Review of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and Negotiations

This report provides an in-depth analysis of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference from the perspective of a government delegate. It details the complex political dynamics, key policy issues, and the positions of major countries and coalitions during the UN climate negotiations. The report offers an insider's account of the heated debates and the dramatic collapse of the conference, highlighting the failure to produce a global climate treaty. It contrasts the stagnation of the UN process with the progress in aggregate climate policy and multilevel climate governance. The report also examines the background and context of the conference, the stakes involved, the consequences of climate change, and the policy ramifications. It concludes by assessing the outcomes of Copenhagen, identifying policy achievements and failures, and evaluating the current state of global climate politics.

Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations:
The Copenhagen Conferenceropr_472 795..822
Radoslav S. Dimitrov
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
UN negotiations on climate change entaila fundamentaltransformation of the globaleconomy and
constitute the single most important process in world politics. This is an account of the 2009 C
summitfrom the perspective ofa governmentdelegate.The article offersa guide to globalclimate
negotiations,tells the story of Copenhagen from behind closed doors,and assesses the currentstate of
globalclimate governance.It outlineskey policy issuesunder negotiation,the positionsand policy
preferences of key countries and coalitions, the outcomes of Copenhagen, and achievements
in climate negotiationsto date.The Copenhagen Accord isa weak agreementdesigned to mask the
political failure of the international community to create a global climate treaty. However, clim
around the world is making considerable progress.While the UN negotiations process is deadlocked,
multilevel climate governance is thriving.
KEY WORDS: climate change,climate politics,internationalnegotiations,environmentalpolicy,
Copenhagen Accord
Introduction
The UN Climate Change Conference of December 2009 in Copenhagen brought
togetherthe global political elite to launch humankind’s response to global
warming.The conference was the largest summit in the history ofinternational
diplomacy.One hundred and nineteen kings,presidents,and prime ministers in
the same building constituted the highest concentration of robust decision-making
power the world had seen. Their presence on a highly visible political arena raised
high hopes for a successful outcome: Copenhagen was “condemned to success.”1 By
the middle of the second week,however,we knew the only outstanding question
was concerning the exact shape of failure.
This is an account of the Copenhagen negotiations from behind closed doors,
from the perspective of a government delegate.2 UN climate change negotiations
are not “environmental”:they are aboutthe economic future ofnations.Today
governments are negotiating a fundamental transformation of the global economy
toward low-carbon development.Climate politics is reshaping our world and the
new climate treaty willlikely be the mostimportantinternationalagreementin
human history.Having been privy to consequentialpolitical discussionswhere
neither the globalmedia nor civilsociety had access,I would like to share obser-
vations concerning the political dynamics and policy outcomes that affect all people
around the world.
The article offers a guide to global climate change negotiations. After describing
the problem and clarifying the economic and ecological stakes, it explains key policy
issues in UN climate negotiations and the positions of major countries and political
coalitions. The article provides an insider’s account of the Copenhagen conference
and retells some of the heated debates among states. The story lets countries speak
for themselves and relies on direct quotes from delegation statements to illustrate
795
Review of Policy Research, Volume 27, Number 6 (2010)
© 2010 by The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.

their positions and to convey the highly emotionalexchange that led to the dra-
matic collapse of the conference.3 The final sections summarize the Copenhagen
outcomes, identify policy achievements and failures, and assess the current state of
affairs in global climate politics.
The Short Story
The sheer size of the summit was staggering.There were 37,000 registered
participants including 10,500 government delegates,13,500 observers from civil
society, and 3,000 journalists.4 Security was so tight that the Chinese Minister of the
Environment could not enter the Bella Conference Center for two days because he
had been issued the wrong conference pass.Government delegations conducted
more than 1,000 official and informal meetings over the two weeks and held 300
press conferences.The record number of premiers and ministers required 1,200
limousines and 400 helicopters. And while the world’s attention was justifiably on
Copenhagen,the conference produced perhapsthe most ambiguousoutcome
in diplomatic history, leaving governments and observers alike wondering how to
assess the results (Averchenkova, 2010; Egenhofer & Georgiev, 2009).
The brief story of Copenhagen, in my view, contains three main political devel-
opments.First, Western countriesmade considerable contributionsto a strong
global agreement. All industrialized nations, with the exception of the United States
and Canada, laid the ground for a treaty by offering ambitious national emissions
reductions and providing considerable amounts ofmoney for climate policy in
developing countries.Second,China, India, and Brazilprevented an agreement.
They consistently blocked substantive policy proposals and refused to reciprocate to
Western concessions with any policy commitments of their own. Third, the Copen-
hagen Accord was created as a face-saving device to “greenwash” the absence of a
substantive agreement. The Accord was not adopted due to opposition by several
politically weak countries like Bolivia and Sudan who thwarted an arrangement by
great powers. And while the wee-hour battle over the adoption of the Copenhagen
Accord stole the headlines, this fight should not obscure the more important story
of failing to produce a global climate treaty due to opposition by large developing
country emitters.
The conference was a failure whose magnitude exceeded our worst fears and
the resulting Copenhagen Accord was a desperate attempt to mask that failure.
However,there is a sharp contrast between multilateralclimate governance and
“aggregate” climate governance.Today we face two concurrent realities: the UN
climate processis seriously damaged while aggregate climate policy ismaking
significant progress. All countries with major emissions have ambitious policy plans
for emission reductions,billions of dollars for climate policy are being mobilized,
and subnationalpolicies are thriving.The trajectory ofthe internationalpolicy
path matters more than single conference events, and recent developments display
distinctly positive trends.This contrastbetween a stagnantUN process and a
vibrant multilevelpolicy realm underscores the need for a global“barometer” of
climate policy worldwide thatprovidesa composite measure ofglobal climate
governance (Dimitrov, 2010).
796 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

Background and Context
The Copenhagen conference was the culmination oftwo years ofintense inter-
nationalnegotiations on a new globalclimate agreement.The new treaty would
likely strengthen climate policy through stringent emission reductions in advanced
economies,concrete actions by developing countries,and internationalfinancial
and technological support for climate policy. While the UN is the main negotiation
forum, multilateral discussions take place also at the Major Economies’Forum on
Energy and Climate Change, the G-8 and the G-20 meetings, among others. The
stakes are uniquely high:the widespread consequences ofclimate change mean
political decisions would affect most human communities around the world as well
as future generations.
The Climate Problem
Climate change is the defining challenge of our times, for two reasons. First, it is the
only global problem whose grave consequences occur on a planetary scale and affec
the prosperity and security of allhuman communities.The cumulative economic
impact of climate impacts will be overwhelming. Under a business-as-usual scenario,
climate change can reduce global GDP by 5–20 percent each year (Stern, 2007). The
World Bank calculates globaladaptation costs at 75–100 billion per year between
2010 and 2050 (World Bank, 2009). Second, the policy package required to tackle
the problem has profound socioeconomic consequences. These policies are already
triggering a fundamentaltransformation ofmodern societies toward low-carbon
developmentbased on new energy production and consumption.Quite simply,
climate change and the global policy response to the problem will reshape our world
The realities of global warming now accepted by the global political elite and the
international scientific community threaten economic growth, long-term prosper-
ity,and the physicalsurvivalof human populations.5 Average globaltemperature
has increased by 0.74 degrees Celsius over the course of the twentieth century and
is projected to increase another 1.8–4 degrees according to the best estimate and
possibly up to 6.4 degrees by the end of this century relative to 1980–99 (IPCC,
2007; Schneider,Rosencranz,Mastrandrea,& Kuntz-Duriseti,2010).6 Expected
consequences ofglobal warming include:decline in food production from dis-
ruption of agriculture; water scarcity; human health problems on epidemic scales;
increase in the intensity and frequency of natural disasters; disappearance of sea ice
and elimination ofthe Greenland ice sheet by the latter part ofthe twenty-first
century; sea-level rise and inundation of agricultural lands; and refugee waves.
Rising seas will lead to loss of territory and decline in agriculture affecting the 25
percent of global human populations who live in low-lying coastal areas. Especially
vulnerable are island nations in the Caribbean; Pacific and Indian Oceans; and river
deltas of the Nile, Ganges,and the Mekong where food production is heavily
concentrated (IPCC,2007).Such changes threaten the physicalsurvivalof entire
human communities in low-lying coastal nations like Bangladesh and island states
such as Micronesia, the Maldives Islands, and Samoa.
The consequences are not hypothetical, they are occurring today. Heat-related
casualties in the EU were 35,000 people in the summer of 2003, which is projected
The Copenhagen Conference797

