ASEAN and South China Sea Disputes

This assignment examines the evolving dynamics between ASEAN member states and China concerning the contentious South China Sea disputes. It delves into historical contexts, legal frameworks, and regional security concerns surrounding maritime claims, energy cooperation, and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The analysis incorporates various perspectives, including those of ASEAN member states, China, and influential international actors.

Running head: SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN
1
South China Sea and ASEAN
Name
Institution

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 2
There is a lack of consensus in ASEAN? Why?
The major reason for the absence of ASEAN’s consensus is due to the activities of China
on the South China Sea (SCS). The ASEAN defense ministers were thus enable to agree on the
joint statement after the meeting/forum held on Wednesday. This inability is a clear reflection of
the concern of these ministers about the activity of China in the South China Sea. This remained
a salient issues of discussion as well as one of great concern by nations in the meeting since it
was raised by everyone. For example, it was apparent from the unanimous decision by the PAC
in 2016 that China’s activities were hurting Philippines.
The Court ruled in favor of Philippines in most questions including that Chinese ships
behavior were physically obstructing the vessels of Philippines and against the law. The Tribunal
further awarded that the nine-dash line of China alongside the claim to historic rights in SCS
were both invalid as per the international law. 1 The Meeting held in 2016 showed lack of
consensus where defense Ministers had to retract their statement that recognized the activities in
SCS. They had expressed their serious concern over the latest and ongoing development that had
eroded trust as well as confidence, augmented tensions as well as which could have the potential
of undermining peace, security as well as stability in the SCS.
The retracted statement had also recognized and emphasized the significance of non-
militarization as well as self-restraint in conduct of each activity, including land reclamation that
could raise tensions in SCS. They further retracted the statement where they had emphasized the
significance of maintaining peace, stability, security, safety as well as freedom of navigation in
alongside overflight above the SCS according to the conventionally acknowledged principles of
1 Ba, A. D. (2003). China and ASEAN: renavigating relations for a 21st-century Asia. Asian Survey, 43(4), 622-647.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 3
the international law including 1982 UNCLOS (United Nations Convention) on the Law of the
Sea).
The ASEAN members have let the crucial economic links as well as interests with China
to take frontline when working for consensus which only means that they will be sacrificing the
unity on the major issues like SCS. 2 Unlike at the point of ASEAN formation in 1967 where the
organization’s world recognized “trademark” was its consensus approach where decisions were
being taken by consensus, not by majority, the contemporary ASEAN’s decisions are solely by
majority.
When did it emerge? Will it be long standing? Who is behind it -- finally leading up to the
issue of China?
When it emerged?
The lack of consensus emerged where the Southeast Asian Foreign Ministers failed to
release the joint communique in Cambodia’s Summit in 2012 for the first time in history of
ASEAN. The unity of ASEAN over SCS has remained a fraught issue for the ASEAN
organization. 3 For the first time since inception, ASEAN foreign ministers, at the summit in
Cambodia in 2012, failed to issue a joint communique, following a highly publicized stand-off
the same year between China and the Philippines Scarborough Shoal in the SCS. The joint
customary communique at the end of the high-level meeting that took place on 2016 also failed
2 Halper, S. (2010). The Beijing consensus: how China's authoritarian model will dominate the twenty-first century.
ReadHowYouWant. com.
3 Odgaard, L. (2003). The South China Sea: ASEAN’s Security Concerns about China. Security Dialogue, 34(1),
11-24.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 4
to happen in August as the statement was retracted barely hours after it had been released
following the mention of Chinese illegal activities in the SCS.
Will it be long standing?
This lack of consensus will really be a long standing issue following the activities of
China in the SCS. In absence of a leadership initiative on the part an ASEAN’s more neutral
states makes it increasingly doubtful that ASEAN policy toward China shall change any soon.
