The Hart and Fuller Debate on Legal Positivism

This article delves into the Hart and Fuller debate on legal positivism, exploring their arguments on the relationship between law and morality. It discusses the concepts of the Pedigree Thesis, Separability Thesis, and Discretion Thesis, as well as Lon L. Fuller's Internal Morality of Law. The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the debate and its implications.

The Hart and Fuller Debate on Legal Positivism
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Hart - Fuller Debate 2
Table of Contents
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................2
Introduction................................................................................................................................3
Legal Interpretation according to H. L. A. Hart.........................................................................4
The Pedigree Thesis...............................................................................................................4
The Separability Thesis..........................................................................................................8
The Discretion Thesis............................................................................................................9
Lon L. Fuller’s Internal Morality of Law.................................................................................10
The relation between Hart and Fuller’s Arguments on Legal Positivism and Unjust Regimes
..................................................................................................................................................13
Conclusion................................................................................................................................18
References................................................................................................................................20

Hart - Fuller Debate 3
Introduction
The credo of law that deals with the conformist nature of law (socially constructed) is
referred to as legal positivism.1 The theories advanced by many positivists state that law can
be synonymously interchanged with common law, positive norms, case law or norms enacted
by legislators. The formal advancement of the enforcement and effectiveness of law is
adequate to warrant the classification of social norms under law.2 Positivists do not include
divine intervention, human rights or reason in their debate on law. Historically, legal
positivism was developed to oppose the idea advanced by the natural law theory; moral
values are also part of law.3
Legal positivism was not initiated to justify the ethicality of law nor the decision to be made
when the law is obeyed or disobeyed. The issues of humanity and justice are not part of the
idea positivists are trying to explain. Legal positivism merely focuses on the creation of laws.
This includes cases whereby judges making decisions (that are not under legal rules) in their
own discretion and the decisions, later on, become law. Deciding, practicing and toleration
some of the practices in law are also ways of modelling new laws. Legal positivism opposes
the sociological jurisprudence and the interpretations of law which only deal with the
triumphing status of the interpretation of statutes in society. This paper will focus on only two
positivists (Hart and Fuller).
1 Larry Alexander. "Legal Positivism and originalist interpretation." Revista Argentina
de Teoría Jurídica (2015): 15-200.
2 André-Jean Arnaud. "The transplanetary journey of a legal sociologist." Law and
Intersystemic Communication. Routledge, 2016. 29-42
3 Bix, Brian H. "Types of Legal Theory." Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and
Social Philosophy (2017): 1-6.

Hart - Fuller Debate 4
Legal Interpretation according to H. L. A. Hart
The Pedigree Thesis
Hart’s work on the “Concept of Law” is the most significant criticism to John Austin’s
natural law theory.4 Hart states that Austin’s theory only aims at partially accounting for legal
validity whereby people should do or not do some things even if they wish or do not wish to5.
Hart contradicts the belief that all legal systems must have primary rules and regulations by
stating that the constraints found in criminal law portray primitiveness in the legal system.
Hart views Austin’s focus on coercive forces as an overlook of the existence of a secondary
mandatory rule that gives people the power to make, adjust and do away with privileges and
duties of other persons. The rules that govern the formation of contracts and wills aren’t to be
credibly classified as limitations to freedom supported by threats of a punishment. The said
rules endow people to form their legal dealings in the interior basis of the law.6 Hart views
this as among the greatest influences of law to social life. According to Hart, the
contradicting primary rules of law reveal the sophistication of the system that regulates
behaviour.
The difference between civilizations with developed systems of law and those with
rudimentary laws is that developed systems have both primary and secondary rules as first
order rules while undeveloped (rudimentary) ones, do not.
“[Secondary rules] may all be said to be on a different level from the primary rules, for they
are all about such rules; in the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions
4 Brian Brix. "On the dividing line between natural law theory and legal positivism."
Law and Morality. Routledge, 2017. 49-60.
5 Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. The Concept of Law (OUP Oxford, 2012), p. 55-76
6 Tom D. Campbell Legal positivism. Routledge, 2016.