to be the average summer by 2050. The global food crisis of 2007–08 began when
crops failed on severalcontinentssimultaneously and triggered riotsin many
countries. Between 2006 and 2008 average world prices of rice rose by 217 percent,
wheat by 136 percent, and corn by 125 percent (Steinberg, 2008).
The future is like the present, just longer. The IPCC estimates that crop yields
will decline by up to 20 percent in East and Southeast Asia and 50 percent in some
African countries by 2020 (IPCC, 2007). Water stress will affect 20–25 percent of the
global population and will affect 75–250 million people in Africa alone. Freshwater
will decrease in semi-arid areas such as Southern Europe,western United States,
southern Africa,and north-eastern Brazil.The opposite effectswill take place
in other areas such as Canada,Russia,and most of Asia where precipitation will
increase. More than 20 million people were displaced by climate-related disasters in
the year 2008. Climate-related migration is expected to reach 200 million by 2050,
increasing the likelihood of failed states and violent conflicts over scarce food and
water resources both within and between countries.
Policy Ramifications
To avoid the most catastrophic impacts and limit temperature rise to below 2°C,
advanced economies would need to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 25–40
percent by 2020, and global emissions need to be reduced 50–80 percent by 2050.
These IPCC-derived goals were officially adopted by developed countries at the G-8
Summit and the Major Economies’ Forum on Energy and Climate. The main causes
of climate change are human activities emitting GHGs such as carbon dioxide,
methane,and nitrous oxides. Main sources of GHGs are energy sectors(26
percent), industrial production (19 percent), forestry (17 percent), and agriculture
(13 percent). Because the root causes of the problem are related to energy, remedial
policies will affect most aspectsof modern societies:agriculture and food
production, industrial manufacturing,transportation,cooling, heating, and
lighting.
The process ofclimate negotiations can lead to major economic and political
changes on a global scale. Strong policies under an ambitious climate treaty would
entaila transition to a low-carbon economy.Many advanced societies are already
embarking on industrialrestructuring for a new mode of development based on
renewable energy,energy efficiency,and green technologies(Schneideret al.,
2010).Climate policies would lift nationaleconomies offtheir current fossil-fuel
platforms and base them on a different energy paradigm.And changing energy
means changing everything.This transition entails a fundamentalsocioeconomic
transformation of the human world and this global transition is the subject matter
of UN negotiations.
The geopolitical ramifications are equally significant. A shift from fossil fuels to
renewable energy coupled with improved energy efficiency would decrease global
demand for oiland increase energy security and economic self-sufficiency in the
West. Today the oil connection between the West and the Middle East is one of the
key pillars in the current structure of global geopolitics. Imagine a world in which
the United States does notneed Middle Eastern oiland Europe does notneed
Russian natural gas. The green shift will create political independence of advanced
798 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

economies in the West from OPEC countries in the Middle East, and could increase
the potential for conflict between them.
Existing Agreements
There are two currently existing internationalagreementson climate change.
The first is the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or
just “the Convention”) that contains no concrete policy obligations. All governments
have ratified the Convention and are bound by its provisions, including a require-
ment that member “Parties” meetonce a year at a Conference of the Parties
(COP) to review progress in policy implementation and renegotiate agreements.
Copenhagen was the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (and commonly referred
to as COP-15).
The second treaty is the 1997 Kyoto Protocolto the UNFCCC that specifies
binding targets for emission reductions in industrialized countries and economies in
transition (Annex I countries).The Protocol exempts developing countries and
imposes mandatory targets for developed countries that would result in aggregate
emission reductions of 5 percent between 1990 and 2012. Individual countries have
differentialemission targets such as 8 percentcuts for the European Union,6
percent for Japan,and 0 percent in Russia.The Protocolalso has provisions for
achieving reductions by emissions trading and green investments in developing
countries (the Clean DevelopmentMechanism)or in other developed countries
( Joint Implementation). The Kyoto protocol came into force in February 2005 and
effectively expires in 2012 when its first “commitment period” ends.
Legal Mandate: The Bali Road Map
Today,governments are busy negotiating new policies beyond 2012.The process
began in 2007 when countries launched the Bali Action Plan that provides the legal
mandate for UN negotiations and establishes the agenda and scope of discussions.
The mandate requiresgovernmentsto produce an agreementcontaining four
building blocks of policies: mitigation (GHG emissions reductions), adaptation (to
the consequences of climate change),and financialand technologicalsupport for
developing country actions (Clémençon, 2008).
The Bali Action Plan stipulates a two-track approach to negotiations and two
parallel processes offormal negotiations are currently under way.One aims at
renegotiating emission reductionsby industrialized countriesunder the Kyoto
Protocol. This “Kyoto track” was launched in December 2005 and conducted in the
Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). The second, “Convention track” is a broader reconsid-
eration of long-term commitments by all countries, including developing countries.
It was launched in December 2007 and negotiations take place in the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA).
The AWG-KP and AWG-LCA are legally separate butpolitically intertwined.
They work parallelto each other in the same building ateach conference and
involve more or less the same negotiators from government delegations. A serious
political obstacle to progress was the reluctance of either group to complete its work
The Copenhagen Conference799

before the other:industrialized countriesin AWG-KP would not finalize their
commitments before guarantees of developing country commitments in AWG-LCA.
Similarly,developing countries insist on finalizing the AWG-KP talks on Western
obligations before making commitments themselves. In Copenhagen, the two nego-
tiation tracks were presumably supposed to come together for a trade-off of policy
commitments between developed and developing countries.
Key Issues under Negotiation
What do states argue about in climate talks? The building blocks of the next treaty
under negotiation are: policies for mitigation (i.e., reducing GHG emissions), adap-
tation (to the consequences ofclimate change),and financialand technological
support for developing country actions.The negotiations address a large range
of highly technicalpolicy issues detailed better elsewhere (Fry,2008;Kulovesi&
Gutiérrez,2009; Rajamani,2009).Here, I focus on the broader politicaldebates
regarding what to do, who should do it and how, and who would pay for it.
Global Policy Targets
A fundamental disagreement pertains to the overall goal of the global policy effort.
Article 2 of the UNFCCC states the goalis to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference” but leaves the meaning of “dangerous” to subjective interpretation.
All Western countries,China, India, Brazil, and others support limiting average
globaltemperature rise to 2°C above 1,900 levels thatwould require restricting
concentrations of atmospheric carbon to 450 ppm (parts per million). The Alliance
of Small Island States,and many other vulnerable countries insist on 1.5°C and
carbon concentrations below 350 ppm,respectively.According to a Plenary state-
ment by Grenada,up to 100 countries or half of UN membership endorse that
goal. Finally, the ALBA group of Latin American countries support an even more
ambitious limit to temperature rise of 1°C.7
Legal Architecture
The legal nature of the next climate agreement is a matter of considerable conse-
quence. The negotiation output could be a new treaty, an amendment to the Kyoto
Protocol, a nonbinding political declaration, or a set of legally binding “decisions”
by the Conference of the Parties. A big fight in global climate politics is whether to
negotiate one or two climate change agreements.Most Western countries (and
especially Japan,Russia,and Canada) demand a single globaltreaty binding all
major emitters in developed and developing countries alike (read China and India)
that could entaila long ratification process.Developing countries demand two
separate agreementsand insist on renegotiating the Kyoto Protocolfirst, with
policies for a second commitment period beyond 2012 (Kyoto 2). Indeed, replacing
Kyoto altogether would likely leave a gap in climate governance since a new treaty
would require a prolonged ratification process that may take many years and whose
outcome is uncertain.
800 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

