Analysis of the Development of Japanese-German Partnership During WWII

This research paper examines the development and ultimate failure of the Japanese-German partnership during World War II. It explores the formation of the Tripartite Pact, highlighting the political, economic, and military aspects of the alliance. The paper delves into the areas of interest for both nations, including their differing approaches to warfare and their interactions with other countries. It analyzes the trade and financial relationships, including the challenges posed by the lack of resource exchange and central planning. The role of racial discrimination as a key factor in the partnership's failure is also discussed. The analysis incorporates primary sources and secondary scholarly sources to provide a comprehensive understanding of the complex relationship between Japan and Germany during World War II.

Running head: DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
Alliances between sovereign states had been among the least constant of political
associations. The association between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan which had been
known as two totalitarian governments was a challenging one in the Second World War. The
colonial plans of Germany, Italy as well as Japan against the world order of established
oriented authorities indicated a kind of threat under the situations of the worldwide system of
the 1930s and early phase of the 1940s1. These nations had the chance to encounter the rest of
the nations of the world by strategizing their colonialist plans. In due course the strategy of
these nations for conflict turned out as a fascist shared idea. The British officials perceived
this plan as a form of threat since the early 1930s. Moreover, in a subcommittee of the
Committee of Imperial Defense, Japan was considered as a direct threat to the British Empire.
On the other hand, Germany was perceived as the ultimate prospective enemy by Sir Maurice
Hankey. The main reason for Germany developing association with Japan was because, Japan
in 1939 was not considered as an ultimate warning for the European Western authorities
when Germany planned to attack and put an end to Poland2. However, the But the association
with the Soviet Union failed to pose threats to the Great Britain and France in intervening by
waging the conflict that later developed as the Second World War. The thesis statement is
“The development of Japanese-German relationship never achieved the quality of a shared
strategy during World War II.”
Initiation of the Tripartite Pact
Japanese-German partnership basically developed in 1940 with the conquest of
France by Germans. Such defeat destroyed major regions of Northern as well as Western
Europe. By drawing relevance to these military successes, Italy during the concluding days of
1 Wippich, Rolf-Harald. "Restoring German-Japanese Relations after World War II." In Transnational
Encounters between Germany and Japan, pp. 207-225. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2016.
2 Kaiser, David E. Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France,
and Eastern Europe, 1930-1939. Princeton University Press, 2015.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
the triumphant German battle in France participated in the war. On the other hand, Japan
subsequent to the seize-fire between France and the Axis powers strengthened its bases in
Northern Indochina. It further developed its chance to stop supporting China from the south.
The developments were witnessed by Germany owing to its own successes. However,
Japanese actions on the other hand were not shared previously.
There was found a Japanese suggestion of a treaty on separate zones of control. This
suggestion helped German to attain develop interest and eventually was expanded by the
Germans. Meanwhile, the most vital effect for the Japanese in proposing this treaty was to
develop affairs with the Soviet Union and pave their way for further discussions with the
United States3. On the other hand, the Germans were overall focused on preventing the
United States to combat the British. This led to the introduction of the Tripartite Pact on 27
September 1940 which was based on the assurance of supporting all political, financial as
well as military means. The partnership was restricted to an attack by a control not at engaged
into the European War or the Sino-Japanese conflict. This implied the United States or the
Soviet Union. However, since the Soviet Union was clearly excluded, the United States
remained as a potential opponent. Rather than preventing the US, a major proportion of the
North Americans considered the pact as a trouble which intended to control the whole world.
The pact ended as Germany made certain official allowances under the support of
Ambassador Eugen Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. These allowances
went against the commands given by Ribbentrop. Tripartite directives for political, armed and
economic queries were officially recognized in Berlin, but failed to attain much importance4.
The Tripartite Pact further failed to be recognized in any mutual plans for military
3 Nicholas, Tom. "The Organization of Enterprise in Japan." The Journal of Economic History 75, no. 2 (2015):
333-363.
4 Earhart, David C. Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media: Images of World War II in
the Japanese Media. Routledge, 2015.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
collaboration. However, it directed the Italian approach of warfare5. Campaigns of Italy such
as the North African campaign in 1940 and the campaign held in Yugoslavia in 1941 did not
result in direct defeat, due to German’s militarily intervention to support its confederate.
