Critical Analysis Report on Executing and Closing Projects

This report provides a critical analysis of the execution and closure of projects, using the Sydney Opera House as a prominent case study. It begins with an introduction to the project and its context, followed by an examination of the control systems implemented for cost, schedule, scope, and quality. The report delves into the reasons behind the significant cost and time overruns experienced during the project, exploring factors such as design changes, incomplete initial designs, and stakeholder influences. It assesses the degree to which the execution team could be held responsible for these overruns, considering the roles and contributions of various stakeholders. Furthermore, the report analyzes the relationship between the identified problems and the needs and influence of stakeholders. Finally, it proposes project management actions that could have been taken to control and mitigate the issues, concluding with a summary of key findings and recommendations.

Running head: EXECUTING AND CLOSING PROJECTS
Executing and Closing projects
Name of the Student
Name of the University
Author Note

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Table of Content
Introduction to the project..........................................................................................................3
Control systems for cost, schedule, scope and quality...............................................................4
Reasons behind the cost and/or time overruns reported during the project...............................5
Degree to which execution team could be held responsible for time and cost overruns...........7
Problems identified in section 3 above and the stakeholders’ needs and influence.................10
Project management actions that could have been taken to control.........................................12
Conclusion................................................................................................................................14
References................................................................................................................................16

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Introduction to the project
It is widely known that Sydney Opera house remains as one of the renowned iconic building
which is identified across the world and it is more of a global symptom of Australia. For the
popularity and reputation of the building, the architecture Jorn Uzton won the architecture
competition which is developed by the government of New South Wales for the new building
in 1957. This fact indicates that the construction was started in 1959 but the project scheduled
for more than four years. In addition to this, the budget of the project is around AUS$7
million but the completion of the project took more than AUS$102 million.
Presently, Sydney opera house, is presently known as most disastrous construction project of
the history if the financial ground is considered accordingly. Sage, Dainty and Brookes
(2013) mentioned that the starting of any project goals and objectives should be clearly
defined by consumers to produce the guideline required for the completion of the project.
Author of the paper have also mentioned the fact that cost quality, time for the project was
highly important
In order to support this statement, Howsawi, Eager and Bagia (2011) mentioned that no
adequate implication about the
Howsawi, Eager and Bagia (2011) mentioned that for the completion of the project no
proper amount of time and cost were provided. Consequently, architect of the project has got
their own freedom to design the business the way they want to be. According to the report of
Red Book Sydney National Opera House, it might consist of some plans and section by the
consultants. Moreover, the fund for the project came almost wholly from a dedicated lottery,
so starting the project or work of the project was not at all a financial burden of the
government. Howsawi et al., (2014) mentioned that stakeholder Uzton is fundamentally
concerned with the design element rather than the cost and time which appeared challenging.

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On the other side, most significant stakeholder was the client- which is the State of New
South Wales
Control systems for cost, schedule, scope and quality
The construction project of Opera House Sydney helps to observe the fact that the
cost of overall project is deemed to be the most controversial
The construction project of Opera House Sydney helps to observe the fact that the
cost of overall project is deemed to be the most controversial element of the whole project.
Nixon, Harrington and Parker (2012) that government of New South Wales took the decision
of making the investment around $100,00 in the project because they observed an
responsibility towards the public to select the existing affair. Rather than doing the same,
funding of the project was done and processed on the basis of the lottery system which is
mostly used across the project length, approved the cost and created funds necessary to keep
the project running. Angus, Flett and Bowers (2005) arguably stated cost of project
anticipated $5.5 million but the initial expense of stage 1 was calculated to be around
AUD$1.3 but this certainly increased to $2.5 by the initial stage of work which has left 47
weeks behind the schedule and it was over the budget and hence Anbari, Carayannis and
Voetsch (2008) arguably, to blame the rise in expenditure, considered the plans that were
being changed and were left incomplete.
It has been identified that the original cost estimated to develop Sydney Operate
House was $7million but the final cost was around $102 million it was entirely backed by a
State Lottery. Thus, Murray (2003) mentioned the fact that the range of control system used
in the project is tedious which lacked insight because there is a large gap between the actual
cost and the estimated cost of the project. Likewise, Gann and Salter (1998) mentioned that
initial it was expected that construction would take four years but the overall completion of

