The Evolution of Marks and Spencer: A Case Study in Retail Growth Strategies

This case study delves into the five phases of growth at Marks and Spencer, analyzing their strategies from store expansion to diversification. It challenges traditional retail evolution theories and emphasizes the importance of adaptive long-term vision in sustaining success.

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The Evolution of Marks and Spencer
Article in The Service Industries Journal · July 1999
DOI: 10.1080/02642069900000030
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Gary Davies
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The Evolution of Marks and Sp
Gary Davies
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The Evolution of Marks and Spencer
GARY DAVIES
Financial data drawr~f,-om Marks awd Spencer S arc-hives and
annual reports is used to idenlvyfive phases in the Company S
sales growth. Early, rather erratic, growth, often through
acquisition, gave way to a second phase of store development
funded by the Company S.floatation in the 1920s. Sales growth
in the third phase came substanriveljl through an increase in
store size. A fourth phase involved irnprovernerzts in labour
and space productivity. The final and current phase of
evolution emphasises divers(fication. The pattern of evolution
is compared with two theories of retail change, the Wheel of
Retailing and the Retail Accordion. Neither is compatible with
the sustained growth exhibited, indeed both theories could be
said to predict the failure of the Company 's overall strategy.
INTRODUCTION
Marks and Spencer is widely regarded as one of Britain's leading retail
businesses. They are unusual in having remained substantially in the same
style of retailing for over 100 years (the variety chain store) and in trading
as a single entity.
Their sales growth has been sustained over most of this period without
substantial diversification or the acquisition of different businesses. Their
success has been largely through organic growth and the managed evolution
of a retail format that has changed remarkably slowly over their existence.
The purpose of this study is to identify what Marks and Spencer have done
in the operation of their business to maintain their sales growth and to
compare these findings with two theories of retail change and evolution.
Gary Davies is at Manchestcr Business School, Booth Street West, Manchester MI5 6PB.
The Service Industries Journal, Vo1.19, No.3 (July 1999). pp.60-73
P U B L I S H E DB Y F R A N K C A S S , L O N D O N

EVOLUTION OF MARKS A N D SPENCER
THEORIES O F RETAIL C H A N G E
There exist a number of theories to explain major change in the retail sector
[Roth and Klein, 19931. The most prominent is the 'Wheel of Retailing',
based on the observation that new retail businesses tend to enter the market
as low cost/low price businesses [McNair, 19581. Over time the retailer
'trades up' by enhancing its service levels and ambience and by raising its
selling prices. This makes the retailer vulnerable to a newer form of
retailing, operating with a lower cost structure and able to offer shoppers
lower prices. The Wheel theory has been much discussed since its inception
[Hollander, 1960; Davidson et al., 1976; Brown, 1988; Valentin, 19911 and
criticised as having no real grounding in economic theory. Nevertheless the
idea of such a cyclical process can be used to explain the long-term
evolution of certain retail sectors, such as that for groceries, where self-
service superstores replaced counter service retailers to be replaced by
lower cost supermarkets, which were attacked in turn by other lower cost
formats such as hypermarkets [Knee and Walters, 19851.
A second model of retail evolution relevant to any study of Marks and
Spencer is that of the 'retail accordion', [Hollander, 19661. Again
observation of actual process was used to suggest a general rule. According
to Hollander a retail sector is dominated in turn by wide assortment retailers
and, more focused, specialist retailers. Department stores developed from
more focused mercers in the mid-nineteenth century [Ferry, 1960;
Adburgham, 1964; 19811 by expanding the different types of product they
sold from textiles to finished clothing, food, furniture and general
household goods. The department store became the one stop shop for the
middle class in Europe, Japan and North America. While the format has
continued to hold a high share of retail sales in North America, it has
declined in Europe, particularly in Britain. More specialist retailers with
narrower ranges concentrating for example on the sale of clothing for one
sex and age group, specialist furniture stores, and, recently, even more
highly focused retailers such as Sock Shop and Tie Rack have all eroded the
market of the generalist department store. The same effect in reverse can be
seen in the decline of specialist food retailers such as butchers, fishmongers,
and greengrocers in favour of grocery superstores, where the wide range
and choice appeals to time pressed shoppers who may prefer not to have to
visit a number of stores for their regular and routine purchases.
There is, therefore, considerable anecdotal evidence to support both
theories. Interestingly both propose a cyclicality in the process of retail
evolution, an inevitability that one type of retailing will be overtaken by
another [Davies, 19921. The expectations would be that a retailer who both
trades up and expands its range places itself at risk to both the Wheel and
Accordion effects. As will become apparent, Marks and Spencer have done

