University Law1019/LAW2396: Animal Control Act Advice Letter

This assignment presents a legal memorandum providing advice on the application of the Animal Control Act 2019 (Vic). The advice is addressed to a client facing charges under the Act regarding a piglet. The memorandum argues against the charges, emphasizing that a piglet is an animal of mansuetae naturae and not a "large dangerous animal" as defined by the Act. It further highlights jurisdictional issues, as the incident occurred in NSW while the Act applies to Victoria. The analysis delves into relevant sections of the Act, including definitions of "owner," "large dangerous animals," and the responsibilities associated with them. The memorandum also discusses the concepts of cattle trespass, strict liability, and negligence, drawing comparisons to legal precedents like Rylands v Fletcher, Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd, Donoghue v Stevenson, and Grant v Australian Knitting Mills. The author argues that the officer lacked authority to seize the piglet and should be held liable. The memorandum concludes by emphasizing the need to return the piglet to its owner and provide proper training to officers to distinguish between different types of animals. The document also includes a bibliography of cited legal sources.

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Animal protection

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To
Georgia
444 Any Street
Albury NSW 2640
This letter is pertaining to the refuting of the charges imposed upon you by the officer
authorized in accordance with Section 8 of the Animal Control Act of 2019. Such kinds of
charges are not applicable since a piglet is an animal of mansuetae naturae and you are not
the original owner of the piglet. Additionally, you are living in Albury which is in New South
Wales and the jurisdiction of the Animal Control Act of 2019 is over Victoria. As a result, it
is imperative that you cannot be fined an amount of five hundred dollars as far as Section 7 of
the Animal Control Act of 2019 is concerned accordingly. Section 2 of the Animal Control
Act of 2019 implies that dangerous animals include tigers, lions, bears, dangerous dogs and
other such related animals of ferae naturae. It is imperative that responsibility and charges
under Sections 7 and 8 of the Animal Control Act of 2019 respectively would imply with
regard to the large and dangerous animals which further implies that the piglet as per the facts
of the case is not such kind of an animal. The aspect implies cattle trespass as far as the
responsibility of the owner of the piglet Emily is concerned accordingly. The concept of
cattle trespass is similar to the one pertaining to the rule pertaining to strict liability laid down
by the House of Lords as far as the case of Rylands v Fletcher is concerned1. If any harm by
Bruno the piglet is caused, then Emily would be liable for negligence as far as due care and
diligence are concerned accordingly. However, the rule of strict liability laid down by the
House of Lords in the case of Rylands v Fletcher was done away with in the case of Burnie
Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd2. In this case, the High Court of Australia decided to
apply the aspect pertaining to negligence only as implied by the case of Donoghue v
Stevenson as far as the decision of House of Lords is concerned3. In the case of Grant v
Australian Knitting Mills, the aspect pertaining to reasonable care was taken into account by
the High Court of Australia4. It is to be seen to what extent the harm is caused to a person by
Bruno the piglet who enters into Victoria from New South Wales after being excited on
seeing a possum as far as the facts of the case are concerned. Section 3 of the Animal Control
1 Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1
2 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520
3 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100
4 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills (1933) 50 CLR 387

