Role of BP in Deepwater Horizon Disaster

This essay focuses on the contribution of British Petroleum in the 'Deepwater Horizon disaster'. It discusses the safety culture throughout BP, the cost-cutting strategies, faulty decisions and communication failures, and the role of other parties involved. The essay concludes with recommendations for better coordination and security measures.

Running Head: ROLE OF BP IN DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
ROLE OF BP IN DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
Name of the Student
Name of the University
Author Note

ROLE OF BP IN DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
Essay Question:
How did the safety culture throughout British Petroleum contribute to the
extensiveness of the ‘Deepwater Horizon Disaster’?
Introduction:
‘Deepwater Horizon Disaster’ widely known as ‘Deepwater Horizon oil spill’, is the
largest marine oil spill that started on 20th of April, 2010, at the Gulf of Mexico, near the delta
of Mississippi river, United States. This industrial disaster occurred due to the explosion
which took place on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig. The Deepwater Horizon rig is owned by
Transocean, an organization engaged in the off-shore oil drilling and leased by BP, a British
multinational oil and gas super major which has its headquartered in the city of London.
Though this oil and gas super major received the recognition of the sixth-largest oil and gas
company, experts claim that the reckless conduct of BP was responsible for the ‘Deepwater
Horizon Disaster’. This essay focuses on the contribution of British Petroleum in the
‘Deepwater Horizon disaster’. Hence the thesis statement for this essay, put forward the
arguments that BP bears the majority of the blame for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The
first section under the main discussion or body part of the essay put forward an argument, in
support of the thesis statement. According to this section, in an attempt to cut its costs BP has
done a series of blunders which resulted into ‘Deepwater Horizon Disaster’. The next section
of the essay cites argues that, BP's faulty decision and communication failures were
responsible behind the mishap. The third section argues that the mishap should be considered
to be the consequences of multiple faults by multiple parties involved with this oil and gas super
major, such as- Transocean and Halliburton. The final section of this essay sums up the
whole incident in a nutshell and provides some recommendations.

ROLE OF BP IN DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
Main Body:
Michel, et al. (2013), has termed, the Deepwater Horizon oil spillas the‘Largest oil
spill’. According to Mason et al. (2014), if the history of petroleum industry was observed,
one will find that, no other oil spill was as massive as Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Kimes, et
al. (2013), argues that, Deepwater Horizon oil spill was 8% to 31% more in volume as
compared to the previous biggest one-Ixtoc I oil spill, which was also occurred in the Gulf of
Mexico. According to Schwacke, et al. (2013), it was a months-long spill which killed 11
people and caused harm to millions of marine habitats. It also impacted wildlife
habitatsadversely. King, et al. (2015), argues that, due to this massive oil spill, fishing and
tourism industries have to bear the burdens of loss. Kimes, et al. (2015), consider that
Deepwater Horizon Disaster contributed largely to water pollution.
Section: 1
Zhou, et al. (2013), blame that the cost cutting strategies of BP contributed largely to
the oil spill disaster, according to the findings of the federal probe, the intention of BP
engineers as well as the managers to save over the drilling costs led to the failure of several
safety measurements that could have prevent the mishap. One of the instances of BP’s lack of
spending on safety measures is the dodgy cement, for which a seal could not be created at the
lower portion of the boreholes. Hence the oil and gas started to leak and reached the pipe
which was exposed on the surface. According to Gutierrez, et al. (2013), BP should engager
more workers to assess whether seal had been created or not. According to Sammarco, et al.
(2013), BP should spend more to arrange two barriers— one mechanical, and one cement,
and should check thoroughly, whether the seal had been created successfully or not.
Dubansky et al. (2013), has found out another instance of lack of expense and ignorance on
the safety measures. According to him, BP did not engage much workers to recheck whether

