Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)

This assignment delves into the establishment, functions, and impact of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in New South Wales, Australia. It requires an analysis of the ICAC's historical context, its legal framework and powers, notable investigations conducted, and the broader influence it has had on promoting integrity within the public sector. The assignment emphasizes the critical role played by the ICAC in combating corruption and fostering public trust in government.

Chapter 6: The Australian approach – The Role of ICAC in Australia
Introduction
The anti-corruption strategies that have been implemented in Australia to prevent
corruptionhave been successfully implemented by the government of Australia through
various agencies and its strategies. These strategies include Eg Whistle-blower legislation
under the Corporations Law and in state jurisdictions such as NSW, Public Interest
Disclosures Act 1994 and unaccounted proceeds provisions.
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) The purpose of examining
the NSW Commission is whether Libya can learn from the experience of the NSW ICAC in
fighting corruption. Libya like Australia is a federated system with political authority divided
into Central/Federal and State/Local authority levels.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will examine ICAC structures,
functions, powers, and its accountability mechanisms. The second part will investigate the
various types of strategies employed in past years and the drivers that have controlled and
led to the amending these strategies over time.
6.1 The NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption
6.1.1 Overview of the NSW Integrity System
Australia's 'National Integrity Systems' are the aggregate of organizations, laws,
systems, practices and states of mind that empower and encourage honesty. New South
Wales is Australia's largest state. It was the first British settlement built up in 1788, getting
capable government in 1855 NSW has been selected for discussion as the largest state with

the largest numbers of public sector employees and the importance of ICAC to preventing
and combating corruption. The sector is governed by the Public Sector Employment and
Management Act 2002 (NSW).
The NSW part of the National Integrity System assessment investigated 23 different integrity
agencies and organisations, divided into three main categories.
On the other hand, the same studyfootnote the study found deficiencies that could hamper
public sector integrity, including:
1.Concerns about the independence and the capacity of the Electoral Funding Authority that
supervised financial donations, the funding and the spending by political candidates1. These
concerns were built around two of this Authority’s members being nominated by the Premier
and the Opposition leader. This was a problem because there would have been a conflict of
interest between the interest of the Authority and the interest of the opposition and ruling
party. These members may have worked for the interest of the parties and not the authority.
2.The absence of a legislative framework that would identify the required basic public sector
employees’ ethical conduct, particularly after the elimination of the Public Service Board
(PSB) in 1988. This left NSW the only state government that did not have a statutory code of
conduct for its public sector.2
3. Questions regarding the efficiency of the overall number of integrity agencies3. Fewer
institutions would reduce repetition and increase effectiveness.4NSW investigative and
integrity agencies can be divided into three groupsthe first group with general investigative
powers are the ICAC, the Ombudsman and the Audit Office. Also important are
administrative, legal and official organizations, courts and police, and the Premier's
12017. Promoting Integrity: Evaluating and Improving Public Institutions. Pp- 233-245
2Ibid
3Australian Commission of Law Enforcement, Police Integrity Commission, Criminal Justice Commission
4Ibid

Divisionand the Administrative Decisions Tribunal. The third group the Information
Commissioner) and in relation to particular areas, the Law Enforcement Conduct
Commission (formerly the Police Integrity Commission) and Health Care Complaints
Commission.
4. The lack of cooperation between the integrity institutions due to the political, legal and
budgetary limitations.5
5. The need for a sensible balanced approach between investigation, enforcement, education
and prevention to address public sector corruption.6
These factors will be important to the consideration by Libya about what measures to put in
place to deal with corrupt practices in Libya. The next section examines the jurisdiction and
effectiveness of the NSW ICAC.
6.1.2 The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
ICAC was established in 1988 and is central to prevention of corruption in NSW.
ICAC commenced operations in March 1989. ICAC was formed as part of the government
efforts to preserve and maintain the integrity of the NSW public sector7.Premier Greiner said,
in introducing the ICAC Act into the Parliament that the purpose of the legislation wasto
restore the integrity of the public administration and public institutions in NSWNothing is
more destructive of democracy than a situation where the people lack confidence in those
administrators and institutions that stand in a position of public trust. If a liberal and
democratic society is to flourish we need to ensure that the credibility of public institutions is
5IbidSmith, above n
6Brown, above n ; Smith, above n
7 Lethbridge, Henry J. Hard graft in Hong Kong: Scandal, corruption, the ICAC. Oxford University Press, 1985.

restored and safeguarded, and that community confidence in the integrity of public
administration is preserved and justified.8
Its other principal function is to prevent of such corruption through education and
research.The ICAC’s jurisdictionis limited to the public sector only, unless such acts by the
private sector cause an act of corruption by a public servant. This has caused issues such as in
the Cuneen case
Another difference between both the bodies is that The Hong Kong ICAC puts strong focus
on deterrence against corruption and on the other hand there is not much emphasis put by the
NSW ICAC on deterrence against corruption.
6.1.2.1 The organisational structure of NSW ICAC
The Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988is the statute establishing
ICAC, its structure and powers. The details of the establishment of ICAC are important to
any recommendations for an ICAC style body for Libya. The first year was devoted to
setting up the regulatory structure. It was always designed to be relatively small with staff
not to exceed 150.9
ICAC shall consist of a Chief Commissioner and two other commissioners. The Chief
Commissioner and the Commissioners are assisted by the chief executive officer, and such
other number of directors for its divisions.
In relation to the organisational structures, the Commission’s first organisational
charter begun with the four main positions: Director of Operations, Director of
Administration and Public Affairs, Commission Secretary and the General Counsel. Together
8 Griffith, G., 2015. ICAC v Cunneen: the power to investigate corrupt conduct. NSW Parliamentary Research
Service
9Ian Temby, 'ICAC-Working in the Public Interest' (1990) 2 Current Issues Crim. Just. 11

with the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner, this group served as the ‘senior
management group’ charged with planning for the Commission, implementing work systems
and appointing staff.10
Over the years, there have been changes to the Commission’s structures. The first of
the challenges was the appropriate balance between investigation and prevention. In 1995,
ICAC’s undertook its first 3 yearStrategic Plan 1995–199811. This was in response to the
increased demands on the Commission to detect corruption which continued to consume most
of its resources. Under this plan, the Commission gavepriority to an ‘integrated approach’
involving both prevention and education. An example of this approach is the investigation of
the former State Rail Authority (SRA), which found the SRA to be rife withcorruption. The
ICAC recommended for the establishment of a proper framework to combat corruption.
Consequently, not only did the new SRA management positively take into consideration the
Commission’s recommendations, but also it worked cooperatively with other agencies like
Freightcorp and Railway Service Australia to formulate preventative measures and setting up
time-limits to implement such strategies.12 These changescombined both the corruption
prevention and the education functions of the Commission into one program.13This provides
important lessons for Libya in its consideration of whether an ICAC style body should be
adopted for Libya.
In 2001, the Commission undertook another major ‘structural and functional’ review.
This review led to restructuring the Corporate Service Division into three units instead of the
previous seven units. The Operation Division was restructured to promote financial
investigation skills and strategic risk assessment. This structural and functional
10Ibid
11Doig, Alan, David Watt, and Robert Williams. "Hands‐on or hands‐off? Anti‐corruption agencies in action,
donor expectations, and a good enough reality." Public Administration and Development 26.2 (2006): 163-172.
12ICAC, '1998–1999 Annual Report ' ( Independent Commission Against Corruption, Sydney, 1999), p. 3.
13ICAC, 'Community Attitudes to Corruption and the ICAC 1995' ( Independent Commission Against
Corruption, 1996)

rearrangement was followed by evaluating the Commission staff skills, conducted in 2001 by
Ernst and Young. This examination showed deficiencies in areas such as leadership and risk
assessment. In response to this, the ICAC introduced the ‘Learning and Development’
program to improve and upgrade its staff skills.14This is also important in assessing whether a
statutory anti-corruption body should be implemented in Libya.
6.1.2Legislation and Jurisdiction
Section 13 of the current ICAC Act sets out in detail the Commission’s functions. The
functions can be categorised into five major categories: Investigating corruption complaints,
reviewing policy, work procedures and laws, providingan advisory role and performing an
educative function. It is also responsible for communicatingthe results of its investigationsto
appropriate authorities.15 The Act defies corrupt conduct as intentional and moral wrongdoing
rather than mistake or negligence.
“Corrupt conduct, as defined in the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act
1988 ("the ICAC Act"), is deliberate or intentional wrongdoing, not negligence or a mistake. It
has to involve or affect a NSW public official or public sector organisation.
While it can take many forms, corrupt conduct occurs when:
 a public official improperly uses, or tries to improperly use, the knowledge, power or
resources of their position for personal gain or the advantage of others
 a public official dishonestly exercises his or her official functions, or improperly exercises
his or her official functions in a partial manner, breaches public trust or misuses
information or material acquired during the course of his or her official functions
 a member of the public influences, or tries to influence, a public official to use his or her
position in a way that is dishonest or partial
 a member of the public engages in conduct that could involve one of the matters set out
in section 8(2A) of the ICAC Act where such conduct impairs, or could impair, public
confidence in public administration.
The NSW community expects public officials to perform their duties with honesty and in the
best interests of the public. Corrupt conduct by a public official involves a breach of public
trust that can lead to inequality, wasted resources or public money and reputational damage.
Some examples of corrupt conduct are:
 a local councillor voting in favour of a development in which the councillor has an
undisclosed financial interest
 a member of the public bribing an official to pass a drivers licence test
 a former public official selling confidential information gained while working in an official
capacity.
14 FIRST NAME Masters, A.B. and Adam Graycar, , 2016. Making corruption disappear in local
government. Public Integrity, 18(1), pp.42-58. Is this a book or where can it be found????
15The Independent Commission Against Corruption Act, 1988 Australia

