American Influence: Red Cross Societies in Interwar Internationalism

This essay explores the influence of the American Red Cross on the League of Red Cross Societies during the interwar period, specifically from 1919 to 1922. It compares the League's efforts to establish an international anti-epidemic campaign in Poland with the International Committee of the Red Cross's repatriation program for prisoners of war in Siberia. The essay argues that the League's failure to secure intergovernmental funding for its public health and welfare initiatives reveals that international support was primarily reserved for crises perceived as direct threats to European peace and stability. It highlights the political motivations behind international relief efforts and the conditions under which governments engaged in international cooperation during this period, emphasizing the limitations of American-led humanitarian models in the face of national interests and priorities.

DOI: 10.13154/mts.57.2017.37-56 Moving the Social · 57 (2017) · p. 37 – 56
© Klartext Verlag, Essen , ISSN 2197-0394 (online)
Kimberly A. Lowe
The League of Red Cross Societies
and International Committee
of the Red Cross:
a Re-Evaluation of American Influence
in Interwar Internationalism
Abstract
In 1919, the Allied Red Cross societies founded a new international federation
Cross movement, the League of Red Cross Societies. The League of Red Cross
brought a new commitment to an “intelligent, peacetime programme”1—specifically
public health education, medical research, and disaster relief—to a hum
movement that had previously focused on wartime medical aid to soldiers. Th
Red Cross Societies initially attracted much attention, but its focus on health a
development failed to attract the intergovernmental funding necessary to imp
its programme. This article compares the League of Red Cross Societies’ attem
mount an international anti-epidemic campaign in Poland with a concurrent e
the International Committee of the Red Cross to mount an international repat
programme on behalf of prisoners of war in Siberia from 1919 – 1922. The Lea
Cross Societies’ failure to transform the focus of the Red Cross movement tow
and welfare is indicative of the fact that intergovernmental support for human
relief was reserved for humanitarian crises that were viewed as a clear threat
and prosperity of Europe. Comparing these concurrent relief operations illumi
the political purposes of international relief and the terms through which gove
understood international cooperation during the interwar years.
Keywords: repatriation, public health, humanitarian relief, world war, 1914 – 1
Poland, nongovernmental organizations
1 League of Red Cross Societies, Articles of Association, 5 May 1919, quoted in Cha
Anderson: The International Red Cross Organisation, in: The American Journa
International Law 14:1 / 2 (1920), pp. 210 – 214, p. 212.

38 Kimberly A. Lowe
In 1919, with the support of President Woodrow Wilson, the Allied Red Cross Soc
founded a new international federation of the Red Cross movement, the League
Red Cross Societies. The League of Red Cross Societies was a much-publicised a
to establish the American Red Cross’s “wartime model for international health a
welfare work on a permanent and global basis.”2 It brought a new agenda for “peace
work” — specifically medical research, public health education, and disaster reli
humanitarian movement that had previously focused on wartime aid to soldiers
a classic example of the “commitment to the creation of expert knowledge” tha
philanthropic internationalism and humanitarian organisations during the interw3
The League of Red Cross Societies’ focus on long-term development of health an
is also representative of what Julia Irwin has called the “Americanisation” of inte
humanitarian aid.4 American aid operations during and after the First World War we
noteworthy for their zealous commitment to centralised efficiency, scientific ma
(of both caloric intake and public health programmes) and the long-term develo
of self-reliance.5 As the largest and wealthiest operations during and after the First W
War, American organisations such as the American Red Cross and American Rel
Administration became the model for other charities seeking to emulate their su
2 Julia Irwin: Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanita
Awakening, Oxford 2013, p. 151.
