Paris Attack: Terrorism, Security Measures, and Law Enforcement Strategies

In this document we will discuss about Paris Attack and below are the summary points of this document:- Terrorism poses a significant security threat, requiring vigilant and tactical responses from law enforcement agencies. A transnational and international approach is necessary to effectively combat terrorism and prevent attacks. The Paris attack of November 2015 resulted in numerous casualties, highlighting the need for improved law enforcement strategies and prevention measures.

Running head: PARIS ATTACK
Paris Attack
Student’s Name
Institutional Affiliation

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Paris Attack
Terrorism has become a great security threat in the contemporary world. Terrorists
have advanced their techniques and this has left the security personnel of different nations
with no other choice but to be more alert and employ new tactics (The Islamic State’s
External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus, 2019). Historically, there has been a
trend of negotiating with the terrorists with the aim of ensuring that they do not kill hostages.
Things have changed, however. In the contemporary society, terrorists are more likely to be
suicide bombers. With this situation, the police are left in a dilemma. If they launch an attack
in a place where terrorists have taken hostages, there is a likelihood that people will die. On
the other hand, if they do not launch an attack, people will surely die. The contemporary
nature of terrorism does not leave any room for negotiations (Towards a Security Union,
2019). The antiterrorism officers must, therefore, act tactically and swiftly to save the lives of
innocent citizens from the hands of cruel terrorists.
To effectively avert terrorism, there is a need for a transnational and even an
international approach. The terrorists take advantage of any weak security measure to
advance their plans (Gless and Wahl, 2017). At the moment, anti-terrorism is usually planned
and actualized at the national level. It is appropriate to ensure that this is expanded to the
national and international levels. This is likely to help avert the terrorism effectively. This
assignment will focus on the Paris attacks that happened on 13th November 2015. A critical
analysis of the response will be provided. In addition, the essay will also focus on the failures
on the part of the law enforcement agencies and how these could be prevented. The essay will
also focus on challenges to law enforcement in preventing and responding to terrorism.
More than 120 people lost their lives while over 350 were injured on 13th November
2015 when Paris was attacked by terrorists (Australia's terror response must change after the

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Paris attacks, 2019). The attack was the worst to occur in Europe since the Madrid bombings
of 2004 that let 191 persons dead. The attack was perpetrated by a group of at least seven
attackers who launched attacks at six different locations in Paris. The Islamic State released a
statement taking responsibility for the attack. They quoted the airstrikes by France in Syria as
the reason for the retaliation. The deadliest of the attacks occurred at Bataclan. On the night
that the attack occurred, there were more than 1500 people who were gathered here enjoying
rock music performance. Three attackers gained entry to the venue and started shooting
indiscriminately to the audience. The terrorists were using automatic weapons. The attack left
87 people dead while several others were injured. When the police stormed the venue to
rescue the hostages, the terrorists were dead within two minutes. Two of the terrorists blew
themselves up while the other was shot by the police.
Another attack occurred outside the state de France. At the time, there were people
watching a football game at State de France. Among them was the then president of France.
There were three explosions outside the auditorium which led to the death of one person and
the three attackers. The attackers detonated belt bombs and blew themselves up. Several other
people were injured during the incident. As indicated above, the attacks took place in six
different locations in Paris and left 129 people dead and more than 350 injured.
Analysis of the Response
Accounts from those who survived, police officials and analysis by outside security
experts reveal that that were substantial periods when the terrorists went on with their mission
without any intervention from the police. Among other reasons, this has been blamed on the
heavy chain of command that existed in French police at the time. This heavy chain had been
blamed for the reduced neighbourhood patrols in favour of a specialized unit. The heavy

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chain of command contributed to delay in response by the police. It follows that this was a
great weakness of the operation.
The first police officer arrived at the worst site of the attack, that is, the Bataclan
concert hall about 15 minutes after the attack had started. He was armed with only a sidearm.
He managed to reduce the terror activity through shooting one of the attackers. The move led
to blowing up the terrorist's suicide vest. The terrorist died but none of the people around him
were killed. This is a positive move and it is a pro for the policeman. He acted in a swift
manner but was sure to take care of the innocent citizens. After killing the terrorist, the
officer was ordered to withdraw. The aim was to send more specialized units. The specialized
units arrived about half an hour into the attack. There was an apparent failure in the chain
command since these specialized units had been first sent to sites where attacks had already
ended. According to a French news report, there was a specialized unit that was never
deployed.
After the officer was told to withdraw from the Bataclan auditorium, the two
remaining attackers went on to shoot the audience. As noted, the specialized units arrived
about 30 minutes into the attack. It took nearly three hours before the police could be the
terrorist attack to an end. It is worth noting that the nature of the attack was complex and
well-coordinated. The police, therefore, made brave and great moves to avert the attack.
Although this is the case, some experts argue that it would have been better if there were
local police around rather than depending on a heavy chain of command. The experts also
conclude that in such situations, the local police would avert danger if allowed to (Meijer and
Wyss, 2018). They argue that this is a better strategy compared to waiting for the arrival of
specialized forces.