For the ICAC to be able to pursue a matter (that is, for the matter to be within ICAC
jurisdiction), the corruption must involve or affect a NSW public official or public authority.
If the ICAC is to consider investigating the matter, the conduct must also meet the conditions
set out in section 9 of the ICAC Act. These conditions are that the conduct could constitute or
involve:
 a criminal offence, or
 a disciplinary offence, or
 constitute reasonable grounds for dismissing or otherwise terminating the services of a
public official, or
 in the case of a member of the NSW Parliament or local government councillor, a
substantial breach of an applicable code of conduct.”
JURISDICTION OF ICAC
The ICAC’s jurisdiction is set out under the Act. The principal section is section 8
which provides:
SECTION 8 OF THE ICAC Act states “8 General nature of corrupt conduct
(1) Corrupt conduct is:
(a) any conduct of any person (whether or not a public official) that adversely
affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the honest
or impartial exercise of official functions by any public official, any group or
body of public officials or any public authority, or
(b) any conduct of a public official that constitutes or involves the dishonest or
partial exercise of any of his or her official functions, or
(c) any conduct of a public official or former public official that constitutes or
involves a breach of public trust, or
(d) any conduct of a public official or former public official that involves the
misuse of information or material that he or she has acquired in the course of
his or her official functions, whether or not for his or her benefit or for the
benefit of any other person.
(2) Corrupt conduct is also any conduct of any person (whether or not a public
official) that adversely affects, or that could adversely affect, either directly
or indirectly, the exercise of official functions by any public official, any group
or body of public officials or any public authority and which could involve any
of the following matters:
(a) official misconduct (including breach of trust, fraud in office, nonfeasance,
misfeasance, malfeasance, oppression, extortion or imposition),
(b) bribery,
(c) blackmail,

(d) obtaining or offering secret commissions,
(e) fraud,
(f) theft,
(g) perverting the course of justice,
(h) embezzlement,
(i) election bribery,
(j) election funding offences,
(k) election fraud,
(l) treating,
(m) tax evasion,
(n) revenue evasion,
(o) currency violations,
(p) illegal drug dealings,
(q) illegal gambling,
(r) obtaining financial benefit by vice engaged in by others,
(s) bankruptcy and company violations,
(t) harbouring criminals,
(u) forgery,
(v) treason or other offences against the Sovereign,
(w) homicide or violence,
(x) matters of the same or a similar nature to any listed above,
(y) any conspiracy or attempt in relation to any of the above.
(2A) Corrupt conduct is also any conduct of any person (whether or not a public
official) that impairs, or that could impair, public confidence in public
administration and which could involve any of the following matters:
(a) collusive tendering,
(b) fraud in relation to applications for licences, permits or other authorities
under legislation designed to protect health and safety or the
environment or designed to facilitate the management and commercial
exploitation of resources,

(c) dishonestly obtaining or assisting in obtaining, or dishonestly benefiting
from, the payment or application of public funds for private advantage
or the disposition of public assets for private advantage,
(d) defrauding the public revenue,
(e) fraudulently obtaining or retaining employment or appointment as a
public official.
(3) Conduct may amount to corrupt conduct under subsection (1), (2) or (2A)
even though it occurred before the commencement of that subsection, and it
does not matter that some or all of the effects or other ingredients necessary
to establish such corrupt conduct occurred before that commencement and
that any person or persons involved are no longer public officials.
(4) Conduct committed by or in relation to a person who was not or is not a
public official may amount to corrupt conduct under this section with respect
to the exercise of his or her official functions after becoming a public official.
This subsection extends to a person seeking to become a public official even
if the person fails to become a public official.
(5) Conduct may amount to corrupt conduct under this section even though it
occurred outside the State or outside Australia, and matters listed in
subsection (2) or (2A) refer to:
(a) matters arising in the State or matters arising under the law of the State, or
(b) matters arising outside the State or outside Australia or matters arising under
the law of the Commonwealth or under any other law.
(6) The specific mention of a kind of conduct in a provision of this section shall
not be regarded as limiting the scope of any other provision of this section.”
What is corrupt conduct,
Corrupt Conduct,isdefined by the ICAC Act, in sections WHAT SECTIONS.
Give details from the act section by section. The material you have set out below is not
sufficiently clear. It is better to go back to the Act and make sure you have the details
correct.
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION
The three primary functions of ICACare: This should refer directly to the Act and
what it sets out as the primary functions of ICAC.

i. Examining and uncovering corrupt conduct in the NSW public sector
ii. Preventing corruption through guidance and help
iii. Instructing the NSW people, group and public sector about corruption and its
effects.
Investigating corruption and ICAC
These key capacities of ICAC are accomplished through the receipt, examination and
appraisal of complaints and reports of claimed corruption, referrals by the NSW Electoral
Commission of certain conceivable criminal offenses under race subsidizing, decision or
campaigning laws, and the direct of examinations, mandatory examinations and open
investigation into genuine and fundamental defilement. *
The Act gives ICAC wide power to explore any claim or situation which, as its
would see it, infers that degenerate direct has happened. The ICAC can likewise explore
direct prone to permit, empower or cause corrupt conduct.
The ICAC effectively supports individuals from the general population and open
authorities to report presumed degenerate direct. Essential officers counting heads of state
government offices and general directors of committees are required to report any issue that
they sensibly presume includes or may include degenerate lead. ????Pastors are likewise
required to report either specifically to the ICAC or through the office's vital officer. The
NSW Parliament can coordinate with the ICAC to explore an issue and the ICAC can
distinguish matters for examination itself.
The ICAC gets and enlists all grumblings, reports and NSW Electoral Commission
referrals, makes an underlying appraisal and looks for additional data as required. It at that
point, it refers all issues within ICAC's jurisdiction to an Assessment Panel for a choice about

how each issue ought to be managed. The ICAC likewise investigates whether complaints
demonstrate a particular pattern warranting intervention.
IN A SEPARATE PART you should looking at processes, procedures open v closed
hearings, different strategies that can be employed.
The findings of the Waverley Municipal Council investigation were subjected to a
number of legal proceedings by plaintiffs challenging among, other things, the Commission’s
power to mark any findings or report that a person had committed or was guilty of a criminal
offence or had behaved in a manner that would be considered a criminal offence. They also
challenged and argued the legality of the hearings on the ground that the conducted hearings’
extent and rationale were beyond its power.16
The High Court held that ICAC’S role was to ‘investigate and assemble evidence’ but
not to decide the criminality of such findings, confirming that the Commission ‘is not a law
enforcement agency and it exercises no judicial or quasi-judicial function’.17
The litigation against the ICAC findings continued with other investigations, to the
point where defending such lawsuits was considered an impediment to the Commission’s
original functions, causing delays in furnishing reports for up to 12 months in some cases and
constituting a wastage of its financial resources during the process of defending these
allegations.18
The court decisions in these cases, and in the cases over the years to come, supporting
such allegations not only undermined the Commission’s work and effectiveness but it also
started new precedents for future investigation results to be challenged. For example, in 1992,
16ICAC, 'ICAC Annual Report To 30 June 1990' ( The Independent Commission Against Corruption, Sydney,
1990)
17V. Blunden, ' ICAC Not Entitled to Issue Findings of Guilty: High Court', The Sydney Morning Herald,
Sydney. 1990, p. 4.Balog v Independent Commission Against Corruption [1990] HCA 28; (1990) 169 CLR 625
18ICAC, above n aat pp 422

the Metherell/Greiner/ Moore investigation was referred to the ICAC by the NSW Parliament
accusing both the then-Premier Greiner, the Minister of Environment, Mr. Moore, and Dr
Terry Metherell, a member of the NSW Parliament, of acting corruptly by orchestrating the
resignation of Dr Metherell from the Parliament by offering him apublic service post.19 The
allegations in this particular case were that such a resignation was fabricated between the
parties so that the Greiner Government would maintain a political stability within State
Parliament after Metherell threatened to vote against the Government.20
The Commission’s investigations revealed that both the Premier Greiner and his
Environment Minister had behaved corruptly within the meaning of the ICAC Act.21 These
findings were litigated in the NSW Court of Appeal in which the Court decided that the
Commission’s findings regarding the then-Premier and the Environment Minister
involvement in a corrupt conduct were outside ICAC’s jurisdiction as stated in the Cuneen
case22. The effect of the Court of Appeal ruling in this case was considered as a ‘negative
aspect’ of the work in the Commission’s early years. Its first Commissioner, Ian Temby QC,
contended that this put a large group of public sector employees beyond its ‘jurisdiction’.
Together with the Commission’s Parliamentary Committee scrutinising the ICAC Act
andrecommending some changes,23 the Commission saw the necessity of making ‘statutory
changes’ to its Act. In his address before the Australian Bar Association Conference 1990,
the Commissioner said
Body such as the ICAC which exists to serve the community can function in
such a way as to protect in a proper way the interests of individuals who appear before
19ICAC, Report on investigation into the Metherell resignation and appointment' ( Independent Commission
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinosrch.cgi?method=boolean;query=independent%20commission%20against
%20corruption;meta=%2Fau;mask_path=au%2Fcases%2Fcth%2FHCA&offset=20Against Corruption, Sydney,
1992)
20ICAC, ' The Investigation Process. Sydney' (2006)
21ICAC, 'Publication and Resources ' (1992) ICAC, Sydney
22Corruption vCunneen [2015] HCA 14
23Ibid