3 Katharina Rietzler: Experts for Peace: Structures and Motivations of Philanthrop
Internationalism in the Interwar Years, in: Daniel Laqua (eds.): Internationalism
Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars, Lo
2011, pp. 45 – 66, p. 57. Numerous scholars have highlighted the technocratic chara
of interwar humanitarian aid as one of its defining characteristics. Davide Rodogno n
“interwar humanitarianism, in Western Europe and the USA, paralleled the develop
[scientific] philanthropy, and was distinct in its reliance on social scientific knowledg
approaches to the management of humanitarian problems.” Davide Rodogno: The A
Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Humanitarian Politics a
Policies in Asia Minor and Greece (1922 – 1923), in: First World War Studies 5:1 (201
pp. 83 – 99, p. 85. Dominique Marshall notes that the various nationalities of progre
businessmen, social workers, and private associations working at the League of Nat
Child Welfare Committee were united by a common reliance on “scientific expertise
administration of their operations.” Dominique Marshall: The Rise of Coordinated Ac
for Children in War and Peace: Experts at the League of Nations, 1924 – 1945, in: Da
Rodogno / Bernhard Struck / Jakob Vogel (eds.): Shaping the Transnational Sphere: E
Networks and Issues From the 1840s to the 1930s, New York 2014, p. 89.
4 Julia Irwin: The Disaster of War: American Understandings of Catastrophe, Conflict an
Relief, in: First World War Studies 5:1 (2014): pp. 17 – 28.
5 See, among others, Tammy Proctor: An American Enterprise? British Participation in
Food Relief Programmes (1914 – 1923), in: First World War Studies 5:1 (2014), pp. 2
Nick Cullather: The Foreign Policy of the Calorie, in: The American Historical Review
112:2 (2007), pp. 337 – 364.

39The League of Red Cross Societies and International Committee of the Red Cross
The peacetime programme of the League of Red Cross Societies was similarly
much enthusiasm by national Red Cross societies eager to benefit from the w
American Red Cross, and establish their influence in the post-war internationa6
However, the League of Red Cross Societies never lived up to its initial prom
struggled to attract funding for its programme of public health education and
relief. By 1921 American funding for the federation had been curtailed, and it
post-war agenda for peacetime development focused on the more modest go
public health education, and the Junior Red Cross. The current historiography
League of Red Cross Societies points to a number of factors that contributed t
federation’s failure.
John Hutchinson focuses on the internal bickering between the Leagu
Cross Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross over leader
the Red Cross movement. For John Hutchinson, the League of Red Cross Socie
was outmanoeuvred by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the
fell into obscurity.7 Bridget Towers highlights the fact that the League of Red Cro
Societies failed to integrate with the League of Nation’s health section, leavin
a clear institutional home in the new international order. While Woodrow Wils
envisioned the League of Red Cross Societies as the medical arm of the Leagu
its European member states were wary of giving funds to a private associatio
after the United States failed to join the League in 1920.8 Finally, John Hutchinson,
Bridget Towers, and Julia Irwin all agree that the League of Red Cross Societie
a victim of post-war American isolationism, which resulted in the general with
American aid organisations from Europe. The American Red Cross lost domes
for its own post-war aid activities and had to shut down its programmes. Fund
the League of Red Cross Societies was likewise cut and only partially replaced
from the Rockefeller Foundation.9
While I do not disagree with these explanations, it is my contention that the
of Red Cross Societies’ failure to establish its peacetime programme wi
the Red Cross movement or League of Nations reveals more about the multifa
nature of interwar internationalism and the appeal of American models of scie
6 John Hutchinson: Custodians of the Sacred Fire: The ICRC and the Postwar Reorga
of the International Red Cross, in: Paul Weindling (eds.): International Health Orga
and Movements, 1918 – 1939, Cambridge 1995, p. 27.
7 See John Hutchinson: Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, B
1996.
8 See Bridget Towers: Red Cross Organisational Politics, 1918 – 1922: Relations of D
and Influence of the United States, in: Paul Weindling (eds.): International H
Organisations and Movements, 1918 – 1939, Cambridge 1995, pp. 36 – 55.
9 See Julia Irwin: Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Hu
Awakening.