Hart - Fuller Debate 5
that individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary
rules themselves. They specify the way in which the primary rules may be conclusively
ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively
determined.”7
Hart has 3 different set of secondary rules that influence the changeover of rudimentary laws
to complete systems of law.
1. The rule of recognition
This is a group rule that specifies the features which suggest that it should be supported by
the pressure it exerts socially.8
2. The rule of change
This rule allows societies to add, modify or extinguish valid rules.
3. The rule of adjudication
This rule provides the mechanisms for determining whether or not valid rules have been
dishonoured.
According to Hart, the interpretive tests of legal principles are not the alternative standards
provided for by the rule of recognition.9 The rule of recognition can constitute constraints and
restrictions on legal validity including those that have been incorporated into the concept of
7 Herbert L. A. Hart "The new challenge to legal positivism (1979)." Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies 36.3 (2016): 459-475.
8 Kaarlo Tuori. Critical legal positivism. Routledge, 2017.
9 Brian Leiter. "Marx, law, ideology, legal positivism." Virginia Law Review (2015):
1179-1196.

Hart - Fuller Debate 6
morality. Soft-spoken positivists have created a set of standards that classify legal principles
based on content and not by pedigree.
Hart’s view establishes that developed systems have the rule of recognition which allows for
the criteria of validating laws. The rule also articulates for creating, reviewing and arbitrating
law. Law is the fusion of principal and subordinate rules. Hart further outlines that Austin
failed to accept the significance of secondary rules in the establishment of legal legitimacy.
H. L. A. Hart disagrees with Austin’s theory that legal obligations are powerful. He further
states that the principle advanced by John Austin whereby people are coerced to behave in a
particular manner is not different from people being forced to hand over money by gunmen.
The act of forcing people to develop a certain behaviour is not an exercise of duty or
obligation10.
“What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of
behaviour as a common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism (including
self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism and
demands are justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the normative
terminology of 'ought', 'must', and 'should', and 'right' and 'wrong' in society.”11
Hart suggests that the bulky population should be requested for the acceptance of the rule of
recognition to be the final standard for legal authority. Many citizens do not have the general
perception of how the legal structure is and the conditions for legal rationality.12 Hart advises
that legislators should take an internal perspectives towards the criteria for legal validity. The
10 Margaret Jane Radin. "Reconsidering the rule of law." The Rule of Law and the
Separation of Powers. Routledge, 2017. 37-76.
11 Herbert L. A. Hart “The new challenge to legal positivism (1979)." Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies 36.3 (2016): 459-475.

Hart - Fuller Debate 7
rule of recognition should also be interpreted internally. This rule requires people to adhere to
the principle rules that are legitimate and legal.13 Hart lays out two conditions that are
mandatory and sufficient for the application of legal systems. First, he states that the valid
rules of behaviour must be obeyed and also, the rules of recognition, change and adjudication
must be incorporated into the common behaviours of the public.
The principle progressed by Hart is susceptible to the same reproach that he labels on the
Austinian theory. Hart rejected Austin’s theory because the force of behaviour can no longer
give rise to obligations; it is not different from a gunman forcing people to surrender their
money.14 However, the situation is also not any divergent if the gunman applies the internal
standpoint in issuing the threat. Even if the gunman believes that he is under command to
threaten, the victim becomes obliged and not indebted to give in to the threats. The behaviour
of the gunman is just as much forcible in Hart’s principle as it is in Austin’s point of view.
The officials of the minimal legal system are the only ones that have taken the internal
perspective applying the rule of recognition which bestows on them the power to arbitrate,
impose and execute the rules.15 Even though the officials believe that they are authorized to
make laws which people are obliged to adhere to, the people are not obligated to comply with
the enactments. The situation is similar to the gunman’s behaviour; the gunman did not have
12 Tay Choon Howe. "An Analysis of ‘the Law’: Legal Positivism." Journal of
Malaysian and Comparative Law 40.1 (2018): 49-66.
13 Julie Dickson. "Descriptive Legal Theory." Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law
and Social Philosophy (2017): 1-6.
14 Frederick Schauer. "The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism." Virginia Law
Review 101 (2015): 957.
15 Lawrence B. Solum, Lawrence B., Lawrence B. Solum Pbase Photo Galleries, and
My Academia edu Page. "Legal Theory Blog." Legal Theory (2017)