it. However, it cannot, unless enabled to bring down reports which are not just
thorough but which are also prompt. Presently, the statute and the judgment upon it
are such as to invite further litigation and accordingly there will certainly be further
long delays so far as future reports are concerned. The position can and should be
rectified by statutory changes which state precisely what our rights and
responsibilities are when it comes to the preparation of reports.24
As a result, the Parliamentary Committee on the ICAC examined the Commission’s
procedures for public and private hearings and how it would deal with its witnesses. The
Parliamentary Committee of the ICAC investigation came to support the ICAC’s
investigative procedures and the use of public hearings. It also advocated the adoption of
procedures that would minimise any damage to witnesses that could be caused by public
hearings including the amendment of s31 of the ICAC Act that would give it more options
including private hearings.25The ICAC Act was amended in December 1990. The amended
Act touched on, among other things, the Commission’s reporting powers, the expansion of its
summons powers to include people located interstate.26 So what does the Act now provide?
One of the major challenges to the Commission’s investigative function was the way
the ICAC conducted its investigations. The ICAC’s investigative function’s main purpose
was to uncover public sector corruption to pave the way for a ‘systemic change’. It did not
perform a prosecutorial role..However ICAC’s investigations and hearings shared a number
of the characteristics found in both the inquisitorial and the adversarial judicial models.
Generally, its conduct of private investigations and public hearings to reveal corruption
concur swith the inquisitorial judicial model, while using public hearings as an investigative
tool ‘in their own right’ leans to the adversarial judicial model.27
24ICAC, above n, p. 62-63.
25ICAC, above n
26Ibid you need to refer to the info in more details.
27First name first Pakes, F., 2014. Comparative criminal justice. Routledge.

ICAC also uses public hearings as a method of investigation. This has the advantage
that it allows ICAC to distance its inquiries from scepticism and unfounded allegations.28
However, using public hearings was associated with concerns related to the damage that this
might cause to the reputation of people brought before the Commission.29 A good example of
such concern would be what has happened to Mr Brian Preston during the ICAC’s North
Coast Inquiry in 1990. Mr Preston was publicly accused by Mr Frank, one of the landowners
on the NSW north coast, in relation to how Mr Preston gave evidence during the inquiry, for
soliciting a bribe from Mr Frank as a way to stop court proceedings against the witness. After
airing such allegations on the television news, the accusations turned out to be baseless and
Mr Preston innocent.30
To guard against these kinds of incidents, in 1990, the Joint Parliamentary Committee
reviewed the Commission’s procedures in relation to witnesses and other persons appearing
in its investigations. In its final report titled ‘Openness and Secrecy in Inquiries into
Organised Crime and Corruption: Questions of Damage to Reputations’31, the Committee, in
spite of acknowledging the positive effects of public hearings, asserted that they had negative
consequences as well. Its recommendations came to provide the foundation for amendment to
the Actin 1991 to include precautions and measures to the way public hearings were
conducted that would prevent damage to reputations. The Commission was given greater
discretion in deciding whether the matter would be investigated publicly or in private
hearings under part 3A the Act..32
28ICAC, above n
29Luis Garcia, 'Televising ICAC ' A Danger To Witnesses', The Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney 1990
30ICAC, above n
31Newburn, Tim, and Barry Webb. Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons
from the literature. London: Home Office, 1999.
32ICAC, 'Corruption ... Who Wants to Know? Unravelling Corruption II: Exploring Changes in the Public Sector
Perspective 1993–1999' (2001) Independent Commission Against Corruption, Sydney

Legal changes affecting the Commission’s operations continued over the years. This
was either at the recommendation of the Commission and its Committee or as a result of
litigation. The Act was again amended in 1996 because the Police Integrity Commission Act
1996 transferred the ICAC responsibility of investigating complaints of police corruption to
the newly established Police Integrity Commission (PIC), (GIVE ITS NEW NAME) and
limited the ICAC’s role to advising and assisting the Police Service on issues related to
corruption prevention and education.33
These changes represented one of the main characteristics of the ICAC experience.
The ICAC Act went through more than seven amendments after its establishment in 1989,
many of them touching upon specific aspects in the Act, but the latest one was the most
significant to date. The 2006 amendments abolished the Operations Review Committee,
which was charged with advising the Commission on whether or not to initiate or to
discontinue an investigation. The creation of the office of the ICAC Inspector in 2005 with its
very wide responsibilities over the Commission’s functions rendered the Operations Review
Committeework insignificant, so it was officially abolished in June 2006. As for the ICAC
jurisdiction, the Commission’s jurisdictionis limited to the public sector only, unless such
acts by the private sector cause an act of corruption by a public servant. The Commission was
created under section 12A of the ICAC Act 1988 with both an investigative and a preventative
role supported by ‘unusual powers’ that covered more than 130 governmental organisations
with an estimated population of more than 360,000 employees, making it about 10.5% of the
total New South Wales labour force. Its jurisdiction also extended to more than 159 local
councils, employing up to 1800 councillors and over 40,000 staff. In addition, more than 10
universities within NSW come under the ICAC authority and an additional 1000 boards and
33ICAC, above n ; ICAC, above n ; Graham Kelly, ' The Annual Report of the Inspector of the Independent
Commission Against Corruption 2005–2006' (Office of the Inspector of the Independent Commission Against
Corruption, Sydney, 2006); Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment (Operations Review
Committee) Act, 2006 No 29 (NSW).

committees across the state.34 Are these figures up to date? The footnotes refer to 1988 and
2005. This needs to be checked.
6.1.2.3 Powers
Search warrants need to be applied for and approved by a judicial authority in the
local courts. Using listening devices requires the approval of a Justice of the Supreme Court
and the use of telephone interception needs to be approved by a member of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal and use of the surveillance techniques must be authorised
by the Commission’s Executive Director, the Strategic Operation Director and needs, in
addition, to be reported to the Investigation Management Group that oversees ICAC
investigations as provided in section 88 of the ICAC Act.35
6.1.2.4 Accountability
In 2000, the ICAC Parliamentary Committee started the first ever examination of the
Commission’s accountability structures. The review resulted from the increasing number of
complaints filed against ICAC’s operations and its officers. ,.36
The Committee reported a noticeable deficiency in the way complaints against the
ICAC and its employees were administered. The Committee Chair claimed there were
numerous complaints against the ICAC itself that were neglected and not properly
independently investigated. The ICAC Committee was not adequately equipped to deal
effectively with those complaints.37 Additional power and training were provided to the
committee so that they would be able to address the issue more appropriately.
34Jennifer Hewett, 'The Wide, Wide Powers of ICAC' (1988) Australian Financial Review ; C. Gellatly,
'Overview Report For The NSW Public Sector Workforce Profile' (NSW Premier's Department Public
Employment Office, 2005)
35New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, above n
36John Ellicott, 'Corruption body to get inspector', The Australian 2000; John Hatzisterrgos, 'The ICAC –
Accounting For Extraordinary Powers' (2000) Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption,
Sydneyincluding an officer involved in a sexual relationship with an informant under investigation.
37John Hatzisterrgos, above n ; FIRST NAMES FIRST L. & O'Brien Perry, N.,, 'Call for a watch on watchdog',
The Australian 2003; AAP, ' NSW – ICAC to be put under microscope', Australian Associated Press 2000