This is because ASEAN members seem to have the potential to lead the organization that can by
extension establish a consensus on China. 4 Such a regional leader seems not to be here yet since
it will need capacity both human and financial resources, internal commitment to undertake a
leadership role as well as the buy-in of its regional as well as global neighbor. None of the
ASEAN members seems to fit this decision yet or even come close to fitting it. For example,
Jakarta stays the symbolic head that host the secretariat of ASEAN, yet Indonesia presently lacks
the will to take the definitive leadership responsibility and role.
The future of ASEAN will remain tied to rise of China. With an array of economic,
military and political variances among ASEAN members, ASEAN requires a string voice among
the member countries to guide both external and internal consultation, were members hope to
generate on ASEAN-centric approach to issues of security and ultimate creation of consensus. In
absence of a committed as well as capable ASEAN leader (s) on political-security matters,
periodic eruptions of crises in SCS might continue to turn the status quo balance of power into
the ASEAN chronic instability.
Who is behind it -- finally leading up to the issue of China?
4 Buszynski, L., & Sazlan, I. (2007). Maritime claims and energy cooperation in the South China Sea. Contemporary
Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 29(1), 143-171.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 5
China is behind this long standing stand-off primarily due to its activities in SCS. When
the statement was released prior to retraction, it is understood that it attracted private protests
from Beijing; even whereas it never mention China by name, it remained unusual for ASEAN
ministers to implicitly criticize Chinese behavior or activities on Chinese soil. The diplomats
have said to be the lack of consensus regarding how to refer to the South China Sea disputes. The
South China Sea has remained a longstanding thorny issues for ASEAN, with various opinions
amongst its ten members on how to speak to China’s assertiveness as well as China’s building
alongside heavy arming of Chinese artificial islands in the disputed waters. The issues entail the
requirement to mention the need to evade land reclamation and militarization fronted by Vietnam
that is among the 4 members with competing sovereignty claims with China. China remains
extremely sensitive regarding ASEAN mentioning its military capabilities expansion on such
islands and some ASEAN members are concerned about the feasible repercussions of upsetting
Beijing provided its economic power and military.
Any attempt to reissue the statement with a softening of language on SCS-or even an
outright omissions of this particular issue- might have raised fundamental questions regarding
the willingness of ASEAN to jointly stand up to the adventurism of China in SCS, where Beijing
has built the artificial islands as well as raised its military footprints lately. Among these states of
ASEAN only Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are direct claimants in the SCS
disputes. Indonesia has lately encountered challenges with illegal fishing activities of China in its
exclusion economic zone, but doesn’t recognize the dispute with China. 5
5 Thao, N. H. (2003). The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note. Ocean
Development &International Law, 34(3-4), 279-285.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 6
The ASEAN seems unwilling and unable to stand up to China. The negotiations between
China with ASEAN on the Code of Conduct for the SCS have dragged into their thirteenth year.
China, at the same time, has undertaken an enormous land reclamation campaign to alter the
status quo in SCS, leaving critics to lament the inability of ASEAN to form a united policy
toward China. 6
The ambiguity regarding the rise of China remains “a black sheep” in the in Southeast
Asia integration. Even though ASEAN had plans to achieve economic pillar of building a
regional community by 2015, integration on political-security pillar remained gradual, partially
as a result of ASEAN principles of non-interferences and non-confrontational haggling that slow
consensus building. 7 The continuation of same policies by ASEAN towards China since 1990s
has remained unsuccessful in keeping China from pushing Asian region towards instability as
well as threatening the integration of ASEAN. For instance, China compelled a confrontation
with Philippines over Second Thomas Shoal only 9 days prior to a round of Code of Conduct
consultations in the year 2014, China demonstrated it had little concern for the goal of a
cooperative regional order set by ASEAN.
What has China got to do with the lack of consensus in ASEAN and how does that relate to
the South China Sea dispute(s)?
What has China got to do with the lack of consensus in ASEAN?