Who Should Take Action
The globaldivision of labor in mitigating climate change is the most contentious
issue in the talks as global competitiveness concerns generate prolonged debates on
“comparability of efforts” and a “shared vision” for long-term policy goals. The high
economic stakes and policy costs generate acute relative gains concerns: everyone
demands guarantees ofcomparable emission reductions in other countries,and
attribute paramount importance to transparency in verifying compliance.
Developing Country Actions—The terms of participation by developing countries in
internationalclimate policy have been a major theme in the lasttwo decades.
Governments embrace the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”
enshrined in the Convention but disagree on what “common” means. While aggre-
gate emissions from industrialized countries since the 18th century are the main
cause of the problem, roughly 50 percent of current emissions originate in devel-
oping countries. China, India, and Brazil’s participation is therefore indispensable
for avoiding catastrophic climate impacts. Developed countries acknowledge their
historic responsibility for pastemissionsand agree to take the lead but insist
everyone must take some action. Today everyone agrees to let developing countries
choose their policies freely but whether these “nationally appropriate mitigation
actions” should be quantified, measured and reported (MRV) to the international
community to provide transparency and ensure compliance remains contentious.8
Developed Country Actions—New,quantified economy-wide emission reductions in
advanced economies will be a centerpiece of future climate policy and the size and
timing of such reductions is under negotiation. The EU and many other countries
endorse 25–40 percent cuts by 2020 as consistent with the IPCC estimate and 80–95
percent by 2050.Central American countries support 45 percent by 2020 while
Bolivia, Cuba, and others demand 49 percentreductions.States argue intransi-
gently about the method of determining targets. Industrialized countries generally
support a “bottom-up” approach wherein governmentsdetermine their own
national goals. Developing countries prefer a “top-down,” science-based approach
that guaranteesenvironmentalresultsby fixing aggregate emission reductions
necessary to preventtemperature rise above 2°C or 1.5°C and then negotiating
individual countries’share of the burden.
Mitigation Policy Options—The UN process involves highly technical discussions on
mechanisms for policy implementation and accounting rules, including: emissions
trading, national emission caps, energy intensity targets, sectoral approaches, poli-
cies and measures such as a carbon tax, land use and land use change (LULUCF),
and reducing emissions from deforestation (Bodansky, 2003). The role of interna-
tional “offsets” is an ever-present theme and concerns whether advanced economie
must reduce emissionsby strictly domestic actionsor be permitted to finance
emission cuts in developing countries and receive credit.One point of political
consensus is that forestry (accounting for 17 percent of globalemissions and 50
percentof the mitigation potential)providesa cost-effective way to ameliorate
climate change and will be an integral part of the new climate agreement. Devel-
The Copenhagen Conference801

oping countries regard reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
tion (REDD) as a future source of financial rewards (money in exchange for forest
protection) and eagerly negotiate eligible forest activities, accounting mechanisms,
and institutional arrangements (Fry, 2008).
Adaptation—Developing countries seek a comprehensive globaladaptation frame-
work that provides financialsupport for coping with naturaldisasters and other
climate change impacts. An Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol is fed by a
2 percent levy on transactions under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Current talks focus on a possible second fund under the Convention,levels of
funding, developmentof nationaladaptation plans,an internationalinsurance
mechanism for loss and damage, and how to differentiate adaptation activities from
development policy for purposes of funding.
Finance—The World Bank estimates the costs of adapting to a 2-degree temperature
rise at 75–100 billion dollars per year between 2010 and 2050. Climate mitigation
policies in developing countries alone require 140 to 175 billion dollars per year
in the next 20 years (World Bank, 2010). All industrialized countries endorsed an
estimate by the European Union to provide 100 billion per year by 2020.Least
developed countries suggest at least 1.5 percent of GDP that is additional to official
development assistance9 while the ALBA group suggested financial contributions by
developed countries of 6 percent of their GDP.
Apart from the level of funding, countries also debate sources of funding: market
mechanisms and private investment (as preferred by developed countries) or public
funds (advocated by developing countries). Proposals include: a global carbon tax
around $2/tonne (Switzerland);auction ofemission allowances to raise revenue
(Norway); and a Green Fund financed through assessed contributions by developed
countries (Mexico). The third debate is on the “chicken-or-egg” question of timing:
whether policy actions by developing countries are contingent on prior Western
funding, or whether funding is offered after actual policy development.
TechnologyTransfer—The developmentand dissemination ofclean technologies
are central to long-term solutions. Vigorous discussions address the role of research
and development and intellectual property rights (IPRs), market access, and tech-
nology financing. Developing country proposals include a multilateral technology
fund, compulsory licensing,patent pooling,and government incentives for tech-
nology transfer to developing countries. Developed countries uphold the current
IPR regime, firmly reject the proposed technology fund,and propose globalor
regional centers for exchange of information.
Positions of Key Players
The European Union
Considered the globalleader on climate policy,the EU advocates a strong global
agreement with stringent economy-wide emissions reductions, substantial financial
support, and robust compliance mechanisms. Europeans stress “win-win” solutions
802 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

to climate change that benefit the economy and the environment,and economic
advantage from energy savings and clean technologies.In Copenhagen,the EU
stated:
European Union: Let us agree to the 2 degree objective and to global emissions reductions
of at least 50 percent as well as aggregate developed emission reductions of at least 80–95
percentby 2050 compared to 1990 levels,and in the order of 30 percentby 2020.
Developing countries as a group should committo actions thatachieve a substantial
deviation below the currently predicted emissionsgrowth rate in the order 15–30
percent.10
On international finance, Europe has the most detailed position among indus-
trialized countries and pledged to provide 2 to 15 billion Euros per year by 2020.
Their position was outlined in their opening statement:
European Union:The net incrementalcost for adaptation and mitigation has been esti-
mated at around 100 billion Euros per annum in developing countries by 2020, including
internationalpublic supportin the range of22–50 billion Euros.All countries,except
the least developed,should contribute to such internationalpublic financing through a
comprehensive, global distribution key based on emission levels and GDP.
In 2007 Europe committed to unilateral20 percentcuts by 2020 compared
to 1990 regardlessof negotiation outcomes,and up to 30 percentif other major
economies reciprocate.In December 2008,the European Parliamentapproved
their “Energy and Climate” policy package that became law in June 2009 and is now
legally binding on its 27 country members.The European Commission expects
savings of 100 billion Euro per year from improved energy efficiency,50 billion
from reduced oil exports and projects 1 million new jobs in green industries.11
The Umbrella Group consists ofAustralia,Canada,Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan,
New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and the United States who
seek to coordinate positions and deliver common statements.The group wants a
single global legally binding treaty that locks major emitters into transparent actions
that are subject to internationalverification.Their opening statement in Copen-
hagen, delivered by Australia, summarized the group’s preferences
Madame President, we, the Umbrella Group, want a success at Copenhagen. In fact, we
want a resounding success. . . . Our vision is simple: we recognize the scientific view that
the increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed
2 degrees Celsius. We want a global outcome that puts the world on a path to 50 percent
reduction in emissions by 2050,and peaking emissions as soon as possible.We want all
countries to act according to their national ability . . . in the context of post-2012 outcome
we’re resolved to support quick, substantial and high-impact financing to assist the most
vulnerable developing countries, both from public and private funding sources, including
carbon markets.
The United States cannot participate in renegotiating the Kyoto Protocolin the
AWG-KP talks because they have not ratified the Protocol. After having stayed out
of the climate regime during the Bush years, the United States changed course in
2009 and now seeks a comprehensive agreement involving all countries, reliance on
market mechanisms and existing global financial institutions, low-carbon technol-
ogy research and development, and a global “climate technology hub” for exchange
of information on clean technologies. Domestically, the Barack Obama administra-
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tion seeks a nationalpolicy to reduce emissions by 17 percentby 2020 and 83
percent by 2050, compared to 2005 levels.
Japan also made a U-turn on domestic emission reductions. In September 2009,
the Hatoyama governmentannounced plans to reduce its own emissions by 25
percent below 1990 levels by 2020, contingent on a global policy framework involv-
ing all major economies. Japan favors “sectoral approaches” to emission reductions,
that is, international agreement to target particular economic sectors and thus allay
competitiveness concerns for those sectors. The Japanese are strongly against Kyoto
2 but appear committed to creating an ambitious new treaty and generally played
a constructive role in the talks. At Copenhagen they provided 11 billion dollars of
public funding for internationalpolicy,and the head of their delegation spoke
earnestly and passionately when he said:
Japan: We are here neither to accuse each other nor to blame each other.We are here
assembled to do our utmost to save the Earth. It is shameful of ourselves condemning each
other. The whole world is watching us. Our delegation has grave concerns on the life and
death threat facing small islands, vulnerable countries on the surface of the Earth. We are
here not just to save these nations but also to save ourselves, our children and our future
generation.
The Russian Federation is generally uninvolved in debates and rarely takes the floor
to make statements. They advocate voluntary bottom-up approaches that allow each
country to determine so-called “no-lose” targets whose achievement would bring
rewards butwherein noncompliance brings no penalties.Domestically,Russia is
currently considering national emission reduction goals.
Developing countriesnegotiate effectively asa powerful coalition (the G-77/
China).12 They are united in advocating Kyoto 2 with stringent binding policy in the
North, voluntary policy in the South, substantial international financial and tech-
nological support, and no MRV for policies that are unsupported internationally.
The G-77 demand firm legal obligations for developed economies before making any
policy commitments themselves, and decry demands for a global treaty as attempts
by industrialized nations to “destroy Kyoto” and shun their historical responsibility
for global warming. Delivering a formal opening statement on behalf of the coali-
tion (G-77), Sudan stated:
G-77/China: We reject attempts of developed countries to shift the responsibility of address-
ing climate change and its adverse effects on developing countries, and we equally object
to their objective of concluding anotherlegally-binding instrumentthat would put
together the obligationsof developed countriesunder the KP and similar actionsof
developing countries.This would revoke the principle of“common,but differentiated
responsibilities” and “historicalresponsibility” under the Convention by imposing these
obligations as well on developing countries under the guise of a “shared-vision.”
The coalition is fractured by fundamentalconflictsof interestamong heavy
industrial emitters like China and India, forested countries, fossil-dependent OPEC
members,and the Alliance of Small Island Nations (AOSIS). These conflicting
interests are deliberately suppressed for the sake of unity but they ruptured the
coalition in Copenhagen.
Brazil,South Africa,India,and China (the BASIC group) are heavyweight GHG
emitters with strong influence on the G-77 coalition. Unlike other G-77 members
804 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