There are both internal and external accountability mechanisms as well as judicial oversight
through judicial review.
6.1.6 External Accountability
The Parliamentary Joint Committee is generally charged with monitoring and
examining the way the Commission is conducting its functions, activities, and reports and
examining corruption trends and practices for the reason of advising the Parliament of any
changes which needed to be added to the Commission functions or procedures to meet such
trends.38
Section 64 (2) of the Act clearly states that the Committee is not authorised to review
the Commission’s findings, recommendations or decisions on a particular investigation or
particular conduct.39 In general, the Committee’s role is to provide an ‘oversight of a policy
and procedural nature’.40The operations of ICAC are overseen by the Inspector for ICAC.
This position was preceded by an Operation Review Committee which was subsequently
abolished.
The now abolished Operations Review Committee during its review of the ICAC
accountability arrangements, raised two main concerns. The first was the Committee’s
inability to advise on issues categorised by the Commission as information or reports, which
in return gave the ICAC ample opportunity to classify matters before it. The second concern
was the increasing number of cases and reports needing to be examined by the ORC at each
meeting, casting some doubts on the comprehension and the thoroughness on deciding each
matter.41Followingthe McClintock review of the ORC, in 2005, ORC was abolished in
38New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, above n, ICAC Act Part 7, Section 64,
subsection (1).
39Ibid, Part 7, ection 64, subsection (2). S.64(2)
40John Hatzisterrgos, above n, p. 14.
41Ibid

accordance with the recommendations42. The review was abolished as it had bad implications
towards fighting corruption.
The abolition of the ORC paved the way for the creation of the ICAC Inspector
position recommended in the review. The inspector was to monitor, audit, investigate and
report on the activities of the ICAC. Accordingly, the ICAC Act was amended to reflect these
recommendations. The Office of the ICAC Inspector was created under the Independent
Commission Against Corruption Act (Amendment) 2005 section 6A. 43 it is important for
Libya as the level of corruption in the country is very high.
The role of the Inspector
The findings of the review concluded that there was an absence of a proper
accountability mechanism to deal with allegations and complaints of misconduct by the
ICAC or its employees (see section 6.1.6 above). Therefore, there was a need to establish an
Office of the ICAC Inspector, with the necessary statutory ‘powers’ authorising them to
tackle these matters.44The Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment Act
2005, assented to on 14 April 2005, established the Inspector of the ICAC, with the main
duty of scrutinising the ICAC’s usage of its investigative powers, examining complaints
made against the Commission and its officers, supervising any maladministration such as
delays in the investigation or unjustified invasion of privacy and to measure the effectiveness
of the Commission’s activities.45During the first year of operation, the ICAC Inspector
received 35 complaints in relation to the ICAC operations and its officers. Twenty-one
42McClintock, David, and R. Ison. "Conceptual metaphors: a review with implications for human
understandings and systems practice." Cybernetics & Human Knowing 11.1 (2004): 25-47.
43AAP, above n ; ICAC, above n
44Graham Kelly, above n ; Paola Totaro, 'Corruption Watchdog To Face Judicial Review', The Sydney Morning
Herald 2004
45Justice Jerrold Cripps, 'The Independent Commission Against Crime' in T. H. K. YEADON (ed), The 2nd
National Conference of Parliamentary Oversight Committees of Anti-Corruption/Crime Bodies (Parliament
House, Sydney., 2006), Part 5A, Section 57A & 57B; Independent Commission Against Corruption Amendment
(Operations Review Committee) Act, 2006 No 29 (NSW).

matters were finalised, three were referred for re-examination by the ICAC while 11 of those
complaint were ‘still active’.46
Powers of the inspector under part 5A of the Independent Commission Against Corruption
Act 1988 (ICAC Act) are as follows. The inspector can investigate any conduct of ICAC
officers or any aspect of the ICACs operations. The inspector may request for full access to
the records of the ICAC along with copies. The officers of ICAC may be asked to appear
before him and to produce documents. He has power to access and investigate complaints
against ICAC officers. He also has the power to make recommendation for disciplinary
actions.
These major external accountability measures usually work in conjunction with other
methods of accountability imposed upon the Commission. These accountability mechanisms
include limiting the Commissioner to a single non-renewable term, according to section 33
the financial scrutiny by the Treasury, the ability of the Ombudsman to examine its telephone
interception powers, protecting disclosures in connection with misconduct inside the
Commission and administering petitions under the Freedom of Information Act 1982.47This
info is very out of date as the Freedom of Information Act was repealed in 2009, see Now
Government information (Public Accesss) Act 2009.
6.1.7 Internal accountability UP TO HERE
Internally, the Commission had created a ‘committee system’ to monitor its main
functions, such as the ‘Investigation Management Group’ to supervise its investigative work,
the ‘Prevention Management Group’ to review its preventative, education and research
development and the ‘Executive Management Group’ in charge of directing, improving and
applying procedures to enhance the organisational output of the Commission.48
46ICAC, above n
47Heilbrunn, above n
48ICAC, above n Now the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009.

6.1.8 Judicial Review
Equity is a completely subjective and dynamic idea - like greatcraftsmanship, we
know it when we see it, yet it can't be characterized. This qualification is basically vital, not
minimum since when courts look to convey equity as opposed to law, the outcomes are
typically unintended.
That, lamentably, is precisely what most of the High Court has done on account of
ICAC v Margaret Cunneen SC. In conveying an outcome about which a great many people
will think, "That is correct, appears to be correct", the Court has significantly fixed ICAC and
murdered off an immense piece of the power the general population of NSW thought they
had given to ICAC to uncover the sort of foundational debasement about which we've learned
as of late exclusively on the grounds that ICAC researched it. That won't be occurring later
on.
What Cunneen professedly did was to prompt her child's sweetheart, who had an auto
collision, to imagine she was having chest torments with the goal that the police would not
give her a breath test. ICAC propelled an examination. Cunneen tested its energy to do as
such, in the long run winning four to one in the High Court. The outcome for her is that there
will be no ICAC request, in spite of the fact that the police could at present explore and she
would be blameworthy of a genuine wrongdoing if the affirmations demonstrated right.
6.2 Conclusion
Although the ICAC, for the last seventeen years of its life, has gone through different
phases from overcoming the teething difficulties of introducing itself to the community and
establishing its credibility, it has become an essential part of and a driving force in preserving
the integrity of the NSW public sector. When asked to comment on his Commission’s
success, former Commissioner O’Keefe said, among other things, ‘the word is out there that

people can come to NSW and do business and they’ll be fairly dealt with, and if they’re not,
that there’s someone you can go to and complain’.49
This view was repeated in the Commission's annual report of that particular year
(1997), by stating that NSW became a better business hub in Australia largely because of the
work of ICAC, with business leaders expressing their satisfaction toward the existence of
ICAC as a mechanism to insure that public officials in NSW abide by the law, and for ICAC
to be a front runner in the preservation of the integrity of NSW public sector both nationally
and internationally.50
Examining ICAC structures, legislation and its special powers presents a similar
picture. Equity is a completely subjective and dynamic idea - like great Though it was not a
product of an inquiry, but election promises, the ICAC’s overall framework, beginning with
its roots, shares similar political backgrounds because it was created by its political masters.
The creation of the ICAC in NSW furthered the interests of the Greiner Government of New
South Wales as a government that upheld its promises of creating such agency to the public
of NSW if it was elected. The ICAC bill was received with enormous support by both
Houses of Parliament of NSW.51
Its legislation, jurisdiction and its powers are similar to others, with the exception that
it does not have powers over the police. That power of police was removed from its
jurisdiction in 1996 in what has been seen as a failure on its part to deal with matters. The
other difference between the two Commissions are you talking about Hong kongis that the
ICAC has been designed exclusively to deal with corruption, while the what is CMC has the
organised crime function as well as its misconduct function.
49D. Fagan, '1997', The Australian Do the watchdogs need Muzzling?
50ICAC, 'Community Attitudes to Corruption and the ICAC 1996' (Independent Commission Against
Corruption, Sydney, 1997)
51ICAC, above n

However, despite the lack of evidence it can be argued that the ICAC has an
advantage that it functions with a single focus on corruption. It is possible to argue that all
these inclusions might divert the Commission from its original track of combating public
sector corruption.
The next part will examine what strategies the ICAC has been implementing in order
to combat corruption in the NSW public sector. What kind of reactive and proactive measures
of combating corruption are found to be more effective than others? The part will also be
examining the ICAC’s performance indicators.
Chapter 6: The Australian approach – The Role of ICAC in Australia
6.2 Evaluation, success, failure
The previous section has described the Independent Commission Against
Corruption’s structures, legislation, jurisdiction, functions, powers and its accountability
mechanisms. This section examines the different types of strategies implemented across time
and the circumstances that have led to the changing of these strategies over the years. The
agency was designed as a fact-finding organisation. This meant, over the years, a greater
focus on the investigative function, particularly in its formative years. In recent years, a more
integrated approach was applied to cope with corruption investigations, with corruption
prevention taking precedence.
The ICAC study, found lacks in formal coordination mechanism between its integrity
system components. However, in general, the ICAC has most of the strategies, reactive and
proactive, contained in the proposed model, except for the integrity testing, complaints
profiling and early warning systems.