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the project took 14 years; and there is a large gap between the actual schedules developed
against the project the time it took.
It has been identified that almost 233 entries were received from 32 different nations
and the submission was expected to adhere to well-defined criteria and it should consist of a
large half 3000 seats as well as a small hall for almost 1200 people and each was supposed to
be designed for different categories of use with the inclusion of full scale opera, orchestral
and choral concern, lecture and mass meeting, bullet performance and lecture (Murray,
2003). Thus, it can be stated that Sydney Opera House covers a wide area of services.
Nonetheless, it was mentioned that even though the project is a big failure in terms of cost
and time, quality after the completion of the project certainly enhanced the weightage of the
stated iconic symbol.
Reasons behind the cost and/or time overruns reported during the project
Although the project was running smooth at the initial stage, it is worth telling that there were
some reasons from the beginning of the project Utzon and Drew (1995) mentioned the fact
project was categorized in three different stages. So, the first stage is about the podium and
the second stage is about the outer shell as well as the last one about the interiors and
window. However, Smith and von Krogh Strand (2011) stated that Uzton stuck to the
concern against the issue that he did not complete the design for the structure but the
government intentionally paid attention to construction that got under-way. On the other side,
another concern was that the client made some changes in the project in the middle of
completion and this occurred when construction begun to move away from the potential
threats to four so the plans and designs were mostly needed to be modified at the time of
construction. Morris et al., (2006) mentioned about overall budget of the initial estimation
which was drawn on the incomplete drawing and site survey which further led to

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disagreement. It has been identified that about project budgets’ the initial estimation was
particularly drawn on complete designs drawings and survey sites that led to disagreement. It
has also been identified that contractor for the initial stage effectively claimed extra cost of
AUD$1.2 million in 1962 because of the changes in design but when the project was
accomplishment, it had cost an estimated amount of AUS$5.2 million (Colbert, 2003). In
addition, it was also observed that project went over 47 weeks which went beyond pre-
developed schedule. Another reason was found in the stage II which is probably the most
controversial stage of the whole construction.
This indicates that since the cost of the project kept increasing, in the middle a new
government got into the action as well as supervised all sort of payments that were being
requested by Opera House. On the other side, Hale and Macdonald (2005) in their evolution
of construction project highlighted the fact that at the last or ultimate stage, stakeholder
Uzton handed over an updated estimate of overall cost project which costs around AUD$1.2
million. Furthermore, it has also been identified that a large amount of payment were being
processed and delivered but no clear progress was established and consequently, government
of the nation started withholding payment to Uzton. Hence, Freeman, (2017) argued that
stage II particularly slowed down the growth and progress of the project in 1996 and as a
result stakeholder groups were forced to resign from the project and hence the freedom is
limited and it is not able to bring the perfection and appropriateness in ideas to completion.
Bereson (2003) mentioned that Uzton walked out of the project, the stakeholder did
not leave any sort of design or the sketches to work with as the this stakeholders did not
leave the sketch to work because he was convinced. Stakeholders would be called back to the
project once the new failed, new ones had to be created on the basis of the existing structure
of Opera House as well as unforeseen complications were discovered.

