Coalition of Military Intervention in Libya

This document provides an overview of the coalition of military intervention in Libya. It discusses the reasons for the intervention, key findings, project description, successes, challenges, and lessons learned. Students can find study material and solved assignments on Desklib for further reference.

Coalition of military
intervention in Libya

Executive Summary
1.1 Summary
In the year of 2011, conflict (Civil War) basically took place in Libya which was
considered to be a part of Arab Spring process where they have gained international attention
because the leader of Libya started threatening individuals living in Libya. When the civil war
broke out in Libya, there was an intervention by NATO or The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. This was basically done as a response to the events during the war. The United
States took part in the intervention and helped in saving the lives of rebels who were against
Gaddafi with airstrikes against the Libyan army. This is because Muammar Gaddafi had
converted the country into a public that was governed by his council. Basically, the civil war
took place because the leader of Libya (Muammar Al-Gaddafi) was following an autocratic
leadership style and this is why the change of regime was important in it. In the present context,
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was introduced and specifically the reason that in
front was to protect Libya. The various countries that came together during the coalition included
Denmark, France, Ireland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
1.2 Key Findings
The key findings of the report are listed below -
 NATO took responsibility by developing military intervention to protect Libya against
dictatorship (Janičatová, 2020).
 Unified Protector which was considered to operation conducted in the month of March of
2011. This operation kept its focus on defending civilians of Libya.
 Under the rules and regulations of UN Security Council, the military intervention named
as Operation Unified Protector was conducted.
 Aerial attack, Arm embargo, no-fly zone and a range of attacks took place on Libyan
government forces (Ibrahim, 2020).

Project Description
2.1 Introduction
Decades before the Libyan Civil War that took place in the year 2011, both Libya as well
as the United States were not on good terms. The Civil War that took place in Libya was said to
be a part of Arab Spring process where civilians started protesting against the dictatorship of
Muammar Al-Gaddafi. In reply to the same, Gaddafi attacked civilians and this is where the non-
violent protest was also militarised for days. This coalition was led by multiple states began a
military intervention in Libya. The United States took part in this helping the rebels who were
against Gaddafi with airstrikes against the army of Libya (Gregory, 2015). The United Nations
authorized military intervention in Libya to protect civilians. This was done as a response to
violence between the government as well as the opponents. After two days when violence
between government forces and opponents took place, NATO started an intervention, wherein it
established a no-fly zone and launched aerial attacks on the government forces. The Libyan rebel
forces killed Muammar Gaddafi, the former ruler of the country (Johnson Lafferty, 2020).
2.2 Description of the context
The chosen intervention is that NATO-led a multi-state coalition that took place in Libya.
NATO or The North Atlantic Treaty Organization stepped in during the civil war to protect the
civilians in Libya and not to set up a democracy. The primary aim was to protect the civilians as
well as areas that were populated in case of an attack. This effort was initiated by France and the
United Kingdom and the commands were given by the United States during the Libyan Civil
War (Hodge, 2013). The circumstances were not good and also, the United Nations intended to
have immediate peace within the country. It wanted to end the current attacks that were taking
place against civilians.
2.3 Description of the intervention
The intervention which was developed by NATO for Libya has been a multi-state
military intervention and this particularly was named Operation Unified Protector. Authorized
member states of this military intervention used a range of measures to protect Libyans like
enforcement of arms embargo, the imposition of the no-fly zone, and the freezing of assets. Great
Britain, France, the United State were the primal countries that took an immediate military
response where they have considered missile strikes, airstrikes after the resolution. Away with