40 Kimberly A. Lowe
philanthropy. Advocates of international health and welfare programmes believ
scientific, cultural, and humanitarian programmes would promote “a new frater
sympathy among peoples”10 and eliminate the distrust and prejudice responsible for
conflicts among nations. For the international experts in charge of the League o
technical sections and advisory committees, international policies were best for
an environment insulated from the political exigencies of national interest.11 Yet, the
history of the League of Red Cross Societies reveals that while the League of Na
recognise humanitarian and public health work as a form of “civic diplomacy” u
maintaining world peace, its member states only considered certain programme
funding. The liberal internationalism underlying the creation of the League held
respect for the sovereignty of nations and a federal structure for world relations
the best guarantees of world peace. As Emily Baughan and Patricia Clavin have
argued, interwar internationalism therefore complemented rather than negated
and national identities.12 Membership in the League of Nations did not mean a state
set aside its national interests in favour of international cooperation; rather, it s
a belief that international cooperation would promote the mutual self-interest o
All of the humanitarian crises that arose in the years following the Firs
War — concerning prisoners of war, refugees, famine victims, and epidemic relie
financing and supplies that surpassed the means of even the wealthiest Americ13
10 International Conference of Red Cross Societies: Proposed Plan for World-Wide Coord
of Red Cross Activities, Washington, D.C. 15 March 1919, p. 6.
11 Contemporary proponents of the League of Nations claimed that the League of Natio
utilisation of experts had produced a “revolution” in international affairs by separati
international problems from Great Power politics and putting them into the h
“professional craft.” Alfred Zimmern: The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 19
London 1936, pp. 318 – 21. See also Alexander Loveday: Reflections on Intern
Administration, Oxford 1958, pp. 36 – 37.
12 Patricia Clavin: Introduction: Conceptualising Internationalism Between the World W
in: Daniel Laqua (eds.): Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Mov
Between the World Wars, London 2011, p. 6. Emily Baughan: The Imperial War Relie
and the All British Appeal: Commonwealth, Conflict and Conservatism within the Brit
Humanitarian Movement, 1920 – 1925, in: The Journal of Imperial and Commonweal
History 40:5 (2012), pp. 845 – 861, p. 849.
13 This held true for American post-war operations as well as European ones. After the
Armistice private donations to both the American Relief Administration and America
Cross began to decline precipitously, and these organisations became even more de
Congressional appropriations. While they did raise money from private donations (es
from wealthy corporations and philanthropies), the American government provided
of the billions of dollars worth of food, medical supplies, and clothing distributed by
American Relief Administration and American Red Cross. See Julia Irwin: Making the
Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening, pp. 161 – 16
Benjamin Weissman: Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia, 1921 – 192

41The League of Red Cross Societies and International Committee of the Red Cross
A clear and recognised need for relief, however, did not automatically translat
for these projects. Governments resisted funding projects not tied to establish
war political and economic stability of Europe and preventing the spread of Bo
Even the government-financed assistance programmes of the American Red C
American Relief Administration were designed to prevent Europeans from em
“Bolshevism, anarchism, and other radical ideas.”14 The League of Red Cross Societies
consistently struggled to find funding for its projects, because it was unable to
a coalition of governments that its public health and medical research progra
make a significant impact on the political and economic stability of the new in
order. The European member states of the League were not interested in the
improvement of society but the specific social and economic recovery of Euro
the First World War.
This becomes clear when one compares the League of Red Cross Societies’
mount an international anti-epidemic campaign in Poland with a concurrent e
the International Committee of the Red Cross to mount an international repat
programme on behalf of prisoners of war in Siberia. This article does not aim
comprehensive history of the League of Red Cross Societies or post-war aid o
to analyse the intersection of national interests, liberal internationalism, and i
relief. The fates of these two concurrent aid operations highlight the importan
national interests to the success of League of Nations-funded humanitarian pr
following the First World War.
