Market Structure in the Telecom Industry
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Running head: MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
Market Structure of Telecommunication Industry
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Market Structure of Telecommunication Industry
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1MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
Executive Summary
The report discussed about the telecommunication industry of Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom. By calculating the market concentration of the telecommunication industry in
the respective countries it is found that the industry in the concerned countries operate under
oligopoly market structure. Thus, the industry is exploitative in nature and caused loss in social
welfare and consumer surplus. The government of Australia has taken price policies to reduce
the inefficiency of eh market and is successful to some extent.
Executive Summary
The report discussed about the telecommunication industry of Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom. By calculating the market concentration of the telecommunication industry in
the respective countries it is found that the industry in the concerned countries operate under
oligopoly market structure. Thus, the industry is exploitative in nature and caused loss in social
welfare and consumer surplus. The government of Australia has taken price policies to reduce
the inefficiency of eh market and is successful to some extent.
2MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
Table of Contents
Introduction......................................................................................................................................3
Market concentration in telecommunication industry.....................................................................3
Market structure of the telecommunication industry.......................................................................7
Government policies to control non-competitive Australian telecommunication industry...........10
Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................11
Reference.......................................................................................................................................12
Table of Contents
Introduction......................................................................................................................................3
Market concentration in telecommunication industry.....................................................................3
Market structure of the telecommunication industry.......................................................................7
Government policies to control non-competitive Australian telecommunication industry...........10
Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................11
Reference.......................................................................................................................................12
3MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
Introduction
Telecommunication industry is one of the important industry in the world. In different
countries, there are different telecommunication companies that operate and serve the entire
market. The main concern of this report is to study the telecommunication industry of Australia,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. By studying the industry of the above mentioned
countries, the report finds the market structure the telecom companies of the respective countries
operate in. The report uses Herfindahl Hirschman Index to find the market concentration of the
telecommunication industries of the said countries and thereby confirms market structure of the
industries (De Vries et al., 2017) . Additionally, the report focuses further on the characteristics
of the markets structure in which the industry companies are operating in and thereby finds the
possible profit of the companies. It means that whether the companies are making loss, zero
economic profit or super normal profit. The discussion on the welfare of the producers,
consumers and society is one of the interests of this report. However, the effective governmental
policies and their consequences will be discussed that would curb the price of the
telecommunication industry in Australia if it is found that the industry in Australia is non-
competitive in nature. Therefore, the report discusses the different aspects of market structure of
the telecommunication industry in the above mentioned countries.
Market concentration in telecommunication industry
The market concentration in the telecommunication industry in Australia, the United
Kingdom and New Zealand can be estimated by the use of Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI).
For the calculation the given market shares of the companies operating in the broadband service
and mobile phone service segment of the industry in respective countries has been considered.
Introduction
Telecommunication industry is one of the important industry in the world. In different
countries, there are different telecommunication companies that operate and serve the entire
market. The main concern of this report is to study the telecommunication industry of Australia,
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. By studying the industry of the above mentioned
countries, the report finds the market structure the telecom companies of the respective countries
operate in. The report uses Herfindahl Hirschman Index to find the market concentration of the
telecommunication industries of the said countries and thereby confirms market structure of the
industries (De Vries et al., 2017) . Additionally, the report focuses further on the characteristics
of the markets structure in which the industry companies are operating in and thereby finds the
possible profit of the companies. It means that whether the companies are making loss, zero
economic profit or super normal profit. The discussion on the welfare of the producers,
consumers and society is one of the interests of this report. However, the effective governmental
policies and their consequences will be discussed that would curb the price of the
telecommunication industry in Australia if it is found that the industry in Australia is non-
competitive in nature. Therefore, the report discusses the different aspects of market structure of
the telecommunication industry in the above mentioned countries.
Market concentration in telecommunication industry
The market concentration in the telecommunication industry in Australia, the United
Kingdom and New Zealand can be estimated by the use of Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI).
For the calculation the given market shares of the companies operating in the broadband service
and mobile phone service segment of the industry in respective countries has been considered.