who emphasize internationalfinancialand technologicalsupport, money is not
their priority: BASIC countries want freedom of nationaleconomic development
unencumbered by legaltreaty obligations.They insist their actionsshould be
discussed after finalizing negotiations on developed country actions.Notably,all
four appear positioned to take domestic action (see Table 1). The year 2009 marks
the first time in the history ofclimate negotiations developing country emitters
accepted the idea of quantified targets. China, for instance, plans for 40–45 percent
cuts in carbon dioxide emission intensity of GDP and derive 15 percent of their
energy from renewable sources and nuclear by 2020.
Indonesia, Congo, Brazil, and other heavily forested countries can reap consider-
able financialbenefitsfrom a global agreementrewarding forestconservation
for the sake ofclimate change abatement.They carefully negotiate institutional
arrangements and financialdetails and,given the rightincentives,would break
ranks with the G-77 on the need for developing country actions. Saudi Arabia, on
the other hand,seeks to obstruct negotiations in every possible way,engaging in
diplomatic carpet-bombing ofsorts.Heavy reliance on fossilfuels makestheir
economy extremely vulnerable to prospective energy efficiency and alternative
energy policies. Their delegation champions discussions on negative consequences
of climate policy and compensation for “spillover effects” of low-carbon develop-
ment strategies in advanced economies.
The Alliance ofSmallIsland Stateswant action as strong and swiftas possible,
due to their extreme vulnerability to sea levelrise. The group includes some of
the most proactive players in the negotiations, and many of the innovative policy
ideasand key substantive textproposalscome from the delegationsof Tuvalu
and Micronesia.AOSIS advocate 45 percent emission cuts by 2020 and limiting
global temperature increase to below 1.5 C. On the opening day of Copenhagen,
Grenada stated:
Alliance of Small Island States: We have a moral imperative to act. All of us face this. But as
small island states going under water,losing our territorialintegrity,facing increased
poverty, and frankly, given that our very survival is threatened, we stand to lose the most
if nothing happens here. . . . A final agreement has to address emissions reductions by all
major emitting countries based on the principle of “common, but differentiated respon-
sibilities.” This is critical and this requires a limit to temperature rise to no more than 1.5
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, which then requires greenhouse gas concen-
trations to be returned to 350 parts per million . . . Madame,AOSIS will not accepta
made-for-television solution.
Table 1.National Policy Plans by Major Developing Country
Emitters.
Country Policy Plan by 2020
Brazil 36–39% emission reductions below 1994
China 40–45% cuts in carbon dioxide emission intensity of
GDP and 15% renewable energy share of energy
consumption
India 20–25% cuts in emission intensity of GDP
Korea 30% cuts below 1990
Mexico 30% cuts below 1990
South Africa 34% cuts below current levels
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Copenhagen: The Long Story
Nine rounds of global negotiationstook place between Baliand Copenhagen.
Between December 2007 and December 2009, AWG-LCA and AWG-KP held ses-
sions in Bonn, Accra, Poznan, Bangkok, and Barcelona. These two years brought
little progress in key policy debates and much of the exchange consisted of countries
reiterating well-known positions and wrangling on procedural issues. In the three
months before Copenhagen,however,an avalanche of positive developments
occurred. Following European leadership,Japan pledged highly ambitious25
percentemission cuts below 1990 levels by 2020 while US Congress considered
legislation for 30 percent below 2005 by 2025 and 42 percent by 2030. The global
media reported quantitative policy pledges by major developing country emitters:
first Brazil with 36–39 percent cuts by 2020 below business-as-usual,followed by
China with 40–45 percent and India with 20–25 percent decline in carbon intensity
below 2005.
Two long years ofmultilateraldiscussions came to an end and world leaders
arrived in the Danish capital to finalize a global deal on combating climate change.
With all major players ready for domestic action,the stage appeared setfor an
international agreement. The sense of historic importance was aptly captured in an
opening statement by the highly energetic and famously straightforward President
of the Conference, Danish Connie Hedegaard:
We don’t have to choose between economic growth or climate conservation. A global deal
will drive job creation,a globaldealwill drive competitive advantage,a globaldealwill
drive energy security. So ladies and gentlemen, let’s get it done. . . . Let us on December
18th look each other straight into the eyes and take satisfaction in the fact that we all gave
our very best to the defining gathering of a generation. . . . Let’s mark this meeting in
history, let’s open the door to the low-carbon age, let’s get it done, and let’s get it done now.
Thank you.
The Copenhagen conference was indeed a turning point in climate negotiations
but the internationalcommunity took the wrong turn in Denmark.The outside
world expected a global climate treaty but inside negotiators did not regard this as
a viable option, except island nations who pursued it faithfully to the end. The idea
of a binding agreement was abandoned a month before, at the Barcelona round in
November 2009 when lack of progress made negotiators concede we are not ready
for a December treaty. Citing political expedience and time constraints, the AWG-
LCA Chair Michael Zammit-Cutajar officially proposed aiming at a “comprehensive
core decision” in Copenhagen and continuing negotiationsin 2010. The UN
climate boss Yvo de Boer came to us to lobby the EU and other key players for a
comprehensive COP decision containing substantive policy elements, but eventually
nonbinding in legalnature.The European Union and other countries seeking
a strong treaty reluctantly conceded. The aim became a nonbinding “core decision”
and our worst-case scenario for Copenhagen was a political declaration. Everyone
except perhaps SaudiArabia focused their efforts on avoiding a declaration and
ensuring a comprehensive decision capturing as much policy substance as possible.
Several issuesproved impossible to resolve in Copenhagen,including the
number of internationalagreements to be negotiated,the future of the Kyoto
Protocol, and collective emission reduction targets. Negotiations came to a complete
806 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

stalemate on the second day when developing countries presented a hard ultima-
tum: negotiate Kyoto 2 or leave empty-handed. They stated a discontinuation of the
Kyoto Protocol would be a “deal-breaker,” and left no doubt they would block any
Copenhagen agreement without a second commitment period for Kyoto.
On the other hand, three countries were strongly against Kyoto 2: Japan, Russia,
and Canada opposed keeping Kyoto alive and wanted a brand-new global accord.
The United States also wanted a single treaty but, having arrived in Copenhagen
without any domestic policy commitments confirmed by Congress,was in a weak
negotiating position. Europeans were flexible and ready to accept Kyoto 2 but on
three conditions: inclusion of United States,China, India, and Brazilin a second
globalagreement;flexible mechanisms for policy implementation to allow emis-
sions trading and joint implementation; and favorable accounting rules on agricul-
ture and forest policy.
The Tuvalu Proposal
On the third day, the developing country coalition split.The Alliance of Small
Island States and severalLatin American countries broke ranks and called for a
globallegally binding “Copenhagen Protocol” based on a detailed text proposal
officially submitted by Tuvalu earlier.The ambitiousagreementwould impose
obligations for major developing countries as wellas Western nations and limit
temperature rise to 1.5 degrees (instead of the widely supported 2 degrees) and
carbon concentrations to 350 ppm (instead of 450).
The highly elaborate text proposalhad been officially submitted in May 2009,
and in Copenhagen Tuvalu demanded formal negotiations on their text. While civil
society outside the Bella Center were ecstatic in lauding Tuvalu for tabling the most
ambitious climate treaty, opposition inside was widespread. Island states and severa
Latin American countries backed Tuvalu’s text but their repeated calls to negotiate
on basis of the proposalwere never answered by either other delegations or the
presiding chairpersons. In the final days, one country openly confronted the AWG-
LCA Chair in Plenary: “We want the Tuvalu proposal that everyone seems to have
read except you, Chair!” The response of Michael Zammit-Cutajar was flippant at
best and offensive at worst: “Tonight when I go to bed, I will take the proposal with
me for bedtime reading.”
Money on the Table
One particularly intractable issue was whether developing country actions should
be subject to international measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV). The West
accepted voluntary actions by developing countries, agreed to finance them in part
and offered 25 billion—a major and long-awaited move in negotiations. Consistent
in their global leadership on climate policy, the EU was the first actor to put money
on the table. On Friday of the first week, the EU Council pledged 2.4 billion per
year of fast-track funding. The Japanese followed suit shortly. On Tuesday evening
of the second week, a sheet of paper was distributed to the table of each delegation
The title read: “Press release” and announced thatthe Hatoyama government
The Copenhagen Conference807