Hart - Fuller Debate 8
the authority to order the victim and the victim did not have any obligation to conform with
the gunman’s commands.
The Separability Thesis
The separability thesis emphasizes on the distinction between law and morality. The concepts
between law and morality are entirely different. Any reference made to moral values when
defining law or legal systems, is inconsistent with the theory of separability. H. L. A. Hart
describes the thesis of separability as just simple contention and that the law need not satisfy
the principles of morality.16 The separability thesis implies that the legal system does not have
any moral constraints.
The Discretion Thesis
Hart’s discretional theory states that some cases that arise do not fall under any specific rule.
The rule of recognition might then deny judges the freedom of making decisions in their own
discretion.17 The rule requires judges to refer to some of issues not addressed by the existent
laws to the law makers. Hart’s view on inclusive positivism supports Dworkin’s opinion on
the rule of recognition which states that judges can make their own decision in cases where
the law does not provide for the exact rules.
Hart acknowledges that the judiciary is restricted in two ways. First, the powers of judges to
make decisions are limited to certain cases and they cannot be used to instigate new large-
scale reforms. According to Hart, the authority that judges have when making decisions in
16 Dennis Patterson. "Dworkin's Criticisms of Hart's Positivism." The Cambridge
Companion to Legal Positivism draft of 1 (2019).
17 Tom D. Campbell and Jeffrey Goldsworthy. Judicial power, democracy and legal
positivism. Routledge, 2017.

Hart - Fuller Debate 9
their own discretion is not because of the absence of legal constraints to the decision-making
but rather it is due to the unavailability of the correct legal answers to the cases at hand. The
judges cannot apply the existing laws in their decisions since the possible outcomes could be
numerous.18 In such circumstances, the best option for the judges is to refer the case to the
legislature as opposed to making their own decisions.
There is one powerful objection that makes the discretion thesis vulnerable. When a judge
makes a decision in his or her own discretion and the decision becomes law, the case will
have been decided based on a law that was non-existent during the time the disagreement
came about. If a magistrate grants payment of damages through a law that was instituted in
his or her own discretion, the case will have been based on a non-existent law. The
defendant’s right to a fair trial is thus violated. It is not fair enough that a person is punished
based on a non-existent law during the time when the liability was created. The fundamental
process of fairness and the doctrine of legality require that a liability constitutes an offense if
the law stated so at the time the omission or act occurred.
Lon L. Fuller’s Internal Morality of Law
Fuller argues in the Morality of Law that law is subjected to 8 internal principles of
morality19. The principles are:
1) The expression of the rules must be done in general (not specific) terms.
2) The promulgation of the rules must be done publicly.
3) The effect of the rules must be prospective for most of the part.
18 Alexander Passerin d’Entreves. Natural law: an introduction to legal philosophy.
Routledge, 2017.
19 Edwin W. Tucker. "The Morality of Law, by Lon L. Fuller," Indiana Law Journal: 40
(1965) 274-275

Hart - Fuller Debate 10
4) The terms used to express the rules must be understandable.
5) The rules should not be inconsistent with each other; they must be correspondent.
6) The rules must not impose extreme conduct beyond the authority of the parties
affected.
7) The subject must be able to rely on the rules; they should not be amended frequently.
8) The administration of the rules must be consistent with what is written down as the
law.
Fuller articulates that no law can achieve social order if the system of rules flops to content
the eight ideologies of legality.20 A system that does not promulgate the rules publicly and
does not use understandable terms is incapable of controlling the behaviours of people. The
people will not be able to determine what the law requires. According to Fuller, the internal
principles have two respects in accordance with morality. To begin with, law conforms to an
intended condition of social order. Secondly, it does so by valuing the independence of
people in decision-making; this helps in guiding people’s behaviour. Fuller states that laws
cannot conform to the principles of legality thus it is necessary that they constitute morality.
Some moral values are in-built in some laws thereby creating an internal conceptualization
between law and morality which contradicts the separability thesis.21
Hart regarded Fuller’s theory as vague and that Fuller failed to distinguish between efficacy
and morality.
20 Charles L. Barzun "Jerome Frank, Lon Fuller, and a Romantic Pragmatism." Yale JL
& Human. 29 (2017): 129.
21 Vittorio Villa. "Neil MacCormick’s legal positivism." Law as Institutional
Normative Order. Routledge, 2016. 53-72.