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4MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
Broadband Services market concentration
Australia
The companies that operate in the broadband service segment of the telecommunication
industry in the country are Telstra, Optus, iiNet, TPG and other. Therefore, market concentration
of this segment of the industry is given as
HHI =(Telstra)2 +(Optus)2+(iiNet )2+(TPG)2 +(Other)2
¿ , HHI =( 41)2+(14)2 +(15)2 +(12)2 +(18)2
¿ , HHI=1681+196+225+144 +324
¿ , HHI =2570
New Zealand
The companies that operate in the broadband service segment of the telecommunication
industry in the country are Spark, Vodafone, Calipus, Orcone and other. Therefore, market
concentration of this segment of the industry is given as
HHI =(Spark )2 +( Vodafone)2 +(Calipus)2+(Orcone )2 +(Other )2
¿ , HHI =( 49)2+(32)2+(8)2 +(5)2 +(6)2
¿ , HHI =2401+1024+64 +25+36
¿ , HHI =3550
Broadband Services market concentration
Australia
The companies that operate in the broadband service segment of the telecommunication
industry in the country are Telstra, Optus, iiNet, TPG and other. Therefore, market concentration
of this segment of the industry is given as
HHI =(Telstra)2 +(Optus)2+(iiNet )2+(TPG)2 +(Other)2
¿ , HHI =( 41)2+(14)2 +(15)2 +(12)2 +(18)2
¿ , HHI=1681+196+225+144 +324
¿ , HHI =2570
New Zealand
The companies that operate in the broadband service segment of the telecommunication
industry in the country are Spark, Vodafone, Calipus, Orcone and other. Therefore, market
concentration of this segment of the industry is given as
HHI =(Spark )2 +( Vodafone)2 +(Calipus)2+(Orcone )2 +(Other )2
¿ , HHI =( 49)2+(32)2+(8)2 +(5)2 +(6)2
¿ , HHI =2401+1024+64 +25+36
¿ , HHI =3550
5MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
The United Kingdom
The companies that operate in the broadband service segment of the telecommunication
industry in the country are BT, Virgin Media, Sky, Talk Talk and other. Therefore, market
concentration of this segment of the industry is given as
HHI=(BT )2 +(Virgin Media)2 +(Sky)2 +(Talk Talk )2+(Other )2
¿ , HHI =( 31)2 +(20)2 +(20)2 +(15)2+(13)2
¿ , HHI =961+ 400+400+225+ 169
¿ , HHI=2155
From the above calculations, it can be observed that market concentration in broadband
segment in New Zealand is the highest with value 3550 whereas in the United Kingdom is the
lowest (Bos et al., 2017). The HHI of both the New Zealand and Australia are above 2500 and
that indicates the market concentration in these two countries are considerable high and the
market structure is of oligopoly. In case of the United Kingdom the market concentration is
lower than 2500 but it is also of oligopoly in nature.
Mobile phone Services market concentration
Australia
Telstra, Optus, Vodafone and other are the companies that operate in the mobile phone
service segment in the telecommunication industry of Australia. Therefore, market concentration
in the mobile phone service segment is given as
The United Kingdom
The companies that operate in the broadband service segment of the telecommunication
industry in the country are BT, Virgin Media, Sky, Talk Talk and other. Therefore, market
concentration of this segment of the industry is given as
HHI=(BT )2 +(Virgin Media)2 +(Sky)2 +(Talk Talk )2+(Other )2
¿ , HHI =( 31)2 +(20)2 +(20)2 +(15)2+(13)2
¿ , HHI =961+ 400+400+225+ 169
¿ , HHI=2155
From the above calculations, it can be observed that market concentration in broadband
segment in New Zealand is the highest with value 3550 whereas in the United Kingdom is the
lowest (Bos et al., 2017). The HHI of both the New Zealand and Australia are above 2500 and
that indicates the market concentration in these two countries are considerable high and the
market structure is of oligopoly. In case of the United Kingdom the market concentration is
lower than 2500 but it is also of oligopoly in nature.