62 THE SERVICE INDUSTRIES JOURNAL
both over 100 years and have not only survived but have prospered. Some
other explanation is needed to explain successful retail evolution.
Figure 1 shows the development of the Company's sales turnover. The
actual figures have been deflated using the retail price index for each year,'
providing a more precise picture of the real growth trend. Sales have
increased by over two orders of magnitude since the company became a
public concern in 1926.
FIGURE I
R E A L S A L E S G R O W T H
1920 " 1940 1960 1980 2000
YEAR
SOURCE: Marks & Spencer Annual Reports
Archives and D.O.E.
Profitability has been sustained throughout this period allowing the
company to invest in new and bigger stores and more recently in
diversification. Over its history the company's growth can be seen to have
developed in a number of phases.
PHASE I : MARKS A N D SPENCER'S EARLY ESTABLISHMENT
(1884-1910)
A number of histories have been written about Marks and Spencer [Rees,
1969; Sieff, 1970; Briggs, 1984; Sieff, 19861 that record the early
development of the company. The founder, Michael Marks was an
immigrant pedlar who'later opened a stall in Leeds market. The accepted
means of trading at the time was to haggle. Marks, probably due to his poor
English as much as his business insight, broke with this tradition with a sign

EVOLUTION OF M A R K S A N D SPENCER 63
which read 'Don't Ask the Price, It's a Penny.'. Marks endeavoured to find
goods he could sell for the fixed price of one penny. The-formula succeeded.
By 1890 he had five.:penny, bazaziis'n.and a..warehouse. In 41894 .Thomas
Spencer joined a busine~s~whichsold haberdashery, earthenware, hardware,
household~goodsand stationery, [Rees, ..1969:1,10].,Their.partnership,became
a ,private . limited. company- in 1903. (.By..1900 .ithere were. 36 .branches,
including 12 shops (as opposed to market stalls or bazaars) .
a After the death of the,partners .whose names (identify the retailer to this
day, ,control. over the, business came. under. Marks'.: son, Simon and his
brother-in-law.Israe1 Sieff:;In 1926;the business became.a public company.
A new. phase .in thecompany:s.history had begun.. . . : i..,
. , . , ' . t . ; I... . ,. . , / ! . a > . ;. - ,,:,,:,
Figure 2 uses data: available .from.Marks. and spencer?^ :archives and the
.
more consistent data from its annual reports since floatati~n~~.to chart the
:,. ' " : " , , ". 1. , I ' , % ~ $ < , 8 t 1 ;,3 t , 1 . .; '...,> .
development of,the number of stores the company has operated. From a
. o . . , . . , . l I I I I
M $ ' i s & - ! '- .leeo'. ' . 19id. ' ', "' . , "' 1 . ' 8 . .' ,;; , ,
1920 , ' 1960 1980 2000
. , . , . I ( . . : I , .. , . . .;',.,.. ;. .I:,. . . ..' . . , . ' " kAR . .
S0URCE::Marks 8 Spencer ~ n n u a lReports. .,;. .:, ,,. :..:, . i: ! t . .
and Archive,Matenal , . , I . I . . . 2 ! . . .
single outlet in 1884.the nuinber-of outletsagrew ~lowly~and erratically,
sometimes .by the.purchase of similhr :businesses .[~ees,.1969]. It would