An “Intelligent, Peacetime Program”
Although the international Red Cross movement could trace its roots back to 1
during the First World War that the Red Cross became the most influential tra
humanitarian network of the early twentieth century. National Red Cross socie
the belligerent states played a crucial role in mobilising the civilian population
the war effort. The Swiss-based International Committee of the Red Cross also
their reputation with national governments by tracking and monitoring the co
Stanford 1974, ch. 6; Edward Willis: Herbert Hoover and the Russian Prisoners of W
War I: A Study in Diplomacy and Relief, 1918 – 1919, Stanford 1951.
14 Julia Irwin: Taming Total War: Great War-Era American Humanitarianism and Its Le
Diplomatic History 38:4 (2014), pp. 763 – 775, p. 771. See also Davide Rodogno /
Piana / Shaloma Gauthier: Relief and Rehabilitation Programmes by Foreign Organ
1918 – 1922, in: Davide Rodogno / Bernhard Struck / Jakob Vogel (eds.): Shap
Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks and Issues From the 1840s to the 1930s
2014, ch. 12, p. 265.

42 Kimberly A. Lowe
of prisoners of war and civilian internees in all the belligerent states. With close
million men held captive during the war, the treatment, and later repatriation, o
of war was a charged issue in both domestic and international politics.
While all branches of the Red Cross movement experienced growth during the
the American Red Cross was unrivalled in both its membership and financial res
Most European national Red Cross societies focused on aid to their co-nationals,
American Red Cross and other associated American organisations undertook op
in all of the Allied countries, especially Russia, Italy, France, and Belgium. They
emergency food and medical care, but also “attempted to achieve more long-ra
complex social welfare goals.”15 The American Red Cross organised nursing schools for
European women, fresh-air camps for European children, anti-tuberculosis and a
typhus campaigns as well as a vast array of hygienic and sanitary reform initiat
the Wilson administration and the American Red Cross War Council saw these c
relief programmes as a powerful tool for creating the healthy, democratic citize
would prevent future European wars.
As the war drew to a close, the Chair of the American Red Cross War Council,
Davison, sought to expand the American Red Cross’ wartime work on internatio
public health through the League of Red Cross Societies. With the war over, Hen
Davison believed that the national Red Cross societies should transfer their war
mobilisation to the peacetime improvement of society through public health, me
research, and disaster relief. His focus was on applying scientific solutions to glo
problems, providing “not merely efforts to relieve human suffering but to preve16
As preparations for the Paris Peace Conference began, Henry Davison gained th
of President Wilson for his plan. Wilson thought the League of Red Cross Societi
become a medical corollary to the League of Nations, which would further demo
the power of international cooperation to solve enduring problems — be they tu
or war. Wilson obtained the support of the other Allied delegations at the Paris P
Conference and their Red Cross Societies. At his insistence, the mission of the L
of Red Cross Societies was officially incorporated into the Covenant of the Leagu
Nations, as Article 25:
15 Julia Irwin: Taming Total War: Great War-Era American Humanitarianism and Its Lega
p. 770.
16 Davison envisioned an international organisation that would “foster the study of hum
disease, promote sound measures for public health and sanitation, the welfare of ch
mothers, the education and training of nurses and the care and prevention of tuberc
venereal diseases, malaria and other chronic or infectious diseases, and would prov
for handling problems of world relief in emergencies such as fire, famine, and pestile
International Conference of Red Cross Societies: Proposed Plan for World-Wide Coor
of Red Cross Activities, pp. 4 – 5.