Mobile phone Services market concentration
Australia
Telstra, Optus, Vodafone and other are the companies that operate in the mobile phone
service segment in the telecommunication industry of Australia. Therefore, market concentration
in the mobile phone service segment is given as
6MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
HHI =(Telstra)2 +(Optus)2+(Vodafone)2 +(Other)2
¿ , HHI =(45)2+(27)2 +(20)2 +(15)2
¿ , HHI =2025+729+400+225
¿ , HHI =3379
New Zealand
Vodafone, Spark and 2 Degreess and other are the companies that operate in the mobile
phone service segment in the telecommunication industry of New Zealand. Therefore, market
concentration in the mobile phone service segment is given as
HHI =(Vodafone)2 +( Spark )2 +(2 Degreess)2
¿ , HHI=(42)2+(33)2+(25)2
¿ , HHI=1764+1089+ 625
¿ , HHI =3478
The United Kingdom
EE, O2, Vodafone, Virgin and Other are the companies that operate in the mobile phone
service segment in the telecommunication industry of the United Kingdom. Therefore, market
concentration in the mobile phone service segment is given as
HHI =( EE)2 +(O2)2+(Vodafone)2+(Virgin)2+(Other )2
¿ , HHI =( 32)2 +(24 )2+(17)2+(8)2 +(18)2
¿ , HHI =1024+576 +289+64+ 324
HHI =(Telstra)2 +(Optus)2+(Vodafone)2 +(Other)2
¿ , HHI =(45)2+(27)2 +(20)2 +(15)2
¿ , HHI =2025+729+400+225
¿ , HHI =3379
New Zealand
Vodafone, Spark and 2 Degreess and other are the companies that operate in the mobile
phone service segment in the telecommunication industry of New Zealand. Therefore, market
concentration in the mobile phone service segment is given as
HHI =(Vodafone)2 +( Spark )2 +(2 Degreess)2
¿ , HHI=(42)2+(33)2+(25)2
¿ , HHI=1764+1089+ 625
¿ , HHI =3478
The United Kingdom
EE, O2, Vodafone, Virgin and Other are the companies that operate in the mobile phone
service segment in the telecommunication industry of the United Kingdom. Therefore, market
concentration in the mobile phone service segment is given as
HHI =( EE)2 +(O2)2+(Vodafone)2+(Virgin)2+(Other )2
¿ , HHI =( 32)2 +(24 )2+(17)2+(8)2 +(18)2
¿ , HHI =1024+576 +289+64+ 324
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7MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
¿ , HHI =2277
The above calculations regarding market concentration of mobile phone service segment
of telecommunication industry in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom show that in
all the three countries the structure of market of the segment is oligopoly nature (Brezina et al.,
2016). However, it should be noted that market concentration in Australia and New Zealand is
much higher than that of the United Kingdom.
Market structure of the telecommunication industry
In the previous section, the market concentration of the two segment, that is broadband
and mobile phone service segments of the telecommunication industry of the Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom has been calculated and it is found that both the segments in all
the three countries are of oligopoly in nature (Lipsky et al., 2018). Apart from market
concentration, it has been observed that the firms operating in the industry are few in number.
Thus, it can be strongly stated that the companies operating in the telecommunication industry in
all the three countries have substantial market power. However, companies in the United
Kingdom has comparatively lower market power than the other two (Azar & Vives, 2019). In
oligopoly market structure, there are huge fixed cost associated and thus high constraints to entry
and exit exist in the market. The companies in this markets structure are price setter and the since
there are numerous buyers, the buyers are the price takers. The demand curve faced by the
companies in this market structure is downward sloping and the profit maximizing output is
decided where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC) (Adams & Williams 2019).
However, unlike perfectly competitive market structure price is not determined at MR=MC. The
demand curve is well above MR=MC point and the price is determined from the demand curve at
the level of profit maximizing output. Thus, it is evident that the price of the telecommunication
¿ , HHI =2277
The above calculations regarding market concentration of mobile phone service segment
of telecommunication industry in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom show that in
all the three countries the structure of market of the segment is oligopoly nature (Brezina et al.,
2016). However, it should be noted that market concentration in Australia and New Zealand is
much higher than that of the United Kingdom.