64 T H E S E R V I C EINDUSTRIES J O U R N A L
appear that some consolidation occurred in the early 1920s. From 1926 to
1939 the number of stores grew but in a more sustained manner. In 1900
most shops were small bazaars, typically 30 to 70 feet long by 6 to 13 feet
wide [Briggs, 19841. The capital raised from floatation in 1926 was used to
fund a rapid building and rebuilding programme. Between 1931 and 1935
alone 129 stores were built or rebuilt. By 1940 the company traded from
almost the same number of locations as it has today. This phase of
expansion was typical of a number of multiple retail businesses in the early
part of the twentieth century [Jeffreys, 19541. The separation of the
activities of making and selling goods dated from the industrial revolution
but the development of such large retail businesses did not occur until the
twentieth century [Davies and Hanis, 19901, largely due to the constraints
of legislation designed to aid the small scale retailer. Although resale price
maintenance legislation persisted until the 1960s in Britain [Corina, 197 I],
retailers such as Marks and Spencer found ways both to circumvent it and
to compete on price, in the latter case by concentrating on the sale of own
brand merchandise. It was this price advantage that was so attractive to the
emerging working classes in the new, industrial towns and cities. After
resale price maintenance declined, large scale retailers were able to
negotiate more favourable terms from suppliers more easily, adding to their
cost and price advantage. Marks and Spencer had gained an early lead
through its focus on own brands that were less influenced by price
maintenance during this phase than the supplier branded goods sold by most
of their rivals.
P H A S E 111 G R O W T HI N S T O R E S I Z E(1945-95)
After the Second World War, the number of stores increased far more
slowly. Figures 3 and 4 provide a clear picture of how the company
increased sales volume, not now by increasing the number of stores but by
increasing the average size of each store and with it the range of products
that could be sold. Most stores shared an architectural feature that facilitated
such a strategy, a structural cube, stores being built in multiples of such. As
a result they could be added to in any dimension with relative ease. The
benefits to the retailer from operating larger stores include economies of
scale [NEDO, 19881, and also economies of scope by increasing the range
offered to shoppers [NEDO, 19881. It costs little more to serve a customer
spending £40 than if they spend £4. Expanding the product range increases
the likelihood of multiple purchases.
The total sales areas expanded from 1928 to 1995 by almost exactly 30
times, and this expansion was due substantially to increases in the size of
stores rather than in their number, as had been the case in the second phase

EVOLUTION OF MARKS A N D SPENCER 65
FIGURE 3
AVERAGE S T O R E S I Z E
1940 1960
YEAR
SOURCE: Marks 8 Spencer Annual Reports
and Archives
FIGURE 4
S A L E S AREA
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
YEAR
SOURCE: Marks 8 Spencer Annual Repom

66 T H E SERVICE I N D U S T R I E SJ O U R N A L
of development. However total sales grew in real terms faster than the
increase in sales area (see Figure 4). Marks and Spencer were not only
becoming a larger business, they were becoming more efficient in what
should be regarded as a fourth phase in their development, one that is
concurrent with much of the third phase. Deflating the UK turnover of the
company by the retail price index provides a measure of real sales volume
(see Figure 1). The retail price index varies in the products used to construct
it and it contains factors that are not necessarily relevant to Marks and
Spencer's business. Using somewhat different data over an extended time
series is therefore an imperfect way of estimating the true change in real
sales volume, but it nevertheless reveals a growth in real sales from 1928 to
1991 of a factor of 89, compared to that in sales area of a factor of 26. The
company were selling more from each bit of selling space each year.
PHASE IV IMPROVED PRODUCTIVITY (1930-80)
A retailer's two main areas of cost, other than the products it sells, are staff
and premises. Productivity in retailing can therefore be assessed by
examining the sales achieved for every unit of sales area and for every hour
of staff time. Figure 5 shows how deflated (reaI) sales per square foot of
selling space improved over the period.
F I G U R E 5
SPACE PRODUCTIVITY
10
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
YEAR
SOURCE: Marks 8 S encer AnnualRepolts
and g 0.6

EVOLUTION O F M A R K S A N D , S P E N C E R 67
The data in some of the war years are somewhat unreliable leading to an
erratic change from year to year. Nevertheless the improvement in space
productivity from 1930 to 1960 is impressive . From then on, no significant
increases have been achieved.
FIGURE 6
EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY
4
& .',? , ., . 1950, : : . , , ' 1 9 6 ( 1 ; , .1?'0 i . 1980 . , , . 1 9 9 0 . . 2000
. . . . . . . . . . . . .L , . ,. , , 1
YEAR
. . 1 , : . . .
SOURCE: Marks.& Spencer Annual Reports , . . . . . . .,. . . . . and Archives. D.O.E. .,,: :..... : ' . . I ~ . . . .
. . . . .. . ..', .:- .<' . . ., . , .. ? i, ./ , . I . , , . '
Figure 6 shows how the company has continued to improve its productivity
through better use of labour.~ r o m1950 to 1991, deflated sales per full time
equivalent employee,.more than, doubled. Retailers $tend .to record their
numbers of employees in .their financial reports using the measure of 'full
time equivalentsl.(FTE), the number of employees who~would.haveworked
the hours paid by the%,companysif'they had been employed full time. The
improvement in labour productivity has probably.:been achieved in a
number of ways, higher sales for each customer visit for example;but one
approach widely adopted in the retail sector has been to. usemorepparttime
staff. Figure 7 shows the,ratio ofathe number.of~al1staff to the FI'E count in
Markstand Spencer. ; , 1
i This ratio increases by a third from,1955to 1992indicating a substantial
change in+theway staff were being employed: Part-time staff cancbeasked
to .work when stores are busy or jlist beforetsuch trading,hours:when shelves
. . .
need, to be.filled.. : , -.. . m e ,. ,: . .* ,. ., ;: .s ,!; . .-,.., '. . ,:, .. , .
_. i 1. 5 . -
.'.,I Both, productivity measures have .tended,to.remain,relatively constant

