Strategies of Alexander the Great in the Battles of Issus and Gaugamela

This article discusses the strategies employed by Alexander the Great in the battles of Issus and Gaugamela against the Persian army. It explores his tactics, positioning, and the psychological advantage he gained by targeting the Persian king, Darius.

Philip II, Alexander the Great,
and
the Macedonian Empire

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The battle of Issus
Strategies of Alexander proved to be more effective as the strategies started much before the
start of the battle. The first strategy that Alexander made in this battle was to confront with
the Persian army on the coastal plains that was narrow between the mountain range of
Amanus and the sea (Fuller, 2018). He did so to hinder the effective cavalry deployment as
he knew choosing this plain would make the battles between the infantries where he knew
that his phalanx was stronger than their rivals. This strategy failed as Darius stopped on the
northern plains of Syria. One night before, he chose a vantage point by Pillars of Jonah which
gave them the clear vision of the campfire of the Persian who was on the lower terrains. He
moved along the terrains which took lot of time because of the topology of the place and
hence they got time to plan the battle.
In the battle, he gave the responsibility of stopping the left wing of Persian army to their
archers and he himself adjusted himself behind the centre along with allied and mercenary
infantry as well as with Macedonian cavalry. His strategy in the war was to kill Darius which
could have given them advantage in the psychological terms. He decided to penetrate the
Persian line with the help of his cavalry and he himself with trusted man focused their
attention towards the positioning of Darius. He started a slow march and once he reached
closer his cavalry launched an attack on the centre of Persian defence (Strauss, 2003). He
believed on the experience and skill of Parmenion to hold on the left side of the Persian army.
Alexander started his movement towards Darius and killed his bodyguards which led Darius
to leave the battlefield. This news demotivated the Persian army and in confusion his armies
started to leave the battle ground. Seeing this, Alexander order to kill the men that was
leaving the field hence more number of Persian solider got killed when compared with the
numbers of soldiers that was killed in the actual battle.
Battle of Gaugamela
Same as Issus his strategies for battle started much before the battle actually started i.e. his
plan of moving on the battle field along the east of Tigris. This ensured that enough of supply
was available for their soldiers and also gave four day rest to his army. For understanding the
Persian plains and lines he moved through the hills with his companion cavalry (Brosius,
2003). Darius ordered that his troops to remain awake at night which helped Alexander to
notice the deployments of Persian King according to it. Alexander understood that his
numbers were again less in the battle field hence he again adopted the strategy to attack

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Darius which was successful in the battle of Issus. He positioned him facing Darius in the
centre with his cavalry.
Before the start of the war he moved all along his armies encouraged all his men by telling
the hardship the faced individually by taking their names and said that Alexander is also same
as them. When Darius chose to deploy their left wing it made a gap in the Persian line and
hence Alexander stopped his advance towards right and he with his men turned toward
Darius. This failed as the Sacae and Bactrian cavalry blocked the gap (Olbrycht, 2010). This
strategy did not worked to kill Darius but it delayed the deployment of Scythed chariot
charge and Alexander himself kept the pressure on the left flank of the Persian army which
was highly powerful. Menidas were sent to launch attack against Bactrians and Sacae. The
casualties kept on building and he still kept sending Menidas.
Another important strategy was to order his army to move right or left when attack come
from chariots. Once the chariots moved away then their backs got exposed to arrows of
Macedonian archers. This reflected Alexander’s split-second timing and precision strategy
(Worthington, 2014). When both the forces were engaged, Alexander found a gap and moved
towards Darius with the help of his companion cavalry and infantry. Darius left the field but
in this direct engagement with Persian army led Alexander to lose 60 of his companions.
As suggested by the historians, Alexander knew that his strengths are outnumbered. If he
aims to defeat other army he made a strategy to kill the king so as to gain psychological
advantage over the other army. He used vacant gaps to attack on Darius which led to the win
in both the battles.

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References
B. Strauss, 2003. 'Alexander: The Military Campaign’, in Roisman (ed.), Brill’s Companion
to Alexander the Great (Leiden), pp. 133-156.
Fuller, J.F.C., 2018. The generalship of Alexander the Great. Pickle Partners Publishing.
M. Brosius, 2003. 'Alexander and the Persians', in Roisman (ed.), Brill’s Companion to
Alexander the Great (Leiden), pp. 169-193.
M. Olbrycht, 2010. ‘Macedonia and Persia’, in Roisman and Worthington (eds.), Blackwell
Companion to Ancient Macedonia (Malden), pp. 342-369.
Worthington, I., 2014. By the Spear: Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Rise and Fall of
the Macedonian Empire. Ancient Warfare and Civilizati.