Market structure of the telecommunication industry
In the previous section, the market concentration of the two segment, that is broadband
and mobile phone service segments of the telecommunication industry of the Australia, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom has been calculated and it is found that both the segments in all
the three countries are of oligopoly in nature (Lipsky et al., 2018). Apart from market
concentration, it has been observed that the firms operating in the industry are few in number.
Thus, it can be strongly stated that the companies operating in the telecommunication industry in
all the three countries have substantial market power. However, companies in the United
Kingdom has comparatively lower market power than the other two (Azar & Vives, 2019). In
oligopoly market structure, there are huge fixed cost associated and thus high constraints to entry
and exit exist in the market. The companies in this markets structure are price setter and the since
there are numerous buyers, the buyers are the price takers. The demand curve faced by the
companies in this market structure is downward sloping and the profit maximizing output is
decided where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (MC) (Adams & Williams 2019).
However, unlike perfectly competitive market structure price is not determined at MR=MC. The
demand curve is well above MR=MC point and the price is determined from the demand curve at
the level of profit maximizing output. Thus, it is evident that the price of the telecommunication
8MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
industry in the given countries is higher than the price in perfectly competitive market (Colombo,
2019). It is known from the market theory of microeconomics that in perfect competition
companies earn zero economic profit, which is termed as normal profit too. Thus, in oligopoly
telecommunication industry the firms are positive economic profit or super normal profit
(Gomez-Martinez, Onderstal & Sonnemans, 2016). However, the super normal profit earned by
the companies operating in the telecommunication industry is lower than a company that
operates under a monopoly structure. In contrary, the companies in the telecommunication
industry can earn super normal profit equal to a monopoly company if the companies in the
industry collude that is cooperate with each other and set price accordingly (Bradshaw, Linneker
& Overton, 2017). Hence, under this case of collusion companies in the oligopoly
telecommunication industry will be able to charge price as high as possible and thereby earns
super normal profit like a
monopoly company. The
graphical illustration of the
oligopoly market structure
is given in figure 1.
industry in the given countries is higher than the price in perfectly competitive market (Colombo,
2019). It is known from the market theory of microeconomics that in perfect competition
companies earn zero economic profit, which is termed as normal profit too. Thus, in oligopoly
telecommunication industry the firms are positive economic profit or super normal profit
(Gomez-Martinez, Onderstal & Sonnemans, 2016). However, the super normal profit earned by
the companies operating in the telecommunication industry is lower than a company that
operates under a monopoly structure. In contrary, the companies in the telecommunication
industry can earn super normal profit equal to a monopoly company if the companies in the
industry collude that is cooperate with each other and set price accordingly (Bradshaw, Linneker
& Overton, 2017). Hence, under this case of collusion companies in the oligopoly
telecommunication industry will be able to charge price as high as possible and thereby earns
super normal profit like a
monopoly company. The
graphical illustration of the
oligopoly market structure
is given in figure 1.
9MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
Figure 1: Oligopoly market
Source: (Created by the Author)
In figure 1, it can be observed that QC and PC are the quantity and price respectively at the
equilibrium at competitive market structure (Cohen, Perakis & Thraves, 2017). On the other
hand, Q* and P* are the quantity and price respectively at equilibrium in oligopoly market. The
yellow shaded region is super normal profit earned by the companies operating in the
telecommunication industry.
Winners and Losers
It is evident from the figure 1 that under perfectly competitive market companies earn
zero economic profit but when the he market structure takes the form of oligopoly the n the price
of eth products increase from PC to P*. Due to this increased price due to difference in market
structure the profit of the companies operating in the industry increases and earn super normal
profit equivalent to the yellow shaded region (Butera et al., 2019). However, owing to earn more
the producers has to sacrifice a part of surplus given as green triangle region as shown in the
figure. The area of the yellow shaded rectangle is large than the area of green shaded triangle.
