Eifler v. Shurgard Capital Management Case

This case study examines the legal battle between John Eifler and Shurgard Capital Management Corporation, focusing on issues of bailment, negligence, and violations of the Consumer Protection Act. The case arose after Eifler's car was stolen from a self-storage facility. The court determined that a bailment for mutual benefit was created when Eifler left his car keys with the facility's managers, but the self-storage company was not considered a professional bailee and could limit its liability for ordinary negligence. However, the court found that the Consumer Protection Act claim should have been presented to a jury due to the misleading nature of the company's advertisements. The case also addressed issues of restitution and attorney fees, ultimately affirming some decisions while reversing others and remanding for further proceedings.

71 Wash.App. 684
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 2.
John A. EIFLER, Jr., Appellant,
v.
SHURGARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a Shurgard Self Storage, Respondent.
No. 14363-1-II.
Nov. 22, 1993.
Tenant brought action against self-storage company for breach of contract, negligence, and Consumer Protection Act violations arising from loss
of automobile apparently stolen from self-storage lot. The Superior Court, Kitsap County, William J. Kamps, J., dismissed, and tenant appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Morgan, J., held that: (1) bailment for mutual benefit was created; (2) self-storage company was not precluded from limiting
its liability for ordinary negligence; (3) Consumer Protection Act claim was for jury; and (4) self-storage operation was not entitled to award of
attorney fees and costs.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
West Headnotes (17)Collapse West Headnotes
Change View
1Automobiles
Storage of Vehicles; Parking Facilities
Bailment was created when tenant owner left his automobile and keys with resident managers of self-storage operation; by leaving car keys,
tenant impliedly authorized managers to move car around premises.
2Bailment
Delivery and Acceptance
There can be no bailment without change of possession and assumption for acceptance of possession by person claimed to be bailee.
1 Case that cites this headnote
3Automobiles
Storage of Vehicles; Parking Facilities
Bailment created when tenant left automobile and keys with resident managers of self-storage operation was bailment for mutual benefit, rather
than professional bailment; tenant wanted to obtain space in which to store his car and self-storage company wanted to lease space and thereby
obtain compensation, but self-storage company did not acquire right to possess property stored on premises, as it could not generally move
property from one storage locker to another or from one part of premises to another.
4Contracts
Exemption from Liability
Generally, party to contract can limit liability for damages resulting from negligence.
1 Case that cites this headnote
5Bailment
Bailments for Mutual Benefit
“Bailment for mutual benefit” arises when both parties to contract receive benefit flowing from bailment.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
6Bailment
Nature and Elements in General
“Professional bailee” is one whose principal business is to act as bailee and who deals with public on uniform rather than individual basis.
7Bailment
Bailments for Mutual Benefit
When bailment for mutual benefit is also professional bailment, public policy will not permit bailee to limit his or her liability for negligence.
8Bailment
Care and Use of Property, and Negligence of Bailee
Bailment
Bailments for Mutual Benefit
Bailee was entitled to limit its liability for negligence pursuant to terms in lease agreement; bailment was not a professional one, and lease
agreement clearly stated that bailee would not be responsible for loss of property and was not providing insurance that would cover loss but,
rather, bailor could purchase insurance from bailee or his own agent.
1 Case that cites this headnote
9Automobiles
In General; Nature of Relation
Tenant owner was not entitled to refund of payments made to self-storage company for months in which owner alleged stored automobile had
been stolen; owner failed to produce evidence sufficient to support finding that his car disappeared before date on which payments at issue were
made.
10Payment
Evidence
Although money paid under mutual mistake can be recovered, payor has burden of proving each element necessary to his or her cause of action.
1 Case that cites this headnote
11Automobiles

In General; Nature of Relation
Tenant was not entitled to receive refund of money paid to self-storage company during time period stored automobile was missing; self-storage
company was entitled to credit that payment to rental owed on another space tenant was leasing for personal property other than the automobile,
as there was no evidence that tenant directed company to apply payment exclusively to automobile storage.
12Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Questions of Law or Fact
Issue whether self-storage company's failure to provide secure storage was violation of Consumer Protection Act was for jury in tenant's action for
damages resulting from loss of vehicle apparently stolen from self-storage lot; evidence indicated that self-storage operation was less safe than
its name, advertisements and brochures made it appear and that that fact was proximate cause of injury to tenant's property. West's RCWA
19.86.010 et seq.
13Trial
Sufficiency to Warrant Recovery, or to Establish Cause of Action or Defense
Trial
Hearing and Determination
Directed verdict is appropriate if, viewing evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party, evidence is insufficient to support one or more facts
needed to establish cause of action.
14Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Nature and Elements
Elements needed to establish Consumer Protection Act cause of action are unfair or deceptive act or practice, occurring in trade or commerce,
public interest impact, injury to plaintiff in his or her business or property and causation. West's RCWA 19.86.010 et seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
15Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Public Impact or Interest; Private or Internal Transactions
Act or practice affects public interest impact, for purposes of Consumer Protection Act analysis, when it is part of pattern or generalized course of
conduct and there is real and substantial potential for repetition of defendant's conduct after act involving plaintiff. West's RCWA 19.86.010 et
seq.
3 Cases that cite this headnote
16Costs
Nature and Grounds of Right
Costs
Bad Faith or Meritless Litigation
Self-storage company was not entitled to award of attorney fees and costs in action brought by tenant for loss of automobile stored in self-storage
lot; tenant's claims, including breach of contract, negligence, restitution and Consumer Protection Act violation were not frivolous. West's RCWA
4.84.185, 19.86.010 et seq.
1 Case that cites this headnote
17Costs
Leases
Landlord was not entitled to award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to lease provision providing that tenant agrees to pay all costs and
expenses, including attorney fees and reasonable service fees of landlord in enforcing terms of lease; since tenant was suing landlord to enforce
his rights under common law and Consumer Protection Act, landlord was not required to enforce terms of lease. West's RCWA 19.86.010 et seq.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
**1073 *686 John W. Sweet, Seattle, for appellant.
Thomas R. Merrick, Robert J. Roche, Bullivant, Houser, Bailey, Pengergrass & Hoffman, Seattle, for respondent.
Opinion
MORGAN, Judge.
After John Eifler's car disappeared while stored at Bremerton Shurgard Self Storage, he sued for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of
the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). We affirm the dismissal of his claims for breach of contract and negligence, but reverse and remand for trial
on his CPA claim.
Bremerton Shurgard Self Storage (Bremerton Shurgard) is owned and operated by Shurgard Capital Management Corporation. In May, 1988, its
resident managers were Vi and Ed Reinhart.
Eifler is a sailor whose job takes him to sea for months at a time. While he is gone, he needs a place to store his belongings.
In 1986, Eifler leased interior space at Bremerton Shurgard. In May, 1988, he leased additional, outside space, because he needed a place to
store his car.
*687 In May, 1988, Eifler signed a written lease. It provided in part:
3. TENANT RESPONSIBLE. Tenant acknowledges and understands that no bailment is created by this lease, that landlord is not engaged in the
business of storing goods for hire nor in the warehousing business, but is simply a landlord renting the Storage Unit in which Tenant can store
items of personal property owned by Tenant. The Storage Unit is under the exclusive control of Tenant. Landlord does not take custody, control,
possession or dominion over the contents of the Storage Unit, and does not agree to provide protection for the Self-Storage Facility, Storage Unit,
or its contents thereof.
**1074 ALL PERSONAL PROPERTY ON OR IN THE STORAGE UNIT IS AT THE RISK OF TENANT. Tenant must take whatever steps are
necessary to safeguard whatever property is stored in the Storage Unit....
Landlord does not have any obligation to carry insurance on tenant's property stored in the Storage Unit. IF TENANT WISHES TO HAVE HIS
PROPERTY COVERED BY INSURANCE, TENANT MUST OBTAIN SEPARATE COVERAGE. Landlord will not be responsible or otherwise
liable, directly or indirectly, for loss or damage to the property of Tenant due to any cause, including fire, explosion, theft, vandalism, wind or water

damage, any defect now, or subsequently created or discovered, in the Storage Unit, or acts or omissions of any third party, regardless of
whether such loss or damage may be caused or contributed to by the negligence of Landlord, its agents or employees.