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Act implies that the aspect of responsibility is applicable only in the instances that it is a
dangerous animal which can possibly cause harm leading to grievous injury or even death. As
a result, it is implied that the aspect pertaining to responsibility is not applicable to Emily. It
is also imperative from Section 1 of the Animal Control Act of 2019 implies that besides
people, native animals are also to be protected from massive dangerous animals. As a result,
it is imperative that a piglet like Bruno is ought to be protected from dangerous animals as
defined under Section 2 of the Animal Control Act of 2019 as far as Section 1 jurisdiction of
the Animal Control Act of 2019. As far as the aspect of ownership is concerned, Section 2 of
the Animal Control Act of 2019 is not applicable to Emily since she is the owner of a piglet
which is not a large dangerous animal as aforesaid accordingly. It is also inferred from the
facts of the case that the piglet Bruno has not caused any such harm as far as a nuisance is
concerned with reference to Section 8 of the Animal Control Act of 2019. As far as seizure
and destruction of animal is concerned on part of the authorized officer with reference to
Section 8 of the Animal Control Act of 2019, only large dangerous animals can be seized and
destroyed which is not the case of piglet accordingly. As a result, the officer would be held
liable accordingly if any harm is caused to the piglet as far as the seizure is concerned.
Therefore, it is the responsibility of the officer to take due care of the piglet up to the period it
is under the custody as far as the supervision of the Victorian Animal Protection Services is
concerned accordingly. It is imperative that the Victorian Animal Protection Services must
play an extremely vital; role with regard to the safety of the piglet and to return it to the
rightful owner Emily as soon as possible failing which stringent action would be initiated
against them. Additionally, the Victorian Animal Protection Services must also make sure
that the authorized officer does not cause any kind of harm to the piglet Bruno otherwise
stringent action has to be initiated against such officer accordingly which may involve
compensation to Emily as far as the harm caused to Bruno is concerned as a result of the
seizure5. Therefore, it is imperative that such kind of seizure by the authorized officer is not
valid in accordance with Section 8 of the Animal Control Act of 2019 since the Animal
Control Act of 2019 provides a demarcation between the animals of ferae naturae and the
animals of mansuetae naturae. If it is implied that the owner Emily took due care and it is
only the nature of the piglet Bruno that led him to cross the border and run into Victoria from
New South Wales, she would not be held liable since it is supposed to cause no harm and
quite friendly with the humans as far as the aspect pertaining to domestication is concerned
accordingly. Furthermore, the safety of Bruno must be taken into account accordingly as far
5 Amanda P. Stickley, Australian torts law. (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2016).

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as Section 2 of the Animal Control Act of 2019 is concerned accordingly. As far as Section 7
of the Animal Control Act of 2019 is concerned, if any dangerous animal attacks Bruno in
any manner, the person who is the owner of the animal would be liable for negligence as far
as not taking due diligence is concerned and be fined up to an amount of five hundred dollars
accordingly. Taking account of the facts of the case, even Emily cannot be fined under
Section 7 of the Animal Control Act of 2019 taking account of the nature of the piglet Bruno
as far as the liability of the owner of the dangerous animal is concerned. If it is observed and
inferred from the facts of the case that if the Animal Control Act of 2019 has received Royal
Assent after being passed by the Parliament of the Australian state of Victoria, it would be
effective and enforceable accordingly after fourteen days from the receiving of Royal Assent
accordingly as far as Section 1 of the Animal Control Act of 2019 is concerned accordingly.
As a result, the period of fourteen days has to be taken into account accordingly in order to
imply that the Animal Control Act of 2019 is applicable in a valid manner. The charges
pertaining to five hundred dollars imposed on you by the concerned authorized officer have
to be set aside on an immediate basis on the grounds being nether you are the owner of the
piglet Bruno nor he is a massive dangerous animal as far as the ingredients and elements of
Sections 7 and 8 of the Animal Control Act of 2019 are concerned accordingly. The objective
of the Animal Control Act of 2019 is to be fulfilled accordingly within the ambit of Section 1
of the Animal Control Act of 2019 which is not the case on part of the authorized officer as
far as the facts and circumstances are concerned. It is to be seen whether the authorized
officer is able to distinguish between animals of mansuetae naturae and the animals of ferae
naturae as far as the guidelines issued by the Victorian Animal Protection Services within the
purview of the Animal Control Act of 2019. If it is inferred that there is no such guideline
issued by the Victorian Animal Protection Services, such kind of a regulation must be
formulated and implemented accordingly thereby leading to the providing of training to the
authorized officers in a proper and appropriate manner accordingly so that they are able to
distinguish between animals of mansuetae naturae and the animals of ferae naturae. As a
result,, such charges imposed on you by the authorized officer must be set aside on an
immediate basis and Bruno has to be returned to Emily as early as possible accordingly.
Kind Regards

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XYZ

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Bibliography
Amanda P. Stickley, Australian torts law. (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2016)
Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills (1933) 50 CLR 387
Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1