Hart - Fuller Debate 11
“[T]he author's insistence on classifying these principles of legality as a "morality" is a source
of confusion both for him and his readers.... [T]he crucial objection to the designation of
these principles of good legal craftsmanship as morality, in spite of the qualification ‘inner,’
is that it perpetrates a confusion between two notions that it is vital to hold apart: the notions
of purposive activity and morality. Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, and reflections
on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles. But to call these principles of the
poisoner's art "the morality of poisoning" would simply blur the distinction between the
notion of efficiency for a purpose and those final judgments about activities and purposes
with which morality in its various forms is concerned.”22
Hart articulates that all deeds including lawmaking and poisoning, which are virtuous and
impermissible respectively, have internal standards of efficacy and that they should not be
mistaken for morality. Hart acknowledges that eight principles of legality are internally built
in the existing law conditions. The principles do not bring about a connection between the
concepts of morality and law.23
However, Fuller’s principles construe the moral ideals of fairness. The promulgation of rules
publicly and in terms that are understandable is a major component of efficacy; it also
doubles up as a ethical ideal. Morally, it is not right for a nation to impose rules that have not
been broadcasted in the presence of the public and in understandable terms. States should not
enact nor implement inconsistent and retroactive rules; rules that provide for impossible
actions. Impermissible acts such as poisoning could have their internal criteria of efficiency,
22 Frederick Schauer. "Fuller's Fairness: The Case of the Speluncean Explorers." U.
Queensland LJ 35 (2016): 11.
23 Charles E. Marske, Charles P. Kofron, and Steven Vago. "The Significance of
Natural Law in Contemporary Legal Thought." The Catholic Lawyer 24.1 (2017): 5.

Hart - Fuller Debate 12
however, the criterions are very different from the ideologies of legality. This makes the act
inconsistent with the provisions of moral ideals.
Nonetheless, the principles of Fuller do not operate as moral ideals; they operate internally as
aspects of efficacy. Fuller concedes that the legal systems of nations are in consistence with
substantial disparity from the eight moralities of legality. The legal conditions are
promulgated publicly, but in vague terms that bring about ambiguity. Most of the times the
officials also fail to fairly administer the laws in the best interest of th3e legal systems. The
administration of laws is sometimes unfair and unjust to other people. The created
divergences are said to be inconsistent with the legal system of a nation if they render the
system incapable of executing its primary mandate of guiding the social behaviours of
people.
The eight principles of legality function as conditions of efficacy not as moral ideals thereby
making them in-built conditions for law. Fuller’s legacy in advancing the theory of legal
positivism intends to extinguish the implications brought by John Austin’s theory.24 Fuller
discredited Austin’s view that the essential mandate of rules is to control behaviour. In this
type of legal system, the rules are defined as guidance for intelligent creatures by other
intelligent beings. The said beings that guide their peers are said to have power over them.
Austin’s theory seems to advance a system that involves rulers and subjects. Austin defines
law as rules set by those in power to govern people. Failure to subject to the rules leads to
punitive measures. Fuller seeks to oppose these implications that are raised by the Austinian
theory.
24 David Lyon. "Moral Aspects of Legal Theory 1." Law and Morality. Routledge,
2017. 109-140.