6.2.1. Reactive Measures
The previous chapter 6.1 identified investigation, prosecution, surveillance and
enforcement (penalties and sanctions) as the major reactive mechanisms that could be used as
part of the reactive approach to corruption. Intelligence plays an important role when dealing
reactively with misconduct. It has been recognised as the main supportive strategy. In many
reactive investigations, intelligence experts tend to take part and provide a vital supportive
assistance to the investigative team. Some of their functions when they participate in the
investigation of corruption are to examine and assess results and investigation outcomes, thus
providing analysis, advice and direction to areas that need to be examined by the team in
charge of the investigation. There are also other supporting elements that complement the
work of the reactive approach of the ICAC. These include organisations such as special
commissions, police services, or other anti-corruption bodies such as the Ombudsman or (in
the case of NSW) the Police Integrity Commission (PIC). These organisations play an
important role in reinforcing the effectiveness of the ICAC’s reactive strategies and easing
the workload of different anti-corruption commissions. The use of these supporting elements
and agencies might very much fit the current trend with anti-corruption bodies to give public
sector organisations and the police service greater responsibilities in handling complaints of
misconduct.
6.2.1.2 Investigation
During the past few years of ICAC’s work, investigations were, and still are, the
corner stone of its functionality. The reason behind this might be because the agency was
formed as a fact-finding organisation. The idea was that the results of such investigations not
only expose corruption and lay the foundation for any further legal actions by the concerned
authorities, through putting together evidence that might be acceptable by the court of law,
but also that they are closely related to the preventative work of the agency through the

application of such investigations and recommendations to prevent the recurrence of
misconduct in the future.52 Though the ICAC Act allows the Commission the privilege of
deciding which cases to investigate, the investigative work of the Commission started
immediately after its commencement. The first year of the ICAC was devoted mainly to the
establishment of the Commission’s multiple departments and functions; the investigation of
corruption was given the same attention. This commitment to the investigative work of the
Commission was a response to the public outcry for the need to have such an agency in NSW
to tackle corruption, and to convey the message that the newly formed agency was serious
about tackling such a problem. By the end of June 1989, the Commission had seven official
matters under investigation, with only two of those cases brought to the public, but none were
completed and therefore none led to any legal or disciplinary action.53 The Waverley
Municipal Council investigation was one of the first publicly heard cases by the Commission.
The investigation started in mid-March 1989 into whether there were linkages between the
Waverley Council Chief Engineer and town planner personnel and family business dealings.
McDonald G Stait with the developer Dainford group for the latter had received favourable
treatment from the Council. The findings of this investigation were subject to legal challenge,
as was stated in the previous chapter, over the Commission’s power to report findings of
criminality against the people it investigated.54
Another early case involved the Tweed Shire Council. There were allegations of
bribes being given to consultants and local politicians by developers interested in the
52Peter Larmour, above n ; Deirdre Cooper and Alexandra Mills, 'Learning From Experience: The NSW ICAC
project to review investigations to support knowledge-based prevention policy
' in European anti-corruption agencies: Protecting the community’s financial interests in a knowledge-based,
innovative and integrated manner
(2006)
53ICAC, above n
54ICAC, above n

development of the Northern Rivers region of NSW. The investigation confirmed such illegal
payments. The Commission’s report was followed by several legal proceedings.55
In all, by the end of its first full year of operating, the Commission had 14 official
investigations in hand, as a result of assessing 1091 ‘approaches’ alleging corrupt acts
requesting the ICAC to examine such allegations. Both local governments and the police had
the largest number of these complaints, with the first having 36.5% and the latter 15.9% of
the total complaints. About a quarter of such approaches fell outside the Commission’s
jurisdictions.56
In the years to come, the flow of complaints continued to increase rapidly. Table 6.6
illustrates the expansion for both the ICAC’s received complaints and the number of formal
investigations. It must be noted that using the term ‘formal investigation’ was meant to
represent matters/cases of misconduct that were believed to be the Commission’s special
powers. It is important to examine such allegations in accordance with s20 of the Act. The
authorisations to formally investigate claims of corruption have their own processes, where
theallegations are weighted against various elements, such as the significance of the claims,
the complications, what chance the preventative measures had in dealing with such
allegations and whether the Commission, by investigating those claims, could send a message
in relation to corruption.57 Table 6.7 is an illustration of the ICAC’s expanded investigative
functions.
In deciding which matters to investigate, the Commission established the ‘ICAC
Assessment Panel’, comprising the Director of Investigations, the Commission Solicitor,
theDirector of Corruption & Education and assisted by the Manager of Assessments. The
panel has created a number of criteria to help it make decisions on which matters to examine.
55ICAC, above n
56ICAC, above n
57ICAC, above n ; ICAC, above n

These criteria include: whether the matter lies within the Commission’s jurisdiction, whether
there are any indications of systemic deficiencies in that particular public organisation, and if
so, what the seriousness is of such weakness, what its effects are, particularly those
concerning public safety, and whether it is related to financial aspects.58
The panel can take one of four major actions regarding each matter reviewed. First, it
can either take ‘no action’ if the matter does not warrant corruption charges or immediately
refer it to other investigative organisations such as the Ombudsman, the Health Care
Complaints Commission or the Department of Local Government. Secondly, it could require
the agency against which the matter or the complaint is made to investigate the allegations if
the Commission was satisfied that that agency had adequate facilities to do so. In this case,
the agency would be required to report back to the ICAC on its findings. Third, the ICAC
could decide to conduct a preliminary investigation if the issues were judged to be
worthwhile. Though this kind of matter might not lead to a formal investigation, through
examination it may later be decided to refer it to another agency or deem it to be ‘not for
investigation’. The fourth option is for the Commission to conduct a formal investigation if
the issue has the potential for exposing major systemic corruption.59 Table 6.8 provides an
example of the panel actions taken during1999/2000 to illustrate the different outcomes
possible.
An example of the matters referred to public agencies for investigation is the ICAC’s
decision to refer to the Department of Health several matters it had received about drugs
disappearing from hospitals. The agency investigations found some loopholes in the
procedures concerning the handling of drugs and presented 19 recommendations touching
different aspects of handling drugs, such as managing drug safes, procedures related to
58ICAC, '1999–2000 Annual Report' ( Independent Commission Against Corruption, Sydney, 2000)
59Ibid

entries for drug registers, training and drug deliveries.60 The Commission, in ensuring that its
investigations and recommendations were implemented, established the Recos on the web
program. This initiative was intended to monitor and report the level of implementation of
ICAC investigative reports by the public departments concerned.
For example, in 2003–2004, the ICAC made 92 recommendations to various
departments in ten of its investigation reports that particular year. In their obligation to report
back, the involved public departments showed a high percentage of implementation rates of
the Commission’s recommendations.61
The ICAC was formed to act as a fact-finding body, consequently, its investigative
functions continued to take up most of its resources. Looking at its staffing distribution across
its different divisions, it is most noticeable that its Strategic Operation Division takes most of
its staff. Table 6.9 provides an illustration of its staff profiling over the last few years.
6.2.1.3 Surveillance
Surveillance, as stated previously, is one of the ICAC’s investigative techniques at the
disposal of the Strategic Operation Division (SOD.) It is not a given statutory power as is the
case with the Queensland CMC. For the Strategic Operation Division to use surveillance it
must be authorised by the Executive Director and it must be reported to the Investigation
Management Group (IMG) which directs, advises and monitors the Commission’s
investigations.62
Surveillance has been always part of the Commission’s investigative branch, the
SOD. For many years, surveillance officers were incorporated within the investigation unit.
However, during 2001–2002, the Strategic Operation Division was restructured to reinforce
60ICAC, 'ICAC 2002–2003 Annual Report ' (Independent Commission Against Corruption, Sydney, 2003)
61ICAC, 'ICAC 2003-2004 Aunnal report' (Independent Commission Against Corruption, Sydney, 2004)
62ICAC, above n

the ICAC’s investigative function. The restructuring brought the Strategic Risk Assessment
Unit (SRAU) to be responsible for the ‘intelligence, physical and counter surveillance,
technical services, and management of electronic surveillance and assumed identities’.63
In 2005 and as a result of another internal assessment, the name of the SRAU was
changed to the Investigation Unit when the intelligence function was removed. The current
Surveillance and Technical Unit came into effect in April 2005. It was tasked with
undertaking physical surveillance activities to recognise and watch persons that were
considered of interest to an ICAC investigation.64
A good example of an investigation using the capacity of the surveillance and
technical unit was the allegation that a bribe was offered to an officer working with the
Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust. The offer was made by a commercial painting
business in their effort to win a large maintenance contract. The officer reported the offer to
the ICAC, which began its investigations by conducting a controlled operation that included
setting up a meeting between the officer and a business representative. The situation was
under physical and electronic surveillance and the ICAC was provided with the ‘listening
device and to intercept telephone communication’ warrant. This operation resulted in gaining
concrete evidence proving the bribe, including the $1000 cash offered during the meeting.
The case was referred to the DPP for possible prosecution.65
6.2.1.4 Prosecution
Because the ICAC was set up as a fact-finding and investigative agency, it is not
allowed to prosecute or apply disciplinary action against those subject to its investigations.
However, the ICAC investigations could lead to different outcomes. First, it could seek the
advice of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), particularly when dealing with the results
63ICAC, above n, p. 26.
64ICAC, 'ICAC 2004-2005 Aunnal report' (2005)
65ICAC, above n

of serious corruption cases, for a prosecution against the persons being investigated for
specific criminal offences. Secondly, it could recommend disciplinary action including
dismissal or termination of employment be taken by the employer against the offender. Third,
it could provide an opinion that action should be taken ‘for a specified disciplinary offence’
against the person.66
It is the responsibility of the DPP to consider each prosecution action and initiate
prosecution proceedings and for employers to consider and apply disciplinary actions.
However, in 2004 after examining the ICAC 2002–2003 Annual Report, the Committee on
the Independent Commission Against Corruption issued a recommendation that the ICAC
and the DPP needed to coordinate efforts. The aim of this recommendation was to explore
workable ways to promote faster decision-making processes to ‘initiate proceedings’ on the
Commission’s briefs. In his foreword in the Committee on ICAC examination of the
Commission report, the Chairman Kim Yeadon expressed the Committee’s concerns over the
increasing number of cases in which the DPP was reluctant to initiate proceedings owing to
deficiencies in the ‘admissible evidence’.67
The problem of the lack of admissible evidence that would support the DPP taking
legal actions in the ICAC cases was considered one of the ‘low points’ in the work of the
Commission in 2002–2003. The Hon Fred Nile, a member of the ICAC Committee,
questioned the matter at the public examination on 23 February 2004 after referring to the
DPP decision not to initiate proceedings in nine out of ten ‘possible prosecutions’ in
Operation Jommelli. (This was a combined investigation between the Commission and the
66ICAC, above n
67T. H. K. YEADON, ' Report No. 4/53 on Examination of the Report Profiling the NSW Public Sector of the
ICAC' (Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2004)

