Deterrence Theory: Analyzing Strengths, Limitations, and Examples

This essay comprehensively examines the strengths and limitations of deterrence theory, a cornerstone of military strategy and international relations. It begins by defining deterrence and its core principles, including the crucial elements of credible retaliation and the role of uncertainty in deterring aggression. The essay then delves into the theory's strengths, such as its potential to prevent wars and maintain peace through military capabilities and bargaining behavior. However, it also acknowledges significant limitations, including the reliance on assumptions about the intentions and perceptions of both attacking and defending states, the influence of leaders' psychology, and the potential for miscalculations. The essay highlights the 2016 surgical strike conducted by India as a contemporary example of the deterrence theory in action, analyzing its strategic objectives, execution, and impact on the India-Pakistan relationship, ultimately arguing that the strike served as a deterrent to prevent a full-scale war. The essay concludes by emphasizing the complex and nuanced nature of deterrence theory, underscoring the importance of understanding its strengths, limitations, and the context-specific factors that influence its effectiveness.

Running head: STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY
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Question: What are the strengths and limitations of the deterrence theory? Elaborate
with the help of a recent example.
The deterrence theory is primarily considered as a military strategy through which a
certain power utilizes the threat of retaliation efficiently to impede an attack from a rival
power (Snyder 2015). With the emergence of nuclear weapons, the application of the
deterrence theory to the strategies of nuclear power and major alliances has been prevalent.
The premise of the aforementioned strategy is the fact that every nuclear power maintains a
lofty level of catastrophic and destructive capacity against any form of aggression. The
pivotal element in the success of the theory is a level of uncertainty on the part of the
supposed aggressor as to whether the targeted power, although attacked and severely
damaged, shall nonetheless retaliate – even at the risk of suffering more crippling damage in
a secondary attack. Therefore, it can be stated that the nuclear deterrence theory is based on
two conditions: the capacity to retaliate post a surprise attack, which must be considered as
credible: as well as the will to do the same and is supposed to be perceived as a possibility
and not essentially as a certainty (Beardsley and Asal 2009).
Under the deterrence theory, the military strategy has become more intimidating and
coercive in nature. The original motive to harm a particular state could now be employed as a
motivating facet for various states to avoid destructive acts and influence the other states to
do the same. It can be summarized that the foundation of the deterrence theory is the
utilization of power to harm as a bargaining power. However, it is only triumphant when held
in reserve. Several critics have argued that the deterrence theory is inconsistent logically and
is not empirically accurate (Huth 1988). Replacing this classical view, the modern scholars
have argued for rational deterrence or perfect deterrence wherein the internal features of any
state may vary in accordance with the credibility of threats of reprisal.

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Rational deterrence is a hugely impactful social science theory, which has towered
postwar academic perspectives on strategic affairs as well as influenced the intellectual
framework of the Western military policy (Achen and Snidal 1989). The approach of the
theory is based on the employment of rational choice and the credibility of the threat
encountered by the defending state. If the defending state owns the military potential to
impose significant costs on the attacking state in pursuit of an armed contention, and if the
latter assumes that, the defending state is determined to employ its accessible military
strength, only then does the rational deterrence theory prove its significance. The key
attributes of the theory can be identified as the military balance, interests at stake, reputation
for resolve and bargaining power; all of which are concerned with the current position of both
the attacking and defending powers.
The strengths of the deterrent theory lies in the military capabilities combined with
the bargaining behaviour of the defending power’s capability and the other facets of the
theory, keeping in mind that the potential attacker must not be provoked. Deterrence is
frequently aimed against the leaders of the state who seek to gain certain territorial objectives
by seizing territories that are disputed and have limited military force or after the failure of
the adversary forces. In either of the cases, the concerns regarding the military costs are
attributes contributing to the short-term strategy. For the success of the application of the
theory, the defending state has to have the military strength to respond promptly. It must be
noted that often the failure of the theory lies in the fact that the defending state overestimate
or underestimate the potential of the attacking powers in taking a specific course of action
(Trager 2016).
Often the defending states have the inducement to act pretending that they are
resolved to withstand the attack, in the expectation that the charging state shall retreat from
the conflict by proposing an apparently resolved adversary. If such aforementioned

