights Watch documented eight cases of alleged unlawful killing of unarmed residents
by the police and soldiers in the cities of Zaria and Kaduna, and received credible reports of
more than a dozen other incidents. Human Rights Watch also received credible reports that the
police and soldiers in Kaduna, Gombe, and Bauchi states systematically beat people rounded up
during or after the riots.
4.4 Examples of some pre 4th republic electoral violence to show that it has become part of
the political culture and not an aberration.
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i.Regional elections were held on October 11, 1965. Chief Samuel Akintola of the Nigerian
National Democratic Party (NNDP) was re-elected as prime minister of the Western Region on
October 11, 1965. Some 160 civilians and seven government policemen were killed in political
violence in the Western Region following the regional elections. Some 20 individuals were killed
in political violence in Ilesha on January 12, 1966. Furthermore post election crisis caused
thousands of death in the infamous “operation wetie” this was one of the key factors that led to
the coup which ultimately led to the civil war.
ii. Eight individuals were killed in political violence in Ibadan in the state of Oyo on July 8,
1983.
iii.Eighty-two individuals were killed in political violence in the state of Ondo on August 18-20,
1983.
iv.President Babangida nullified the results of the presidential election on July 4, 1993, resulting
in the deaths of eleven individuals during rioting in Lagos on July 5, 1993. This election was
annulled by the military.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1 Summary of findings
The major findings from the study include the following:
i.Electoral violence in Nigeria has become endemic, widespread and seen as part of the political
culture.
ii.There are basically two types of electoral violence the one done by the opposition and party in
power using thugs and local militia and the one carried out by the government in power using
state instruments of coercion, especially the police and the army.
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iii.There is a large army of unemployed and unskilled youths who are ready tools at very cheap
prices who are willing to perpetuate these acts often for a token or promise of jobs or contracts
by politicians.
iv.The factor of god-fatherism has made it practically impossible to eliminate electoral violence
in the polity, they act as the sponsors and advisers to these politicians and provide the needed
army of thugs for these acts of violence in other to maintain their spheres of influence.
v.Monetization of the political process means that politicians spend so much during politicking
hence will do everything to recoup their investments using the only means possible that is
electoral violence.
vi.Lack of internal party democracy is also a contributory factor, because these violent acts sart
from the level of party primaries and spill over into inter party wars.
vii.The factor of prependalism; this means that politicians emphasize on the benefits of stae
power and not the responsibilities. This makes them short sighted and very desperate, because in
Nigeria it’s a zero sum game and or winner takes all. Most times when they win they go out of
their way not only to further their business and financial interest but to also ensure they cripple
the livelihood of their opposition through demolition of buildings, withdrawal of business
lincences and other trumped up charges using the state instruments of coercion. Some notorious
ones are the Police, ICPC, CCC, EFCC, Customs and the tax authorities, that’s how bad it gets
for the losers.
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viii. The factor of primordial sentiments; this factor excercebate the already existing fault and
cleavages, the politicians only readily exploit these gaps, and elections are readily turned into
ethnic cum religious mini wars.
ix. The international community especially those that give aid and grant loans to Nigeria have
failed by not wielding the big stick on these politicians. The fact is that most politicians will be
afraid to continue in these acts because they stash their loot in these states, go for medical
tourism there and have their ward attend schools there. These places are their second homes and
it’s a well known fact that these foreign governments can leverage on to force their hand to either
eliminate or drastically reduce the incidence of electoral violence.
5.2 Conclusion
Between independence in 1960 and 1999, Nigeria produced only two elected governments both
later overthrown in military coups. Nigeria's military ruled the country for nearly 30 of its first
40 years of independence. However, in 1999, Nigeria made a transition to civilian rule. The 1999
elections, which brought a retired general, Olusegun Obasanjo, to power, were blighted by such
widespread fraud that observers from the Carter Center concluded that "it is not possible for us to
make an accurate judgment about the outcome of the presidential election."
Federal and state elections in 2003 were again marred by fraud as well as serious incidents of
violence that left at least 100 people dead and many others injured. Human Rights Watch found
that members and supporters of the ruling party were responsible for the majority of abuses,
though opposition parties also engaged in political violence. Most deaths occurred when
opposing bands of armed gangs fought each other in an effort to control an area and displace
supporters of the opposing party. Human Rights Watch documented how ruling party politicians
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in the oil-rich Niger Delta mobilized and funded armed groups to help rig elections. That led to a
sustained increase in violence and criminality in the region.
Despite the abysmal record of the 1999 and 2003 elections, the government did not correct the
problems in the next elections. Observers from the European Union described the 2007 elections,
which brought Umaru Yar'Adua, a Muslim from northern Nigeria, to power, as among the worst
they had witnessed anywhere in the world. Human Rights Watch estimates that at least 300
people were killed in violence linked to the 2007 elections.