NSW Police Strike Force on ‘car re-birthing’.) The reason given was lack of admissible
evidence.68
Though the Commission acknowledged such a problem was one of the challenges to
its work in the last few years, it explained that it had taken a different approach in its
investigations and focused on gaining more admissible evidence through means other than
hearings. The ICAC argued that this would increase the possibility of later successful
prosecutions. Examples were initiating an extensive and broad evidence collection before
conducting public hearings and working with other departments, such as the NSW Police, as
was the case in the Operation Trophy on Rockdale City Council, which investigated their
corrupt deals with ‘developers and go-betweens’.69
The ICAC Commissioner also argued during the annual Parliamentary examination of
its annual report of 2001–2002 that the Commission, according to the ICAC Acts.13 , was
mainly a ‘fact-finding body’ and that the collection of admissible evidence that might be used
in prosecutions came under section 14 (1) under ‘other functions of the Commission’. It also
added that the ICAC rate of prosecution would be higher if evidence obtained during
compulsory procedures, such as public hearings, could be admissible in court proceedings. It
stressed the point that criminal law has generally protected against self-incrimination, and
this was unlikely to change.70
The Commissioner of the ICAC, The Hon Jerrold Cripps QC, in his presentation during the
2nd National Conference of Parliamentary Oversight Committees of Anti-Corruption/Crime
Bodies 2006, focused on the matter, suggested that it would be unreasonable under the
circumstances to judge the ICAC’s success based on the number of prosecutions:“A very
68T. H. K. YEADON, 'Report No. 2/53 on Examination of the 2001–2002 Annual Report of the Independent
Commission Against Corruption' (Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2004), p. 7.
69ICAC, above n, p. 27-28.
70I. & Yeadon Moss, K, 'Report on Examination of the 2001–2002 Annual Report of the Independent
Commission Against Corruption' (Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2004)

common criticism levelled at the Independent Commission Against Corruption is that it has a
low success rate in achieving criminal convictions. Others question whether the Commission
should have any part in the prosecution of persons for criminal offences other than simply
making available what evidence it does have to a prosecuting authority ... it would seem to
me therefore that it is unwise for people to attempt to assess the performance of the
Independent Commission Against Corruption by reference to the number of criminal
scalps.”71
6.2.1.5 Penalties and sanctions
ICAC as stated previously is not designed as a court or disciplinary tribunal.
Therefore, it cannot proceed with prosecution nor can it take a disciplinary action. The ICAC
experience has shown that in many cases the DPP has refused to pursue prosecution or that it
was not successful in prosecutions. For example, the Commission reported that only 29
(42%) out of 69 persons investigated between 1998 and 2003 and reported to the DPP for
prosecution were found guilty of an offence; most of those convictions were because of a
criminal offence committed during the Commission inquiries, such as lying under oath or
perjury. In more than half of the other cases (58%) the DPP decided not to prosecute or the
cases failed during the trial.72 Comparative information about DPP actions in other, non-
ICAC matters is not publicly available.
6.2.1.6 Intelligence
Intelligence plays an important role within the ICAC’s reactive approach. The
intelligence function has always rested with the investigative arm of the Commission, the
Strategic Operations Division. Looking at its organisational chart, it is most noticeable that
71Justice Jerrold Cripps, above n, p. 112-115.
72T. H. K. YEADON, (Paper presented at the The 2nd National Conference of Parliamentary Oversight
Committees of Anti-Corruption/Crime Bodies Parliament House, 2006)

intelligence was and still is within the scope of the SOD. The only variation was that it
sometimes worked within its investigative unit and some other times was attached to its
surveillance and technical unit.73
For example, in 2002, the Strategic Operations Division underwent a major reshuffle,
resulting in the establishment of the Strategic Risk Assessment Unit (SRAU). The newly
created SRAU was given the intelligence responsibility. The intelligence section came to
work as part of the bigger unit. However, the section was remodelled and enhanced with
more staff in a way that would support the new ICAC approach of an ‘intelligence-led
approach to investigation’.74
Currently, the intelligence function is re-attached to the investigation teams, as a
result of the 2004/2005 assessment of the function of the SRAU. This restructuring meant
that intelligence projects would be dealt with by multi-skilled teams.75
6.2.1.7 Other supportive elements in the reactive approach
In the ICAC, in carrying out its operations needs to establish working relationships
with other agencies that are involved in dealing with corruption in NSW. For example, the
Commission, under its ‘Strategic Partnerships and Liaison with other agencies’ scheme,
shares intelligence with the NSW Police, the Police Integrity Commission (PIC), the
Australian Federal Police, the Australian Crime Commission and the NSW Crime
Commission.76
In 2002, the Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the NSW
Police which paved the way for better trained and more experienced police to execute its
73ICAC, above n ; ICAC, above n
74ICAC, above n, p. 26.
75ICAC, above n
76ICAC, above n, p. 38.

search warrants as a measure to limit any physical hazard, such as assault, to the
Commission’s staff and the public.77
Another example in this aspect is the development of close relationships with the Police
Integrity Commission (PIC), both individually and organisationally. At the organisational
level, it continues to share information and intelligence in different areas of its work with the
PIC and in some significant investigations also receives special technical help. In addition to
that, officers from both organisations participate in joint exercises and training courses to
further enhance their technical capabilities.78
6.2.2 Proactive strategies
6.2.2.1 Corruption prevention
The ICAC Act established investigation and corruption prevention would act as the
Commission’s two arms working ‘hand-in hand’ within ICAC to succeed in its objectives.79
Part 4 of the ICAC Act indicated explicitly the dual role of the Commission’s
functions in investigating and preventing corruption together with educating the public and
the people associated with managing the public sector agencies of NSW.80 In implementing
its prevention duties, the Commission can review laws, procedures and practices used to
manage and administer public sector establishments; it can also provide advice and
consultations in ways to minimise the possibility of corruption.81
With respect to the prevention side of its duties, the Commission, in its efforts to build
a suitable corruption prevention strategy, started by writing to the foreign countries’
diplomatic representatives in Australia advising them of its existence and requesting their
77ICAC, above n
78IbidICAC, above n
79ICAC, above n, p. 8.
80The Independent Commission Against Corruption Act,
S. 13 (1).
81Ibid, S13(1)d, e, f, g, h, I, j, k.

respective countries’ experiences in dealing with and preventing corruption. It also
corresponded with New South Wales ministers to identify the type of procedures they had in
place against corruption in their ministries.82
In early 1990, the first Director of Corruption Prevention was appointed. After
receiving responses from foreign diplomatic missions and ministries, the Commission was
able to formulate its first corruption-prevention strategy based on three main pillars of:
•‘prevention is better than cure’
•‘corruption prevention is a management function’
•‘accountability makes for committed management’.83
Based on the previous principles, the Commission started identifying the necessary
work in this aspect of its function internally and externally. Internally, it was initiated by the
results of the Commission’s investigations that might indicate an institutional failure that led
or would lead to corruption. Other internal sources for its prevention works were the result of
complaints that were made to the Commission which although not officially examined,
reflected an organisational malfunction that permitted or would permit the appearance of
corruption.84 Externally, its preventative functions were driven from a number of sources,
such as calls by government departments to develop or help in establishing codes or creating
‘guidelines’ or providing advice on how better to improve the workability in areas identified
with weaknesses and problems. The Commission’s cooperation with similar agencies, such as
the Ombudsman and with local governments, was also another source for its corruption-
prevention work.85 Practically, the Commission’s activities in this aspect during its first year
of full operation can be summarised in Table 6.10.
82ICAC, above n
83Ibid, p. 64-65.
84Ibid
85Ibid

As ICAC matured, its experience in corruption prevention also matured and it was
able to establish ‘expertise’ in this area. Research played an important role in developing
strategies to foster an ethical culture in the NSW public sector. Its current research uses a
number of methods to that end, such as:
... exploring the employee’s point of views about corruption. The idea is that the employees
are in the best position through their daily interactions and dealing with the public to identify
the socially more accepted and commonly used definition of corruption in the public sector
domain. Identifying such definitions would help in the efforts to put together plans to
suppress corruption.86
ICAC’s preventative work extended to include research projects conducted in
collaboration with other ‘industry partners’, such as Transparency International. An example
would be the major ‘Whistling While They Work: Enhancing the Theory and Practice of
Internal Witness Management in Public Sector Organisations’ project, led by Griffith
University and including another 14 industry partners and six universities.87
In describing the project, the official project website summarises its main objectives
as the following:
The project is the first national study to examine and compare procedures within
organisations managing and protecting whistleblowers and other insider’s witnesses on public
sector corruption and misconduct, with the aim to produce better strategies that would
prevent and minimise the risks of whistleblowers and internal witnesses being subjected to
any act of vengeance or retaliation for reporting misconduct.88
86Angela Gorta, 'A tool for building corruption resistance' (2001) 11, p. 17.
87New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, above n
88Ibid