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assumptions and pretensions are applied by every defending state, it will not be long before
the attacking states consider such deterring warnings to be a case of mere bluff (Kenwick,
Vasquez and Powers 2015). In accordance with this common assumption, the rational
deterrence theorists argued that effective and expensive signals must be employed for
communicating the cogency of the defending state’s intentions. These costly signals include
the statement and actions that vividly enhance the potency of a military conflict as well as the
expenses of retreating from the threat of deterrence. As a result to this, the states that are
feigning shall remain hesitant to go beyond a definite threshold of military action as they
would have the fright of engaging the state into an armed conflict.
The deterrent theory’s prime advantage lies in its ability to resolve wars and proclaim
peace. However, there are certain situations for this to be successful. The first facet
influencing the conditions for resolving the war is the past behaviour of the defending state in
international crises (Asal and Beardsley 2007). This affects the potentially attacking state’s
beliefs regarding the defending state’s credibility of acting in future conflicts. Secondly, the
political and military condition of the defending state in a given span of time wherein the
attempted deterrence is taking place. In spite of considering these facets, there are also cases
wherein the deterrence can backfire or fail to perform if the assumptions are not accurate
regarding the other state’s perceptions.
Another attribute that strengthens the act of deterrence is the interests of the defending
state that would apparently justify the risks of committing to a military conflict. Since wars
drain the state’s treasury, the economic interests of the defending state and how much they
are willing to overlook it to promote their military interests, are considered or rather
calculated by the attacking state to verify the validity of the deterrent threat (Crocker,
Hampson and Aall 2007). If the defending state is prepared to commit to taking up the

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military interests at hand for an immediate resolving of the conflict then it acts as an
advantage for the defending state.
Furthermore, the critics and supporters of the theory argue that the inaccurate
assessment of the international and domestic status quo by the powers concerned can severely
undermine the victory of the deterrence theory. According to the theory, if the expected use
of not utilizing force is diminished by the depreciating status quo position then the theory is
most likely to be unsuccessful, as the other option of enforcing conflict becomes more
agreeable.
Due to the extensive advent of nuclear weapons and disputes among nations, the
deterrence theory does not always live up to its expectations. The limitations of the theory lie
in the fact that they are not always relevant and often are based on mere assumptions, which
can prove to be inaccurate. For instance if the defending state has stronger intentions of
inflicting harm or damage to the attacking state then it might not consider the methods under
the deterrent theory. The psychology of the leaders greatly influence the aforementioned
criteria and history stands witness to this. There are innumerable wars fought till date that
often fail to justify the cause of entering into wars (Schelling 1960). The thirst to gain power
overcomes the benefits of committing the state to implement the theory.
It must also be noted that the long-term economic, political, social and such other
prospects of the nation dominate the narrow considerations by the military leaders in their
decision to commit to war or not. If the prospects seem valid and effective, the state shall
deter from attacking directly. On the contrary, if the prospects appear to be unfavorable, and
the state shall find the current affairs to be intolerable and hazardous, the attacking or
defending states would be more likely to extend their consent towards a war even in the face
of a blatant defeat.

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The intentions and the motives of both the defending and the attacking state cannot be
completely and accurately understood or judged. The efficacy of the deterrence theory can be
negated and put in harm’s way by letting loose the wrath of the leaders of the concerned
states (Erickson et al. 2013). As an aftermath of any steps taken in accordance with the
deterrence theory, the attacking state might procure revengeful motives that shall put the
defending state in further danger. The fear of further retaliation remains and this particular
facet acts as a limitation of the deterrence theory.
The recent instance of the deterrent theory can be the surgical strike conducted in
2016 by India. The prime motive of the surgical strike was to avoid a full-fledged war with
Pakistan, complying with the concept of the deterrent theory (Biswas 2017). The surgical
strike was conducted by India on the Line of Control in Pakistan occupied Kashmir against
the military launch pads, which wrecked significant casualties as it had no adverse impacts
over the common people. The casualties count was 35-70 and it should be noted that each of
the soldiers engaged in the strike returned unharmed (Gokhale 2017). The efficacy of the
strike was praised globally especially in 2018 when the partial footages of the strike being
committed were released to the Indian media by the Indian Army. The statement that the
Indian Army had conducted surgical strikes against the Jihadists marked a new era of
deterrence. For decades the Indian Army and government had borne the embarrassing tag of a
subdued state influenced highly by a culture of strategic restraint. However, the present prime
minister of India proved it to be wrong by imposing on Pakistan the necessary pressure for
keeping the defense structure of India intact.
The concept of a surgical strike is to cause significant damage to a particular target
without causing any harm to the innocent people and properties belonging to the common
people (Marsh, Kenny and Joslyn 2013). It basically attacks the attacker in the most
unexpected way and wipes out the root strength of the attacking state, thereby paralyzing the