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Challenges to Law Enforcement and in Preventing and Responding to Terrorism
It is the hope of every nation that they would effectively avert any terrorist
attacks and ensure that their citizens are always safe. The aftermath of any terrorist attack
leaves the question of what measures could be put in place to ensure that such a situation
does not happen again in future or it is dealt with in a better way. There are a number of
intelligence and security flaws that have been identified in the case of the Paris attacks. The
first challenge is the French security personnel command chain (Attacks highlight security
flaws, 2019). As indicated above, the French police had a heavy command chain at that time.
Since counterterrorism requires urgent and immediate action, it is appropriate to ensure that
the command chain is not heavy. This would make it easier to intervene more quickly and
possibly save more lives. A heavy chain of command is known to cause delays which could
aggravate the suffering of hostages in terror attacks. This was one of the security flaws in the
Paris attacks.
Some of the individuals involved in the terror attack were known to the authorities for
extremist links before they moved to Syria. In addition to this, they were able to move from
Syria and back to France without being detected. This may have been a failure on the part of
the authorities but it cannot be concluded so yet. Such a large terror operation requires great
planning and it is normal for the terrorists to leave some kind of footprint that would trace
their activities (Herrington, 2019). In this attack, however, things were different. The
intelligence was not able to collect any piece of information regarding the terror attack plans
(Traynor, 2019). It has been argued that maybe the terrorists were communicating using
encrypted apps. Therefore, one cannot conclude that it was solely the failure of the police.
Another challenge lies in the number of French people moving to Syria. It is
estimated that about 1000 people from France have gone to Syria. Keeping track of these

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people is a challenge. In addition, keeping track of the people who come back from Syria to
France is also a challenge. This poses a great security threat to France since there is a
possibility of some of the individuals coming back having been radicalized by the Islamic
states. The French authorities should take more action is as far as monitoring these
individuals is concerned (The Paris attacks, 2019). This would likely avert such attacks in the
future. The best approach is to carry out a risk assessment and prioritization to determine
where to devote the limited resources set aside for surveillance.
In the 21st century, terrorism has taken an international dimension. Jihadists operate at
an international level and it is therefore appropriate to approach the terror activities from an
international level (Response to Paris Attacks Points to Weaknesses in French Police
Structure, 2019). For instance, the Paris attackers had moved to several countries in Europe
before they finally carried out the attack. It is worth noting that Islamic jihadists always take
advantage of a security weakness even if that weakness is found at an international level
(Foreign Terrorists and International Law, 2019). Here is an example. The terror attack in
France appears to have been planned in Belgium. Belgium is a relatively smaller state and the
security services are not as advanced as those of France. The terrorists, therefore, took
advantage of this to plan the attack in Belgium. Security services are more concerned with
ensuring safety in their own nations (Law enforcement, 2019). It would be more appropriate
and effective to improve intelligence sharing to a regional level and then an international
level (Consolidated Version of The Treaty on The Functioning of The European Union,
2019). For instance, Europe could share intelligence information at a European level. This
would help in effectively alleviating terrorism. A failure on France may be detected here.
Reports show that France had received intelligence reports about one of the attackers from
Turkey but did not do anything about it. To ensure safety and combat terrorism it is

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appropriate for countries to share intelligence information and to act appropriately (Katainen
and Mogherini, 2017).
Law Enforcement Capability Failures and How they Could be Remedied
The Paris attack was mainly blamed on intelligence failures. After the attack, a
parliamentary committee investigated the matter to find out what could have contributed to
the terror attack. The commission found out that there was a great failure on the intelligence
units in the country and recommended a total overhaul of the units. The commission found
out that the intelligence units as were currently constituted were not effective in carrying out
their mandate (The Paris Attacks and the Evolving Islamic State Threat to France, 2019). At that
time, France had six intelligence units. Each of them reported differently to the ministries of
interior and defence. The commission found out that there lacked coordination between the
different intelligence units rendering them ineffective. The best to solve this is by abolishing
the different intelligence units and constituting a single intelligence unit such as that of the
United States of America. As observed by the parliamentary commission, had there not been
a failure in the intelligence, the attack would have been averted. All of the attackers had
previously been flagged to the authorities. At the time of the attack, some of the terrorists
were still undergoing judicial surveillance either in France or Belgium. Some of them had
had convictions in France. The solution to this is to establish a single intelligence unit.
An inquiry by the parliamentary commission found out that the intelligence units were
unable to effectively communicate with each other concerning some known Islamists. The
Islamists in question here are mainly those who had been previously convicted, had their
phone tapped or who were under judicial surveillance at the time of the attack. One of the
terrorists involved in the Bataclan attack had moved to Syria despite having a travel
restriction. He travelled to Syria and then came back unnoticed and attacked the Bataclan

