Leadership Styles and Organizational Safety

This assignment delves into the relationship between leadership styles and organizational safety. It examines how various leadership approaches influence employee well-being, job demands, and the occurrence of workplace accidents. The analysis draws upon research studies and theories to shed light on the crucial role leadership plays in fostering a safe and healthy work environment.

Risk Perception and Analysis
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PART A
1. Ionising Radiation
2. Flowing Mechanical energy
3. Micro-biological organisms.
4. Acoustic (pressure energy)
5. Gravitational energy
6. Gravitational energy
7. Non-energy threat
8. Thermal energy and non-threat energy
9. Mechanical energy
10. Gravitational energy
PART B
a)
i. Charge over professional negligence – all the three officers; first mate, second mate and
captain can be charged with professional neglect in a court of law. The manner in which the
communication and delegation of duties were done was too casual and unprofessional. Also,
incomplete work by the first and second mate could even amount to gross professional
negligence.
ii. Also, they could be charged over reef grounding – the state government could also
initiate a case against the destruction of the reef which is costly to construct. According to

Weng, & Yang (2015) ship grounding is one of the fatal and expensive marine transportation
accidents. The state government will, therefore, sue the shipping company alongside its
management and the crew.
iii. Spilling of oil on the ocean – this is perhaps the most catastrophic consequence and
could call for the highest penalty. Despite the natural death of aquatic life due to oil spillage,
White et al. (2012) note that oil spillage also affects the growth of corals. Oil spillage will
also affect the health of the community who are using the sea water or even industries that
draw water from the ocean for use.
iv. Destruction of property and loss of life. Ship grounding on the seabed or waterway side
may lead to the damage of the submerged part of the hull of the ship especially the bottom
structure causing water ingression and consequently the compromise of the structural
integrity, stability, and safety of the sheep. Less severe accidents may damage the hull, and in
extreme cases, the breach may be hulled, cargo spills, complete destruction of the vessel, and
at the end loss of life. The owner of the ship will as well lose revenue in addition to the loss
of income by the employees.
v. Loss of public confidence (notional) in maritime transport of cargo. The public will no
longer be confident of the safety of their cargo being transported by water.
b)
i. Charge over professional negligence could lead to the withdrawal of their work
licences and closure of the company owning the ship

ii. Reef grounding could lead to overflowing of sea water which can result into flooding
and loss of life and property
iii. Oil spillage could lead to the death of aquatic life and deterioration of the health of the
members of the surrounding community.
iv. Destruction of property and loss of life. The ship may fatally be damaged and the
cargo destroyed including the death of the people on board.
c) An event can formally be defined as the loss of control over the damaging
properties of a threat (Viner, 2015). In the context of the case, the event is the point in
time when control was lost over the possible detrimental act of not inserting the last
navigation coordinates into the navigation computer. The threat, in this case, is poor
management. That is, the lack of proper delegation and follow-up of coordinates that
was to guide the ship. Again, the aspect of undefined roles is as a result of poor
management. This is a kinetic energy source of threat (grounding) which leads to an
unexpected negative consequence. The neglect and perhaps miscommunication
among the two mates and the captain led to the undesired event. A simple statement
for this event is: when the first mate forgot.
d)
i. Ineffective procedure and process of delegation. The system of managing the ship is weak
because it does not specify the tasks that can be delegated, to whom and at what time. For
example, the second mate and the Captain plotted a course through which the ship was to be
guided. Then they went ahead and entered all the coordinates into the navigation computer
except for the last coordinates which were left for the first mate to key into the navigation
computer, and he forgot leading to grounding.
ii. Undefined roles. This is another possible mechanism for the event. Based on the
observable casual delegation of duties, it is not clear which part should be done by whom and

which ones should be delegated and by whom. This is a possible mechanism for the event
because none is held accountable in case specific roles are not carried out efficiently. It also
creates a sense of irresponsibility knowing that other officials will do what I have not done.
iii. Fatigue can also be a possible mechanism for the event. From the scenario, it is like the
second mate was overworked and as a result, he left the remaining coordinates to the first
mate to enter them into the computer of which he forgot and the ship run ground. The second
mate can at least be excused from the occurrence of the event because he had overworked for
38 hours without rest.Pre-conditions of an even are the circumstances and conditions of the
facility, machinery, environment, and nature of work or organization that are a precursor to
the occurrence of an event (Viner, 2015). This mechanism is the ship being damaged by
running ground. The mechanism of the grounding is that both the second mate and the
captain ascertained all the navigation coordinates and entered them into the computer except
the last ones which the second mate delegated to the first mate to key them in after the former
had overworked without a break. The coordinates were to guide through a commonly used
shortcut to the sea-lane. This apparently led the ship to run aground. Hence the pre-conditions
include:
e)
i. Lack of management concern for the health and safety of its employees
leading to overworking. The second mate went to rest after working for 38
hours without a break and he delegated his incomplete work of entering the
last coordinates to the navigation computer to the first mate who forgot and
the ship run ground. Thus, the lack of concern on the health and safety of the
employee is a pre-condition to the mechanism.
ii. Improper management structure of the ship. According to the roles played by
the three crew members, it is clear that there are no defined roles for each of