commits to providing 11 billion dollars of public finance for climate policy for the
period 2010–12 and another 4 billion in private investments.
The provision of real money was the most important substantive offer in Copen-
hagen and a major turning point in the history of the UN climate talks. I saw an
informal table circulated among key delegations by the Secretariat (see Table 2).
According to that table, the EU pledged $10.6 billion, Japan pledged $11 billion in
public finance,while the United States offered informally 3.7 billion for 2010–12
even though the American delegation never made the announcementpublicly.
Norway’s pledge was truly impressive and nearly equalto that of Japan whose
economy is much larger.
Remarkably, the money trump card had no apparent impact on the negotiations.
The financial news triggered no discernible reaction from developing country
delegations.China, Venezuela,and others openly stated “We don’twant your
money.” Grenada, echoed by many island nations, stressed: “For us the main issue
is survivaland not financialaid.” China,India, and Brazil in particular did not
extend any policy offers to seek compromise and did not table their media-reported
nationalpolicy plans.Among the BASIC countries,only South Africa soughtto
build bridges and made an officialpledge to reduce domestic emissions by 34
percent by 2020 and 42 percent by 2025.
Saving Face: Origins of the Copenhagen Accord
When negotiations failed,priority switched from saving the world to saving face.
Heads of states arrived in Copenhagen on the second week to finalize an agreement
but negotiators had no text to present to them. The AWG-KP and AWG-LCA held
their last sessions without delivering texts as many delegations said the draft texts
developed over two years were too heavily bracketed and unsuitable for adoption.
“Negotiations have reached a dead end,” stated South Africa in the middle of the
second week. “Further negotiations would be only useless theatre,” one of the EU’s
chief negotiators regretfully noted during internal consultations.
The “Friendsof the Chair” Group—When the conference ground to a haltand it
became obvious that no progress would be made following formal procedures, the
Danish hosts pressed for the creation of a small“Friends of the Chair” group of
countries to break the politicaldeadlock.The pragmatic decision was made for
politicalconvenience and dictated by the necessity for problem solving.The idea
was to form a group of key countries representing allmajor regions that would
Table 2.Informal Pledges for Financial Contributions to
International Climate Policy Made at the Copenhagen Conference
Country Pledges for 2010–2012
Canada NA
EU 10.7 billion
Japan 11 billion
Norway 10.5 billion
Russia 200 million
USA 3.7 billion
808 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

consult broadly with others and ensure that everyone’s interests would be properly
considered. This proposal met vehement opposition by many developing countries
who feared that the Friends of the Chair group would serve as an exclusive
committee ofgreat powersto impose decisionson others. Severaldays of the
conference were lost on procedural wrangling and the G-77 blocked any discussion
by smaller groups.
This conflict turned into a major political theme that defined the conference, the
tension between the UN principle of global democracy and the pragmatic need for
problem-solving. The decision-making rule in the UNFCCC is consensus building:
all countries mustendorse a particular decision before itcan be adopted.The
practical implication of this rule is that each country effectively has a veto power and
even one country’s opposition can preventpolicy decisions.This rule promotes
sovereign equality of nations and provides a valuable safeguard against powerful
countries imposing decisions on the smalland weak ones.At the same time,it
severely limits the likelihood of a strong global climate policy agreement. Because a
treaty limiting emissions has enormous economic and social ramifications, opposi-
tion by at least some countries is virtually guaranteed.
To make it possible for Copenhagen to produce an agreement,some tried to
change the decision-making procedures. At the opening of the conference, Papua
New Guinea had proposed to adopt a three-fourths majority voting in cases where
consensus was impossible.Their justification:“Consensus means that any agree-
ment here can only aspire to the lowest common denominator amongst us. From
our perspective, in the face of this growing whirlwind of disaster, making decisions
based only upon the lowestcommon denominator is beyond irresponsible,it’s
gravely negligent.” The proposal was rejected.
Eventually, practically everyone accepted that the major political hurdles could
only be addressed in smaller circles. The Friends of the Chair group was created on
the last day of the conference and consisted of 25 countries, including the United
States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Norway, Mexico, the
Maldives, Lesotho, South Africa, Bangladesh, Algeria, Denmark, Germany, France,
India, Ethiopia,Colombia,Korea, China, and Brazil.The group involved mostly
heads of state and while they met regular negotiations were virtually suspended.
Many delegates,including leading negotiators and Ministers,were walking the
corridors for two days without much information about what was happening in the
real talks.
“Why don’t we be frank and tell the world we failed?” the head of a European
delegation told me privately.Irreconcilable differencesamong developed and
developing countriesprecluded a meaningful agreement.At the same time,
allowing the mostgrandiose eventin internationaldiplomacy to failwould be
an embarrassmentfor all presentpremiers.The last hours of the conference
were dedicated to masking the failure ofthe internationalcommunity.Pens in
hand, 25 prime ministers and presidents were crafting a text themselves,some-
thing rare in diplomacy since Churchill’s famous scribble on a napkin in Yalta
that resulted in the division of Eastern European spheres of influence during the
Cold War.
What emerged from the Friends of the Chair group in Copenhagen was a brief
politicaldeclaration.The draft texts of 200-plus pages negotiated over two years
The Copenhagen Conference809

were effectively trashed and replaced with a brand-new declaration of 2.5 pages
labeled the Copenhagen Accord.Three drafts were developed over a day and a
half, each one slimmer than the previous.Early drafts contained references to
global emission cuts of50 percentand 80 percentreductions in industrialized
countries by 2050,but those disappeared from the text.The final version of the
Accord includes a goalof limiting temperature rise to 2°C,allows countries to
determine their own nationalemission targetsand policy actions,and pledges
financial commitments by industrialized countries for 30 billion dollars for 2010–12
and long-term finance of 100 billion dollars per year by 2020.
The premiers of the United States, China, India, and Brazil met privately in a
smallmeeting on the last,Friday night of the conference.The private consulta-
tions addressed the important topic of the future negotiations in 2010 and while
these discussions remained secret,the importantresult of the meeting was that
the reference to “legally binding” outcome offuture climate negotiationswas
dropped. In simple words, the four great powers agreed that further climate talks
need not produce a binding treaty.When the document was printed and circu-
lated,many delegates were in disbeliefthat the “legally binding” reference was
out. The European Union had been sidelined and grudgingly accepted this deal,
not without fights within.
In what proved to be a strategic mistake,U.S. PresidentObama,Australian
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, and other world leaders gave pressconferences
announcing to the world the creation of the Copenhagen Accord as soon as they
walked out ofthe Friends ofChair meeting and before the Conference Plenary
could even consider the text let alone adopt it. Presidents flew away Friday night
with a particularly weak political declaration in their wake and a weakened mandate
for future talks without commitmentto a “legally binding outcome.” We had
reached our worst-case scenario.
The Dramatic Finale
As we hit rock bottom and thought things could not get worse,they did.In final
Plenary at 3 a.m.on Saturday,Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen introduced the
document and suggested that delegations take one hour to consider it in regional
consultations.Seven countries opposed the Accord:Tuvalu, Nicaragua,Bolivia,
Cuba, Venezuela,Sudan,Pakistan,and more implicitly,Saudi Arabia.13 Each had
veto power in a UN process based on consensus.Western delegations appeared
mortified, facing the prospect of failing to adopt a declaration by their own heads
of state.
The Opponents—The final battle over the Accord is worth recounting in detail, given
that opposition to the Copenhagen Accord brought the conference to its disastrous
end and the Accord is likely to remain a centralcontentious issue in the coming
years.Countries opposing the Copenhagen Accord gave two primary reasons
for doing so: the weak policy content of the agreement, and the allegedly “undemo-
cratic” and “illegitimate” proceduresthrough which it was created.First, they
argued the Accord does notcontain policies required to preventthe disastrous
810 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