Likewise, the Japanese and German ways to war also separated. However, Germany
organized its conflict of annihilation against the Soviet Union. At this juncture, Japan felt
stimulated to protect its non-involvement in thee these types of war against the Soviet Union.
Areas of Interest for Japan and German
The Japanese primary area of interest was far-reaching as compared to the European
territories under German regime. Between the two influential, there remained an unsolved
question of the ways of dealing British India. As per studies, in 1942, Germany and Japan
decided to end the agreement of labelling the 70th degree of Eastern length as a point of
separation between the two ranges of power. Furthermore, the German Marines strictly
supervised if the Japanese maintained the labelled line. In addition, the financial dealings of
German-Japanese affiliation remained fundamental. The Germans criticized that immediate
need of raw materials for example rubber, quinine as well as tungsten which were not
delivered in the quantities which were demanded. On the other side, the Japanese showed
great disappointed due to the inadequate supply of equipment, steel as well as chemicals
which were supposed to be imported from Germany.
Japanese-German partnership in the trade domain
Studies claim that the Japanese-German partnership in the financial and technological
domain needs further attention6. The usually dominant financial associations of German with
China during the late 1930s were changed with Japan. On the other hand, common trade
structures between Germany and Japan failed to show any hope. Japan had determinations to
5 Lyons, Michael J. World War II: A short history. Routledge, 2016.
6 King, Amy. China-Japan Relations after World War Two: Empire, Industry and War, 1949–1971. Cambridge
University Press, 2016.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
obtain German trade products during the WWII which were required for European conflict.
Furthermore, Japan showed incompetence in delivering raw materials to German which the
country needed the most during that period. This led to an uncertain commercial treaty
between the two nations. However, it was not signed owing to the Hitler-Stalin Pact.
However, after1939 the Trans-Siberian Railway offered few effective alternative chances for
the exchange of materials when they saw a gradual extinction of sea transport by the British
obstruction of German business. According to studies, when Germany received rubber, food
merchandises as well as manganese through railways, Japan on the other hand continued
showing interest in industrial goods, particularly armed goods. However, all of these products
were immediately required for Germany’s personal conflict7. This led to a problem that
further influenced German market associations. Moreover, trade discussions after the end of
the Tripartite Pact till 1941 did not give any effective octomoms. Japanese record of military
material increased rapidly in relation to German potentials. It gradually became challenging
as the notion of shared spheres of impact in financial terms were not easily recognized by the
Germans for the South East Asia.
Subsequent to the German anger against the Soviet Union, transportation developed
as a problematic area for reciprocated trade. There was an idea of future sea route for trade
which was reinforced by shared interest. However, it was only less than half of the Germans
in 1942 who found their way either from or to Germany. While the other half were contented
with half the possible goods. Studies reveal that the Germans found it problematic to agree to
the new Japanese Empire, as the raw materials from former French or Dutch colonies went
under Japanese regime. On the other hand, German tried to deal for technologic
7 Craig, William. The Fall of Japan: The Final Weeks of World War II in the Pacific. Open Road Media, 2015.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
authorizations as well as exclusive rights which were not considered as a justifiable deal, but
gathered great prominence8.
Meanwhile, Nipponization and Germanization were implemented as process of
cultural access. As per studies, in the German employment policy, such process tends to give
economic effect. Furthermore, in Eastern Europe, the funding of businesses as well as the
selection of representatives was simplified by aryanization9. The racial policy functioned as a
means for attaining control over the war-relevant business sectors. On the other hand, in the
already captured parts of Poland as well as in the General Government, the funding policy
showed greater criticality with several cases of possessions removals. In the occupied states
of Western Europe, the repossession policy was more restrained. Certain industrial plants in
planned divisions were established as per process of repossession. These divisions were the
steel workings in Lorraine and Northern France, the Norwegian aluminium division or Dutch
biochemical workings.
On the other side, in the occupied regions of South East Asia, essential alterations in
asset possession were made by means of confiscation of opponent assets. Businesses which
were essential for the trial of the conflict were established as per Japanese control10.
