Critical Review: Desert Storm and the Triumph of Joint Warfare

This essay presents an article review of D.D. Chipman's 'Desert Storm and the Triumph of Joint Warfare Planning,' focusing on the U.S. military's air power contribution to the Iraq War victory. The review highlights the article's emphasis on air strikes that crippled Iraqi infrastructure, leading to Sadda...Read More

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Article review
The purpose of this article is to emphasize on the contribution of the U.S military air power and
the strategy bombings by the U.S air force to the victory of the United States in the Iraq war.
This article has highlighted how the usage of air power helped destroy the communication
centers, electrical grids, air defense systems and transportation centers and eventually compelled
Saddam Hussain to withdraw his troops from Kuwait.
It is worth mentioning that victory in the Gulf war can be held to be a significant event in the
drastic transformation of military power of the United States. The air strikes led by the U.S
military and the coalition of air power were successful in destroying a high percentage of the
fielded forces which destroyed the communication and economic systems of Saddam Hussain in
Iraq. It can be stated that the 100 hour offensive air strikes launched by the coalition land forces
compelled the enemies to surrender. The decisive victory of the United States in the Iraq war can
be attributed to the development of a unified joint doctrine under the guidance of a joint forces
air commander and the leadership of the United States command combatant commander Gen. H.
Norman Schwarzkopf, servicemen who are well trained and new technology such as precision
guided weapons and stealth and under the guidance of a joint forces air commander and the
leadership of the United States command combatant commander Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf.
However despite these contributory factors the final victory of the United States in the Iraq war
ultimately depended on the proper application of the air power. It was after the war that the
contentious discussion related to the promise of the air power of the U.S military surfaced. It was
believed by most that the desert storm air strategy was the primary reason of victory of the
United States in the Iraq war. The question of relative importance of the strategic air attack
campaigns which were initially developed by the Warden and his Checkmate staff was at the

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heart of the controversy. The operation “Instant Thunder” of the U.S military, focused on the
usage of air power to attack the communication center, transport centers, electrical power grids
and air defense systems which subsequently led to the fall of Saddam Hussain’s regime. It is
worth mentioning that the proposed air campaign of the U.S military aimed at forcing Saddam to
withdraw his troops from Kuwait within period of ten days. It had been acknowledged by
Warden that a decapitation strategy was very difficult to implement. It is worthwhile to mention
that this article could have been better written had all more details been included in it. This
article was written from the perspective of the United States military and therefore did not
capture the perspective of the forces of Saddam in the Ira war. It is worth mentioning that this
article was researched. This article was written on the findings of several well researched
journals, books and articles which referred to researches done through collection and analysis of
primary data and a comprehensive compilation secondary data.
The author failed to account for various socio economic circumstances which compelled the
forces of the U.S military to intervene in the scenario and addition of the ancillary factors would
lead to a more holistic analysis of the matter in concern.

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References:
Chipman, D. D. (2005). Desert storm and the triumph of joint warfare planning. Air Power
History, 52(1), 52.