this, the concept of R2P was specifically introduced by NATO for the first time against any Arab
country. Including this, the operation reached an end when the termination of Libya's
government leader i.e. Muammar Al-Gaddafi took place (Joffé, 2020).
Key Intervention Successes
3.1 Key Successes
Military intervention that took place in Libya was successfully implemented, which
helped NATO to protect civilians against Gaddafi's attack on Libyans. This intervention was also
considered to be a humanitarian success against the bloodbath that took place in Libya and this
aid them in opposing Libyan overthrow Muammar Al-Gaddafi's authoritarian program. Away
with this, if it is talked about Operation Unified Protector (OUP) then it saved a couple of
thousand Libyans at a really very low cost as compared to a range of previous missions that was
done by NATO and with zero causality as well (Hodge, 2013). The end of the civil war was
declared following the death of Muammar Gaddafi by Mustafa Abdul Jalil (Libyan Politician).
Although the war led to many destructions, it can still be referred to as a real accomplishment
and success internationally (Mundy, 2018). This is because the intervention of NATO saved a lot
of protestors in Libya from a bloodbath. Besides this, it also helped the Libyans in freeing
themselves from an extremely violent regime (What the Libya intervention achieved, 2020).
Also, the war did not lead to the partition of Libya as well as the collapse of the National
Transitional Council. Also, it helped in building an international norm, however, it was
imperfect. Hundreds and thousands of lives were at risk during the war and when reports are
cross-examined, it is revealed that Libyans would have died on a massive scale if his actions
were followed. These key successes were attained by the intervention of NATO to implement the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. Another key success of the Libyan
intervention was that the crimes committed in Sirte are very small in scale than the ones that
might have occurred if Gaddafi would have been allowed to overrun Benghazi. Concerning the
same, Libya now is considered as a model for implementing the so-called ‘Responsibility to
Protect’ (R2P).
3.2 Impact of Key Successes
There were many key successes due to the coalition of military intervention in Libya.
Besides having negative impacts, there are still some positive impacts of the key successes of the

same. For example, the rate of crimes committed came down. The impact of the intervention can
still be felt throughout the region. The intervention of NATO was executed in a very systematic
and flawless manner. It was good that Gaddafi did not win, had this been the case, the world
would not have been able to possibly return to business which is a positive thing for Libya.
Another impact is that Libya was able to develop positive relationships with its
neighboring countries. But there are some sources which state that the war cost more lives than it
saved. But the key successes also have a positive impact because the primary reason for NATO
to intervene in the war was to protect the civilians and not to set up a democracy. And if NATO
had not intervened, Gaddafi would have seized the advantage. Also, there would have been
violence in the country due to which the overall growth of the nation would have been impacted
(Mundy, 2018). The confederation among NATO and UNSC took full responsibility, to save
civilians of Libya against the dictatorship of Gaddafi who was the leader of the Libyan
government. This has helped in bringing structural changes within Libyan politics as it was also
considered as the revolution, which improved the security and limits the external transformation
in Libya (Bannelier-Christakis, 2016).
Key Intervention Challenges and Failures
4.1 Key Challenges
Owing to its outsize effects on the country's economic growth and political stability, Libya is
a vital national security issue for Tunisia. World Bank relates Libya's instability to for at least 24
percent of Tunisia's cumulative decline in gross domestic product from the year 2011 to 2015. In
early 2020, the alliance of militant groups operating on behalf of the Tripoli-based and UN-
recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) expanded its military presence in Libya and
also made major advances against the Libyan National Army (LNA) of Khalifa Haftar
(Bannelier-Christakis, 2016). GNA fell well short of dispersing LNA from Libya, after
recapturing several strategic cities around Western Coastal Road among Tripoli and Tunisian
frontier, namely Surman and Sabratha in April 2020. This is important because many see this as
the ultimate purpose of Turkey's involvement is needed to aid prepare the GNA for peace talks to
resume instead of a military win over the LNA. After Haftar supported by Egypt, United Arab
Emirates (UAE) and Russia had acquired vast areas of territory spanning most of eastern and
southern Libya before initiating an all-out attack on Tripoli and GNA in April 2019, Turkey's

support for GNA has proved important, helping to deter and more recently hold back the advance
of an LNA (Chollet and Fishman, 2015). NATO involvement has also gone as far as to say that,
amid all the facts to the contrary for regime change, the military operation was strictly limited to
ending attacks on civilians. These proponents have also suggested that democratic change may
have been considered in the truce as an aspect. Due to the continued fighting or lack of
flexibility, getting access to war victims remains challenging in a variety of countries (Böller,
2017).
4.2 Impact of Key Challenges
As a consequence, the humanitarian situation is always difficult to evaluate thoroughly and
provide an adequate solution in the right place at right time. It remains the goal to obtain access
to all people arrested in connexion with the dispute. Although seven months of NATO's
campaign were short as opposed to other political interventions, civil war throughout Libya is
going on forever. If the NATO Office The campaign started in March 2011, rebels were still in
retreat, and Gaddafi with exception of Benghazi had taken back most of the rebel-held cities (de
Castro Santos and Teixeira, 2014). Through raising perceptions of diplomatic and military action
to defend communities threatened through such retaliation, moral hazard is generated that
inadvertently promotes rebellion through reducing the predicted expense and enhancing the
probability of success (Egnell, 2014). Moral threat encourages irresponsibility in some situations.
5. Lessons Learned
5.1 Replicating Key Successes
Considering the overall situation of Libya, NATO’s intervention has given a range of
lessons that are required to learn because if something that may take place shortly in any other
country then it is maybe possible that the right decisions could effectively be made right on time.
In the present context, the intervention strategy which was previously adopted by NATO was
costly, which took place among different nations like Kosovo, Afghanistan, and so on. However,
NATO's intervention for Libyans has helped them in finishing the overall operation at a low cost
with no casualty. Also, to overcome the challenges in Libya, there are some strategies. The US
will not divorce the Salafi-jihadi phenomenon from the Libyan civil war and diplomatic strife.
The interrelationship or connectivity of numerous competitions and disputes taking place within
the country must also be included in every plan for Libya (Fonck and Reykers, 2018). The