them hence the reason why both the captain and the second mate could
ascertain and enter the navigation coordinates and then leave the first mate to
key the last ones into the computer. The same second mate was previously in
charge of de-docking, docking and loading. Thus, poor management structure
can be attributed to the confusion in the roles of the crew.
iii. Poor communication/coordination amongst the mates and the captain. There is
evident of poor communication and coordination after the second mate and
captain feeds the computer the coordinates and then the second mate leaves
the last ones for the first mate to enter and forgets later on. This implies the
crew are not coordinated and supervised leading to the neglect and hence
grounding.
iv. Low staffing levels. The fact that the second mate worked for a total of 38
hours without rest shows that the employees are overworked. Furthermore, the
multiplicity of duties carried out by the second mate shows that the staffs in
charge of the ship are fewer compared to the workload. This pre-condition
leads to the mechanism where the second mate overworks and doesn’t
delegate properly to the colleagues who already have duties to do.
f)
i. The navigation coordinates were not entered and the ship run ground – the
outcome of the event of forgetting to insert the last navigation coordinates into
the navigation computer by the first mate made the ship to run ground.
ii. Another one is that the navigation coordinates are not entered into the
computer and the ship doesn’t run ground.
PART C Time Zone 1

i. Organization category.
This refers to the character, style, and focus of the organization (Salmon, 2011). An
organization character is usually set by the management and is observed by the other staff.
This is determined by the style of management and the objective or focus of the organization.
The administration uses various control points under the organizational category to achieve
their desired goal. These include management style/attitudes and capabilities, production
pressures, and information communication. Production pressures are exerted on the staff by
the management to ensure that the set production output is attained. The production pressures
exist when the employees are assigned excessive workload and are expected to complete it
within a short duration of time. These pressures at work are the sources of stress, burnout
(Nahrgang, Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011; Toker, & Biron, 2012) and a threat to patient
safety leading to the possibility of errors and workarounds (Reason, 2016).
The attitudes and capabilities or the management styles are also significant because they can
either serve to motivate or demotivate the employees. Leadership is significant to employees’
performance because it is the executive that directs guides and affects the conduct and work
of the staff (Yukl, 2013; Maloş, 2012). Management styles include autocratic, democratic,
and participative leadership styles. Different management styles have varying impacts on
employee performance. A democratic approach is where decisions are made within groups,
with equal regards to the input of each member (Gonos, & Gallo, 2013). The leader only
approves the opinions or decisions of the team members (Bhatti et al., 2012). Participative
leadership is where all team members are party to the identification of significant goals and
developing strategies to their achievement (Randeree, & Ghaffar Chaudhry, 2012). The
leader mainly functions as a guide or facilitator and doesn’t just issue orders or assign tasks

(Miao et al., 2013). Participative leadership also allows for the nurture of leadership skills
among the members from which can rise leaders to serve the organization in the future. It
provides a platform where people can showcase their creativity, talent, and abilities.
Autocratic leadership style is where the leaders issue orders and expect them to be executed
immediately without dispute (Rast III, Hogg, & Giessner, 2013). The group is isolated from
the development of plans and policies and instructions are issued without reasons or
explanations. This type of leadership makes unrealistic demands to the workers, exerts
excessive discipline and punishment, and doesn’t allow the staff to dispute instructions
(Ojokuku, Odetayo, & Sajuyigbe, 2012). It is most likely that the owners of the ship practice
autocracy style of leadership. All of the control points mentioned above can only reach the
team through communication or relaying of information through teaching or training.
Activities such as skill development and personal protective gear are dependent on timely and
relevant information.
Lastly, there are always risks attached to the management decisions and actions taken by
employees. Thus the management uses the control point of risk control to set their priorities
right about the best step to take that will minimize risks while maximizing returns.
ii. Under time zone 1, the organization category can be viewed in three stages namely pre-
conditions, mechanisms, and outcomes. i.e., before the event takes place. In the pre-
conditions stage, various circumstances and conditions associated with the administration of
the ship can be attributed to grounding. These include the various aspects of the organization
regarding the staffing levels, organizational goals, and the type of work, workgroup, and the
people. This stage shows the cause of the given outcomes. For instance, the grounding can be
attributed to poor staffing level in which the crew that is managing the ship are overworked
leading to grounding. Additionally, the type of work that the first mate was engaged in like