43The League of Red Cross Societies and International Committee of the Red Cross
The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establish
co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations
as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the
of suffering throughout the world.17
Having gained the accession of the British, French, Italian, and Japanese Red
Societies, Henry Davison called a conference to formulate the programme of
Red Cross federation. In April 1919, delegates from 24 national Red Cross soc
international medical, scientific, and public health professionals met in Canne
On 5 May 1919, the delegates ratified the Articles of Association of the Leagu
Cross Societies. The national Red Cross societies that joined the League of Re
Societies agreed to foster medical research, public health education, and disa
their respective countries.18 They cited the important role that the American and oth
national Red Cross Societies had played in managing the influenza epidemic a
example of the need to extend the Red Cross programme into peacetime.19 The League
of Red Cross Societies headquarters in Geneva would serve as a permanent w
organisation of “experts who will keep in touch with the developments throug
the world in the various lines in which the Red Cross is interested.”20 These experts
would scrutinise new public health practices and medical discoveries, and tra
recommendations for best practices to national Red Cross societies around th
Initial interest in the League of Red Cross Societies was strong. It had no di
attracting membership from national Red Cross societies eager to benefit from
funds and influence the new post-war order. For the Red Cross Society of Japa
example, support for the League of Red Cross Societies formed part of Japan’
17 Article 25, in League of Nations: The Covenant of the League of Nations, Boston 1
p. xi; Outgoing cable (Cannes Conference), 2 April 1919, League of Red Cross Soc
Miscellaneous Records, 1 – 8, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California
(henceforth HIA); Outgoing cable (Cannes Conference), 3 Apr 1919, League of Red
Societies Miscellaneous Records, 1 – 8, HIA.
18 Henry Pomeroy Davison: The American Red Cross in the Great War, New York 191
President Wilson to H. Davison, 13 May 1919, League of Red Cross Societies Misce
Records, 2 – 36, HIA.
19 Alfred W. Crosby: America’s Forgotten Pandemic: the Influenza of 1918, Cambridg
p. 51; Janice P. Dickin McGinnis: The Impact of Epidemic Influenza: Canada, 1918
in: Historical Papers / Communications Historiques 12:1 (1977), pp. 120 – 140, p.
also Nancy K. Bristow: American Pandemic: The Lost Worlds of the 1918 Influenza
Oxford 2012.
20 International Conference of Red Cross Societies: Proposed Plan for World-Wide Co
of Red Cross Activities, pp. 4 – 5.

44 Kimberly A. Lowe
to “maintain the international standing of Japan as a world power.”21 Henry Davison
became the Chairman of the League of Red Cross Societies’s Board of Governor
the day-to-day operations of the headquarters in Geneva were handed over to t
general Sir David Henderson as Director-General. William Rappard, a member o
International Committee of the Red Cross, also became the first Secretary Gene
first meeting of the General Council of the League of Red Cross Societies in Mar
Eric Drummond, the League of Nations Secretary General, announced that he w
the “closest cooperation” between his organisation and the League of Red Cros
As an apolitical and worldwide concern, Henry Davison believed that the advanc
of health and welfare would result in “better conditions and in increased happin
contentment throughout the world.”22
Combatting Typhus in Poland (1919 – 1922)
When news of a typhus epidemic raging in Poland reached the Cannes conferen
presented the perfect opportunity to demonstrate the utility of the new Red Cro
programme to an order dedicated to international cooperation. Central and Eas
Europe had suffered from typhus outbreaks throughout the war. After the war, o
of the disease in Russia and Eastern Poland reached epidemic proportions. An e
six million inhabitants of the former Russian Empire were affected by 1920.23 By March of
1919 the spread of the disease had become so alarming that sanitary delegates
Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, and Romania requested that the Internat
Committee of the Red Cross help them create an “international sanitary commi
armed with full authority and extensive means”24 for combatting the epidemic. These states
had only been in existence since the end of the First World War, and found them
the midst of on-going conflict. They lacked both the infrastructure and financial
21 Quoted in Yoshiya Makita: The Alchemy of Humanitarianism: The First World War, th
Japanese Red Cross and the Creation of An International Public Health Order, in: Firs
War Studies 5:1 (2014), pp. 117 – 129, p. 123.