impactof climate change.Tuvalu was the firstcountry to rejectthe Accord as
inadequate to ensure the survival of small island states:
Tuvalu:There is no guarantee thatthe [Kyoto Protocol]will continue into the next
commitmentperiod in this text . . . And we see there is money putbefore us.Can I
suggest, in biblical terms, it looks like we are being offered 30 pieces of silver to betray our
people and our future. Mr President, our future is not for sale. I regret to inform you that
Tuvalu cannot accept this document.
A most incendiary statement was delivered by Sudan when their Ambassador
Di-Aping Lumumba compared the Accord to the Holocaust:
Sudan:[The Copenhagen Accord]is murderous.It condemns and turns Africa into a
furnace because 2 degrees Celsius results in 3.5 degrees [temperature rise in Africa]
according to IPCC . . . [The document] asks Africa to sign a suicide pact, an incineration
pact in order to maintain the economic dominance of a few countries. It is devoid of any
sense of responsibility, morality and it is a solution based on values, the same very values,
in our opinion, that tunneled 6 million people in Europe into furnaces. Mr Prime Minister,
no one, no one or yourself can force Africa to destroy herself, its future generations and
its current generations . . . The promise of 100 billion US dollars would not bribe us to
destroy the continent.
Many delegationsexpressed indignation at the Holocaust reference and
demanded thatSudan withdraw its statement:Canada,Australia,the European
Union, Spain, Mexico, and Grenada, among others.
The second, procedural argument, was that the UNFCCC requirement of con-
sensus building was violated as the Accord was drafted by a small group of coun-
tries.Ardent Latin statements from the delegations of Venezuela,Bolivia, Cuba,
and Nicaragua protested the lack oftransparency and inclusivity in decision
making. Venezuela called ita “coup d’étatagainstthe Charter of the United
Nations.” Bolivia said:
Bolivia:We say this emphatically and as clearly as possible:we are seeing actions in a
dictatorial way, and this is not the way a world should discuss the future of humanity and
the planet.
Cuba protested against“grave procedural violations,”the “antidemocratic
approach,” and “arbitrary, exclusive and discriminatory” debate formats.
Cuba: What you call, Mr President, “a group of representative leaders” is a gross violation
of sovereign equality thatis enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and a
mechanism that would impose decisions on the international community.
Mr President, four hours ago PresidentObama announced an agreementthat is not
existent. This is a lack of respect of the international community. He is behaving like an
Emperor. . . . Cuba considers it absolutely insufficient and unacceptable this particular text
of this document, apocryphal document. The target of 2 degrees Celsius is unacceptable
and would have catastrophic consequences that would be immeasurable and particularly
for smallisland states. . . . The document that you have submitted does not contain any
commitments whatsoever of reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases unlike the earlier
versions . . . Your paper here actually is a document that will extinguish the Kyoto Protocol
and my country does not accept it.
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The Saudis were mostsubtle and implicitaboutopposing the Accord.Their
delegate opposed a UK proposal to accept the Accord and list those who abstain,
with these words in final Plenary:
SaudiArabia:Mr President, it would really give me greatpleasure ifwe can agree by
consensus to move this decision forward. But we operate by rules, and we are guided by
these rules . . . Mr President, with all due respect to His Excellency Mr Ed Milliband [of the
UK], you cannot put a proposal like this. . . . This is not how this body operates, and we are
not going to establish new ways for this body today here.
Political ideology was evident in the discourse.
Venezuela: Here, today, in this fateful hour, the imperial interests are being imposed, and
this is really flying the face ofthose who are the most vulnerable. . . . Our dignity,Mr
Presidentand Mr Secretary General,does not have a price tag.We will not sell our
principles, we won’t sell the principles of the Convention even for 30 billion dollars. Thank
you very much.
The ideological arguments triggered reactions by some like Barbados:
Barbados: We cannot afford for this process under the UNFCCC to break down in the face
of petty wrangling and proceduralmaneuvering.This forum where we are seeking to
address the most defining issue of our time should not be used to score cheap political
points. This is not acceptable.
The Supporters—Many delegations supported the draft Copenhagen Accord as the
way forward:the African Union,the Maldives,the European Union,the United
States,Australia,Japan, Russia,Norway, the Philippines, Senegal,Bangladesh,
Singapore,Barbados,Gabon,and Belize,among others.All recognized that the
Accord is “imperfect” butsupported it as the only way to proceed forward in
negotiating a stronger agreement on climate change.
Australia: I just want to say on behalf of the Australian delegation that we are absolutely
astonished at this cynicalway this document and the meeting of leaders today has been
characterized,including by delegations who had a place atthe table.The Holocaust
reference is truly beyond the pale. World leaders gave their time, thought, power to help
us break through the hurdles and challenges. . . . That their efforts could be so diminished
and belittled is very unbecoming at this conference.
The United States defended the decision-making process:
United States: There is nothing to apologize for, in terms of the process convened by the
President of this body.This was a transparent group pulled together from each of the
major regional groupings. It included heads of state who came to participate in what was
supposed to be a historic conference.
Notably,even the Alliance ofSmall Island States (exceptTuvalu)threw their
support behind the Accord.Many of their members defended the Friends of the
Chair’s group and stressed that they had been adequately consulted.
Maldives: We need this document for us to go on. There are many countries who need this
document.It has many life lines.And please,I would like to make this plea from the
bottom ofmy heartto my fellow friends from the developing countries to acceptthis
document and to adopt this decision.
812 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

The United Kingdom appeared to lead the battle for endorsing the Accord.
United Kingdom:I think this institution and the work we have done faces a moment of
profound crisis at this meeting, in the early hours of the morning. And I think we have a
choice of two roads and I urge delegates to think very carefully about which road they take
There is a road of a document that . . . is by no means perfect. . . . It does a limited number
of things but it does very important things. We have one choice before us to accept this
documentand go forward and start the money flowing and startimplementing the
decisions under it. And then we face the choice that Ambassador Lumumba offers us. It is
a choice of disgusting comparisons to the Holocaust which should offend people across
this conference from whatever background they come from. And, frankly, it is a choice of
wrecking this conference. So, Mr President, I urge you to . . . make this a COP decision.
Because if we can do that, we can get the money flowing and we can show some credibility
to the world. Thank you very much.
The Gloves Come Off
Money was indeed a key element of the draft Accord and likely a major reason why
many small island states and African countries accepted the otherwise weak agree-
ment. The opponents portrayed the offer of 30 billion as a bribe. Cuba was openly
confrontational:
Cuba:Mr President,I deeply regret that European delegation offered money here for
adoption of this document. This seems to me to be disgraceful blackmail whereas we all
know the money will not come whether there is a document or not.
The accusationsof “bribing” drew a sharp response from typically poised
Scandinavians. Norway’s Minister was visibly shaken with emotion when he said:
Norway: Norway wanted a much more ambitious document than this—much more ambi-
tious, on many points.But we believe thatone step forward is better than two steps
backward. . . . Letme then also commentupon another accusation which I also find
regrettable. . . . When developing nationshave very fairly for a long period of time
demanded more money from developed nations, Norway supported that. We are the only
nation in the world to have 1 percent of GDP for developing purposes. When that aim is
supported in the document, sir, some people call it a bribe. How can it be a bribe when for
first time developed nations are living up to the expectations? How can I go back to my peo
Norway and encourage them to pay more ifit is a bribe to developing nations? Itis
unacceptable. [emphasis added]
What followed was the most dramatic episode of world politics in action I have
witnessed.The United Kingdom made a proposal to adopt the Accord, “duly
noting” concerns ofcountries againstand registering their opposition with the
Secretariat. The meeting was suspended, everyone rose, and around two hundred
people gathered at the center, surrounding delegates from Bolivia and Venezuela
who were physically pressed againstthe wall of the podium. There were open
threats: “You will never get the money again!” shouted one Western delegate. The
President of the Maldives pleaded with a Bolivian official: “Please Madam,this is
our last chance. I have two daughters and wish to live with my grandchildren. Our
nation is 1.5 meters above sea level . . . ”
In the imbroglio of interpersonal diplomacy, one delegate captured the essence
of the historic moment while confronting a Bolivian: “What we are doing now is
The Copenhagen Conference813