The lease also contained an addendum relating to insurance. It stated that Eifler could obtain insurance from his own insurance agent or from
Shurgard, or that he could elect to be self-insured. Eifler chose to be self-insured.
When Eifler leased the additional, outside space for his car, the Reinharts asked that he leave a set of car keys with them while he was out at
sea. They were trying to convince a truck rental company to park its trucks at Bremerton Shurgard, and if the deal went through, his car might
have to be moved to another part of the premises. Honoring the request, Eifler left a set of keys.
During the remainder of 1988, Eifler used his car on a number of occasions while on shore leave. After each use, he returned the car to its
outside storage space. The car was in *688 its outside storage space when he last saw it on December 10, 1988.
On February 25, 1989, Eifler returned to Bremerton Shurgard and could not find his car. He then sought out and spoke with Mark Bourgeois, the
new resident manager. Bourgeois said he knew nothing about the whereabouts of the car or the set of keys. He said Vi Reinhart had died, and Ed
Reinhart had left the previous November. He said that Bremerton Shurgard had not had a resident manager since November, though it had had
daytime managers since that time. Eifler cancelled his lease on the last day of February, 1989.
In August, 1989, Eifler sued, alleging breach of contract, negligence, restitution, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The case
was referred to mandatory arbitration, where Eifler lost. He then demanded trial de novo under MAR 7.1.
A jury trial was held July 17-20, 1990. Shurgard's assistant manager testified that he had discovered a large hole cut in the fence near Eifler's
outside storage space about a month before the car was discovered missing. Apparently, however, the hole was soon fixed. Ed Reinhart testified
the fence was easily breached because of its weak construction. Reinhart also testified he had informed his superiors of the problem, but they
had done nothing to correct it. Reinhart also confirmed that he had had possession of a set of keys for Eifler's car.
Eifler himself testified that in 1986, when he had needed a place to store his belongings, he looked in the yellow pages and noticed an
advertisement for Bremerton Shurgard Self Storage. The advertisement declared, “We Have Safe Storage All Locked Up”. It went on to proclaim
that Bremerton Shurgard was “fenced and lighted”, with a “resident manager” and “electronic security and gates”. He thought the facility “sounded
safe”.
After Eifler had presented his case, Shurgard moved for directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion as to the CPA claim, but denied it as
to the contract and negligence claims.
*689 Shurgard rested without presenting evidence. It then renewed its motion for directed verdict on the contract and negligence claims. It argued
that the lease precluded liability for ordinary negligence, **1075 and that there was no evidence of gross negligence.
The trial court granted the motion on grounds that Shurgard had effectively limited its liability for ordinary negligence by means of the lease. The
trial court submitted the issue of gross negligence to the jury, which found that Shurgard had not acted with gross negligence.
After trial, the court awarded Shurgard costs and reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $10,011.50. The reasonable attorney fees were those
“incurred following the date plaintiff filed his request for a trial de novo.”1 See MAR 7.3.
I. BREACH OF CONTRACT AND NEGLIGENCE
Eifler argues that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on his claims for breach of contract and negligence. He says the lease was ineffective
to limit Shurgard's liability for negligence because he and Shurgard had a bailment relationship, and a bailee cannot limit its liability for
negligence. We address (A) whether there was a bailment relationship and (B) if so, whether Shurgard effectively limited its liability for
negligence.
A.