22 League of Red Cross Societies: Opening Session, held Tuesday, March 2nd
, at 3:30pm at Hotel
de Ville, Geneva, in: Meeting of the General Council of the League of Red Cross Soci
Geneva, March 1920, Minutes of the Meeting, International Federation of the Red Cr
Archives, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 16 – 33, p. 23.
23 Marta Aleksandra Balinska: Assistance and Not Mere Relief: The Epidemic Commissi
League of Nations, 1920 – 1923, in: Paul Weindling (eds.): International Health Orga
and Movements, 1918 – 1939, Cambridge 1995, p. 82.
24 Letter from Dr. Ferriere (Vice-President of the International Committee of the Red Cr
to the British Minister in Berne, 31 Mar 1919, in: Papers Relating to the Foreign Rela
of the United States, the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume X, Washington, D.C.
p. 260.

45The League of Red Cross Societies and International Committee of the Red Cross
to mount an extensive anti-epidemic campaign. The International Committee
Red Cross appealed to the national Red Cross Societies and British Minister in
help. American Red Cross reports from April 1919 warned that 275,000 cases
from the Baltic, to the Black Sea, to the Adriatic, and as far west as Vienna, R
and Marseilles.25
Both the practical and political challenges of an anti-epidemic campaign in
were complicated by the fluctuating borders of a region still at war. Between
1918 and January 1921, the Poles registered close to 2.5 million persons who
through their border controls.26 Typhus was brought to Poland by the disorganised fl
of prisoners of war making their way home to Central Europe from fighting on
Eastern Front, as well as by Russian civilians fleeing westward from the Red A
the Treaty of Versailles had recognised the independence of Poland, the easte
proposed by the Allied Commission on Polish Affairs pleased neither Polish no
Russian leaders. Polish nationalists considered that a reconstructed Poland sh
all territories with a significant Polish population and culture. This included, at
Białystok, Grodno, and Wilno, all in the Borderlands of the former Russian Em
Chief of State and Chief of the Army Józef Piłsudski also aimed to create a Pol
federation of independent states formed from the Borderlands. He therefore a
nationalist uprisings in Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Bolsheviks
to retain control of the Borderlands through the “Sovietisation” of the region,
military conquest or popular revolution. Still intent on a world revolution, the
considered Poland and the rest of the Borderlands to be a crucial link between
the eventual Soviet Germany and Soviet Austria and Hungary. These conflicti
ambitions led to over two years of violent conflict between the Polish and Red27
In the meantime, the typhus epidemic spread. At the Cannes conference an
epidemic campaign in Central and Eastern Europe became the immediate foc
new League of Red Cross Societies programme. Unlike the influenza epidemic
had already elicited a robust response from national public health officials and
Cross societies in Europe and North America, no competent national or intern
body had implemented measures to address the typhus epidemic. Responsibi
controlling the disease would have naturally fallen on Poland and the other st
Eastern Europe, but these governments had already indicated their inability t
an effective containment of the disease. In the opinion of the experts gathere
25 Telegram [From the League of Red Cross Societies] to Mr. Georges Clemenceau (C
Hon. Woodrow Wilson, Hon. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando, Inter-Allied Peace Conf
11 Apr 1919, in: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, the
Conference, 1919, Volume X, Washington, D.C. 1919, pp. 285 – 286.
26 Harold Fisher / Sidney Brooks: America and the New Poland, New York 1928, p. 24
27 Jerzy Borzęck: The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar Europ
Haven 2008, pp. 27 – 30.

46 Kimberly A. Lowe
“only the great Governments of the world have the resources to meet the dem
combatting this epidemic, which was necessary in order to safeguard the “healt
peace of the world.”28 Henry Davison sent a telegram on 11 April to Clemenceau, Wils
Lloyd George, and Orlando alerting them to the severity of the epidemic and off
medical and sanitary expertise of the League of Red Cross Societies.