killing this process. The signal we are giving to the outside world when millions are
watching will be ‘We failed. The UN system failed’.” Pressure and pleas brought no
results: countries did not drop their opposition and the Accord was not formally
adopted. Most notably, China, India, and Brazil never made a statement during this
final Plenary, a clear testimony they were content with this vacuous outcome.
The end of the conference was symbolic. People were leaving to catch their flights
home while major issues were still on the table. UN talks were to continue during
2010 and the exact mandate of negotiations was stillbeing discussed as the giant
room was becoming emptier and emptier.By the end,there were approximately
150 people in the Plenary room that hours before had reached its capacity of 2000
people.Instead of coming to a clear and distinct finale,the conference gradually
subsided into completion.
Copenhagen Outcomes
The conference produced two document outputs: the Copenhagen Accord and the
continuation of UN negotiations. The Accord was not formally adopted; the official
decision by the Conference of the Parties was a single sentence that reads: “The
Conference of the Parties takes note of the Copenhagen Accord of 18 December
2009.”14
The Copenhagen Accord
The Copenhagen Accord is a political agreement among heads of state of certain
countries.15 “We agree that deep cuts in globalemissions are required according
to science . . . so as to hold the increase in globaltemperature below 2 degrees
Celsius . . .” The text does not include a specific deadline for capping global emis-
sions,rather that“we should cooperate in achieving the peaking ofglobaland
national emissionsas soon as possible.”The Accord endorses the bottom-up
approach to emission targets:nationaltargetsfor industrialized countriesand
actions for developing countries are to be defined voluntarily by each country and
communicated to the Secretariat by January 31, 2010.
Regarding policy commitments by developing countries,only actions funded
internationally are subjectto internationalMRV. “Mitigation actionstaken by
Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and
verification, the results of which will be reported . . . every two years. . . . Nationally
appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a
registry along with relevanttechnology,finance and capacity building support.
. . . These . . . actions willbe subject to internationalmeasurement,reporting and
verification in accordance with guidelinesadopted by the Conference of the
Parties.”
The text also includesa decision to establish a Technology Mechanism to
accelerate technology development and transfer; notes agreement “on the need”
to immediately establish a REDD-plusmechanism;and provides for a policy
implementation review by 2015,including considering limiting temperature rise
to 1.5°C.
814 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

The most substantive paragraph pertains to finance. “The collective commitment
by developed countries is to provide new and additional resources . . . approaching
USD 30 billion for the period 2010–12 with balanced allocation between adaptation
and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most vulnerable
developing countries.” Developing countries also commit to mobilizing 100 billion
dollars per year by 2020 from public and private sources, contingent on meaningful
and transparent mitigation actions in developing countries. “A significant portion
of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund,” yet
the text provides no information concerning institutionalarrangements for the
new fund.
The Accord is weak for three reasons. First, it is a nonbinding political declara-
tion. Second, the text is light on policy content, with no global targets for aggregate
emission reductions to ensure environmentalresults.Third, the Conference of
Parties did not formally adoptthe Accord as an officialdecision,and the text
remains a free-floating agreementwithout institutionalhome. Therefore the
Accord is outside the UN system and of highly ambiguous legal status in interna-
tional law. Presidents, prime ministers, and UN officials describe the Accord as an
imperfect but important “first step” to a meaningful agreement, assertions intended
to hide the failure at Copenhagen to fulfil the Bali mandate.
Official confirmation thatthe Accord has no legal standing came from the
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC in January 2010.A notification to countries
was circulated internationally and read:
The Secretariat sought to convey two facts regarding the legal nature of the Accord. First,
that since the Conference of the Parties neither adopted nor endorsed the Accord,but
merely took note of it, its provisions do not have any legal standing within the UNFCCC
process even if some parties decide to associate themselves with it. Second, that since the
Accord is a politicalagreement,rather than a treaty instrument subject to signature,a
simple letter or note verbale to the Secretariat . . . is sufficient to communicate the intentio
of a Party to associate with the Accord.16
The second decision was to continue negotiations in 2010 but the new mandate
is distinctly weaker than the previous mandate provided by the BaliAction Plan.
The United States, Brazil, China, and India closed a deal to delete the reference to
a “legally binding” negotiation outcome and the EU,Japan, Russia,Norway,and
others objected to no avail.Thus, negotiations in 2010 have no clear goalwhile
prospects for resolving the fundamentalpoliticaldifferences thathampered the
Copenhagen summit are uncertain.
Achievements and Failures
Issues that remained unresolved in Copenhagen are fundamental to global climate
policy. No substantive progress was made on: the temperature degree limit of globa
warming that humanity should seek, the long-term target for global GHG emission
reductions,the collective emission targets for Annex I countries,and the “peak”
year at which emissions should reach their maximum level. Governments did not
make arrangements to operationalize the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund or
internationalinstitutionalarrangements for adaptation policies such as helping
The Copenhagen Conference815

victims ofclimate impacts or a globalinsurance mechanism to address loss and
damage from natural disasters and sea level rise.
Remaining Political Disagreements
What does the globalpoliticallandscape ofclimate discussions look like today?
Political disagreements among states today pertain to:
• the level of global warming nations could accept: 1.5 or 2°C;
• long-term emission levels ranging from 50 to 95 percent by 2050;
• emission reduction goalby developed countries:25–40 percentor 20–49
percent by 2020; and 80–95 percent by 2050, or 100 by 2040 requested by one
country;
• the base year against which to measure emission reductions (1990,2005,or
current levels);
• time for emissionspeak: 2015, 2020, or the noncommittal“as soon as
possible”;
• accounting rules in measuring emissions: the role of agriculture and LULUCF;
• sources and level of finance for REDD and a quantitative goal for REDD; and
• emissions from aviation and marine bunker fuels: whether to establish hard
targets,what to do with revenues from implementation,and the role of
the International Maritime Organization and InternationalCivil Aviation
Organization.
Deep ideological disagreements also remain concerning:
• the governance of climate finance and specific numbers on long-term finance;
• the relative importance of public versus private finance;
• the division of labor in internationalfunding policies:whether developing
countries should also pay and whether to assign financial contributions using
a mandatory scale or indicative scale, or on a purely voluntary basis;
• adaptation response measuresand the historical responsibility forpolicy
action; and
• the role of intellectual property rights in technology transfer.
On the positive side, all industrialized countries appear ready for legally binding
economy-wide emission reductions. Achievements in Copenhagen included:
• provision of substantive finance for climate policy;
• political consensus on new and additional long-term finance;
• broad politicalsupport for IPCC science and for emission reduction targets
consistent with IPCC scenarios;
816 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

• some progress toward agreementon MRV of policy actions in developing
countries, in favor of the G-77 and China;
• nearly complete text on a REDD-plus17 mechanism and a financialcommit-
ment to provide 3.5 billion dollars over two years for reducing emissions from
deforestation;
• principled agreement and progress toward establishing a technology mecha-
nism; and
• agreement to review policy implementation in 2015 (Averchenkova, 2010).
Perhaps the biggest positive breakthrough in Copenhagen was finance: billions
of dollars were pledged for climate policy worldwide.This was a major develop-
ment in the history of climate negotiations and perhaps the key achievement of the
conference.The provision of internationalfinancialsupport for climate policy in
developing countries had been a primary issue in the two decades of global discus-
sions. And now industrialized nations made provisions. The most remarkable thing
about money was how little impact it had on overall negotiations. Major developing
countries did not change their positions in the least after money was offered. This
does not bode well for the future prospects of breaking the political deadlock.
Analysis and Implications
Today the UN climate talks are in serious trouble and in my view the blame is largely
with big emitters in the developing world.The West made considerable compro-
misesin the last three yearsand received practically nothing in return from
developing countries.Norway, the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand
developed strong domestic policy plans and pledged binding emission reductions.
The West agreed to accept binding commitments while allowing voluntary actions
by developing countries,showed readiness to finance those actions and put27
billion on the table in Copenhagen. The only concession they demanded in return
was international verification of the voluntary actions in the developing world. Even
this was too much for China,India, and Brazil who never reciprocated with any
policy offers and unapologetically trumpeted their freedom of economic develop-
ment regardless of environmental impacts.
Even developing countries acknowledged that the culprits were in the developing
world. In an open statement during the final Plenary session Papua New Guinea said:
Papua New Guinea:We mustidentify . . . thatmany of the flaws are due to us as G-77
members ourselves.That many of the Annex I countries were willing to pledge in this
document deep emission cuts and it was G-77 members themselves that struck them from
this document.While many of the Africans,smallisland states,and Annex I sent their
leaders, many G-77 countries sent only public servants as a disrespect to our leaders.18 And
it was these public servants that struck much of the substance out of this document.
The current situation in the UN multilateralprocess is perhaps worse than
before Copenhagen. Failure to adopt the lightest possible nonbinding declaration
underscores the bleak prospects of the consensus-based UN process for responding
to climate change,signaled the limits of UN universalmultilateralism and raised
questions concerning the adequacy of global institutions to handle policy challenges
The Copenhagen Conference817

