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(PDF) Nagorno Karabakh Conflict

   

Added on  2021-06-07

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Nagorno-Karabakh ConflictIntroduction"The unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus are the primary threats to the region's stability sincethe status quo is inherently unstable and contains dangers of escalation...The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is of particular concern; there are recurring deadly incidents along the line of contact" (http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2010/07/08/semneby-concerns/), stated European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby in an address to the OSCE PermanentCouncil this summer. Two months later, at the beginning of September, 2010, another phase of violence erupted, victims on both sides were reported. The conflict has still been remaining its hostile character, whereas, none of international mediators could reach any significant result towardspeace-settlement. In order to develop relevant and solid solutions to any conflict, it is essential to reveal all reasons that have caused it, studying stakeholders that have their interests in related on-going processes, as well as evaluating all circumstances that prolongs violence and hinders peaceful resolutions. Nagorno-Karabakh is a case which has long historical roots and very complex causes. In the following essay, I will try to provide and analyse some major reasons that, in my opinion, greatly determined the emergence and/or exacerbation of the current conflict. In order to simplify the style of my essay, I will classify the causes in three categories: regional – external (2), socio-psychological (5) and state-level (1).Regional – External Cause #1: Soviet – Turkey Relations in 1920s and Stalin’s DecisionOne of the primary causes that created a base for future violence comes from the decision of Joseph Stalin and Caucasian Bureau with respect to Soviet relations with Turkey in 1921. Before the Sovietisation of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh region with a majority of ethnic 1

Armenians and minority of Azeris, had been a matter of constant dispute between the two countries. After the Trans-Caucasian Federation had collapsed and the Russian Red Army had taken over all three Caucasian states by April 1921, it was now up to Moscow to determine the future of the conflict region, favouring either Armenia or Azerbaijan. Due to their common ethnic roots and cultural links, Turkey and Azerbaijan have always been major partners in the region. Any political clash with Azerbaijan might have directly resulted in the deterioration of relationships with Turkey, which was a very important political player in the region: “Needing to placate Turkey, the Soviet Union agreed to a division under which Zangezur would fall under the control of Armenia, while Karabakh and Nakhchivan would be under the control of Azerbaijan...” (http://www.servinghistory.com/topics/Nagorno-Karabakh::sub::History). This decision was made under the circumstances of bitter ethnic opposition and even hatred betweenthe two nations. By establishing a mainly Armenian enclave within the territory of Muslim Azerbaijan without any special structural models and security guarantees, Stalin and Soviet government created a potential for future ethnic conflict: “Had Turkey not been an issue, Stalin would likely have left Karabakh under Armenian control...” (http://www.servinghistory.com/topics/Nagorno-Karabakh::sub::History). Thus, Soviet – Turkey relationships and Stalin’s decision should be considered as a very important reason of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.Regional – External Cause #2: Moscow’s Double StandardsIn the presence and hostility of current conflict, one could certainly blame the major political actor in the Caucasus Region – Russia. Historically, Russia has had close political and economic ties with both countries. While evaluating the current situation, Russia’s reluctance to settle the conflict is caused by two circumstances: 2

Firstly, Russia has a very serious economic interest in Azeri gas and oil resources. Russia strives to get maximum amount of natural gas from Baku “which has an estimated potential of extracting 5 trillion cubic meters a year” (http://www.livetradingnews.com). Currently, Russia represents a majormarket for Azeri oil products, whereas, if the border with Armenia opens, Azerbaijan will have more geographic options to sell its gas and oil (http://www.tabula.ge/article-2009.html). On the other hand, Russia and Armenia have always been strategic military allies. According to the latest agreement between the two countries, Russian military bases will stay in Armenia until 2044 (http://www.rferl.org/content/New_RussianArmenian_Defense_Pact_Finalized/2128266.html). Nowadays,the importance of these bases for Armenia stems from its hostile relations with Azerbaijan. “If the tension between these two countries disappears, Russia will automatically lose its strategic leverage on South Caucasus, as the importance of its military bases will drastically lessen for Yerevan...” (http://www.tabula.ge/article-2009.html). By providing different kinds of support to both countries, Russia contributes to prolong the conflict and it represents very important factor in the existence of present-day conflict.Socio-psychological Cause #1: Security DilemmafromAzerbaijan’s PerspectiveThe existence of ethnic Armenian enclave within their territory made Azeris feel endangered. Their fear was based on Karabakhis’ active relations with Yerevan: “Lachin corridor sits astride what the Karabakhis call the "road of life." This 50-ile-long route from the border of Armenia proper to Stepanakert, which an army of workers is now turning into a modern highway, is in many ways at the centre of Karabakhis’ identity: for the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh, life means, above all, the connection to Armenia...” (http://www.jstor.org/stable/20047941?seq=5) The notion of security dilemma that is frequently used in the field of international relations can be logically applicable to this situation. On one hand, Karabakh Armenians were members of an ethnic minority and Baku had official responsibility to protect them as other citizens of Azerbaijan 3

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