supervising of de-docking and docking should have been done by another different staff not
managing the ship.
Under the mechanisms stage of the Time Zone 1 in the Time Sequence Model, grounding can
be attributed to the failure of standard controls. The shortcomings of these controls are
unintentional and incidental. The mechanisms here are the uncontrolled active failures. The
event, therefore, is the loss of control over the threat of ship damaging which is grounding.
The ship grounding can be attributed to the failures of both the administration and the captain
in exercising control over the management of the ship. Incompatibilities between production
and health and safety of the crew are also evidenced by the study case.
In the outcomes stage of the Time Sequence Model, the process through which the threat
reaches the level of damage takes a long time. The practice of casual delegation of duties and
undefined roles amongst the team is a culture that has grown over time and is unchecked.
There are no operating procedures for the defined roles and responsibilities of the crew. This
is evidenced by the manner in which the second mate overworks on the supervision of de-
docking, docking, loading and later on in the generation of navigation coordinates. The
outcomes can also be attributed to lack of job planning, oversight, and leadership. The
mistake of forgetting to enter the navigation coordinates by the first mate can also be due to
poor job planning and supervision. Job planning helps in identifying the expected roles and
adequate preparation for their execution. Also, if the first mate were supervised on time, the
grave mistake of forgetting to key in the coordinates would have been avoided. Other
outcomes under the Time sequence Model include the workload, shift patterns, work hours
and levels of manning. The workload is not equally distributed amongst the mates and the

captain leading to overworking of the second mate. The shift patterns and working hours are
also not clear or are undefined because the second mate breaks for rest after 38 hours of non-
stop working and resumes after two hours only. This makes some workers work for more
extended hours than the rest. Furthermore, the manning levels do not show the defining
boundary of the roles of the captain, the second and first mate.
PART D
Risk at the workplace which is a wet floor. This is a risk because it may lead to
slipping or falling over.
i. The units of exposure for the risk of a wet floor are daily or as often as the
cleaning is done. Also, the units of exposure will depend on the number of
people crossing the wet floor.
ii. The probability risk of a wet floor can be measured by the extent of injury
caused to the staff or client. The degree of harm will vary depending on the
body part injured. For example, someone may slip and fall on the floor and an
arm is twisted while the other may break a leg. Both cases are injuries
resulting from a wet floor but the level of their severity is different, that is the
injuries can vary from minor to major. Thus the measure of the risk is the risk
frequency with which slipping and falling over will occur.
iii.
Frequency measure Unit/score
Rare (Monthly) 1
Occasionally (Weekly) 2
Frequent (Daily) 3
Constant (Hourly) 4

iv.
Risk consequence value Risk score Explanation
AUS$100 – small injury,
needs first aid only
1-2 Tolerable. Doesn’t need any
additional response on risk
control
AUS$250 –strained joint, a
single day off
3-4 Designates restrictive
acceptability. Other risk
control procedures should be
reflected upon and the present
controls checked
AUS$450 – body non-
functionality
5-6 Designates intolerable risk
level. controls and measures
need to be instituted and acted
upon in the shortest time
possible
AUS$10,000 – deadly 7-16 Designates intolerable risk
level. the controls must be
acted upon immediately or the
activity to cease
v. A risk is defined by ISO 31000 as the uncertainty effect on objectives and
Seffect is a deviation from the anticipated whether positive or negative (Purdy,
2010). It is a statement of the association between Frequency and
Consequence value. The definition assumes that everybody lives in a world
that is uncertain. Each time an objective or goal is sought for; there are
chances of events not going as planned or projected. Each initiated and action
is characteristic of a risk element which requires being managed, and also,
every result is uncertain. Always it is the case that the results are not the exact
ones initially expected. The outcomes come sometimes be positive or negative
but seldom do the results turn out to be both. It is for this reason that the level
of uncertainty in any undertaking should be reduced as much as possible. The

lack of certainty or uncertainty is the condition or state that comprises a lack
of information and results to insufficient or partial awareness or
understanding. In risk management, uncertainty is deemed present when the
understanding or information about an occurrence, consequence, or probability
in insufficient or partial.

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