Corrupt politicians, in many cases backed by mafia-like "godfathers," openly mobilized gangs of
thugs to terrorize ordinary citizens and political opponents and to stuff or steal ballot boxes. The
police were often present during such incidents but frequently turned a blind eye or, at times,
participated in abuses. In other locations elections simply did not take place, yet the electoral
commission reported ruling-party victories with high voter turnout. Following Yar'Adua's death
in May 2010 from natural causes, Goodluck Jonathan, his vice president, was sworn in as
president. An internal zoning agreement within the ruling People's Democratic Party provides
that a northerner should have held the presidency following the eight-year administration of
Obasanjo, a Christian from south west Nigeria.
Despite opposition by some of the northern leaders, Jonathan managed to secure the ruling
party's ticket in the party primary in January 2011 and went on to sweep the predominately
Christian south during the April elections. His main opponent, Muhammadu Buhari, the
candidate for the Congress for Progressive Change, won the majority of votes in the largely
Muslim north. The election left the country deeply divided on religious and ethnic lines. The day
after the presidential election, held on April 16, Buhari's supporters launched demonstrations in
the streets of northern Nigeria. The protests turned violent in 12 northern states as mobs burned
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the homes, vehicles, and properties of ruling party stalwarts, most of whom were Muslim, and
traditional leaders who were seen to have backed the ruling party.
The rioters also began targeting and killing Christians and members of southern Nigerian ethnic
groups, who were seen as supporting the ruling party, and burning churches across the north.
More than 15,700 people have been killed in, politically related and motivated violence since
Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999. The human cost of such violence has been particularly
high in n Plateau state for instance where Human Rights Watch estimates that more than 3,800
people have been killed in inter-communal and sectarian clashes often politically motivated,
since 2001, at least 1,000 of them in 2010 alone.
Election is an important element of modern representative government. Its presence or absence is an
indication of how democratic society is or is not. Election is seen as the symbol of democracy
because of the enormous importance attached to it. The fundamental assumption of democracy, “the
governed should have a say in the selection of the people who man the different institutions that have
been established for the purpose of governance”. The citizens are called upon at stipulated periods to
select from amongst themselves those to whom they wish to entrust their destinies.
Election is “the barometer to measure the political maturity, health, legitimacy and stability of
democratic governance”. It is generally held to be the single most important indicator of the presence
or absence of democratic governance. Thus, “how a state arranges and conducts its elections tells a
lot about the level of political development of that particular state. The process of selecting the
officers or representative of an organization or group by vote of its qualified members”, and as
political phenomenon, elections are institutionalized procedures for choosing political office-holders
by the electorate of a country. In other words, it is a means through which the electorate chooses their
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representatives into the different positions of the government. Having re-echoed this it is thus
disheartening that Nigeria’s previous electoral experience has been bogged down by electoral
violence since the 1969 elections conducted by the British colonialists.
The country since that period has always had a history of controversial, flawed, rigged, monetized
and violent polls. The subsequent election after the 1959 i.e the 1964 election set the tone of what
was to come. In place of the more temperate pre-independence politics, dominated by the nation’s
three founding figures, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Sir Ahmadu Bello, it
started a more crooked and muscular approach, defined by greed and violence. The federal elections
of 1964 and the Western regional elections of 1965 were rigged, with the opposition openly
intimidated and threatened. The impatient military staged its first coup in January 1966, citing the
rigging of those elections and the violence that greeted the results as major reasons.
The first period of the military rule lasted unit 1 October 1979, with elections allowed only during the
last three months. Accepting the need to return Nigeria to civilian rule, the military ensured that the
1979 polls were conducted under its very close watch. Most citizens were prepared to accept any
result, provided it meant and end to the military rule. That sentiment, notwithstanding, the euphoria
that greeted the victory of the National Party of Nigeria (PNP) candidate, Shehu Shagari, had barely
died down when Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) challenged the results. The
election Tribunal and the Supreme Court rejected his reasons but suspicions linger that the latter’s
decision might have been motivated by political expediency.
The 1983 elections was said to be a mockery of an election with the ruling party using state means of
coercion not only to intimidate, kill, imprison but also to deport key members of the opposition the
notorious case of one Alh. Shugaba readily comes to mind. The fall of out of this election made it
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easy for the military to strike and take over power only to come and even perpetuate worst atrocities
from 1985-1993 in the sham they called transition to civil rule, culminating in the annulment of the
1993 general elections perceived to have been won by a business mogul M.K.O Abiola who hitherto
had been a military close ally and coup sponsor. He later died under mysterious circumstances in
1998 June 12th after a cup of tea served in the presence of the U.N helms man Koffi Anam by the
same military officers who had been his friends all those years.
The 1999 elections heralding the 4th republic and the subsequent elections till the recently concluded
2019 general elections have all independently thrown up serious issues of concern, because the
problem of electoral violence had remained and even assumed deadlier and more sophisticated
dimension. For instance the Boko haram sect which is reputed to be one of the worst killer groups in
the world by the UN has been said to be sponsored by politicians……………. The killer herds men
have also been fingered as politically motivated to ensure certain populations are displaced so they
can’t vote………….
