Research Article Clinical Reasoning 846487

j a Pa
229DOI: 10.1177/0003065119846487
67/2Michael T. Michael
CliniCal Reasoning, gRünbaum,
and FReud’s “CleveRest dReameR”dReam inteRpRetation
The philosopher Adolf Grünbaum has repeatedly criticized Freud’s rea-
soning, claiming that much of it is overtly fallacious. One such criticism
that has gone without reply concerns Freud’s controversial response to
the counterwish objection to his theory of dreams, that the reason some
dreams appear to represent the frustration of a wish rather than the
fulfillment of one is that they actually represent the dreamer’s wish to
prove Freud wrong. Grünbaum contends that in giving such a response
Freud commits several glaring fallacies. But Grünbaum’s analysis is mis-
taken and misrepresents Freud’s thought. Contrary to Grünbaum’s
interpretation of Freud’s reasoning as deductive, this reasoning is best
construed as a form of “inference to the best explanation.”
Keywords: Adolf Grünbaum, Sigmund Freud, counterwish dreams,
inference to the best explanation, commonsense psychology
The philosopher of science Adolf Grünbaum has long been one of
the most prominent critics of psychoanalysis. As Mills (2007)
writes, “Adolf Grünbaum may arguably be psychoanalysis’ most tena-
cious critic. What sets him apart from other critics . . . is that he has more
substance, breadth, and sophistication to his critiques” (p. 539). Grünbaum
has, in particular, argued that Freud’s reasoning does not live up to the
expectations one should have of such an influential thinker. Somebody
approaching Freud’s arguments through Grünbaum’s analyses is likely to
come away with the impression that Freud’s reasoning is fundamentally
flawed. Other critics have reinforced this impression, but Grünbaum’s
criticisms remain the most penetrating.
Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, Underwood International
College, Yonsei University (South Korea).
Submitted for publication June 20, 2018.
846487APAXXX10.1177/0003065119846487michael t. michaelCLINICAL REASONING, GRÜNBAUM, AND FREUD
research-article2019

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In her influential response to Grünbaum’s critique, Rachel Blass
(2001) has argued that his criticisms have “had a latent effect on clinical
practice” (p. 115). This effect is most apparent in relation to dream inter-
pretation. Blass suggests that Grünbaum’s criticisms have contributed to
two trends. One is the popularity of the hermeneutic view of psychoana-
lytic interpretation, which casts doubt on the nature of interpretation as
identifying causal states, something that Freud strongly believed to be the
case but that many modern psychoanalysts do not. The other trend is “the
present-day focus on the dream as a form of discourse and communica-
tion” (p. 146). These two trends often coincide, though are in principle
separable, the first encompassing a philosophical position, the second
being driven by more pragmatic considerations. Both trends, however,
deemphasize Freud’s conception of psychoanalytic interpretation as hav-
ing to do with discovery—that is, as bringing to light the unconscious
causes behind mental phenomena such as dreams (for an extended discus-
sion, see Blass 2001, pp. 143–147).
If Blass’s suggestions about the latent influence of Grünbaum’s cri-
tique on clinical practice are correct, then it is important to engage closely
with those criticisms to see if they warrant the influence they have had.
Numerous commentators have attempted this task, and have made valid
points in reply to Grünbaum (see, e.g., Sachs 1989; Wollheim 1993;
Lothane 2007; Mills 2007). Blass herself has responded directly to the
criticisms Grünbaum makes of Freud’s dream theory. She has argued that
Grünbaum’s approach to the potential justification of Freud’s theory is
too “atomistic,” that is, too focused on justifying individual Freudian
propositions one at a time, and that a more “holistic” approach to justifi-
cation, emphasizing how numerous propositions collectively account for
the evidence, is more appropriate. This point has considerable merit, and
goes some way toward answering many of Grünbaum’s criticisms.
However, though Blass is right to emphasize the value of an holistic
approach to justifying Freud’s theory, doing so does not in itself vindicate
Freud’s reasoning. A case in point is Freud’s response to the objection of
counterwish dreams, given in chapter 4 of the Interpretation of Dreams
(1900). The objection is that counterwish dreams—dreams in which a wish
is frustrated—show that dreams cannot all be wish-fulfilling. Among
several responses to this objection, Freud argued that some dreams appear
to be counterwish on the surface, but are really fulfillments of the patient’s
wish to prove him wrong. This argument has engendered much schaden-
freude among Freud’s critics, who think it a flagrant example of Freud’s