China has exploited the divisions among the members of ASEAN and subsequently
applied economic pressure, both negative and positive, to keep the economies from reaching a
6 Chong, F. (2012). South China sea breaches ASEAN. Asia Today International, 30(4), 5.
7 Ramo, J. C. (2004). The Beijing Consensus (p. 3). London: Foreign Policy Centre.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 7
consensus on the maritime security in their individual backyard. Further, weak leadership on
security as well as political issues has left ASEAN without a united approach on the aggression
of China in SCS. This remains a fundamental reason why ASEAN stays divided on China. There
is no leading economy to overcome political, cultural, and economic variances and forge an
overarching consensus. 8
The leadership in ASEAN following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis remained extremely
weak or absent at all making China to rapidly force divisions among the ASEAN members.
Thailand and Singapore have offered restrained leadership on economic matters, but the ability
of Thailand to perform such a key role has weakened because of Thailand’s internal troubles.
China has exploited the absence of core leader to its advantage particularly lack of strong
internal mechanisms in ASEAN to mitigate differences among the members to facilitate the lack
of consensus in ASEAN.
China, for example, has taken this advantage and allowed many ASEAN members to
pursue different bilateral actions as well as policies which are extremely at odds with the
ASEAN-centric approach to the regional matters. China is at the center of shaping the ASEAN’s
strategic environment than ASEAN itself due the lack of strong ASEAN leadership.
It is proclaimed that Chinese diplomacy had triumphed over Japan and the US stands out.
It is argued that China has succeeded in splitting ASEAN bloc. Issues like the PCA ruling failed
to be integrated into any statement/agreements as Cambodia came out to support China strongly.
The Tokyo and Washington demands that the PCA decision be accepted were never passed. On
8 Chen, L. K., Liu, L. K., Woo, J., Assantachai, P., Auyeung, T. W., Bahyah, K. S., ... & Lee, J. S. (2014).
Sarcopenia in Asia: consensus report of the Asian Working Group for Sarcopenia. Journal of the American Medical
Directors Association, 15(2), 95-101.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 8
the contrary, the position of Cambodia that acted as spokesperson of China to call for bilateral
negotiation carried the day. Based on these sorts of examinations, it is apparent that ASEAN
nations are never the protagonists. Instead, China, Japan and the US are treated as the major
players in accounting of whatever they have in the store for ASEAN nations that are usually
framed as if the lack agency. However, this remains a misguided state of thinking. The ASEAN
individual nations have independent choices to make. 9 Whether or not the ASEAN Foreign
Minister’s meeting integrates a joint statement on the decision of PCA’s South China Sea, this is
never about a national being compelled by Japan, the US or China; it is the policy that has been
chosen by ASEAN.
The real reason is that Southeast Asia has been the focal point of the power wrangle
between China and the United States. Accordingly, when China has made forays into this focal
point (South China Sea) on the basis of China’s individual realism, ASEAN has been in
awkward position thereby finding it challenging to cope as an organization. Further, while
individual Southeast Asian economies could still cope with the United States or China openly
employing logic of territorial expansion, on the surface such arguments have concerned rules-
oriented concepts like the “rule of law”/freedom of navigation. Accordingly, it is increasingly
hard for ASEAN to respond more efficiently and effectively. Simply put, whereas ASEAN
seems to be a forum for deliberation, its structure impedes it from really generating a
consensus/conclusion. This is the reason moving forward and not merely at the Foreign
Minister’s Meeting but at the broad array meeting- differing perception will continue of how
ASEAN is tackling such a Chinese realism internally. This is further evident to recognize the
9 Rowan, J. P. (2005). The US-Japan security alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea dispute. Asian Survey,
45(3), 414-436.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 9
fault lines in the internal structure of ASEAN. This endured attention on a cross-section of
variances is inevitable in its individual manner. However, even where there is an ongoing
attention on rifts within ASEAN, they shall be in the context of restrained issues; as a whole
there shall be an even firmer need for ASEAN to work as it has previously, which is to arrive at
consensus. This further underscores the need for strengthening partnerships with additional-
regional economies that back ASEAN.