(Hass, 2008). The UN consensus rule ensures inclusivity and democracy in multi-
lateral decision making but can also hamper necessary policy decisions that can save
human lives.This fundamentalconflict of values willcontinue to haunt the UN
negotiation process and willlikely shift policy efforts to national,bilateral,and
regional initiatives.The conference delivered nothing butmanaged to destroy
existing hope. Before we were hoping that omnipotent Heads of State could resolve
outstanding political differences in one fell swoop. Now even that hope is gone: if
the highest-level leaders cannot settle differences, who could?
The State of Climate Governance
Paradoxically,climate policy developments worldwide are overallpositive.Aggre-
gate climate governance comprising regional,national,sub-national,and local
policies as well as nonstate initiatives worldwide is thriving (Dimitrov, 2010; Ober-
thur & Pallemaerts, 2010; Schreurs, 2008; Selin & VanDeveer, 2009). The Copen-
hagen disaster should not obscure the bigger and brighter picture: Today the vast
majority of countrieswith significantemissionshave pledged fairly ambitious
domestic targets, many backed with detailed policy implementation plans (Tables 1
and 3).
Three years ago, Japan’s 25 percent or Norway’s 40 percent cuts by 2020 would
have been stunning news beyond the boldest political hopes. The EU has a highly
elaborate and ambitious policy thatincludes 20 percentreductions ofGHGs by
2020, 20 percentreduction of primary energy use,and 20 percent of energy
consumption to come from renewables. This “20-20-20 policy” became binding law
in June 2009 and is now being implemented.
Governments are providing considerable public finance for climate policy,in
addition to private investment.The EU, Japan, and Norway and others pledged
over 25 billion for fast-track adaptation and mitigation policy in 2010–12 (Table 2).
The United States and others endorsed the European estimate of100 billion
annually by 2020. The Accord reflected these numbers and presumably opens the
door for this money to start flowing. Finally, sub-nationalpublic policiesand
Table 3.Emission Reductions Pledges by Developed Countries. Numbers Reflect Public
Announcements and not Obligations Under International Law
Country
Pledged Emission
Reductions by 2020 Base Year Long-term Plans
Australia 5–25% 2000
Belarus 5–10% 1990
Canada 17% 2005
EU (27) 20–30% 1990 80–95% by 2050
Iceland 30% 1990
Japan 25% 1990
Liechtenstein 20–30% 1990
Monaco 20% 1990
New Zealand 10–20% 1990
Norway 30–40% 1990 Carbon neutral by 2030
Russia 15–25% 1990
Switzerland 20–30% 1990
United States 17% 2005 83% by 2050 compared
with 2005 levels
818 Radoslav S. Dimitrov

nonstateinitiativessuch as voluntary carbon-offsetschemesare proliferating
(Schreurs, 2008). Several hundred major cities around the world have developed
policy initiatives and formed transnational city networks.19 While the UN process is
moribund, multilevel policies are likely to continue to grow.
Clearly, current policy pledges are not sufficient to prevent the worst impacts. If
implemented, the national emission cuts would result in cumulative emission reduc-
tions of 12–19 percentin Annex I countries by 2020 (Levin & Bradley,2010).
Obviously, this is far from the 25–40 percent needed to limit temperature rise below
2°C. And even 2°C would doom millions of people in island nations and other most
vulnerable countries. The fast-track finance of 10 billion per year is “not enough to
buy coffins for Africa,” quipped a high-level UN official. The grave tragedy of our
times is that the urgency to save lives conflicts with the slow pace of history and
social change.
A proper historicalperspective may help instillpatience nonetheless.We are
embarking on a globaltransition to a new economy thatconstitutes a veritable
revolution, the Energy Revolution. The sheer magnitude of changes guarantees the
process will take many decades. By comparison, the Industrial Revolution took one
century in Europe alone.Copenhagen was just one event in a rather long-term
process and one failed conference is less important than the overalltrajectory of
policy developments—which isan upward curve. The spate of nationalpolicy
developments in 2009 shows a clear global policy trend and suggests that the shift
toward a green economy is now irreversible.
Acknowledgments
Research for this project was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada whose generous support enabled a research team to participate in climate con-
ferences and document negotiations.I also thank research assistants Jonathan Gamu and
Melissa Harris for their exceptionalwork on the frontlines of diplomacy.Sections of this
article appeared in Dimitrov (2010).
Notes
1 Adil Najam, Professor of International Relations at Boston University (private communication).
2 The author was a government delegate for the European Union and the Republic of Bulgaria at the
Copenhagen conference (December 7–18, 2009) and the Barcelona round of talks (November 2–13,
2009).This article does not contain any politically sensitive information concerning the European
Union that could negatively affect persons, the EU, or the UN negotiation process.
3 Sources of delegation statements include hard copies at conferences and audio records of negotia-
tions.
4 Numbers were provided in the Danish media and by the UNFCCC Secretariat at the conference.
5 Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provide the most authoritative
and comprehensive summary of available human knowledge on the subject.The reports are pre-
pared by 2500 scientists from 130 countries but must be politically endorsed by all governments by
consensus before they are officially released.
6 The IPCC gives a range of expected temperate increase.The exact number depends on human
policy actions, rates of economic development, and population growth.
7 ALBA is an acronym for the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, a group that includes
Antigua and Barbuda,Bolivia,Cuba,Dominica,Ecuador,Nicaragua,St. Vincent,the Grenadines,
and Venezuela.
The Copenhagen Conference819

8 Two proposals are Australia’s idea ofnationalschedules for implementation and South Korea’s
proposal for an international registry of national mitigation policies.
9 Opening statement of Lesotho, on behalf of least developed countries, on December 7, 2010.
10 EU opening statement at the AWG-LCA, delivered by Sweden, December 7, 2009.
11 Public presentation on August 9, 2009 by the European Commission at the climate talks during the
AWG-KP and AWG-LCA sessions in Bonn (10–14 August 2009).
12 China is not a formal member, but always associates itself with the G-77 joint statements and actively
participates in their daily internal discussions.
13 The Pakistanidelegation made only one low-key statement against the Accord.On the same day,
BBC television reported that Pakistan’s domestic politicalopposition called for the government’s
resignation over their rejection of the Accord.
14 In the original text considered at the conference,the Accord was not even attached in an official
appendix; the text merely followed on a separate page (UNFCCC/CP/2009/CP.15 available at http://
unfccc.int/2860.php ( January 8, 2010)). Subsequently, the text of the Accord was incorporated in the
report of the Conference of the Parties and now includes a list of countries who supported it. See
UNFCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 available athttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf
( June 10, 2010).
15 Currently 113 countries have formally endorsed the Accord,including the United States,China,
India, Brazil, the European Union,Australia,Japan, Canada,Bangladesh,Colombia,The Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the Russian Federation, Samoa,
Senegal, and many other small island nations. Notable exceptions include Argentina, Saudi Arabia,
Grenada, Pakistan, Micronesia, Tuvalu, Sudan, and Venezuela, among others.
16 Executive Secretary, Framework Convention on Climate Change, Notification to Parties, 25 January
2010, Ref: DBO/drl available at http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/notifications/application/
pdf/100125_noti_clarification.pdf ( June 10, 2010).
17 REDD-plus is the conglomeration of policy issues related to reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation in developing countries, including the role of conservation, sustainable forest
management, and enhancement of carbon stocks.
18 The diplomat was referring to China who delivered a deliberate snub to Western nations when they
sent a lower-level official to a meeting with US President Obama and other heads of state.
19 An excellent gateway to the literature on local climate governance is Betsill and Harriet (2007).
About the Author
RadoslavDimitrovis AssociateProfessor of Political Science at the University of
Western Ontario. He participates in UN environmental conferences as government delegate
for Bulgaria, UN rapporteur for the Earth Negotiation Bulletin,and consultantto the
World Business Councilfor Sustainable Development.His academic research focuses on
global institutions,environmentalregimes,the science-policy connection and normsin
world politics.
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