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self-serving approach to defending his theories (see, e.g., Webster 1995;
Cioffi 1998; Dolnick 1998). Grünbaum has been particularly critical,
offering an analysis of the dream interpretation Freud first gives in sup-
port of the above response that outlines numerous alleged fallacies. He
writes of this case, “I would be hard put to find any other few sentences
in the writings of a comparably influential thinker that contain so high a
density of fallacies” (1993, p. 361).
Blass’s response to this criticism is, in line with her general response
to Grünbaum, to argue that the criticism is based on an atomistic analysis
of Freud’s reasoning. “The question [Grünbaum] poses,” she writes, “is
whether it can be shown without reference to any other postulate, that
when the content of a dream is the frustration of a wish, then it was caused
by a wish of a specific kind” (2001, p. 136). She goes on to state, taking
a more holistic approach to justification, that “it may turn out to be the
case that . . . [Freud’s] seemingly ad hoc maneuvers in the context of his
counterwish hypothesis . . . are not ad hoc at all” (p. 136; emphasis added).
Though there is important truth in this response, it falls short of defending
Freud against Grünbaum’s precise charge that his reasoning in the rele-
vant case is fallacious. For when we look at the case Grünbaum criticizes,
though it is clear that Freud presupposes claims about dreams that he
takes himself to have already established, that in itself does not show that
he is reasoning correctly in this instance. Bear in mind that the context of
this case is of Freud presenting an argument to a nonpsychoanalytic audi-
ence, to whom the Interpretation of Dreams is addressed, in response to
an objection to his claim that all dreams are wish fulfillments. The argu-
ment is therefore supposed to be persuasive to the general reader.
According to Grünbaum, the argument not only is not persuasive, but it is
not so because it relies on gross errors of reasoning. A satisfactory
response to this should show in some detail that Freud does not commit
the errors attributed to him, which Blass’s more general remarks, how-
ever perspicacious, do not do.
The matter is, I think, of some importance, for it concerns a proper
understanding of Freud’s reasoning and, by extension, clinical reasoning
more generally. In agreement with Blass, I believe that Grünbaum gravely
misunderstands Freud’s reasoning, and, also in agreement with Blass, I
believe that this may have had a knock-on effect on people’s understand-
ing of the interpretive process more generally. This potential effect should
also be considered in conjunction with the broader impact of Grünbaum’s
critique of psychoanalysis, which, as Hinshelwood (2010) puts it, has led

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to a declining “research confidence in clinical material” (p. 362). It is thus
crucial not to leave such criticisms, which go to the roots of psychoana-
lytic practice, unchecked. And in the interest of clarity, it is important to
address them specifically and precisely.
Elsewhere (Michael 2019), I have addressed Grünbaum’s analysis and
criticisms of the argument that Breuer and Freud make in Studies on Hysteria
(1895) that unconscious thoughts can be pathogenic. I have argued in detail
both that Grünbaum misconstrues Freud and Breuer’s reasoning in this case
and that there is a reasonable argument from the evidence the authors present
to their conclusion about the pathogenicity of unconscious thoughts. In so
doing, I illustrate, as I point out in my conclusion, “the importance of paying
attention to the detailed, often subtle evidence that emerges in clinical expe-
rience, and how such evidence can support causal claims” through appropri-
ate inference (p. 48). I wish to add to this general argument another case, the
one described above that Grünbaum uses to imply that Freud’s reasoning is
replete with fallacies, a charge which, as mentioned, has not yet been given
a satisfactory response. Though in this case Freud’s reasoning is not, on my
view, as strong as it is the Freud-Breuer case, it is nevertheless just as reveal-
ing of the characteristic pattern of inference of Freud’s thought, and thereby
can help reinforce the point that Freud’s causal claims can be reasonably
supported in a clinical context.
There is no substitute to engaging with the details if one is to shed
light on Freud’s reasoning process. My approach is to reexamine the rel-
evant passages and show that Grünbaum’s interpretation of the reasoning
found in them is questionable. In my elucidation of Freud’s reasoning, the
flaws of Grünbaum’s approach to Freud will become apparent. Thus, my
aim in responding to Grünbaum’s arguments is not so much to defend
Freud’s conclusions as to show that Freud’s reasoning is not as flawed as
Grünbaum claims.i n F e R e n C e t o t h e b e s t e x p l a n at i o n
Before we begin our examination of the case study, some preliminary epis-
temological remarks are in order. In particular, I wish to articulate the dis-
tinction between the two main processes of reasoning, deductive and
nondeductive, and to outline one of the most widely discussed forms of non-
deductive reasoning within contemporary philosophy of science, inference
to the best explanation (IBE). This form of reasoning is, I believe, frequently
employed by Freud, including in the case I will discuss here.