All over the world, elections represent one of the basic hallmarks of democracy; this fundamental
axiom is lost or not important to African leaders who conduct elections only to fulfill all
righteousness. This is particularly so in liberal democracies of the western states that allows open
political competition of ideas, civil and political rights and liberties, multi-partism and a system of
accountability of representatives to the electorate. Even in non-competitive systems such as those
found in states like China, elections serve as a legitimizing and unifying force for the citizenry, but
not necessarily to effect a change of government, since it is only done to effect a change of guard
from the same ruling party.
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This is meant to ensure continuity of programmes or policies and to safe guard the ideals of
communism. In non-competitive systems, elections are participative and educational in nature, and
are also ways of showing allegiance and solidarity to the government of the day. China still remains a
very good example. These elections are usually devoid of electoral violence, but one may not be in a
hurry to conclude because it is a closed system.
Elections constitute the central institution of democratic government. This assertion hinges on the
fact that in democracy, the authority of government is derived solely from the consent of the
governed. The principal mechanism for translating that consent into governmental authority is the
holding of free and fair election and this in itself may require money as all modern democracies hold
elections but not all elections are democratic. As a matter of fact, dictators also stage elections to give
their rule the "aura" of legitimacy. Democratic elections are symbolic, competitive, periodic,
inclusive and definitive, and they are the means by which the decision makers in a government are
selected by the citizens.
There is a universal crave for good democratic government essentially because of its immense
advantages and, byconverse implication, because of the negative consequences of bad government.
For democratic governance, factors such as economic equality, fraternal feeling and political liberty
within a defined territory are indispensable pre-requisite. The institutional expression of democratic
government in contemporary times consists in equal rights for all qualified adults to vote and to stand
as candidates in periodic election, equal eligibility for execute and judicial office (provided the
essential qualifications for the performance of the assigned duties are specified and satisfied).
Fundamental to any political system that operates democracy is the choosing of political leaders
through election and popular participation. Election is the basic and the most important mechanism of
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involving the people in the decision-making process in the polity. While the political leadership
decides who gets what, when and how through policies and programmes of government, the
electorate are sovereign to determine who get what political office during polls. Thus, electorate
determines the political career of their leaders in an ideal democracy. The organization of election is
germane to the institutionalization of democracy. However, it is not all elections which are
democratic. The conduct of free and fair, transparent and credible elections is dependent on some
factors. Apart from the institutional and legal framework, which must be put in place, all issues
concerning the use of all forms of violence during polls must be carefully addressed.
This is because violence constitutes a daunting challenge to democracy especially when the state is
involved in the perpetuation of these violent acts. This is usually the situation in Nigeria where the
incidence of electoral violence has assumed a form of state sponsored violence, the institutions
mandated to protect becoming the perpetuators of these acts often in collaboration with politicians, or
they turn a blind eye if the victims are opposition members only to move into action if the reverse is
the case. While the developed states have been able to solve the challenges associated with the use of
violence before, during and after elections, underdeveloped democracies are still battling with these
issues. In Africa, raw power expressed through direct acts of violence reigns supreme in deciding
who wins what post at the polls. The Nigerian situation is a case in point that needs to be
continuously re-examined.
5.3 Recommendations
Based on the study conducted and the findings made thereof the following recommendations are
made:
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i.The state institutions such as the military and the police which overtime has always acted as
institutional thugs for any party in power should be retrained and made to become professional so
they can restrict their activities to only professional duties.
ii.The media in Nigeria should also become more professional in their reportage and conduct; this is a
huge challenge due to the very important factor of media ownership and structure. Most of the media
owners are politicians or allies to one party or the other, why the government media channels are
mere propaganda institutions of government.
iii.The electoral umpire should be bold and courageous to out rightly cancel any elections that is
characterized by violence and or rigging. Most times as is often the case the electoral umpire is often
accused of being a willing collaborator in the malaise called electoral fraud.
iv. One sure way to check electoral violence is to flood the country with election observers (foreign
observers) in collaboration with the internal observers and the media both local and foreign they will
effectively act as a credible check. One thing common with the average Nigerian politician is he
wants to create a semblance of normalcy in his perpetuation of electoral fraud hence they are willing
to go to great lengths to cover their tracks, if they know the elections will be discredited and they will
not be recognized as a result of electoral violence even if they win they are very likely to drastically
reduce the use of crude means such as violence during elections.
v.The international community should be willing and ready to wield the big stick if there are acts of
electoral violence. This is simple identify the politicians who sponsor these acts and confiscate their
assets abroad. The average Nigerian politician has most of his investments and usually ill- gotten
wealth stashed in western states of U.S, U.K, and other European states. They should also bar them
from travelling to their states; this will be a very huge deterrent because most of them if not all, travel
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