Case Analysis: ASIC v Cassimatis and Shareholder Oppression

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) v Cassimatis case, focusing on the breach of director's duties under the Corporations Act 2001. The case revolves around the directors of Storm Financial and their failure to prevent the indiscriminate application of a financial model to vulnerable clients. The analysis delves into the court's interpretation of the duty of care and diligence, the importance of considering foreseeable risks, and the rejection of the 'back door' liability concept. Part B of the document explores the issue of minority oppression, specifically addressing whether Kanye can successfully sue the directors and members of Koala Pty Ltd. for the issuance of shares or his removal as director. The analysis examines the relevant provisions of the Corporations Act 2001, the concept of minority oppression, and the powers granted to the court in such cases, providing a detailed overview of the legal principles involved.

Part A
Read Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) v Cassimatis (No. 8) [2016]
Introduction: The Court arrived at the conclusion that the directors of Storm Financial have
breached their duties as directors. It was determined that the duty of care and diligence that has
been mentioned in section 180, Corporations Act, 2001 has been breached by these directors
when they allowed or failed to prevent the application of storm financial model indiscriminately
to the retired clients or who were going to retire shortly and have limited income. This model
provided that the investors borrowed money against their homes and obtained margin loans,
which were invested in index funds. It was found that any reasonable director would have
discovered that strong chances the present that a retired or nearing retired investor would have
received in appropriate advice for using their home as the security for the loan.
While arriving at this conclusion, the court had explored different significant concepts related
with the duty of care and diligence of the directors. This verdict confirms that while using care
and diligence, the directors ought to consider ahead of the financial consequences related with
the particular action or approach. Therefore, they should consider all possible harm that may be
the result, which includes harm to the reputation and probably the loss of license as a result of
the failure of the corporation comply with the applicable rules.
The case of the ASIC relied on the fact that there has been an actual breach by the corporation
which was a stepping stone to discover if there has been a breach of duty imposed by s180 by the
directors of the corporation. Although, in fact, an actual breach was established, the question was
raised by the court if the ASIC had set an unnecessarily high bar which expresses some doubt

regarding the fact if a contravention by the corporation was required to be established in order to
claim a breach of duty by the director. If it were a necessary requirement, this may result in the
unusual result according to which the director may escape the liability for a particularly that was
highly likely to involve a serious breach of law, only due to the reason that as a result of some
good fortune, there was no actual breach.
Relevant Law: In this case, the court had discarded the view that s180 can be used to create
directors’ liability only due to reason that another provisions of the Corporations Act have been
breached by the company, or in other words, "back door" accessory liability. Hence the court
rejected the submission of the ASIC that a general duty was present on part of the directors
which required them to make sure that the company fulfills its statutory obligations. The
conclusions made by the court in ASIC v Mariner Corporation1 was confirmed by the court in
this case. It was stated to be wrong to claim that if the director caused its company to breach a
provision of Corporations Act, then it can be said that the director has also breached section 180.
However, the court approved that the contraventions or the risk of contraventions or the
circumstances that need to be considered by evaluating if the director ordered the officer had
exercised the necessary care and diligence but they are not the only circumstances and similarly
they are not the conditions necessary for creating liability.2 The court had considered the concept,
which provides that a breach of s180 days to be based on jeopardy to the interests of the
company.3 This expression was used by the court, while deciding ASIC v Maxwell4 and had also
been mentioned in other decisions given later on. In the present case, this expression was
described by the court as “short-hand” for the notion that in case the interests of the company are
1 ASIC v Mariner Corporation Limited [2015] FCA
2 Edmunds R and Lowry J, 2002 “Excuses” in P Birks and Pretto A (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing)
3 Getzler J, 2002, “Duty of Care” in Birks P and Pretto A (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing, Oxford
4 ASIC v Maxwell & Ors [2006] NSWSC

