Piper Alpha Disaster: Analysis and Lessons Learned

This assignment delves into the tragic Piper Alpha oil rig disaster, requiring a comprehensive analysis of its causes, immediate and long-term consequences. Students are expected to explore the various contributing factors leading to the explosion, the human toll it took, and the significant changes in safety regulations and practices implemented as a result. The assignment emphasizes the importance of learning from past disasters to prevent future tragedies in the offshore oil and gas industry.

Running Head: Risk management
Risk management
Name of the Student
Name of the University
Author Note

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Introduction
An oil production platform located in the North Sea, Piper Alpha is notoriously known
for its deadliest explosion that had ever occurred in the oil and gas industry in the year of 1988.
On July 6 of the year of 1988, owing to a miscommunication as well as the occurrence of a
safety lapse involving one of the platform’s two condensate pumps, resulted in the biggest man-
made catastrophic incidents in the human history, that in turn had resulted in the death of 167
workers, with 165 crewmen gone mussing and 30 bodies never ever been recovered again
(Broadribb 2015). Considering the adversity of the explosion, and the large number of fatalities
involved in the accident, the question that arises here is that how could the safety regime in the
US offshore oil industry have remained apparently impervious to the lessons of previous
disasters. Further, the next question that arises in this connection is that are the safety standards
on this rig so far below the prevailing norms in the industry that it resulted in such a massive
explosion (Ellul 2014). It becomes clearly evident that the issue of risk prediction, and risk
assessment and prevention remain absolutely intractable issues in the offshore industry. Hence,
the report intends to critically evaluate the risk factors that should have been identified and
assessed by Piper Alpha, and the identification of which could help in the elimination of the
disaster as well.
Failure of safety measures that caused explosion
Prior to discussing the key risk management features of the safety case regime, it is
important to highlight what caused the explosion.
The Piper Alpha Platform was constructed in two sections. The platform consists of the
gas processing system containing two high pressure condensate pumps. For safe side the

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platform was built 300m high and the design was modular. It comprises of four main operating
areas which were separated by firewalls. The platform was equipped with the automatic fire
fighting system. Both the electric and seawater pumps were present to supply water (Shallcross
2013). On one of the high-pressure condensate pumps, maintenance work was carried out
simultaneously. It led to the leak in condensates. During this situation, one of this pump’s
pressure safety valves was removed for repair. The condensate pipe was temporarily sealed with
the blind flange due to incomplete work. Unaware of the fact that the maintenance work is going
on, one of the night crew turned on the alternate pump. Consequently, severe explosion has
occurred, as the firewalls and the blind flange could not handle the pressure. Further, the team
failed to close the gas from the other platform that is connected with the Piper. This intensified
the explosion. In addition the automatic fire fighting system also did not work as before the
accident the drivers worked underwater. The heat and smoke prevented the helicopter services
(Broadribb 2015). It can be concluded from the literature review that the cause of the accident
was human factor. The initial leak in the Piper Alpha was due to maintenance error.
The key risk management features of the safety case regime
The key risk management features of the safety care regimes that are helpful in reducing
the risks are-
 Management and human resources- Any worker newly recruited are to be given
training. The training should be based on the use of safe procedures and
emergency response. It includes training of the platform mangers on responding
to emergencies, and appropriately instructs the workmen on the board. A great
emphasis should be laid on the practice of permit to work system. There must be

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regular audit and review of the system to ensure its efficacy. Employees should be
aware of the short messaging system during the risk operation (Eloff and Bella
2018 ).
 Design and process- The company should use the system to understand the risk
and hazards such as tools called the QRA and ALARP or any other checklists.
The areas prone to the hazard should be segregated from the other areas such as
control room and accommodations (Paterson 2011). There should be a regular
update on the firewalls and control rooms. The blast walls and the muster areas
should be regularly upgraded. The company must have both the active and the
passive fire protection system and is to be used in emergency (Okoh and Haugen
2014). There must be a variety of the exit rooms and escape systems for
evacuation during the hazards. In order to prevent the smoke ingress there is a
need of system called “temporary safe refugee”. The employees should be able to
access the different escape equipments. These secondary instruments may include
ladders, rope, life boats and nets (Christou and Konstantinidou 2012)
 Safety and Health- All the employees must receive the annual safety training.
This training shall include both the existing employees and the new employees to
expose them on the emergency response during the event of fire or any other
hazard. There is a need of regular auditing of the workplace. Inspection must be
carried to ensure the health and safety factors in the workplaces. There is a need
of the enforcing stringent laws to ensure occupational health and safety
(Shallcross and Mathew 2015)