Meanwhile, in Indonesia, these types of purchases included the oil business, the banks as well
as few agricultural plantations, particularly when manufacturing rubber11. However, the
8 Brewer, Susan A. To win the peace: British propaganda in the United States during World War II. Cornell
University Press, 2019.
9 Coicaud, Jean-Marc. "Emotions and Passions of Death, and the Making of World War II: The Cases of
Germany and Japan." Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations (2016):
277-98.
10 Schroeder, Paul W. The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941: 1941. Cornell University
Press, 2019.
11 Vandenbosch, Amry, and Richard Butwell. Southeast Asia among the world powers. University Press of
Kentucky, 2015.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
Japanese involuntary funding of workshops and mines were more far-reaching in occupied
China.
Central planning
While comprehending Japanese-German partnership, it has been noted that central
planning served an insignificant role in the regulation of German occupied economies. The
Nazi propaganda accentuated the role of development in that way tried to prove the capability
of the government. However, the institutional effects of the Speer reform of 1942 attained
great hype. Irrespective of such publicity, there was a lack of centralized planning12. In
contrast, the Nazi reforms supported the self-organization of the deployment business. A vital
consequence of the late Speer reorganizations in 1943 related to the establishment of
uninterrupted trade relationships between German traders and exporting businesses in the
occupied states. Furthermore, the Central Contracts Office gradually lost its prior role in
functioning as an institution for setting up financial dealings between exporting corporations
and German importers. On the other hand, the people who also relocated with the involved
corporations were selected for the role of advancing the process of transfer of orders to the
occupied states13. These involved companies which belonged to the automotive industry were
Renault and Volkswagen. The Renault and Volkswagen were founded in 1943 which
functioned as a potentially operative business. However, these arrangements continued only
for a brief period due to the change in the progress of the war transformed which resulted in
Germany to be on the defeating end14.
12 Feis, Herbert. The atomic bomb and the end of World War II. Princeton University Press, 2015.
13 Speyer Besancon, Rachel. "Managing the Nazi Legacy: Contradictory Reconstruction Policies in US-
Occupied Germany, 1945-1952." (2019).
14 VanSise, Casey. "Good Neighbor Renditions and the Enemy Alien: The Latin American Civilian Internees of
World War II and the Integrity of the Good Neighbor Policy." (2016).

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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
Then again, the Japanese also engaged them in central planning. Certainly, strict
planning as well as control was executed in Japan where the administrations were
considerably steady with functional civil governments. On the other hand, in other regions,
actual planning was abridged to a well-organized resource distribution by special
Commodities as well as Pricing Committees. The management of goods transfers through a
transferal of orders was not proficient in Japanese business. In addition, the zaibatsu served a
decisive role in the Japanese employment government. It has been noted that their roles were
to certain degree similar to the transfer groups of the Speer reform executed in 194315.
However, the role played by the zaibatsu in the occupied markets underwent modifications
overtime. At an initial stage, the Army rejected them due to the accusation of exploiting
communities. On the other hand, the Army gathered the idea of facing challenges in dealing
with occupied economies without the assistance of zaibatsu. Hence, the Japanese
administration passed on the supervision of predetermined associations between Japanese
zaibatsu in addition to foreign associates to the policymakers. As per historical evidences,
zaibatsu dealt with the control of foreign trade. They further made a significant contribution
in directing war-relevant merchandises as well as raw-materials to Japan. Consequently,
exports in planned subdivisions were put under the regulation of these Japanese businesses
through monopolies set up based on commodity distribution.
Racial discrimination
While throwing light to the reasons which led to the failure of the partnership it was
found that racial discrimination from the end of the Germans was the primary cause. As per
studies, racial transparency was best reflected from the fighting spirit of Germans. Germans
characters threatened by Jewish intrusion through democracy could have united with
15 Mouré, Kenneth. "Economies under Occupation: The Hegemony of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in
World War II. Edited by Marcel Boldorf and Tetsuji Okazaki. London and New York: Routledge, 2015. xiv+
335 pp. Map, figures, tables, index. Cloth, $168.00. ISBN: 978-0-415-83533-6." Business History Review 90,
no. 2 (2016): 390-393.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
similarly ethnically endangered Great Britain. According to historical evidences, Hitler
respected Britain during the conflict as well as its ethnic nucleus which further allowed
British to conquer a world kingdom, including India16. As a consequence specifically in
Indian-Japanese relations, Hitler hesitated to show between an appreciation of the “white”,
Caucasian rule of the British and the association with “coloured” Japan. Ethnic classifications
for Nazi Germany continued to be vital also while considering relations with Japan as well17.