not at risk or (likely to be harmed), in such a case, there cannot be a breach. Concerning the
breach of law, the relevant jeopardy can be described as the threat of harm to the interests of the
company including the risk of sanctions. The risk of raising liability of sanctions should be
clearly visible to the directors and the countervailing probable benefits should be insignificant.
The test applied by the court under s180 was to see if a reasonable level of care and diligence has
been exercised by the directors, while using their powers and discharging their duties. It was
noted by the court that in order to provide this test, all the circumstances need to be considered,
including the foreseeable risk of harm that may be suffered by the interests of the corporation,
the magnitude of such harm, the likely benefits of the conduct of the directors and the burden for
the company of taking action in order to alleviate the foreseeable harm. It was discovered by the
court that there was a breach of Corporations Act by Storm when it provided financial services
on the basis of the model to the category of vulnerable clients that have been identified by the
ASIC. The court stated that their duties of care and diligence have been breached by the directors
due to the reason that any other reasonable director under the circumstances of Storm and the
responsibilities held by Mr. and Mrs. Cassimatis was bound to be aware of the strong chances of
a contravention of Corporations Act if such director would have used his powers to cause or
allow the application of Storm model to the category of clients pleaded by the ASIC, especially
the investors who had been retired or were going to retire soon and had little income and few
assets.
Arguments of the Parties: In this case, the submission made by the ASIC was rejected by the
court according to which a real breach by Storm was enough to moving the court that there has
been a breach of the provisions of s180 by the directors of the company. The case of the ASIC
was based on the fact that Storm had made an actual breach of the provisions of Corporations

Act as a “stepping stone” for breaching the provisions of s180 by the directors of the corporation.
In this regard, it was held by the court that serious doubts were present if a real breach was
necessary in order to establish a breach of s180 by the directors but it proceeded on the fact that
real breach was necessary5. On the other hand, a submission was made by the directors of the
corporation according to which the duties mentioned in s180 were owed by the directors only
towards the company. But the ASIC claim that a norm of conduct as being prescribed by s180
that is different from the interests of the company therefore, it argued that the directors owe a
duty towards the public at large.
Decision: Hence, in this case the court rejected the notion that s180 can be used for the purpose
of creating liability of the directors only due to the reason that the company had breached some
other provision of Corporations Act or in other words, a back door liability. The court also
rejected the submission of the ASIC that a general duty is present on part of the directors to make
sure that the company fulfills its statutory obligations. And there is no strict liability duty, which
requires the directors to ensure compliance.6 According to s180, the issue if due to the care and
diligence has been used by the director can be answer only by maintaining a balance between the
foreseeable risk of harm and the likely benefits that can be reasonably expected from such
conduct.7
While evaluating the components of the duty mentioned in section 180, it was noted by the court
that the harm is not only confined to monetary damage. Consequently, such damage also
incorporates the interests of the corporation, which includes the reputation and the interests
concerning compliance with law. For instance, the possible loss of a license. Hence the court
5 Heydon JD, 2006, “Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and Skill Fiduciary?” in Degeling S and
Edelman J (eds), Equity in Commercial Law, Thomson, Sydney
6 Edmunds R and Lowry J, “The Continuing Value of Relief for Directors’ Breach of Duty” (2003) 66 MLR 195
7 Heydon JD, “Equity and Statute” in Turner PG (ed), Equity and Administration (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2016)

stated that it will be difficult to imagine the examples where can be in the interests of the
company that the company should be involved in serious illegal behavior, even if it was very
gainful and the directors reasonably held that it was almost untraceable.8 The court also held that
the balancing act that needs to be undertaken by deciding if there has been a breach of duty is not
a literal weighing of costs against profits. It is not necessary that the director may avoid liability
only by establishing that the probable financial cost of penalty for the breach of law exceeded the
probable profit from such breach.9
8 Heydon JD, 2016, “Equity and Statute” in Turner PG (ed), Equity and Administration Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
9 Handford P, “Intentional Negligence: A Contradiction in Terms?” (2010) 32(1) Syd LR 29

Part B
(a)
The issue that needs to be decided in this part, is if a successful action can be initiated by Kanye
against the directors and the members of Koala Pty Ltd. for the issuance of shares or the fact that
he has been removed as the director of the corporation. In order to have a successful action, it
needs to be established by Kanye that he was facing minority oppression at the ends of the
majority.
Corporations Act, 2001 contains the provisions that deal with minority oppression. It has been
found in many cases that when the majority members of the corporation conducting the affairs of
the company, sometimes they tried to use their influence for the purpose of achieving a benefit
for themselves as against the advantage for their corporation.10 In this regard, the law that this
type of conduct is illegal and at the same time, it may also diminish the shareholding value and
may result in internal damage to the company.11 Generally the conduct that has been mentioned
in s232 is known as minority oppression. This type of conduct includes any conduct that is
contrary to the interests of the shareholders as a whole or if the conduct has been oppressive,
discriminatory or unfairly prejudicial for particular shareholder/s. The courts are required to
decide if particular conduct can be described as aggressive by using an objective test. Under this
test, the court considers the issue if any reasonable words and would also have treated the
conduct as unfair.12 However, it is not sufficient to establish in the court that there is some
discrimination or prejudice. At the same time, it is also required by law that there should be some
unfairness present that if goes beyond mere disadvantage for a particular member or members.
10 Lipton, P, Herzberg, A & Welsh M 2010, Understanding company law, Thomson Reuters Australia Ltd, Sydney
11 Heath W, “The Director’s “Fiduciary” Duty of Care and Skill: A Misnomer” (2007) 25 C & S LJ 370
12 Loose, P, Griffiths, M & Impey D 2011, The company director: powers, duties and liabilities, 11th Edition, Jordan
Publishing Limited, Bristol