Therefore, in total under oligopoly market even after sacrificing a part of producer surplus the
companies earn more (Hutchison, 2017). However, the lost surplus is a loss of surplus as
deadweight loss. From the perspective of consumers end, it can be observed that the consumers
lost a large portion of their surplus. The amount of consumer surplus lost is given as yellow
shaded region and blue colored triangle. Additionally, the blue triangle is the total loss in
consumer surplus and is the loss in welfare called as deadweight loss. Therefore, green and blue
Figure 1: Oligopoly market
Source: (Created by the Author)
In figure 1, it can be observed that QC and PC are the quantity and price respectively at the
equilibrium at competitive market structure (Cohen, Perakis & Thraves, 2017). On the other
hand, Q* and P* are the quantity and price respectively at equilibrium in oligopoly market. The
yellow shaded region is super normal profit earned by the companies operating in the
telecommunication industry.
Winners and Losers
It is evident from the figure 1 that under perfectly competitive market companies earn
zero economic profit but when the he market structure takes the form of oligopoly the n the price
of eth products increase from PC to P*. Due to this increased price due to difference in market
structure the profit of the companies operating in the industry increases and earn super normal
profit equivalent to the yellow shaded region (Butera et al., 2019). However, owing to earn more
the producers has to sacrifice a part of surplus given as green triangle region as shown in the
figure. The area of the yellow shaded rectangle is large than the area of green shaded triangle.
Therefore, in total under oligopoly market even after sacrificing a part of producer surplus the
companies earn more (Hutchison, 2017). However, the lost surplus is a loss of surplus as
deadweight loss. From the perspective of consumers end, it can be observed that the consumers
lost a large portion of their surplus. The amount of consumer surplus lost is given as yellow
shaded region and blue colored triangle. Additionally, the blue triangle is the total loss in
consumer surplus and is the loss in welfare called as deadweight loss. Therefore, green and blue
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10MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
triangles show that under oligopoly market structure of telecommunication industry there is
existence of deadweight loss. Therefore, it is evident the winners are the producers of the
telecommunication industry that is the companies that operate in the industry (Zeuthen, 2018).
On the other hand, the losers in the industry are consumers and the society. For consumers there
is significant loss in surplus and for society, there is loss too shown as deadweight loss in the
figure. Therefore, oligopoly market is more product centric than consumers.
Government policies to control non-competitive Australian telecommunication industry
The government of Australia has found that the telecommunication industry is of
oligopoly market structure and thus charges price higher than perfectly competitive market and
thereby exploits consumers (Doda, 2016). Therefore, to curb the exploitative nature of the
industry and to reduce price the government is taking price policies in order to control the
telecommunication industry of the country. Suppose, the government imposes price ceiling in the
telecommunication industry at the price level equivalent to perfectly competitive market price
PC. Due to this imposition of price ceiling, the amount received by the companies in the industry
is reduced and subsequently, the loss in consumer surplus and social welfare is retrieved (Wu,
2017). However, there is loss in producer surplus which could not be recovered and lost as
deadweight loss. Therefore, it is evident that government policies are to some extent are effective
since they has not caused any further loss in surplus but rather mitigated a significant amount of
welfare loss. At price ceiling, the companies that are operating will be producing the same
amount as they were under oligopoly price because the output is given by the profit maximizing
condition MR=MC (Tremblay & Tremblay, 2019). Hence, it has been observed that after
imposition of price ceiling by the government, there is reduction in price to the level of perfect
competition but quantity traded in the market has not increased a bit and remained at the same
triangles show that under oligopoly market structure of telecommunication industry there is
existence of deadweight loss. Therefore, it is evident the winners are the producers of the
telecommunication industry that is the companies that operate in the industry (Zeuthen, 2018).
On the other hand, the losers in the industry are consumers and the society. For consumers there
is significant loss in surplus and for society, there is loss too shown as deadweight loss in the
figure. Therefore, oligopoly market is more product centric than consumers.