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As put forward by Angus, Flett and Bowers (2005), even though Sydney Opera House
is indulged so far, attitude at the time of the construction could be significantly different as
well as stage two could be the most challenging phrase of the whole project due to its
increasing cost, delays as well as its architecture which was under the constant threat by local
press. Nixon, Harrington and Parker (2012) mentioned that a new liberal government has
stepped into and supervised all payments that are being rejected by Opera House.
Degree to which execution team could be held responsible for time and cost
overruns
In order to analyse the magnitude and extent of the project to which the executive team could
be held responsible depends on the type of stakeholders involved in the project. Hence, the
stakeholders have been categorized as per their contribution to the project.
Stakeholders during the initial construction period of Opera House Project
As put forward by Howsawi, Eager and Bagia, (2011) when Sydney Opera House first
strategy to take form in mid-20 century. Government of NSW is the first stakeholder of the
project. On the basis of the perspective made by Howsawi et al., (2014), government of the
nation is probably a definitive stakeholder, showing power, legitimacy, urgency because they
were given the responsibly of facilitating the creation of such project. Stakeholders here can
be classified as the most dependent as they were mostly appointed by government of New
South Wales to select a proper design for the opera house. It has also been identified that
chronologically, the next stakeholders involved in the project two could be held responsible
for the extent to which cost and time overruns.
It has been identified that construction delays and the funding crisis dogged Opera House
Project from its early inception. Particularly, in 1957 Danish Jorn Uzton have won a NSW
government competition to particularly design a public. However, Angus, Flett and Bowers

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(2005) mentioned that stakeholders who were involved in the investment planning and the
construction engineers who planned the projects were the major stakeholders. These two
categories of stakeholder were highly responsible for the project cost and time overruns. It is
particularly noted that the cost blowout of 14000.
It can be added that project team can be held responsible for the cost and time
overruns. The actual plan had a four-year timetable and AU $7 million budget but eventually
it took AU $102 million and it took almost 14 years to complete. Thankfully, the final
product has successfully met the demands and expectation of Opera goers and the
architectural community of the world and of course the expectation of Australian
Government. Gann and Salter (1998) sated the fat that Australia government recouped the
enormous cost after only two years. The execution team can be held responsible for the cost
and time overruns to a great extent due to inadequate resource management planning which
resulted in no individually dedicated person accountable for the activities of the project and
the budget needed little more attention for being near to perfection. In addition to this,
Murray (2003) mentioned that no management as well as no accounting expectation resulted
in excessive and wasteful material costs.
This means that project management team did not build a required communication
between the management and accounting department. It has been identified that project
management team did not build an effective scheduling; thereby, it leads to delays at all
stages of project’s development. Another significant fact found in the project due to which
the project team can be held responsible to a greater extent. This means not only did the
project introduce with no proper or finalized plans to follow but on the basis of consumers’
demand floor plan was changed. It was changed from two theatres to four after the
construction started. It has been identified that the compounding the chaos that that
considered was the lack of skills of a project manager in the project management team.

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Moreover, instead of a single individual to whom to ask for the direction, partnership and
engineer, Ove Arup mostly handled the project which is particularly assisted by a hastily
assembled team of electrical as well as mechanical. However, the initial project team is not
able to deal with all such planning. To build up the project, whole planning was handed over
to another team or third party.
Moreover, the project team of Sydney Opera House is not able to estimate the overall
cost of the project and time required. The following graph indicates the difference between
the actual cost and the initially estimated cost of the project.
Figure 1: Difference between actual cost and time and estimated ones
(Source: Howsawi, Eager & Bagia 2011_
Sage, Dainty and Brookes (2013) argued that when the organization does not have knowledge
about the finalized design, it can be predicted that the cost of the project is something that
organization might not know. In the beginning of the project beginning, cost of the