As a shareholder is a part of many shareholders, sometimes it is possible that the person may feel
powerless or a lack of influence regarding the decisions made by the corporation. Usually, such a
situation may arise when the majority members of the company conducting the affairs of the
company in such a way that proves to be beneficial for the majority and is disadvantageous for
the minority members.13
Hence, there are certain circumstances where the minority shareholders are allowed by the law to
seek a remedy against such conduct if they can establish that the conduct is oppressive and
unfair. But by providing this protection to the minority members of the corporation by the law, it
does not mean that every decision that has been taken by the majority and with which the
minority shareholders do not agree, can be considered as oppressive conduct. The law provides
that minority oppression can take place only in cases where the majority is conducting the affairs
of the corporation or if the actions of the majority are against the interests of the shareholders as
a whole or if the conduct can be described as oppressive and unfair.
The law provides that when minority oppression has been established, the powers granted to the
court include an ordered by the court which provides that one or more majority members are
required to purchase the shares of the minority shareholder at the price determined by the court.
It may also be ordered that the company should purchase the shares of the minority shareholder.
Other orders include appointing a receiver and manager and also an order directing the winding
up of the company.14 Similarly, the court may also grant an injunction against the company
which restricts the company or a directive from particular action.15
13 Mansfield, J & Chew, LJ 2011, ‘Australia: Continuous Disclosure – What Duties do Directors Have?’, Mondaq
Business Briefing, 30 November, viewed 28 April 2012
14 Terry, A & Guigni, D 2005, Business and the Law, 4th Edition, Cengage Learning Australia, Sydney
15 Getzler J, “Duty of Care” in Birks P and Pretto A (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002)

Therefore in the over these provisions, in this case, also it can be said that successful action can
be brought by Kanye against Koala Pty Ltd only if he is in a position to establish that the
majority members of the company were conducting the affairs of the company in such a way that
is contrary to the interests of the company or its members as a whole or if the conductor was
oppressive and harmful for him.
Kanye can give an example of actions like the issuance of shares were the members for the
purpose of diluting the voting power of Kanye and also the fact that he was removed from his
position as director. Such conduct can be described as discriminatory and prejudicial for Kanye.
(B)
In this part of the assignment, the issue arises if the other two directors of Koala Pty Ltd., Keith
and Kylie were liable for contravening the duty which requires them to avoid conflicts of interest
between their personal interests and their company's interests. The law provides that, while
acting as a director of the corporation, a person may receive information that is capable of being
used for the purpose of making a profit by such person.16 As a result that a significant position is
held by a director in the company, it is provided by this duty that the directors are prohibited
from using their position in order to achieve personal benefit. In some cases, the directors have
used the information received by them due to their position in the company for making a
personal benefit. They were in such cases, the court considers the profit made by the director as
the profit made by the corporation.17 At the same time, this duty, prohibiting the directors from
16 Langford R, Ramsay I and Welsh M, “The Origins of Company Directors’ Statutory Duty of Care” (2015) 37 Syd
LR 489
17 Tomasic, K 2011, ‘Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey: Implications for the directors’
duty of care and diligence’, Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 26th Edition