Government policies to control non-competitive Australian telecommunication industry
The government of Australia has found that the telecommunication industry is of
oligopoly market structure and thus charges price higher than perfectly competitive market and
thereby exploits consumers (Doda, 2016). Therefore, to curb the exploitative nature of the
industry and to reduce price the government is taking price policies in order to control the
telecommunication industry of the country. Suppose, the government imposes price ceiling in the
telecommunication industry at the price level equivalent to perfectly competitive market price
PC. Due to this imposition of price ceiling, the amount received by the companies in the industry
is reduced and subsequently, the loss in consumer surplus and social welfare is retrieved (Wu,
2017). However, there is loss in producer surplus which could not be recovered and lost as
deadweight loss. Therefore, it is evident that government policies are to some extent are effective
since they has not caused any further loss in surplus but rather mitigated a significant amount of
welfare loss. At price ceiling, the companies that are operating will be producing the same
amount as they were under oligopoly price because the output is given by the profit maximizing
condition MR=MC (Tremblay & Tremblay, 2019). Hence, it has been observed that after
imposition of price ceiling by the government, there is reduction in price to the level of perfect
competition but quantity traded in the market has not increased a bit and remained at the same
11MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
level as it was under oligopoly market structure. Therefore, the government policy of price
ceiling is not perfectly effective to bring back the entire lost surplus.
Conclusion
The above discussion regarding the market structure of the telecommunication industry in
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom leads to the conclusion that the industry in all
of the concerned countries are highly concentrated with few firms operating in the
telecommunication industry in the respective countries. Thus, the market concentration showed
that the industry is of oligopolistic in nature in all the three countries. The companies in the
industry charges high price and earns super normal profit. In addition to that, it is noticed that the
companies would be become capable earning profit equivalent to the super normal profit earned
by a monopoly firm if the companies collude with each other and charge a single high price.
Therefore, it has been observed from the further analysis that under the market structure of the
industry the companies gain but the consumers and the society faces loss in surplus. Thus, to
mitigate the problem the government of Australia intervened and implemented price solution
which is able to mitigate the loss of consumers and society but failed to recover the loss faced by
the companies and the there is no increase in quantity supplied in the market.
level as it was under oligopoly market structure. Therefore, the government policy of price
ceiling is not perfectly effective to bring back the entire lost surplus.
Conclusion
The above discussion regarding the market structure of the telecommunication industry in
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom leads to the conclusion that the industry in all
of the concerned countries are highly concentrated with few firms operating in the
telecommunication industry in the respective countries. Thus, the market concentration showed
that the industry is of oligopolistic in nature in all the three countries. The companies in the
industry charges high price and earns super normal profit. In addition to that, it is noticed that the
companies would be become capable earning profit equivalent to the super normal profit earned
by a monopoly firm if the companies collude with each other and charge a single high price.
Therefore, it has been observed from the further analysis that under the market structure of the
industry the companies gain but the consumers and the society faces loss in surplus. Thus, to
mitigate the problem the government of Australia intervened and implemented price solution
which is able to mitigate the loss of consumers and society but failed to recover the loss faced by
the companies and the there is no increase in quantity supplied in the market.
12MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
Reference
Adams, B., & Williams, K. R. (2019). Zone pricing in retail oligopoly. American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 11(1), 124-56.
Azar, J., & Vives, X. (2019). General Equilibrium Oligopoly and Ownership
Structure. Available at SSRN 3501611.
Bos, J. W., Chan, Y. L., Kolari, J. W., & Yuan, J. (2017). Competition, concentration and critical
mass: why the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is a biased competition measure.
In Handbook of Competition in Banking and Finance. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bradshaw, S., Linneker, B., & Overton, L. (2017). Extractive industries as sites of supernormal
profits and supernormal patriarchy?. Gender & Development, 25(3), 439-454.
Brezina, I., Pekár, J., Čičková, Z., & Reiff, M. (2016). Herfindahl–Hirschman index level of
concentration values modification and analysis of their change. Central European journal
of operations research, 24(1), 49-72.
Butera, L., Metcalfe, R., Morrison, W., & Taubinsky, D. (2019). The deadweight loss of social
recognition (No. w25637). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cohen, M., Perakis, G., & Thraves, C. (2017). Consumer Surplus Under Demand
Uncertainty. Available at SSRN 3035992.