In a broader context, the ICAC’s prevention and research functions seem to have
focused during the last few years on the following general themes:
•promoting a clear public ‘understanding’ of the nature of what is involved in corrupt conduct
•recognising and confronting the reasons commonly used to tolerate and overlook misconduct
•the necessity for the public sector administration to tackle corruption through the adoption
of serious and robust measures
•the importance of the management’s commitment in fighting corruption and providing a
leading role in doing so
•introducing an efficient internal procedure for the organisation’s employees to report corrupt
actions securely and without fears of reprisal
•scrutinising the public sector ‘organisational cultures’ and fostering an ethical managerial
culture within these organisations.89
6.2.2.2 Education and training
The first year of the Commission’s work in this particular aspect focused on
introducing the Commission to the public by instigating an awareness campaign, making
country trips, distributing information brochures and starting what became known as a public
attitude survey to understand the general public’s views of corruption and their attitudes to
the existing measures for tackling it.90
In performing its educative function, ICAC created a number of educational and
training initiatives. Its first education strategy was formalised in 1990 based on three main
principles:
89Angela Gorta, above n
90ICAC, above n ; ICAC, above n

• knowledge empowers; aimed at making the public aware of their rights and responsibilities,
as a step towards bringing them into an alliance with the Commission in preventing
corruption
• collective responsibility; by emphasising that tackling corruption is the responsibility of
every citizen in NSW
• permanent change can be achieved through changing public attitudes.91
The strategy sets out the process of educating the public through means of hearings,
reports, targeting the young, reaching minority groups, providing community speakers,
country visits, media liaison and community announcements.92 Since then, the Commission’s
education work has flourished and over the years the ICAC has initiated a number of
educative programs, such as: please put in sentences rather than dot points
• producing audio and video resources to be used in primary and secondary schools
• publishing the ICAC’s newspaper ‘Corruption Matters’
• distributing the ‘introducing the ICAC’ brochure
•promoting the ‘corruption is wrong’ campaign directed to non-English speaking
communities
• providing ICAC publications in about 30 foreign languages other than English
• starting the Non-English Speaking Background project (NESB) targeting NSW NESB
communities and these communities’ leaders, aiming to raise their awareness and strengthen
the means of communication with them.93
91ICAC, above n
92Ibid
93ICAC, above n

• issuing booklets and making resources available to target community leaders.94
• launching the ICAC website on the World Wide Web in March 1999 as another means of
educating the public and presenting its work, functions and achievements.95
• initiating training programs targeting middle and senior managers in the NSW public sector
organisations, and special training programs for NSW universities officials.96
• in taking its education responsibility a step further and as a result of its accumulated
experience during the first ten years of it existence (the ICAC officially started on 13 March
1989) in 1998, the Commission, in association with the Australian National University
(ANU), commenced a post-graduate course in corruption and anti-corruption. This course
targets national and international middle and senior public sector managers and combines
both the academic excellence of the ANU with the practical expertise of the ICAC.97
6.2.2.3 Rural and Regional Outreach Strategy (RAROS)
One of the major projects introduced during the last few years by the ICAC is the
Rural and Regional Outreach Strategy (RAROS). It is another venue for the ICAC to spread
the benefits of its research and education work. Beginning in 2001, the Commission delivered
its corruption prevention work to ‘non-metropolitan areas of NSW’. Since then, the ICAC has
conducted twelve programs, with two visits every year. The main program objectives are:
• to introduce the ICAC and provide its services to local areas
• to gain in-depth information on the type of problems in every area.
94ICAC, above n
95ICAC, above n
96ICAC, above n
97Ibid; ICAC, above n ; Peter Larmour and Nick Wolanin, Corruption and anti-corruption (ANU Press, 2013)

Each visit always runs for one week and includes workshops, discussion groups,
school visits and briefing sessions.98In its examination of the 2002–2003 annual report of the
ICAC, the Parliamentary Committee responsible for overseeing the ICAC praised the
initiative and its success.99
6.2.2.4 Proactive investigation
In recent years, the Commission has not only restructured its Strategic Operation
Division, but has also equally reorganised the way it conducts its other functions, particularly
its investigative work. In the late 1990s, the ICAC took steps to further distance itself ‘from a
rigid structure’ in which its investigative work was carried out separately from its other
functions and was the main objective of the agency.
The Commission’s new approach is to integrate the work of its SOD with its
corruption prevention function. The corruption prevention participation begins in the early
stages of its formal investigations with the aim of developing inquiries that might produce
results that are targeted toward prevention.100
One of the major investigations that employed most of the Commission’s powers was
the investigation into corruption at the Rockdale City Council in 2001/2002. The
investigation also represented the integrated approach to examining matters; it included the
work of the Operation and the Corruption, Education and Research Divisions. The allegations
related to the conduct of two Rockdale City Council councillors with developers. After using
powers, such as telephone interception, listening devices, search warrants and notice to
produce information, the allegations were confirmed and ICAC made recommendation to the
DPP to consider charges against the two councillors and the other four people involved. It
also resulted in amending the ICAC Act in 1989 and the Local Government Act in 1993to
98ICAC, above n ; ICAC, above n
99Yeadon, above n
100ICAC, above n

provide means for the ‘suspension and the eventual dismissal’ of councillors upon the
recommendation of ICAC and their removal if systemic corruption were proven.101
6.2.2.5 Integrity Capacity Building
ICAC’s integrity capacity building is best represented through its training strategy. In
its capacity building efforts, the Commission training initiatives usually target middle and
senior managers because they are in charge of formulating policies and are decision-makers.
It also focuses on the people in charge of preserving their public organisation’s integrity and
preventing corruption, or those carrying out tasks such as auditing, and the handling and
investigation of complaints.102
Some of its capacity building initiatives include the Corruption Resistance Reviews
(CRRs), which have been working since 2000 in examining the broader NSW public sector
agencies’ main ‘corruption resistance’ mechanisms and providing ideas and suggestions to
reinforce them. The other major project is the Local Government Strategy, which focuses on
the development of local government’s corruption resistance capacity. The Commission also
provides corruption prevention advice to public sector organisations.103
6.2.2.6 Law Reform
Since the introduction of the ICAC Act in 1989, many law reforms were presented as
a result of the ICAC investigations and the exercise of its other functions. One of the recent
major ICAC investigations that introduced law reforms was ‘Operation Trophy’ in 2002. This
investigation’s outcomes amended the Local Government Act 1919 by amendments in 1993to
allow the suspension and the dismissal of councillors based on its recommendations. The
outcomes also made amendments to the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 to
101Ibid
102ICAC, above n
103ICAC, above n ; ICAC, above n

permit the appointment of a planning administrator to the council in the case of systemic
corruption being evident.104
6.2.2.7 Integrity testing, complaints profiling and Early Warning Systems
The integrity testing, complaints profiling and early warning systems are newly-
developed proactive strategies to deal mainly with police corruption. ICAC has not been
responsible for police corruption since 1997 after the establishment of the Police Integrity
Commission (PIC) in the wake of the Wood Inquiry 1997. ICAC has never reported the use
of such strategies.
6.2.2.8 Research
In 1994 the ICAC initiated its first major research project studying NSW public sector
employees’ perspectives of corruption and testing their readiness to act against it. I it
conducted the second study in 2001. The ‘Unravelling Corruption: A Public Sector
Perspective. Survey of the NSW Public Sector Employees understanding of Corruption and
Their Willingness to take action’ randomly questioned over a thousand public employees
each time the survey was conducted by presenting them with twelve ‘scenarios’ and asking
them to determine if those cases involved a corrupt conduct and what sort of action they
would be willing to take if they were in the same situations.105
In 1999, after realising that more than 50% of its investigations in the previous year’s
involved individuals from the private sector, the Commission acknowledged that such a
sector was an important element in the fight against corruption.106
In 1998 the ICAC surveyed 204 ‘private contractors and management consultants’ that had
had dealings with the NSW public sector in the previous 12 months and asked about their
104ICAC, above n
105ICAC, above n
106ICAC, above n

perspectives on doing business with the NSW public sector.107 Not clear that this is from the
survey??? You need a linking sentence to explain. Please put dot points into sentences.
• Studying successfully-implemented measures/strategies by managers in their own
organisations and forecasting the possibility of spreading them to other agencies.
• examining the available literature that might help to build up a corruption-resistant culture.
• analysing the collective corruption allegations reported to the Commission as a way to
identify ‘pattern and trends’ of suspected corruption conducts.108
Another important part of the ICAC’s research was the 1993‘Community Attitudes to
Corruption and the ICAC Survey’. It has since become a periodically-conducted survey. It
was established in accordance with the Commission’s functions and its first Corporate Plan
1993–1995 as an aid in keeping the public informed about the Commission’s work and to
assist in formulating its preventative and educative function.109 The survey uses random
sample of an average of 400–500 NSW adults as the population to find out community
perceptions about corruption, their general knowledge of the existence of ICAC and its work
and effectiveness in the fight against corruption in the NS W public sector.110
Since 1993, The ICAC has conducted annually Community Surveys. The findings of
these surveys present a general consistency over the years in some aspects. These can be
summarised as follows. Please put dot points into sentences.
107Ibid
108Angela Gorta, above n
109ICAC, 'Community Attitudes to Corruption and the ICAC 1994 ' (Independent Commission Against
Corruption, 1994)
110ICAC, above n