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auditorium. This information reveals that it was quite possible to contain the situation had the
intelligence been keener and more effective in their work. The remedy to this is ensuring that
the borders are closely monitored to ensure that any person who gets in or out is identified.
Potential security threats are let into the country due to the open borders.
Another reason for the failure resulted from a lack of coordinated intelligence among
European countries. There existed poor communication and coordination as far as security
information is concerned in Europe. If there could have been coordinated intelligence
communication among the European countries, the attack would probably have been averted
(European Organization of Military Associations and Trade Unions, 2019). Here is an
example. The individual believed to have the master planner of the attack was a Belgium
national. In January 2015, he was in Athens, Greece. Here, the authorities identified him as
an individual with links to the Islamic State. In addition, they identified that he was interested
in attacking countries in Europe. Despite having this information, the attacker was able to
escape Athens without being arrested. This is a clear indication of poor communication
between European countries. Athens would have delivered the suspect to the Belgian
authorities for appropriate action. Another instance is where the French Police did not arrest
the only remaining member of the team that planned and carried out the attacks (Sole
Surviving Suspect in Paris Attacks Stands Trial in Belgium, 2019). The parliamentary
commission found out that the suspect was stopped at traffic police check the day after the
attack when he was moving back to Belgium by car. After he was stopped, he gave his
original documents. The police counterchecked against the European files. They found out
that he was in the cross-border information system for common crimes. However, the Belgian
authorities had forgotten to include that he was under investigation for being suspected to be
a potential jihadist. The traffic police were therefore given orders to let him go. It is

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appropriate that the European nations establish a coordinated communications system where
they share intelligence information (The Parliamentary Magazine, 2019).
The commission also found out that the state of emergency that was declared after the
attack and the deployment of thousands of troops had an insignificant effect on the security. It
was also found out that eight of the soldiers who were within the Bataclan auditorium vicinity
did not intervene because they never received the orders to do so. This is an illustration of
how the heavy chain of command negatively affected the operation. To solve this in the
future, it would be important to ensure that the chain of command is not as heavy. In addition,
police officers who arrived at the science of the attack borrowed ammunition from the army
but they refused due to the army rules. This is a clear indication that some rivalry was
experienced between the forces which probably aggravated the condition. In the future, it
would be important for the security forces to work together in harmony and make decisions
that are in the best interest of the innocent hostages (Samaan and Jacobs, 2018).
The commission also found out that the Bataclan concert hall had received several
threats of attacks. A jihadi returning to France had also informed a judge that there were
plans to attack a rock concert. Although it was hard to predict that the attack would be carried
out at Bataclan, appropriate actions by the intelligence would have helped thwart the attack.
With the information provided by the jihadist to the authorities, it would have been quite
easier to prevent the attack. Had the authorities kept in mind the information, they would
have been more careful to ensure security at rock concerts.
Conclusion
Cases of terrorism have been on the rise in contemporary society. Terrorists have
greatly changed their tactics and mechanisms. Due to this, it is important that the authorities
of any nation be sure to advance their antiterrorism techniques. Traditionally, nations have

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negotiated with the terrorists. Negotiations are no longer considered a way of dealing with
terror attacks. The police must take great precaution when intervening. If the police launch an
attack, they would pose danger to innocent hostages. Failure to act would also be a sure way
of giving the terrorists a chance to perpetuate their heinous acts (Selected Issues in Counter-
terrorism, 2019). It follows that the police and the security personnel must take appropriate
measures to avert terrorism. One of the most devastating terror attacks was carried out on 13th
November 2015 in Paris, France. The terrorists targeted six different locations of the city
including the Bataclan auditorium. The well-coordinated attacks left 129 people dead and
more than 350 injured.
There were several failures of the security personnel that contributed to worsening of
the attack. The first failure was the heavy command chain. After about 15 minutes into the
attack, a police officer gained entry into Bataclan auditorium and killed one of the 3
terrorists. He was however instructed to immediately leave the mission since special forces
were to be deployed. Special forces arrived about quarter an hour later. The heavy command
chain, therefore, contributed to worsening of the situation. There was also a case of clashing
between the various forces. For instance, some officers borrowed ammunition from others but
they were denied. The reason for denial was because the law did not allow such a thing to
happen. Another reason for the failure was the poor communication and coordination
between the intelligence units. They were six different units of the intelligence and all
reported differently to the ministries of interior and defence. For intelligence to work well, it
is necessary to have a single intelligence unit that works together in harmony. Failure of
coordinated intelligence systems across Europe is also a challenge. If the countries worked
together, it would be easy to avert terror attacks. In the modern day, terrorists greatly take
advantage of weak points in security systems. This could either be at the national, regional or

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even international level. It is therefore wise for countries to embrace coordination of the
intelligence systems at these different levels to effectively avert terror attacks.

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