Hart - Fuller Debate 13
The relation between Hart and Fuller’s Arguments on Legal Positivism and Unjust
Regimes
The common unjust regime that is known to many is the Nazi Germany. The Hart and Fuller
debate is the battle of ideas between two legal positivists that have laid a legacy in the world
of theories and laws. This paper seeks to analyse the theories advanced by both positivists on
the Nazi law. Hart did not discuss Nazi law in depth; he misrepresented the characteristics
and nature of Nazi law.25 The implications of Nazi law were often misinterpreted; the
misinterpretation was negligible to the principle issues of the debate. The debate sought to
solve the dispute between positivism and natural law on the concept of law.
Hart articulates that law is a social fact which becomes valid upon public promulgation and
the correct procedures outlined by the legal rules in the system; the law is thus pliable to
conceptualization and nonfigurative analysis. The law contains a stable core consisting of
pure legal interpretations that are not influenced by external and non-legal factors. This brans
law as separable from morality and is vulnerable to application in bot immoral and moral
circumstances. Law does not constantly rely on morality so as to be valid. The validity of law
is non-reliant on morality.26 The determinants of legal validity are formal and bureaucratic
structures of the legal system. This is regarded are the most accurate definition of the concept
of Law. The desirable description of law is one that separates law from morality; morality be
arbitrated by agents in the legal system discreetly and applied externally as a criticism to the
law.27 Legal systems depend minimally on morality for the performance of their mandate and
25 Heikki Pihlajamäki. "Merging Comparative Law and Legal History: Towards an
Integrated Discipline." The American Journal of Comparative Law 66.4 (2018): 733-750.
26 David Plunkett. "Negotiating the Meaning of “Law”: The Metalinguistic Dimension
of the Dispute over Legal Positivism." Legal Theory 22.3-4 (2016): 205-275.

Hart - Fuller Debate 14
obligations.28 The dependence is brought by the fact that law and morality complement each
other in prevention of violence, safeguarding property rights, and the standards of impartiality
in the process of administering the law. This theory advances the idea of treating similar
cases in a similar manner.
According to Fuller, the systematic rules that give rise to laws and inspire people to follow
them are regarded as moral rules. The routine rules are applied within the framework of law
and reveal an inherent link between the concept of morality and law. Complying with the
underlying rules is a standard for validating legal systems. Laws can therefore be unjust and
will be regarded as invalid. Fuller articulates that there is an intrinsic link between coherence
and morality. Legal rules that are coherent (correspondent with the principles of morality) are
part of moral rules and are not susceptible to malicious purposes. A challenge on Fuller’s
point of view arises when law and morality are separated; this makes it possible to recourse to
formalism so as to validate the application of impermissible laws. Fuller explains that the
hypothesis represents the desirable and most accurate ways of describing the concept of law.
In this opinion, Fuller seeks to contrast Hart’s view on law as a social fact and non-reliant on
morality.
Both Hart and Fuller refer to a case of a grudge informer. The case was about a woman who
denounced her husband and reported him the authorities of the Nazi regime; she did this
because the husband had negatively remarked about Hitler’s administration. The woman
wanted to get rid of her husband that is why she reported him. The man was convicted and a
27 Joseph Raz. "The rule of law and its virtue." The Rule of Law and the Separation of
Powers. Routledge, 2017. 77-94.
28 Cristine Griffo, João Paulo A. Almeida, and Giancarlo Guizzardi. "Towards a legal
core ontology based on Alexy’s theory of fundamental rights." Multilingual Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL. 2015.

Hart - Fuller Debate 15
death sentence (based on the Nazi statute law) passed on to him because his remarks had
undermined Hitler’s Nazi administration. The provincial court of appeal in FRG (Federal
Republic of Germany) found the woman guilty and convicted her for depriving her husband
liberty unlawfully. Hart’s point of reasoning in the first report on German courts was wrong
basically because the case was erroneous. Hart stated that the court had invalidated the
decision made by the Nazi law courts based on the degree of injustice. The level of injustice
served to the woman’s husband was substantive. The court in FRG upheld the Nazi statutes
but convicted the woman because she had personal reasons for denouncing her husband and
that she knew the consequences of what she had done.
Hart and Fuller focused on ways in which a court of law can appropriately respond to
situations whereby detrimental laws were applied to attain unjust intentions.29 The case does
not offer the nature of the Nazi legal structure; it provides the arguments involved. The
misinterpretation of the grudge case does not affect to conclusive argument, therefore, the
unavailability of direct significance to the arguments advanced is exemplified. The tributary
circumstantial case that focuses on the unjust Nazi law is not significant the major point of
the discussion. This is clear based on the fact that both Hart and Fuller barely give attention
to the Nazi legal system. Despite the fact that the arguments by Hart and Fuller are similar,
the difference in the characteristics of Nazi law brings out the disparity. The application of
Nazi law by Hart and Fuller is determined by the eagerness of both positivists to progress a
claim that incorporates both legal positivism and natural law in the conceptualization of law.
Hart was interested in the Nazi regime in Germany because he wanted to find out why the
administration emphasized on law being law and the differences between law and moral
29 Nicholas GD Gougeon. Exploring Legal Philosophical and Criminological
Knowledge Production through HLA Hart and Lon L. Fuller. Diss. Université
d'Ottawa/University of Ottawa, 2017.