The Supreme Economic Council in Paris expressed theoretical approval of the
of Red Cross Societies’s proposition to aid the Polish government in their fight a
typhus, but finding funding and supplies for the campaign proved difficult. The B
Red Cross Society and British Government both offered the League of Red Cross
30,000 Pounds for relief work in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but the French, Ital
and Japanese Red Cross Societies offered nothing to the League of Red Cross So29
The American Red Cross had agreed to offer a large cash donation to cover the
personnel for the relief operation, if the Allied governments gave the League of
Societies control over surplus transport and disinfection equipment from the de
armies in France.30 The Supreme Economic Council was willing to part with the supp
but they insisted that Poland and any other Eastern European countries receivin
pay for these supplies through credit.31
Neither the League of Red Cross Societies nor the Polish government f
should or could bear the total expense of these operations, but the Supreme Ec
Council remained adamant that the Allies would not bear the cost of relief. Only
American organisations would come to Poland’s aid. After months of negotiation
an impassioned plea from the Polish Minister of Public Health, Dr. Tomasz Janisz
Herbert Hoover and Woodrow Wilson engineered a scheme whereby 6.5 m
Dollars32 worth of army supplies were sold at a discount to the Polish government
28 Telegram [From the League of Red Cross Societies] to Mr. Georges Clemenceau (Ch
Hon. Woodrow Wilson, Hon. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando, Inter-Allied Peace Confere
11 Apr 1919, in: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, the Pa
Conference, 1919, Volume X, Washington, D.C. 1919, pp. 285 – 286.
29 John Hutchinson: Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, p. 313. S
Central Office of the Campaign Against Epidemic Diseases in Eastern Europe to Ame
Red Cross, 9 September 1919, League of Red Cross Societies Miscellaneous R
(1919 – 1922), 1 – 26, HIA.
30 Letter from the Director General, League of Red Cross Societies (Henderson), to Miss
Gertrude C. Dixon, British Council Officer, Supreme Economic Council, 16 May 1919,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, the Paris Peace Confe
1919, Volume X, Washington, D.C. 1919, pp. 283 – 285.
31 Letter from the Director General of the League of Red Cross Societies (Henderson) t
Gertrude Dixon, Secretary, Supreme Economic Council, 14 June 1919, in Papers Rela
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Vol
Washington, D.C. 1919, pp. 412 – 413.
32 In 1919 the exchange rate was 4.425800 Dollars per Pound, making these supplies w
1.4 million Pounds. See Officer, Lawrence H., “Exchange Rates” in chapter Ee of Sus

47The League of Red Cross Societies and International Committee of the Red Cross
British government also donated surplus materials. The American Relief Admi
covered the cost of transporting the supplies, and the American army covered
of a detachment assigned to aid the Polish government in its anti-epidemic w33 The
American-Polish Relief Expedition worked to establish a cordon sanitaire and d
stations, almost three-quarters of which were eventually destroyed by the att
counter-attacks of the Polish and Bolshevik forces. In July 1920 the relief expe
withdrew entirely, its supplies exhausted.34
By the end of 1920 the Allied Powers had also abandoned their military inte
against Soviet Russia. Britain adopted a new policy of “peace through trade,”
focused on anti-Bolshevik propaganda, and both Allied Powers lost interest in
war with the Bolsheviks.35 The Allies supported the independence of Poland but did
not approve of Piłsudski’s “imperialist” ambitions to expand its territory or cre
anti-Russian Federation. Neither the Polish nor Red armies had the ability to a
decisive victory, and Poland faced pressure from its Western allies to end the
Soviet Russia.36 In 1921, the Peace of Riga finally brought a modicum of stability
Eastern Europe and the opportunity to establish an effective system of sanita
along Poland’s eastern border.
