Strengths and Limitations of Deterrence Theory 2022

Running head: STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY
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STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY1
Question: What are the strengths and limitations of the deterrence theory? Elaborate
with the help of a recent example.
The deterrence theory is primarily considered as a military strategy through which a
certain power utilizes the threat of retaliation efficiently to impede an attack from a rival
power (Snyder 2015). With the emergence of nuclear weapons, the application of the
deterrence theory to the strategies of nuclear power and major alliances has been prevalent.
The premise of the aforementioned strategy is the fact that every nuclear power maintains a
lofty level of catastrophic and destructive capacity against any form of aggression. The
pivotal element in the success of the theory is a level of uncertainty on the part of the
supposed aggressor as to whether the targeted power, although attacked and severely
damaged, shall nonetheless retaliate – even at the risk of suffering more crippling damage in
a secondary attack. Therefore, it can be stated that the nuclear deterrence theory is based on
two conditions: the capacity to retaliate post a surprise attack, which must be considered as
credible: as well as the will to do the same and is supposed to be perceived as a possibility
and not essentially as a certainty (Beardsley and Asal 2009).
Under the deterrence theory, the military strategy has become more intimidating and
coercive in nature. The original motive to harm a particular state could now be employed as a
motivating facet for various states to avoid destructive acts and influence the other states to
do the same. It can be summarized that the foundation of the deterrence theory is the
utilization of power to harm as a bargaining power. However, it is only triumphant when held
in reserve. Several critics have argued that the deterrence theory is inconsistent logically and
is not empirically accurate (Huth 1988). Replacing this classical view, the modern scholars
have argued for rational deterrence or perfect deterrence wherein the internal features of any
state may vary in accordance with the credibility of threats of reprisal.

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY2
Rational deterrence is a hugely impactful social science theory, which has towered
postwar academic perspectives on strategic affairs as well as influenced the intellectual
framework of the Western military policy (Achen and Snidal 1989). The approach of the
theory is based on the employment of rational choice and the credibility of the threat
encountered by the defending state. If the defending state owns the military potential to
impose significant costs on the attacking state in pursuit of an armed contention, and if the
latter assumes that, the defending state is determined to employ its accessible military
strength, only then does the rational deterrence theory prove its significance. The key
attributes of the theory can be identified as the military balance, interests at stake, reputation
for resolve and bargaining power; all of which are concerned with the current position of both
the attacking and defending powers.
The strengths of the deterrent theory lies in the military capabilities combined with
the bargaining behaviour of the defending power’s capability and the other facets of the
theory, keeping in mind that the potential attacker must not be provoked. Deterrence is
frequently aimed against the leaders of the state who seek to gain certain territorial objectives
by seizing territories that are disputed and have limited military force or after the failure of
the adversary forces. In either of the cases, the concerns regarding the military costs are
attributes contributing to the short-term strategy. For the success of the application of the
theory, the defending state has to have the military strength to respond promptly. It must be
noted that often the failure of the theory lies in the fact that the defending state overestimate
or underestimate the potential of the attacking powers in taking a specific course of action
(Trager 2016).
Often the defending states have the inducement to act pretending that they are
resolved to withstand the attack, in the expectation that the charging state shall retreat from
the conflict by proposing an apparently resolved adversary. If such aforementioned

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY3
assumptions and pretensions are applied by every defending state, it will not be long before
the attacking states consider such deterring warnings to be a case of mere bluff (Kenwick,
Vasquez and Powers 2015). In accordance with this common assumption, the rational
deterrence theorists argued that effective and expensive signals must be employed for
communicating the cogency of the defending state’s intentions. These costly signals include
the statement and actions that vividly enhance the potency of a military conflict as well as the
expenses of retreating from the threat of deterrence. As a result to this, the states that are
feigning shall remain hesitant to go beyond a definite threshold of military action as they
would have the fright of engaging the state into an armed conflict.
The deterrent theory’s prime advantage lies in its ability to resolve wars and proclaim
peace. However, there are certain situations for this to be successful. The first facet
influencing the conditions for resolving the war is the past behaviour of the defending state in
international crises (Asal and Beardsley 2007). This affects the potentially attacking state’s
beliefs regarding the defending state’s credibility of acting in future conflicts. Secondly, the
political and military condition of the defending state in a given span of time wherein the
attempted deterrence is taking place. In spite of considering these facets, there are also cases
wherein the deterrence can backfire or fail to perform if the assumptions are not accurate
regarding the other state’s perceptions.
Another attribute that strengthens the act of deterrence is the interests of the defending
state that would apparently justify the risks of committing to a military conflict. Since wars
drain the state’s treasury, the economic interests of the defending state and how much they
are willing to overlook it to promote their military interests, are considered or rather
calculated by the attacking state to verify the validity of the deterrent threat (Crocker,
Hampson and Aall 2007). If the defending state is prepared to commit to taking up the