Hart - Fuller Debate 16
values. The first misinterpretation of the Nazi law occurred when a distinction between the
concept of morality and law could not be defined. The philosophy of law being law did not
make sense in the Nazi Germany. This is one of the situations whereby Hart was unable to
analyse the Nazi law based on factual nature of the law. Hart asserted that the Nazi law
conformed to his notion of the validity of law and that the general legal system was
summarized the grudge informer case.30 However, the case was not referenced by any
historical source thus it did not fit perfectly in the triumphing historical evidences. The Nazi
law does not correspond with liberal attitudes that were evident in other states.
Fuller, on the other hand, did not focus on the Nazi legal systems; he merely listed a few
principles that were applied by the Nazi regime. Fuller criticised Hart’s assumption that
something the court’s decision that could still be referred to as law persisted without referring
to the Nazi laws.31 Fuller argued that assuming that the difference between Nazi laws and
English laws was Nazi laws were unjust to Englishmen, was a serious mistake.32 Fuller
focused the nature and application of the Nazi laws subject to the case in the FRG case.
However, this does not contradict the effect of the arguments advanced by both positivists in
their hypothesis. This is because the consequences of the Nazi laws did not change. Hart
articulated that even if the Nazi Germany shifted to a positivist approach, his stand would not
change. Hart was more reliant on the intellectual and theoretical analysis of the law and not
the sociological and chronological analysis. Fuller further delved into the retrospective laws
and secretive laws. Fuller stated that Nazi Germany’s inescapabilty invalidated the nation’s
30 Brian Z. Tamanaha "An analytical map of social scientific approaches to the concept
of law." Legal Theory and the Social Sciences. Routledge, 2017. 53-87.
31 Torben Spaak. "Legal positivism, conventionalism, and the normativity of law."
Jurisprudence 9.2 (2018): 319-344.
32 Dennis Patterson. "After Legal Positivism." Jotwell: J. Things We Like (2018): 1.

Hart - Fuller Debate 17
legal systems. The regime did not follow the law and most of the time people opted to engage
in street violence; the courts were more than willing to ignore the law.
Hart methodologically strayed away from the study of Nazi Germany’s history; this proved
that he had accepted the formality of their legal system.33 This meant that Nazi Germany’s
legal system had inhabited its real core in the meaning of law and that very few cases fell out
of the established legal system. Fuller seems to be in agreement with Hart’s point of view that
the Nazi legal system was formal and valid; the laws were made in accordance with the laid
down procedures in the legal system. Similarly, Hart is not interested in Fuller’s view that
Nazi laws were substantively unfair and unjust; they had certain characteristics that were not
desired and informal.
Fuller makes a misrepresentation on the connection between rationality and morality. Fuller
argues that the procedures inclining to coherence (rationality) also tended towards morality
thereby creating a connection between the principles of legality and the concept of law.34
According to Fuller, positivism is not consistent with unjust laws. However, his claim on
rationality (coherence) is vulnerable to criticisms because of how he advances the idea of
morality functioning in a system that applies good law.
Conclusion
Both Hart and Fuller advanced a claim that Nazi laws were founded on the hypothesis of law
being primarily suited to democratic legal systems. They both failed to take a stand on the
33 Hanoch Dagan. "The real legacy of American legal realism." Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 38.1 (2018): 123-146.
34 Dragan Milovanovic. "International Journal for the Semiotics of Law Revue
Internationale De SÉmiotique Juridique: Instructions for Authors." International Journal for
the Semiotics of Law 12.1 (1999): 127-131.