T H E SERVICE INDUSTRIES J O U R N A L
F I G U R E 7
USE OF PART T I M E STAFF
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
YEAR
I SOURCE: Marks B Spencer Annual Repofts
over the last two decades, indicating that the company is finding it more
difficult to achieve better results in this way. A fifth phase in their search for
sales growth and profitability was needed and a very different approach can
be discovered from the 1980s onwards, that of substantial diversification.
P H A S E V D I V E R S I F I C A T I O N(1980 - C U R R E N T : ,
Retailers can diversify by entering new types of retailing or other types of
activity or they can enter new geographical markets with existing retail
activities. Marks and Spencer have done all three. Early moves into
internationalisation followed a fear of nationalisation by an incoming
Labour administration in the immediate post-war years. Links with
Woolworth (no relation to other companies of the same name) in South
Africa and the acquisition of businesses in Canada began a process that
failed to contribute significantly to sales or profit until other retail
businesses were purchased, Brooks Brothers and Kings Supermarkets,
relatively recently. Exports of St Michael merchandise have made a small
but significant contribution for some years but the growth first of franchised
stores and thereafter of a company owned chain in other European markets
hinted at the development of a truly global business, one where the retail
format is similar around the world after 1980. Figure 8, taken from the 1996

EVOLUTION OF MARKS A N D SPENCER 69
annual report, provides an indication of the relative contribution of the
different business activities to the company's total activity.'
F I G U R E 8
DIVERSIFICATION
United Kingdom Retail
% of takings 1996
80.5
Other European Retail 7.7
Far East Retail 1.9
Canadian M&S outlets 0.7
Overseas Sales of M&S Merchandise
via Franchises or Concessions 10.3
Brooks Bros, Kings, D'Alliards 7.0
>
Financial Services 2.2
In this year the company operated from 628 locations of which only 350
were in Britain. New ventures into Germany and China were planned,
although the D'Allairds business in Canada had been sold. Interestingly the
company's other diversification, into financial services, had proven more
successful, producing 6.5 per cent of group profits in 1996 from personal
loans and the sale of assurance and unit trusts. This business was
predominately in Britain, emphasising how difficult it had been for Marks
and Spencer to achieve the same success outside of its home base.
DISCUSSION
Five phases can be identified in the evolution of Marks and Spencer's
business. After the first phase, where the business was still becoming
established, the growth in shop numbers provides an explanation for their
growth in real sales. After the set backs of World WarI1 the growth of
revenues from British operations was achieved by expanding the company's
store size and product range. Productivity improvements have added to the
company's ability to profit from such sales. ,
There is evidence of some cyclicality in the company's sales history,
downturns during the Second World War, in the mid-1970s and in the early
1990s. All three coincide with downturns in the consumer economy, a more
logical explanation than that possible from either of the Wheel or Accordion
models. A second cyclical effect can be seen in the sales of food.

70 T H E S E R V I C E I N D U S T R I E S J O U R N A L
F I G U R E9
FOOD S A L E S
Marks and Spencer has retailed food from its earliest days. The war years
saw dramatic change in the company's dependency on food sales, but one
created by circumstances other than the Concertina effect. During this
period the company could not obtain textile products for resale in any
quantity and turned its shops substantially into restaurants [Briggs, 19841.
Dependency on food declined after 1945 as sales of non-foods could recur,
a trend also influenced perhaps by Simon Marks' antipathy towards being
seen as a 'grocer' [Sieff, 19861. After his death in 1964, food sales
continued to increase explaining much of the expansion in the company's
overall sales. The growth stems from the establishment of a Food
Development Department in 1948 [Briggs, 19841 and the introduction of an
innovative range of pre-cooked meals, a market largely developed and
dominated by Marks and Spencer in the 1970s [EIU, 19891.
Food sales also provide an interesting test of the Wheel effect. While
Marks and Spencer entered the market over a century ago as a low cost
retailer, its introduction of pre-cooked meals and other premium products
into high cost, largely city centre stores is in no way compatible with the
Wheel concept. Even in its more routine range of groceries, the company
are not and have never been at the lower end of the price spectrum, [AGB,
19961. This is not to say that the company are immune to price competition,
only that the notion of inevitability of cyclical effects in retail markets when
50
40
V)W
A 30
2A
d
t; 2 0 -
Z
10
0
-
-
-
I I 1
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
YEAR
SOURCE: Marks B Spencer Annual Reports
and Archives