Colombo, S. (2016). Mixed oligopolies and collusion. Journal of Economics, 118(2), 167-184.
De Vries, G., Pennings, E., Block, J. H., & Fisch, C. (2017). Trademark or patent? The effects of
market concentration, customer type and venture capital financing on start-ups’ initial IP
applications. Industry and Innovation, 24(4), 325-345.
Reference
Adams, B., & Williams, K. R. (2019). Zone pricing in retail oligopoly. American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 11(1), 124-56.
Azar, J., & Vives, X. (2019). General Equilibrium Oligopoly and Ownership
Structure. Available at SSRN 3501611.
Bos, J. W., Chan, Y. L., Kolari, J. W., & Yuan, J. (2017). Competition, concentration and critical
mass: why the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is a biased competition measure.
In Handbook of Competition in Banking and Finance. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bradshaw, S., Linneker, B., & Overton, L. (2017). Extractive industries as sites of supernormal
profits and supernormal patriarchy?. Gender & Development, 25(3), 439-454.
Brezina, I., Pekár, J., Čičková, Z., & Reiff, M. (2016). Herfindahl–Hirschman index level of
concentration values modification and analysis of their change. Central European journal
of operations research, 24(1), 49-72.
Butera, L., Metcalfe, R., Morrison, W., & Taubinsky, D. (2019). The deadweight loss of social
recognition (No. w25637). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cohen, M., Perakis, G., & Thraves, C. (2017). Consumer Surplus Under Demand
Uncertainty. Available at SSRN 3035992.
Colombo, S. (2016). Mixed oligopolies and collusion. Journal of Economics, 118(2), 167-184.
De Vries, G., Pennings, E., Block, J. H., & Fisch, C. (2017). Trademark or patent? The effects of
market concentration, customer type and venture capital financing on start-ups’ initial IP
applications. Industry and Innovation, 24(4), 325-345.
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13MARKET STRUCTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY
Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times… and bad!. Wiley Interdisciplinary
Reviews: Climate Change, 7(1), 135-144.
Gomez-Martinez, F., Onderstal, S., & Sonnemans, J. (2016). Firm-specific information and
explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies. European Economic Review, 82, 132-141.
Hutchinson, E. (2017). 3.4 Building Supply and Producer Surplus. Principles of
Microeconomics.
Lipsky, T., Wright, J. D., Ginsburg, D. H., & Yun, J. M. (2018). The United States Federal Trade
Commission Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,
Hearing on Concentration and Competitiveness in the US Economy, Comment of the
Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. George
Mason Law & Economics Research Paper, (18-25).
Tremblay, C. H., & Tremblay, V. J. (2019). Oligopoly Games And The Cournot–Bertrand
Model: A Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 33(5), 1555-1577.
Wu, C. (2017). Strategic aspects of oligopolistic vertical integration. Elsevier.
Zeuthen, F. (2018). Problems of monopoly and economic warfare. Routledge.
Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times… and bad!. Wiley Interdisciplinary
Reviews: Climate Change, 7(1), 135-144.
Gomez-Martinez, F., Onderstal, S., & Sonnemans, J. (2016). Firm-specific information and
explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies. European Economic Review, 82, 132-141.
Hutchinson, E. (2017). 3.4 Building Supply and Producer Surplus. Principles of
Microeconomics.
Lipsky, T., Wright, J. D., Ginsburg, D. H., & Yun, J. M. (2018). The United States Federal Trade
Commission Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century,
Hearing on Concentration and Competitiveness in the US Economy, Comment of the
Global Antitrust Institute, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. George
Mason Law & Economics Research Paper, (18-25).
Tremblay, C. H., & Tremblay, V. J. (2019). Oligopoly Games And The Cournot–Bertrand
Model: A Survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 33(5), 1555-1577.
Wu, C. (2017). Strategic aspects of oligopolistic vertical integration. Elsevier.
Zeuthen, F. (2018). Problems of monopoly and economic warfare. Routledge.
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