• Although there were some reductions during the last few years, the fact remains that there is
stability concerning the perceptions of corruption being a problem in NSW. In 2006, 72%
thought of it as a problem in NSW.111
• despite the decreasing level of fears that the possibility of people reporting corruption
would be subject to reprisals for their actions, the results continued to show that the majority
of the participants thought otherwise. In the 1999 survey, 70% agreed that those who reported
corruption were likely to suffer for it compared to a higher percentage in the previous survey
in 1996 of 76%.112
• another consistent finding was that having the ICAC was a ‘good thing for the people in
NSW’. All seven surveys showed a strong agreement — always above 90% — on the benefit
of having an agency such as the ICAC, accompanied with favourable perceptions of the
ICAC’s success in exposing corruption.113
• in relation to the ICAC’s success in reducing corruption, all surveys indicated that just
above half of the respondents believed that it was successful in minimising corruption.114
Another important research project pursued by the ICAC was to formulate its
preventative work, ‘Profiling the NSW Public Sector: Functions, risks and corruption
resistance strategies’ project. It began in 2001 to establish a general overview of the
corruption threats faced by the NSW public sector and the strategies being implemented to
tackle them, with the aim of laying the foundation to strengthen and introduce resistance
measures that might be tailored precisely to each organisation.115 The outcome of this NSW
project, the first of its kind, examined more than 260 organisations and delivered a positive
111ICAC, above n
112ICAC, above n ; ICAC, above n
113ICAC, above n
114ICAC, above n
115Moss, above n

general picture of the way the NSW public sector recognised, responded to and managed
corruption threats.116
At the end of the Parliamentary examination, the Committee recommended that ICAC
should perform ‘follow-up’ research during the next four years and report on how its 29
recommendations were being implemented, to what degree such implementations were
successful in reducing corruption in those particular organisations, and at what cost.117
In 2005, the Commission reported on its first follow-up examination. The follow-up
focused on the existence or the absence in the examined organisations of the ‘core corruption
prevention policies and procedures’ that should be the cornerstones of any corruption
resistance framework. These were: please put dot points into sentences.
• Codes of conduct
• Corruption risk management
• Internal audits
•Gifts and benefits
• Internal investigations.118
The findings of the follow-up research reflected some ‘improvements’ in relation to
implementing the indicated ‘core corruption strategies’ from the time when the first profiling
was conducted in 2001. Table 6.11 compares the level of implementation of these strategies
in 2001 and 2004. The Table should immediately follow.
116Ibid
117YEADON, above n
118ICAC, above n

6.2.2.9 Coordination
One of the main findings of the National Integrity Assessment (NISA) of Australia in
2005 after examining the NSW integrity system was the lack of cooperation among the
various agencies. Two major reasons were cited for this problem. The first one was legally
driven and was particularly related to the Privacy Act1974 (Cth) that restricted those bodies’
ability to exchange information. The second barrier was related to the financial aspect of
these organisations’ constitutions, which rejected the idea of allocating financial recourses to
‘cooperative projects’ which were to be conducted jointly by these agencies.119
Consequently, the lack of a cooperative relationship between the different agencies
resulted in the lack of coordination. This deficiency in coherence itself was a drive toward a
more informal kind of coordination over the last few years. Depending on personal
relationships, this informal cooperation and coordination can be helpful. However, despite its
positive outcomes so far, the NSW integrity system still lacks a formal coordination
mechanism. One of the reasons brought up as a barrier to that is the government’s
unsupportive approach to ‘Complaints NSW’ which is a proposal for a ‘one-stop shop’
system to receive and refer all allegations, complaints and inquiries related to all NSW public
sector employees, including health and legal specialists, and organisations including
community services.
6.2.2.10 Internal Performance Indicators
Current performance measures in the ICAC
In its 2003–2004 annual report, the ICAC confirmed that there was a need to expand
and include more measures that would present a more reliable overview of its performance
119Brown, above n

and efficiency. One way to accomplish this target was through the enrichment of the agency’s
internal reporting processes.120
The agency also identified several performance measures used in relation to its
investigative roles, including: the number of cases reported, the matters that were examined
within adequate timelines, the formal investigations conducted, the cases handled and
finalised in a six-month time-limit, the number of its public or private hearings, and the
number of produced reports.121
ICAC has a number of performance measures to assess how it is functioning when it
comes to preventing corruption, such as number of advices on how to prevent corruption to
other organisations. It also reports the number of ‘Corruption Resistance Reviews’ it carries
out to other agencies each year, and its accomplishments relating to the community by
reporting the numbers of visits in accordance with its ‘Rural and Regional Outreach’
initiative.122ICAC uses self-initiated research projects and the fulfilment of its organisational
legislatives requirements, such as reports to Parliament, as another performance measure of
its efficiency.123
Although they are not reported as a performance indicator in the agency’s annual
reports, ICAC has been conducted a number of surveys, such as the Community Attitude
Survey, the Profiling the NSW Public Sector survey and the Corruption Resistance Review.
In addition to these surveys, the Commission is actively involved in producing guides, tools
and in initiating projects related to the study, assessment and building of anti-corruption
environments within its jurisdiction. Examples would be the ‘Do-It-Yourself Corruption
Resistance Guide’, the ‘Ethical Culture Survey’, ‘What is Ethical Culture?’ brochure, ‘Key
120ICAC, above n
121Ibid; ICAC, above n
122ICAC, above n, p. 9.
123Ibid; ICAC, above n

Issues to Consider in Building an Ethical Organisation Kit’, and the ‘Local Government Risk
Profile’.124
ICAC’S performance is also assessed by other means, such as its annual reports, the
final report of its investigative results, its website and its staff skills development programs.125
In its Strategic Plan 2006–2010, the Commission affirmed the use of these statistical
measures as an indicator of its performance for the coming years. ICAC seems to be in line
with other Commissions in using numerical evidence as the main method to provide a picture
of their effectiveness and efficiency to stakeholders.126
The first part of this chapter discussed the role of the Parliamentary Joint Committee
(PJC), which monitors and reviews its activities and its reports. The ICAC Commissioner is
also required to participate in public hearings before the PJC, twice every year. Another form
of scrutinising the Commission is through the Operations Review Committee (ORC), which
looks into the accountability of the ICAC’s judgments on investigating the grievances
presented by members of the public. The ORC decisions play a vital role in whether the
agency ought to terminate or start to investigate complaints of assumed corruption.127
Another accountability mechanism available to the ICAC is the Prevention
Management Group (PMG), which ensures that the ‘corruption prevention work of the
Commission is consistent with the Commission’s key strategic objectives and statutory
responsibilities’. To complement the other part of its investigative responsibilities, the ICAC
receives direction in matters related to its investigations from the Investigation Management
Group (IMG) in a manner that guarantees that the investigative procedures are in accordance
124Arthur H Shacklock andFrank O’Toole, 'Exploring the public-private divide: An initial comparison of some
integrity assessment tools (IATs)' (Paper presented at 2004 where ); ICAC, above n
125ICAC, above n
126ICAC, above n
127ICAC, above n

with its goals. The IMG also acts as a supervisor for the overall investigation processes and
ensures that all the required resources have been allocated for such an issue.128
The current accountability and performance indicators used by ICAC seem to provide
a fair view of its activities and the degree to which it adequately uses its resources to fight
corruption within the NSW public sector. However, measuring efficiency might need the
development and increased use of measures other than the quantitative indicators previously
mentioned, such as measuring public perceptions, parliamentary hearings and more a
qualitative assessments of its performance.
6.3 Conclusion
The establishment of the NSW ICAC in 1988 was in accordance with most other
Australian anti-corruption Commissions. It was the product of a public outcry taken up by
State politicians. Although its establishment may have been motivated for political reasons,
ICAC remains crucial to fighting corruption in NSW.
ICAC was designed and remained to exclusively look into public sector corruption,
including the Police force, until 1997. Though the removal of police misconduct from the
ICAC might be interpreted as a failure by the Commission to effectively deal with police
corruption, it could be seen the other way around: that police corruption in NSW was so
entrenched that it needed a specialised agency to look into it. It could also be argued that the
removal of police misconduct from the ICAC led to a stronger focus and more resources for
the rest of the public sector agencies.
Since its inception in 1988, the ICAC’s approach to corruption has alternated between
reactive and proactive strategies. The formative years were dominated by reactive measures,
with a focus on investigation. However, as it gained experience, the Commission started to
128Ibid

lean towards a more integrated approach, where its investigations were no longer performed
in isolation from its other functions. Recently the capacity of the NSW public sector
organisations to resist and deal with corruption themselves has increased. The strategies the
Commission have used seem to incorporate most of the suggested models in this study,
except for those of integrity testing, complaint profiling and early warning systems. These
mechanisms are still new to the field of public sector corruption, apart from police
misconduct.

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