Once their military intervention against the Bolsheviks had ended, the
became even more reluctant to fund anti-epidemic work. Mired in a deep eco
crisis and without Gold Reserves to secure their currency in international mar
Polish government could not afford the expensive imported sanitary supplies
to continue their anti-typhus measures.37 In February 1920, a few months before the
planned American withdrawal from Poland, both Lord Balfour and the Polish g
Carter / Scott Sigmund Gartner / Michael R. Haines / Alan L. Olmstead / Richard Su
Wright (eds.): Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the
Millennial Edition, New York 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-97805111329
Ee.ESS.03 (accessed 14 March, 2017).
33 Memorandum from the Director-General of Relief (Hoover) regarding typhus relief
Europe, 30 Jul 1919, in: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United Sta
Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume X, Washington, D.C. 1919, pp. 502 – 504. S
Harold Fisher / Sidney Brooks: America and the New Poland, pp. 239 – 241.
34 Harold Fisher / Sidney Brooks: America and the New Poland, pp. 240 – 247.
35 Jerzy Borzęck: The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar Europ
77, 195.
36 Jerzy Borzęck: The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar Europ
9, 53.
37 Upon independence the Second Polish Republic had no Gold Reserves, as the Rus
had appropriated the wealth of its territory during the long period of Russian rule.
of Riga specified that Soviet Russia was to return the Polish portion of Russia’s Go
although in practice the Poles received only a small portion of the 30 million ruble
coin or bullion specified by the treaty. See Jerzy Borzęck: The Soviet-Polish Peace
the Creation of Interwar Europe, pp. 161, 268 – 270.

48 Kimberly A. Lowe
sent another urgent appeal to the League of Red Cross Societies to undertake t
Convinced that an intergovernmental agency was needed to address the proble
League of Red Cross Societies sought the cooperation of the League of Nations.
Dr. Christopher Addison, the British Minister of Health, organised an informal
conference in April to examine setting up a “permanent organ”38 at the League of Nations
for matters of health. Members of the League of Red Cross Societies, the Polish
of Health, the International Office of Public Hygiene, and League of Nations Secr
were invited to attend, as well as health experts from France, Great Britain, Can
Japan, Poland and the United States.39 This conference recommended the creation of
an official Typhus Commission (later renamed the Epidemic Commission), becau
Polish authorities and League of Red Cross Societies had already found their res
to be insufficient to the task. The commission would be organised and staffed p
by members of the League of Red Cross Societies, but appointed and financed b
League of Nations out of a special emergency budget.40
Turning the anti-epidemic campaign into an official League of Nations program
did little to increase governments’ interest in funding an international health org
The April health conference had estimated that 3.2 million Pounds were necessa
the epidemic in Poland. Members of the British Treasury and British Cabinet exp
almost unanimous opposition to funding the campaign. The British Treasury reje
potential benefits of international cooperation in the field of public health:
The doctrine that the British government should tax the British taxpayer for th
purpose of combatting typhus in Poland on the grounds that it would be open
[His Majesty’s Government] to look for assistance from the Polish taxpayers (
others) for assistance in meeting the cost of an outbreak of typhus in UK shou
occur appears to their Lordships a manifest absurdity.41
The British Cabinet’s League of Nations Committee similarly concluded that Brit
had no commercial or hygienic interest in the Polish epidemic. In June they reluc
consented to donating a maximum of 50,000 Pounds as a sign of benevolence,
on France, the United States, Holland, and Spain making equivalent donations. B
October France had also reluctantly agreed to provide 50,000 Pounds if three ot
38 Marta Aleksandra Balinska: Assistance and Not Mere Relief: The Epidemic Commissi
the League of Nations, 1920 – 1923, pp. 85.
39 Marta Aleksandra Balinska: Assistance and Not Mere Relief: The Epidemic Commissi
the League of Nations, 1920 – 1923, pp. 84 – 85.
40 Bridget Towers: Red Cross Organisational Politics, 1918 – 1922: Relations of Domina
Influence of the United States, p. 46.
41 Quoted in Bridget Towers: Red Cross Organisational Politics, 1918 – 1922: Relations
Dominance and Influence of the United States, p. 45.