making the personal benefit also includes the benefits made by using unlawful means like
commission or a bribe or in return of the favor.18
Under these circumstances, it has been provided by the law that there are certain fiduciary duties
owed by the directors towards the corporation. On the other hand, they can be a conflict of
interest in is the director of the corporation is willing to provide a commercial opportunity
personally or for the purpose of providing a benefit to some other business or person, other than
their own company. The law provides that in such cases, the fiduciary relationship serves the
interests of some other party and as a result, the fiduciaries should not place themselves in any
situation where they may have to give preference to their personal interests or to further the
interests of some other person, apart from their principal. Hence, a fiduciary may pursue any
such opportunity only after the principle has given fully informed consent.
There is nothing unusual if a director of the company goes on to meet with members of their
company. In the same way, the directors are not presented by the law from involving in such
activities. On the other hand, it may be a problem if the director enters into contact with a
companywide acting as the director or a member of such company. Hence, when it is discovered
by the director that there can be a probable conflict of interest, due to which they can be a breach
of duty by the director, such a director is required by the law to completely disclose the
circumstances concerning the contract to the company. In the same way, the directors of the
company can also be allowed by the constitution of the company to enter into a contract with
their own company. But in such a case, the director may decline to take part in voting on such a
matter. Another relevant issue is when the director is required to protect the interests of the
18 Heydon JD, “Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and Skill Fiduciary?” in Degeling S and
Edelman J (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Thomson, Sydney, 2006)

company. Therefore in such cases, the law requires that the director should take all necessary
steps for the purpose of protecting the interests of the corporation.19
But if it has been discovered by the court there has been a breach of their duties by the director,
the court may choose civil or criminal penalties on such a director. According to the corporations
law, a criminal breach of duty may take place by the director if it is found that the director acted
recklessly or with intentional dishonesty.20 Due to the high threshold is present in case of
criminal standard of proof, the company is also allowed by the law to take civil action against the
directors for the breach of their duties. The law also allows the company to seek damages under
common law or the recession of contract, as well as equitable intentions and compensation. In
this way, there is a significant duty present on part of the directors provide a conflicts of interest.
It has been clearly demonstrated by the court in cases like Rich v ASIC that there is a constant
need to remain vigilant in order to uphold the fiduciary duties imposed on the directors.
Under these circumstances, in this case also, it can be said that a successful action can be brought
by Khaled and Kanye against the other directors are members of Koala Pty Ltd if it can be
established that these directors were liable for the breach of their duties.
19 Heydon JD, “Directors’ Duties and the Company’s Interests” in Finn PD (ed), Equity and Commercial
Relationships (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1987)
20 Varzaly, J 2008, ‘Striking a Balance’, Monash Business Review, 01 November, viewed 20 April 2011, InfoTrac
Database

Bibliography
Edmunds R and Lowry J, “The Continuing Value of Relief for Directors’ Breach of Duty”
(2003) 66 MLR 195
Edmunds R and Lowry J, 2002 “Excuses” in P Birks and Pretto A (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart
Publishing)
Getzler J, “Duty of Care” in Birks P and Pretto A (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2002)
Getzler J, 2002, “Duty of Care” in Birks P and Pretto A (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing,
Oxford
Handford P, “Intentional Negligence: A Contradiction in Terms?” (2010) 32(1) Syd LR 29
Heath W, “The Director’s “Fiduciary” Duty of Care and Skill: A Misnomer” (2007) 25 C & S LJ
370
Heydon JD, “Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and Skill Fiduciary?” in
Degeling S and Edelman J (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Thomson, Sydney, 2006)
Heydon JD, “Directors’ Duties and the Company’s Interests” in Finn PD (ed), Equity and
Commercial Relationships (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1987)
Heydon JD, “Equity and Statute” in Turner PG (ed), Equity and Administration (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2016)
Heydon JD, 2006, “Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care and Skill Fiduciary?”
in Degeling S and Edelman J (eds), Equity in Commercial Law, Thomson, Sydney
Heydon JD, 2016, “Equity and Statute” in Turner PG (ed), Equity and Administration Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge

Langford R, Ramsay I and Welsh M, “The Origins of Company Directors’ Statutory Duty of
Care” (2015) 37 Syd LR 489
Lipton, P, Herzberg, A & Welsh M 2010, Understanding company law, Thomson Reuters
Australia Ltd, Sydney
Loose, P, Griffiths, M & Impey D 2011, The company director: powers, duties and liabilities,
11th Edition, Jordan Publishing Limited, Bristol
Mansfield, J & Chew, LJ 2011, ‘Australia: Continuous Disclosure – What Duties do Directors
Have?’, Mondaq Business Briefing, 30 November, viewed 28 April 2012
Terry, A & Guigni, D 2005, Business and the Law, 4th Edition, Cengage Learning Australia,
Sydney
Tomasic, K 2011, ‘Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey: Implications for
the directors’ duty of care and diligence’, Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 26th Edition
Varzaly, J 2008, ‘Striking a Balance’, Monash Business Review, 01 November, viewed 20 April
2011, InfoTrac Database
ASIC v Mariner Corporation Limited [2015] FCA
ASIC v Maxwell & Ors [2006] NSWSC