Hart - Fuller Debate 18
nature of unjust and unfair laws. However, it is evident that both Fuller and Hart agreed on
the fact that Nazi laws were unjust. To conclude, Hart and Fuller are legal positivists that
have divergent philosophies on the issue of legal positivism, natural law and Nazi law.

Hart - Fuller Debate 19
References
Alexander, Larry. "Legal Positivism and originalist interpretation." Revista Argentina de
Teoría Jurídica (2015): 15-200.
Arnaud, André-Jean. "The transplanetary journey of a legal sociologist." Law and
Intersystemic Communication. Routledge, 2016. 29-42.
Barzun, Charles L. "Jerome Frank, Lon Fuller, and a Romantic Pragmatism." Yale JL &
Human. 29 (2017): 129.
Bix, Brian H. "Types of Legal Theory." Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social
Philosophy (2017): 1-6.
Bix, Brian. "On the dividing line between natural law theory and legal positivism." Law and
Morality. Routledge, 2017. 49-60.
Campbell, Tom D. Legal positivism. Routledge, 2016.
Campbell, Tom D., and Jeffrey Goldsworthy. Judicial power, democracy and legal
positivism. Routledge, 2017.
Dagan, Hanoch. "The real legacy of American legal realism." Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 38.1 (2018): 123-146.
d'Entreves, Alexander Passerin. Natural law: an introduction to legal philosophy. Routledge,
2017.
Dickson, Julie. "Descriptive Legal Theory." Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and
Social Philosophy (2017): 1-6.
Gougeon, Nicholas GD. Exploring Legal Philosophical and Criminological Knowledge
Production through HLA Hart and Lon L. Fuller. Diss. Université d'Ottawa/University of
Ottawa, 2017.

Hart - Fuller Debate 20
Griffo, Cristine, João Paulo A. Almeida, and Giancarlo Guizzardi. "Towards a legal core
ontology based on Alexy’s theory of fundamental rights." Multilingual Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Law, ICAIL. 2015.
Hart, Herbert L. A. "The new challenge to legal positivism (1979)." Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 36.3 (2016): 459-475.
Howe, Tay Choon. "An Analysis of ‘the Law’: Legal Positivism." Journal of Malaysian and
Comparative Law 40.1 (2018): 49-66.
Leiter, Brian. "Marx, law, ideology, legal positivism." Virginia Law Review (2015): 1179-
1196.
Lyons, David. "Moral Aspects of Legal Theory 1." Law and Morality. Routledge, 2017. 109-
140.
Marske, Charles E., Charles P. Kofron, and Steven Vago. "The Significance of Natural Law
in Contemporary Legal Thought." The Catholic Lawyer 24.1 (2017): 5.
Milovanovic, Dragan. "International Journal for the Semiotics of Law Revue Internationale
De SÉmiotique Juridique: Instructions for Authors." International Journal for the Semiotics
of Law 12.1 (1999): 127-131.
Patterson, Dennis. "After Legal Positivism." Jotwell: J. Things We Like (2018): 1.
Patterson, Dennis. "Dworkin's Criticisms of Hart's Positivism." The Cambridge Companion
to Legal Positivism draft of 1 (2019).
Pihlajamäki, Heikki. "Merging Comparative Law and Legal History: Towards an Integrated
Discipline." The American Journal of Comparative Law 66.4 (2018): 733-750.
Plunkett, David. "Negotiating the Meaning of “Law”: The Metalinguistic Dimension of the
Dispute over Legal Positivism." Legal Theory 22.3-4 (2016): 205-275.
Radin, Margaret Jane. "Reconsidering the rule of law." The Rule of Law and the Separation
of Powers. Routledge, 2017. 37-76.

Hart - Fuller Debate 21
Raz, Joseph. "The rule of law and its virtue." The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers.
Routledge, 2017. 77-94.
Schauer, Frederick. "Fuller's Fairness: The Case of the Speluncean Explorers." U.
Queensland LJ 35 (2016): 11.
Tucker, Edwin W. "The Morality of Law, by Lon L. Fuller," Indiana Law Journal: 40 (1965)
274-275
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