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Discussion of how application of these features might have prevented the explosion
Permit to work or PTW system is the other safety case regime. This system was not used
properly. If only this system worked successfully there would have been adequate
communication. It would have prevented the fatalities and civil convictions. There was no
remedial action taken by the company. When one of the pumps was shut down, the contractor
simply signed off the PTW. As a result when the next shift worker arrived, accidently turned the
other pump (Swuste et al. 2017). Even after the first explosion the management was reluctant to
shut down the operation.
The most important risk management feature of the oil and gas industry would have been
to impart sufficient emergency response training to the employees, to create awareness amongst
them about the potential danger involved. Since the likelihood of any major explosion is
remarkably high in case of an oil and gas industry, the employees should have been trained well,
to develop their understanding of the steps to be taken to prevent explosion (Christou and
Konstantinidou 2012). In case of the Piper Alpha disaster, during the 1988, the gas compression
module was undergone replacement, and accordingly had the employees been sufficiently
trained, they would have realized the risks involved in continuing the oil production, and would
have stopped the operation process. However, the untrained workers continued the oil production
process that ultimately resulted in the unfavourable incident (Rahman et al. 2014). There was a
lack of adequate training on the use of fire equipment in case of emergency. In this business
there is a high risk of fire hazard,, despite which the training aspect was neglected. If only the
workers were trained they would not have set the fire water system on the manual. It was not the
proper way of starting in such hazard (Paterson 2011).

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Talking about the design system, it greatly reduced the operational safety but has also
rendered the communication system poor. All the cable based communication was jeopardised.
Installing the Remotely Operated Shutoff Valves (ROSOVs) would prevent the back flow of oil
because of pressure differences. It will help the oil to go down the main oil line to shore
(Lymberopoulos et al. 2016). Another important feature of the safety case regime is that it helps
in enlightening the management authority regarding the potential risks involved in an industry,
and entrust them greater responsibilities to combat the issue if any crisis emerges in future
(Shallcross 2013). As far as the Piper Alpha disaster is concerned, there is no point denying the
fact that apart from procedural failure and design failure, management failure also had a large
role to play. Although the Piper Alpha was undergoing major transformation and upgrade at this
time, normal operations were not being halted, and had the production been shut down, through
management intervention, the blind flange plate would never have gone unnoticed. The safety
case regime would have worked if some of the activities before the event would not have been
initiated or may be notified to crew members of both teams. The contactor should read the
permit first and the shift manger too did not explain the permit. The night crew would have been
saved if the management played its role well. Thus, there was a need of eliminating the
redundancies in the communication system (Hull 2013). .Furthermore, it is equally important to
note that the management exhibited its callousness by not upgrading to blast walls, and despite
repeated safety reports going against the gas lines, they were never being reinforced. The core
feature of the safety case regime is to raise awareness amongst the managers regarding the level
of risks assessed, helping them to address the risks in a more holistic way (Hull 2013).
Auditing and regular inspection is also the key feature of the safety case regime. There is
lack of sufficient inspection during the operation. The leakages were not detected due to poor

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inspection of the assembly work (Paik and Czujko 2011). Regular auditing would have helped
detect the leakage earlier. Regular auditing and inspection would have led to early establishment
of gas detectors in place, which could have protected fire. Without auditing, it is difficult to
identify the deficiency in the system designs such as lack of automatic fire protection on
detection of gas leakage and absence of automatic trip functions. It was found that the system
lacks the feedback process. It fails to understand the effects on the safety of operations. The
quality and operational design inspector on regular infections would have observed the bad
location of the radio room, and inadequate refugee system. Regular inspections would have
highlighted the improper structure design which was the source of lead difficulty (Broadribb
2015).
There were several recommendations made for changes to North Sea safety procedures.
After this tragedy several improvements were observed such as North Sea safety shifting from
the Department of Energy to the Health and Safety Executive. There was automatic shut down of
valves installed. These valves were mandatory on rigs to reduce fuel and starve the fire (Ellul
2014).
Conclusion
The explosion occurred 23 years ago and more than 200 people lost their life. The cost of
the explosion sums upto billions of dollars. It massively hit the company’s property and spoil of
reputation. The explosion due to massive fire was popular as most tragic “oil and gas” accident.
It was clearly a preventable human resource management error. It cannot be called a God’s wrath
or his unpredictable act. It is simply an accumulation of error and the decision made by the
management team is undoubtedly questionable. Based on the literature review, analysis and the

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above discussion the explosion in the Piper Alpha is rooted in the company’s culture,
management, design and structure. The event may is also rooted in the procedures of Occidental
Petroleum. Some of this procedure comprise of the large part of the oil and gas industries.
Focusing solely on the production and the related situation was the heart of the problem. This
kind of philosophy is inappropriate for the personnel’s experience. The initial leak in the Piper
Alpha was clearly due to poor maintenance procedures, inexperience, and deficient learning
mechanisms. It is recommended that the safety measures discussed above in regards to
management and human resources, design and process, safety and health to be followed and
implemented sincerely. Strictly adhering to the country’s Occupational and safely health
guiltiness will prevent such tragedy in future. It is also recommended to follow the Offshore
Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992 adopted after the tragedy.

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References
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