How does that relate to the South China Sea dispute(s)?
The interferences by China that has impeded the consensus in ASEAN has a close
relationship to the SCS disputes. For example, China’s has a close ties with Cambodia that had to
support it at the meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers held in Phnom Penh in July. This caused
the dispute since Cambodia’s support to China ensured that the demands by Vietnam and
Philippines were shelved. The two countries wanted the final communique to reflect their
concerns over the series of incidents in SCS saves to China illegal activities and behavior.
Philippines and Vietnam wanted the final communique to include Scarborough Shoal as well as
various cable cutting incidents that involved Vietnamese-chartered ships.
Having been influenced by China, Cambodia that held the ASEAN Chair and that has
created close economic as well as political ties with China saves to land of strong leadership in
ASEAN allowing China to influence it into such bilateral policies, declined arguing that such
incidents amounted to bilateral disputes. 10 This led to failure by States on any attempts to reach a
compromise on the SCS activities among the ASEAN foreign ministers. Accordingly, and for the
first time since ASEAN inception in 1967, the organization failed to issue a final communique in
10 Buszynski, L. (2003). ASEAN, the declaration on conduct, and the South China Sea. Contemporary Southeast
Asia, 343-362.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 10
2012. Cambodia remained highly criticized for such truculence and further accused of having
acted at the China’s behest in order to secure continued assistance economically. Such a fiasco,
was argued by Singapore’s foreign minister (K Shanmugam) had caused ASEAN’s credibility a
severe dent while and hence Cambodia’s actions called ASEAN’s centrality into question.
Cambodia’s actions public as well as embarrassingly revealed the lack of ASEAN solidarity over
the SCS.
This above examination reveals clearly that the lack of consensus in ASEAN is all about
the disputes of SCS where China wants to undertake its illegal activities and behaviors by
ensuring that there is internal division and lack of solidarity in ASEAN to shelve any issues of
mentioning the SCS matters in its communique. China has succeeded in creating division in
ASEAN by engaging directly into bilateral policies with ASEAN individual members in
exchange of support economically and even politically so as to ensure that it has the backing of
some member states of ASEAN to bar consensus as it did in the year 2012.
Such interferences and weakening of the ASEAN by China has seen many disputes
sprouting including the dispute between Philippines v. China on SCS where the International
Court (PAC) has since delivered its ruling in favor of Philippines on most questions as outlined
above. China thus wants to get support among the ASEAN members to illegally allow itself to
continue harming others that it is various disputes.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 11
References
Ba, A. D. (2003). China and ASEAN: renavigating relations for a 21st-century Asia. Asian
Survey, 43(4), 622-647.
Buszynski, L. (2003). ASEAN, the declaration on conduct, and the South China Sea.
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 343-362.

SOUTH CHINA SEA AND ASEAN 12
Buszynski, L., & Sazlan, I. (2007). Maritime claims and energy cooperation in the South China
Sea. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs,
29(1), 143-171.
Chen, L. K., Liu, L. K., Woo, J., Assantachai, P., Auyeung, T. W., Bahyah, K. S., ... & Lee, J. S.
(2014). Sarcopenia in Asia: consensus report of the Asian Working Group for
Sarcopenia. Journal of the American Medical Directors Association, 15(2), 95-101.
Chong, F. (2012). South China sea breaches ASEAN. Asia Today International, 30(4), 5.
Halper, S. (2010). The Beijing consensus: how China's authoritarian model will dominate the
twenty-first century. ReadHowYouWant. com.
Odgaard, L. (2003). The South China Sea: ASEAN’s Security Concerns about China. Security
Dialogue, 34(1), 11-24.
Ramo, J. C. (2004). The Beijing Consensus (p. 3). London: Foreign Policy Centre.
Rowan, J. P. (2005). The US-Japan security alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea dispute.
Asian Survey, 45(3), 414-436.
Thao, N. H. (2003). The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A
Note. Ocean Development &International Law, 34(3-4), 279-285.