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threat from the attacking state significantly. The pivotal and the most influential aspect of the
surgical strike is that it prevents war in a very efficient manner. The strikes are initiated as a
bluff to the adversary power and then with the utilization of superior military force, with
precision, specific and limited goals are achieved. India was successful in implementing this
risky but efficient international stratagem because it was a combination of judicious use of
diplomatic maneuvering and steady military force. Substantial pre-raid preparations in
intergovernmental institutions and international capitals is launched before a military
operation, to employ political cover and a relevant rationale for the drastic actions
(Economictimes.indiatimes.com, 2019). The same was followed effectively by India and that
was how it could take Pakistan completely by surprise. The policy of India of diplomatic
isolation of Pakistan during the recent months prior to the strike comprised of the spade work
for the strike, which have been acclaimed by the international authorities than being
condemned, as it was a deterrent to prevent war and extensive damage for both the countries.
The impact of the strike stated and especially to Pakistan that the full spectrum of Indian
diplomacy can attain the unthinkable levels to reap beneficial rewards for the country and
contribute towards upholding international peace effectively (Sartori 2013).
The connection of the surgical strike with the deterrence theory lies in the fact that it proved
to be effective and exercised the necessary pressure over Pakistan to keep the conditions for
international peace intact. The efficacy of the method was praised by international delegates
all around the globe. The surgical strike has become the new model of deterrent to war and
can be followed by other states in precarious conditions. It must also be noted that the act of
the surgical strike not only effectively removed the threat of Pakistan’s attack over India but
also ensured to inflict a lethal attack on the terrorist groups that had sheltered along the
borders of Pakistan (Khattak, Khan and Qumber 2018). The diplomatic nature of the strike is
praiseworthy and its triumphant execution further promotes the fact that with the proper

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implementation of the deterrence theory, colossal damage and loss of life and property caused
by expensive and catastrophic war, can be averted.
The deterrence theory had come into prominence during the cold war period, as a
contributing factor to reduce the tensions between the USA and USSR (van Dijk et al. 2013).
The theory did prevent a third world war but the fact that there always remains a threat of an
imminent nuclear war must also be taken into account. With the invention of nuclear power,
it was not long before it was realized that like every other scientific invention, the nuclear
power also had its boons and banes. Nuclear deterrence is a concept that became a possibly
lethal ideology, remains influential in spite of being increasingly discredited (Bradley 2016).
The reason for its being discredited lies primarily in the fact that when deterring from war,
the defending state possessing nuclear power might make use of it to end the war
immediately. An instance of which can be found in the history of the Second World War
wherein the USA had dropped the atom bomb over the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas of
Japan to stop the war altogether, also to retaliate for the Pearl Harbor incident. (Sakata et al.
2014) The impact of that minor bomb is felt even today as the effects of nuclear positioning
remains in the genes of humans for several years. The bomb was minor compared to the vast
amount of nuclear power that has been accumulated by several countries across the globe. If
any of these countries attempts to use these nuclear weapons even as a deterrent to quicken
the end of any war, there could exist a risk of wiping off humankind from its existence
(Stavrianakis 2019).
The theory of nuclear deterrence should never be considered as an option as it would
have colossal impact on not only the states concerned but also on the whole of humanity
(Betts 2013). As an alternative to the nuclear deterrence theory, the option of controlling the
procurement of nuclear weapons by countries around the world or even the utopian idea of
stopping the production of nuclear weapons is altogether a better option than the

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aforementioned theory. The deterrence theory is primarily criticized when in connection with
the nuclear deterrence. Several critics have repeatedly claimed that the theory can only prove
to be catastrophic and should never be utilized. On the contrary certain critics have also
maintained the fact that diplomatic intervention is require when the occasion of nuclear
deterrence arises between the concerned states.
Therefore from the above discussion it can be deduced that the advent of the
deterrence theory was during a period of a need to avoid war at all costs. However, with time
the theory too has changed its significance. The plausibility of a nuclear deterrence thus has
become controversial and must be thought over before implementation. Hence, like every
other theory, the deterrence theory too has its boons and curses.

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