policy must ensure that there is reciprocal reinforcement of fiscal, military, political, and other
fronts of effort. In favor of the movement's global failure, America's primary involvement in
Libya is undermining and eventually defeating the Libyan Salafi-jihadi base. It would not
have the desired result to target al Qaeda and ISIS explicitly and could hurt other key US
national security interests in the area. A thorough study and evaluation of the source of strength
of the base, its elements, as well as how to target them are given. US national defense demands
that Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya may not harm homelands of the United States and Europe or
the citizens of the United States in the region. The Salafi-jihadi foundation must be permanently
separated from the Libyan community and degraded in just such a way that entities capable of
targeting the West are neither produced nor accepted. Covert cells can exist, but they must be
separated and made incapable of the external attacks being carried out. Libyan armed forces
should be capable of controlling the flow or flow of foreign fighters. Denying the refuge of
transnational Salafi-jihadi groups in Libyan territories or freedom of travel (Heng, 2018).
5.2 Avoiding and Overcoming Key Challenges
American interests need a secure Libya which does not generate violence or establish
circumstances, namely civil war and common grievances that promote militant activity. In the
context of migrant and refugee outflows and security risks, Libya should not export insecurity to
neighboring states or Europe (Wagner, 2018). So many standards must be fulfilled by
appropriate governance systems. For Libyan people, they first have to be legal. Popular adoption,
a reversal of the present US theory and reality, should take precedence over international
recognition. Mostly in a long run, a regime accepted by the international community but
perceived through Libyans as illegal will not advance American security goals. To preserve their
common credibility, government mechanisms have to be prepared to provide essential services
like security and conflict resolution (Reifler and et. al., 2014). Governance structures should
therefore be durable as established by constitution instead of a temporary arrangement. Away
with this, restoring the economy was also considered to be a major challenge and the reason that
came in front was the uncertain environment, and bringing stability was said to be a crucial
aspect of restoring security. In the present context, one of the main challenges was how to
revitalize the economy, particularly given the constraints on the interim cabinet. To break the
loop of continual peace deals that incentivize groups to fight militarily, to perpetuate and to
revive military war indefinitely, permanence is essential. Governance should be uncontested in

such a way that elements of the system of governance may not compete in a manner that causes
violence. A unitary Libyan state with major powers shifted to local as well as provincial levels is
the most plausible option. Due to the spatial range of Libya's resources and population, the
partition is a minimum feasible option. To regulate and deliver, the state should be able to
(Reykers and Fonck, 2015). The civil war's aftermath and proliferation of armed groups led to
violence and instability across the country, which erupted into renewed civil war in 2014. The
ongoing crisis in Libya has so far resulted in tens of thousands of casualties since the onset of
violence in early 2011.
Conclusion
When analyzing the information which is mentioned above, it can be concluded that the
Civil War in Libya was a successful low-cost operation done by NATO. Also, Muammar
Gaddafi evaded capture until 20 October 2011, just when he was captured and killed in Sirte. On
the 23rd of October, The National Transitional Council specifically declared the liberation of
Libya.

REFERENCES
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Gregory, R. H., 2015. Clean bombs and dirty wars: air power in Kosovo and Libya. U of
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Online

WEHREY, F., 2020. Tunisia’s Wake-Up Call: How Security Challenges From Libya Are
Shaping Defense Reforms. [Online]. Available through: <
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/18/tunisia-s-wake-up-call-how-security-
challenges-from-libya-are-shaping-defense-reforms-pub-81312>.
What the Libya intervention achieved. 2020. [Online]. Available
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