EVOLUTION OF MARKS A N D SPENCER 71
retailers trade up or expand their ranges must be challenged. At best it must
be possible for retailers to manage their businesses so as to avoid such
happenings, as illustrated by this analysis.
, A better understanding is needed of how retail businesses can survive
and prosper over the longer=term.-Thisanalysis of Marks and Spencer has
demonstrated the meed for any, business to be adaptive. The,company has
followed a number of complementary, but different strategies. Such
strategies often evolve from one another and overlap in their time frame, but
they are distinct. They are also long-term. The focus on a growth in store
numbers lasted ten years, that on store size over 50 years. The less
successful, approach of internationalisation as part of diversification began
in 1948 and was only paying substantial dividends by the 1990s. What is
noticeable about such observations is the maintenance of a simple, easily
understood directiqn for the business,,one that would have had to be passed
on from one generation of management to another. he influence of the
Marks and Sieff family interests are likely to have been important factors in
the early years. While the last'two chjef executives of Marks and Spencer
have not been members of either family,they,have both been managers with
a lifetime of experience within the bu~iness.~ Such continuity can be
associated with the long-term evolutionary progress of the business. This
must be compared with the approach adopted by sohe of their competitors,
for example House of Fraser, BhS, Debenhams and NEXT (once
Hepworths), where management and strategies have changed frequently and
often radically. Such businesses have at certain times demonstrated faster
rates of growth than Marks and Spencer, but good periods of trading have
been followed or interrupted by more fallow years. Retailing is often
referred to, with the label 'fast changing' and in many ways it is as retailers
react to the ever changing demands of customers and changes in the goods
they are offered by suppliers. Nevertheless the long-term survival and
success of this one company suggests the need to subordinate such
reactivity to a longer term vision of how growth is to be achieved.
Marks and Spencer's experience of international retailing provides a
further example of the relative benefits of thegradua1,versusthe accelerated
approach to development. Three existing businesses have been purchased
since 1946, D' Alliards in Canada, Brooks Brother and Kings' Supermarkets
in America. D'Alliards has been sold,and Brooks,Brothers has not justified
its purchase price. Stores developed out of Marks and Spencer's own
trading format have proven more successful. The benefit of evolution over
revolution is the most important lesson the company has learned over a
century of trading.
In this century of trading,,the company has traded up in price and
expanded its.range of products and services. Both established theories of

72 T H E SERVICE INDUSTRIES JOURNAL
retail evolution suggest that this would make the business vulnerable to
lower cost, lower price retailers on the one hand and more focused retailers
on the other. Neither theory is then satisfactory. Both are empirically
derived rather than theoretically grounded. Theoretical models of strategic
change exist in the mainstream of the strategic literature. It could be time to
bury both of the retail specific approaches in favour of more generalisable
models that could prove more useful in understanding the evolution of any
business.
NOTES
I. The retail price index is recalculated regularly to reflect the prices paid for a range of
commonly purchased items. The selection of items changes to reflect changes in the
purchasing patterns of the British public. The data is available as a number of series. Where
these overlap, the author has scaled earlier series to be compatible with later series. More
recent data are available from the CSO's Annual Abstract of Statistics. Earlier series were
taken from Mitchell [1975].
2. The data series presented here are derived partly from Marks and Spencer's annual report and
accounts and partly from archive material made available to the author by the late Mr Paul
Bookbinder of Marks and Spencer. Prior to 1928 the data are exclusively from archive
material. Some data series began more recently, such as the recording of employee numbers
and this is reflected in the Figures.
3. The data series used in this article represent only the UK retail trading of Marks and Spencer
unless otherwise stated. From the early 1990s the significance of financial services and
international trading increases and the author has estimated UK sales. More recently the
company has reported UK retail sales separately.
4. This paper was written prior to the changes in senior management in 1999.
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EVOLUTION O F MARKS AND SPENCER 73
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