However, it could have been improved by the recognition of military qualities which could be
highlighted by optimistic cultural values.
To conclude, the Japanese-German partnership never achieved the value of a shared
strategy during the Second World War. However, the line of separation with its shared
challenges of Germany and Japan were equally administering. They expected departures of
the opponent states. In consequence, they established the conditions for the comparative
achievement of the Axis powers in the years till 1942. Important alterations in asset
possession were made by means of confiscation of opponent assets. Businesses which were
essential for the trial of the conflict were established as per Japanese control. Japanese-
German partnership in the financial and technological domain gathered further attention. The
usually dominant financial associations of German with China during the late 1930s were
changed with Japan. On the other hand, common trade structures between Germany and
Japan failed to show any hope. It was found that the Germans criticized that immediate need
of raw materials for example rubber, quinine as well as tungsten which were not delivered in
the quantities which were demanded. On the other side, the Japanese showed great
16 Buruma, Ian. The wages of guilt: Memories of war in Germany and Japan. New York Review of Books,
2015.
17 Cho, Joanne Miyang, Lee Roberts, and Christian W. Spang, eds. Transnational encounters between Germany
and Japan: Perceptions of partnership in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Springer, 2016.

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DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
disappointed due to the inadequate supply of equipment, steel as well as chemicals which
were supposed to be imported from Germany.

10
DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
Bibliography
Brewer, Susan A. To win the peace: British propaganda in the United States during World
War II. Cornell University Press, 2019.
Buruma, Ian. The wages of guilt: Memories of war in Germany and Japan. New York
Review of Books, 2015.
Cho, Joanne Miyang, Lee Roberts, and Christian W. Spang, eds. Transnational encounters
between Germany and Japan: Perceptions of partnership in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Springer, 2016.
Coicaud, Jean-Marc. "Emotions and Passions of Death, and the Making of World War II: The
Cases of Germany and Japan." Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream
International Relations (2016): 277-98.
Craig, William. The Fall of Japan: The Final Weeks of World War II in the Pacific. Open
Road Media, 2015.
Earhart, David C. Certain Victory: Images of World War II in the Japanese Media: Images of
World War II in the Japanese Media. Routledge, 2015.
Feis, Herbert. The atomic bomb and the end of World War II. Princeton University Press,
2015.
Kaiser, David E. Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany,
Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 1930-1939. Princeton University Press, 2015.
King, Amy. China-Japan Relations after World War Two: Empire, Industry and War, 1949–
1971. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Lyons, Michael J. World War II: A short history. Routledge, 2016.
Mouré, Kenneth. "Economies under Occupation: The Hegemony of Nazi Germany and
Imperial Japan in World War II. Edited by Marcel Boldorf and Tetsuji Okazaki. London and

11
DEVELOPMENT OF A JAPANESE–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP
New York: Routledge, 2015. xiv+ 335 pp. Map, figures, tables, index. Cloth, $168.00. ISBN:
978-0-415-83533-6." Business History Review 90, no. 2 (2016): 390-393.
Nicholas, Tom. "The Organization of Enterprise in Japan." The Journal of Economic
History 75, no. 2 (2015): 333-363.
Schroeder, Paul W. The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941: 1941.
Cornell University Press, 2019.
Speyer Besancon, Rachel. "Managing the Nazi Legacy: Contradictory Reconstruction
Policies in US-Occupied Germany, 1945-1952." (2019).
Vandenbosch, Amry, and Richard Butwell. Southeast Asia among the world powers.
University Press of Kentucky, 2015.
VanSise, Casey. "Good Neighbor Renditions and the Enemy Alien: The Latin American
Civilian Internees of World War II and the Integrity of the Good Neighbor Policy." (2016).
Wippich, Rolf-Harald. "Restoring German-Japanese Relations after World War II."
In Transnational Encounters between Germany and Japan, pp. 207-225. Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2016.