ROLE OF BP IN DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
the valves are working or not. As a result, the fault in the mechanical valves which was
designed to prevent the unnecessary acumulation of oil and gas, were not detected before the
incident. This paved the way for the oil and gas to come out through the pipe towards the
surface. According to Beyer, et al. (2016), pressure test was very essential to prevent the
accident, but the lack of arrangements for the pressure test acted as a catalyst in the
occurrence of the mishap. King, et al. (2015), argues that due to the misinterpretation of the
test results, workers thought that the well was under control. According to Michel, et al.
(2013), this is another factor that proved the need for spending more on the pressure test.
Dubansky et al. (2013) argues that, BP did not spend much on training the crew. The
inefficient that was at the surface, was not able to identify the increase in the pressure which
occurred inside the well and was an indication for the leak. All these contributed to the
accident. The lack of spending on safety measures was also evident from the fact that the gas
alarm was not present in the onboard gas detection system for the emergency situation. If
there would be a gas alarm, it would alert the workers and trigger the closure of ventilation
fans so that gas leak and ignition were prevented.
Section: 2
Sammarco, et al. (2013), blames BP's faulty decision and communication failures for
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The BP laborers preset at the time of the incident failed to
consult knowledgeable engineers who probably prevent the accident by finding out
unexpected results from the negative pressure test. As the workers did not consult the
engineers, they were unaware of all the incidents happening in the rig. According to Kimes,
et al. (2013), the federal report published buy White House, claimed that, it was BP’s faulty
decision and lack of collaboration that, BP did not inform all the parties operating for BP to
manage risks associated with Macondo well operations. Some argues that, if the workers

ROLE OF BP IN DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
would have consulted shore-based engineers, the misreading g of the pressure would not
occur and the blowout would never happen.Again, according to the viewpoint of Schwacke,
et al. (2013), the miscommunication, lack of collaborative attitude of the workers as well as
misreading of the pressure acted as the catalyst and accelerated the April 20 rig explosion that
unleashed uncountable barrels. As a result, 11 workers died, marine as well as wild lives were
destroyed, environment was polluted. According to Fred Bartlit, the accident was entirely
preventable but the lack of prudent decision by the management accelerated the occurrence of
the mishap. According to Sammarco, et al. (2013), the faulty decision by the BP leaders
caused this massive accident.
Section: 3
A report was published after the Federal investigators completed their investigation.
This report contradicts the argument cited by Gutierrez, et al. (2013), that only BP should be
blamed for this incident. According to Dubansky et al. (2013), not only the faulty decision of BP
were responsible for this massive accident; rather the mishap should be considered to be the
consequences of multiple faults by multiple parties involved with this oil and gas super major,
such as- Transocean and Halliburton. According to Gutierrez, et al. (2013) Transocean, was
assigned the responsibility to manage the activities at the rig. Hence, the officials from
Transocean should take initiatives to engage more workers to recheck whether the valves are
working or not. Michel, et al. (2013), argue that instead of BP Transocean should be blamed
for not fulfilling their duties to look after the arrangements for the pressure test. Again,
Kimes, et al. (2013) considers that workers of Transocean are also blamed for not
communicating with the BP engineers, and conduct a fair pressure test. Beyer, et al. (2016),
argues that, Halliburton did not handle the cement job carefully. Again, King, et al. (2015),
claims that, Halliburton’s failure to seal the bottom of the well was indicative of its ignorant

ROLE OF BP IN DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
and irresponsible attitude. Again Schwacke, et al. (2013), argue that, the engineers recruited
by Halliburton were not proficient. According to Mason et al. (2014), that Halliburton
employed were untrained, which reflected in their inability to seal the boreholes with the help
of the cement.
Conclusion:
In the conclusion, it can be said that, the British Petroleum, Transocean and
Halliburton need to be more responsible so that security measure during the transportation of
Oil and Gas can be ensured. They need to maintain better coordination. The officials as well
as the workers of Transocean and Halliburton need to maintain a good communication with
the engineers as well as workers of British Petroleum, so that the pressure tests and Valve
checking can be conducted before time and every possibility of accident can be prevented.
Moreover, British Petroleum, Transocean and Halliburton need to follow the
recommendations of the panel. The panel formed for investigation by Whitehouse suggested
that there need to be drastic changes in offshore drilling practices. The security measures
should be strengthened. According to their suggestion, as a transformation in the work
procedure, BP should arrange at least two barriers to be placed in a well — one mechanical,
and one cement.

ROLE OF BP IN DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER
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