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organization started to increase with the changes of orders and then it gone up when it was
found survey site was inappropriate. This means that the budget increased from the actual
cost and by the end of the first stage, monitoring committee of the government was
overseeing the payment. This means that budget increased than the actual estimated cost.
Stakeholder groups namely Uzton categorized the construction project in three different
categories. Nonetheless, just at the end of stage 1, a monitoring committee belonging to
government was actually supervising payments and consequently, they had to withhold some
of them until it has received the evidence of completion of the actual project work. Project
execution team did not establish suitable time frame and as a result seven years from time the
project actually started and after the work of four consecutive years, Opera House was yet not
able to get over with the work of phrase II. Moreover, the scenario also state that changes in
organization’s priority was another reason that project execution team has ignored during the
making of the project (Angus, Flett & Bowers, 2005). None of the individual in the team has
been able to estimate the actual project requirement. There have been many changes in
project’s objectives which the project execution team were not aware of.
Problems identified in section 3 above and the stakeholders’ needs and
influence
Even though Sydney Opera House was a big disaster, it is worth stating the success of
the project depends upon a combination of factors in which one is most likely to deliver
something of real to stakeholders and the other is when the critical mass of key stakeholders
identify the value and effectively appreciate it. Although, cost and time were two big issues,
it received a tremendous attention from the global audience. There was a group of
stakeholders who were highly involved into the project. As put forward by Gann and Salter
(1998), one of the major stakeholder is client who was basically the state of New South
Wales which is in fact the Australian Govt. So, this stakeholder groups started the project but

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ultimately become an obstacle in the timely completion of project by determining changes to
existing plans. Consequently, project incurred many delays and cost overruns. So, one of the
problems that were identified above was that project execution team did not develop a time-
plan which leads to delays and time overrun but this is happened due to controversies in the
middle.
The major client of the project changed the existing plan in the middle due to the
delay in first two theatre. So, major relation which was missing in the project is the
interactive relations between project team and the demands of client. It is certain that project
team and the Sydney Opera House Committee were not aware of the technical needs for
building up the project. In the above analysis, it was found that technical grounds of the
project was not appropriate which caused the delay. However, the project execution team
wanted to finish the project within the given time period but gap of technical expertise
remained as the challenge. It has been identified that the committee was entirely made up
entirely by some political figures who did not have adequate knowledge. Hence, Smith and
von Krogh Strand (2011) arguably mentioned that the relation lies in the fact that client
demanded a committee to oversee the project but members involved in the project were not
skilled enough with respect to the development and use of technology.
Furthermore, the above analysis indicates that changes in client’s demand has a strong
impact on some associated stakeholders. For example, client –Australian Government
changed the plan but the stakeholder Jorn Utzon was behind the design and he had to end up
giving resignation due to the inability and payment issue of his staff. This scenario was
discovered because the project execution team did not build any communicative relationship
with other stakeholders in the process. Thus, Hale and Macdonald (2005) architecture team
was not aware of the growing demand of stakeholders.

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When it comes to the involvement of the stakeholders, involvement of public was
undeniable. Hence, public was the direct stakeholders in the project and public certainly had a
vested interest in watching the project successful. Bereson (2003) mentioned that consumer
demands were about a successful project and thereby, they agreed to fund through the lottery.
Moreover, public actually wanted Uzton returned to the project as he was iconic to the project
but public interest were merely considered in the initiative, which again cause the issues of
communication between the stakeholder parties.
It has been identified that contractors were a specified group of stakeholders who were
known as Civic. This stakeholders group was employed for the work in stage 1 of the project
which was the installation of podium but as the client has changed the plan in the middle of
the project, this group of stakeholders hold no interest in the project because the rest of the
work was done by Hornibrook Group Pyt Ltd. So, in general, it can be added that overall
plan of the project was not aligned to goals and objectives made by the stakeholders groups.
In the above discussion, it was found that cost and time were two major issues that project
execution of Sydney Opera House faced during and after the completion of the project.
Howsawi, Eager, and Bagia (2011) mentioned that the team did not share the concerns of
time and cost with the major stakeholders group of the project. On the contrary, Howsawi et
al., (2014) mentioned that communication was the major issue in the team; for example,
Australian Government insisted on the new plans of the project and created a significant
pressure on the architect Utzon’s job was made even difficult by Australian Government as
they changed the requirements for developing after construction had begun. So, this initiative
was out of the plan, thus, the whole project scenario observed many delays in the middle.