Challenges in Related to Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Essay

This essay delves into the multifaceted challenges associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, presenting a comprehensive analysis of the evolving global security landscape. It begins by highlighting the persistent threat posed by nuclear proliferation and the difficulties in deterring its growth, particularly in the context of a 'second nuclear age' characterized by new nuclear actors and emerging threats. The essay examines how the traditional logic of nuclear deterrence is being challenged by issues like cyber defense, terrorism, and asymmetric conflicts. It also discusses the increasing accessibility of nuclear technology, the current composition of nuclear states, and the diverse objectives assigned to nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the essay explores the questioning of deterrence, its credibility, and its effectiveness in the current geostrategic context, emphasizing the importance of international discipline in preventing further proliferation. The essay concludes by underscoring the complex and heterogeneous nature of the contemporary nuclear world, where technological levels, capacity dynamics, and nuclear postures vary significantly, impacting the overall strategic landscape.

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Challenges in Related to Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
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Challenges in Related to Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2
Introduction
The proliferation of nuclear weapon is a threat to the planet. The move to deter growth of
nuclear weapon is faced with several challenges. The mission to deter nuclear proliferation seem
to be heading nowhere. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, if some had been able to feed the hope
of a post-nuclear world, this illusion will have lasted a little less than ten years. While the 1990s,
still in the shadow of the Cold War, had been marked by an unprecedented effort at global
nuclear disarmament, the years 2000 and 2010 were characterized by the increase in the number
nuclear weapons and by modernizing their arsenals. This period has been classified as a second
nuclear age (Sridharan, 2005 p. 97).
The expression nuclear second age is intended to describe a situation altered by two
phenomena: the existence of new nuclear actors and the emergence of new threats that lead to re-
interrogating the credibility of deterrence. Indeed, proliferation increases, objectively and
subjectively, the accidental or intentional risks associated with the possession of nuclear
weapons. Moreover, the logic of nuclear deterrence is today relativized, bypassed or confined by
a whole series of new security challenges: cyber defense, terrorism, the use of force in
asymmetric conflicts (Kenneth and Scott 2002).
As the discovery and dismantling of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network in 2004 has shown,
nuclear technology, formerly jealously guarded by a few states that intended to control access to
it, is now within the reach of any country. or even any scientific entity that has been little
developed.
Today, the world comprises nine nuclear states: The United States, China, North Korea,
France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United Kingdom. Contrary to some claims, the

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increase in this number is not inevitable. It is also to be hoped that the treatment of the Korean
and Iranian cases as well as the maintenance of an international discipline faithful to the
principles of the Tnp will prevent other countries like Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil, Saudi Arabia,
even Australia or Japan, to be tempted to continue in this direction, favoring a nuclear surge with
unforeseeable consequences.
In view of the current de facto equation involving at least nine nuclear-weapon States and
the ongoing development of their arsenals, it is reasonable to consider that nuclear weapons, over
the next thirty years, will remain a structuring strategic landscape (Karnad, 2005 p. 175).
However, compared to the reality of the cold war, the current nuclear world is more composite.
Among the endowed countries, the technological levels and the capacity dynamics are indeed
very variable. It is also a world that has become more polysemic because the objectives assigned
to nuclear weapons and their employment doctrines differ significantly. What's the point, to take
the example of two countries with only a nuclear component, between the posture of the United
Kingdom and that of Israel? What is the common thread between France, which is reducing and
modernizing its nuclear forces with a strict "sanctuary" approach and China or India at the start
of a new technological cycle and in search of strategic affirmation? (Keith 1996)
Evolutive, because of proliferation risks, and heterogeneous due to differences in nuclear
postures, the current geostrategic context is also reflected in the questioning of deterrence, its
credibility and its effectiveness (Sridharan, 2005 p.327).
The second half of the 20th century saw the logic of nuclear deterrence triumph. After the
end of World War II in Hiroshima, the atomic weapons and terror they inspired prevented the
confrontation between the two blocs from degenerating into open warfare. The chain 14 global
conflict was so broken. Never before had such a weapon of destruction been able to be

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concentrated in such a weapon and, to such an extent, the inhibitory effects of the fear induced
by its use. The classical logic of deterrence 15 finally found tangible incarnation in a
qualitatively and quantitatively measurable reality of the number of vectors, the power of the
strikes and the incommensurability of the damage inflicted or suffered (Nikitin, 2014, p.349).
Nuclear deterrence is a construction, it is a process conceived from the forbidden (the
Hiroshima trauma) and based on the prohibition (the nuclear apocalypse). At the same time in its
theoretical elaboration, in the political discourse and in practice, deterrence is established on the
certainty of the worst and on its rationalization by potential adversaries. In any case, this is how
it was defined during the Cold War and is still being presented today.

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References
Karnad, B. (2005) ‘South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Nuclear Deterrence Theory’, India
Review, 4(2), pp. 173–213. doi: 10.1080/14736480500225640.
Keith P (1996) Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age , Lexington, University Press of
Kentucky.
Kenneth W, and Scott S (2002) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed , NY, WW
Norton and Company.
Nikitin, A. I. (2014) ‘Nuclear Deterrence Theory’, Value Inquiry Book Series, 276, pp. 349–351.
Available at: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=a9h&AN=97490465&site=ehost-live (Accessed: 19 September 2018).
Sridharan, E. (2005) ‘Improving Indo-Pakistan relations: international relations theory, nuclear
deterrence and possibilities for economic cooperation’, Contemporary South Asia, 14(3), pp.
321–339. doi: 10.1080/09584930500463768.
Sridharan, E. (2005) ‘Introduction: South Asia and Theories of Nuclear Deterrence:
Subcontinental Perspectives’, India Review, 4(2), pp. 99–102. doi:
10.1080/14736480500265299.