12A bailment “ ‘arises generally when personalty is delivered to another for some particular purpose with an express or implied contract to
redeliver when the purpose has been fulfilled.’ ” Gingrich v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 57 Wash.App. 424, 431-32, 788 P.2d 1096
(1990) (quoting Freeman v. Metro Transmission, Inc., 12 Wash.App. 930, 932, 533 P.2d 130 (1975)). There can be no bailment without “a change
of possession and an assumption or acceptance of possession by the person claimed to be a bailee.” Freeman, 12 Wash.App. at 932, 533 P.2d
130 (quoting Collins v. Boeing Co., 4 Wash.App. 705, 711, 483 P.2d 1282, 46 A.L.R.3d 1294 (1971)); see also Theobaldv. *690 Satterthwaite, 30
Wash.2d 92, 94, 190 P.2d 714 (1948).
In this case, a bailment was not created simply because Eifler left his car on Shurgard's premises. He leased space from Shurgard, but by that
fact alone, he did not deliver or transfer possession of the car. On the contrary, he continued to take the car in and out of Shurgard's premises at
will, and without notice to Shurgard.2
However, a bailment was created when Eifler left his car keys with Vi and Ed Reinhart. By doing that, he impliedly authorized them to move the
car around the premises. This was a transfer of possession, and it was accepted by Shurgard, acting through the resident managers.
B.
34Generally, a party to a contract can limit liability for damages resulting from negligence. American Nursery Prods. Inc. v. Indian Wells, 115
Wash.2d 217, 230, 797 P.2d 477 (1990). The extent to which a nongratuitous bailee can do this, however, varies according to the nature of the
bailment.
5A nongratuitous bailment can be a bailment for mutual benefit. American Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 232, 797 P.2d 477. A bailment for mutual
benefit arises
when both parties to the contract receive a benefit flowing from the bailment. 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 16 (1988). The benefit to the bailee need not
be in the form of cash. Rather, the benefit may derive from
a bailment [which] is a mere incident to the performance of services for which the bailee receives compensation or to the conduct of business
from which the bailee derives profit, or where the bailment **1076 is motivated by the bailor's desire to promote a sale....
American Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 232, 797 P.2d 477 (quoting 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 16 at 239); see also, White v. Burke, 31 Wash.2d 573, 583,
197 P.2d 1008 (1948).
*691 6A bailment for mutual benefit can also be a professional bailment. American Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 232, 797 P.2d 477. A professional
bailee is one (1) whose principal business is to act as bailee, and (2) who deals with the public on a uniform rather than individual basis. American
Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 231, 797 P.2d 477; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Bailments § 145. Examples include the public warehouse, the parcel checkroom, and
the parking garage or parking lot in which the attendant is given the right to move the car around the premises. W. Keeton, et al, Prosser and
Keeton on Torts § 68, at 482-83 (5th ed. 1984); Wagenblast v. Odessa School Dist. 105-157-166J, 110 Wash.2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988); 8
Am.Jur.2d, Bailments § 145.
When a bailment for mutual benefit is not also a professional bailment, public policy may or may not permit the bailee to limit his or her liability for
negligence. American Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 232, 797 P.2d 477. The controlling factors are set forth in Wagenblast, supra.American
Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 232-33, 797 P.2d 477. As the Wagenblast court said:
Probably the best exposition of the test to be applied in determining whether exculpatory agreements violate public policy is that stated by the
California Supreme Court. In writing for a unanimous court, the late Justice Tobriner outlined the factors in Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60
Cal.2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963):
Thus, the attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It concerns a business
of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to
the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds himself out as willing to perform this
service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards. As a result of the
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of
bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the
public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees
and obtain protection against negligence. Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the *692 purchaser is placed under the
control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.
(Footnotes omitted.) Tunkl, 60 Cal.2d at 98-101 [32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441]. We agree.
Obviously, the more of the foregoing six characteristics that appear in a given exculpatory agreement case, the more likely the agreement is to be
declared invalid on public policy grounds.

(Footnotes omitted.) Wagonblast, 110 Wash.2d at 851-52, 758 P.2d 968 (quoting Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.2d 92, 98-101, 383
P.2d 441, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963)).
7When a bailment for mutual benefit is also a professional bailment, public policy will not permit the bailee to limit his or her liability for
negligence. American Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 230, 797 P.2d 477 (citing Wagenblast, 110 Wash.2d at 849, 758 P.2d 968).3 As stated
in American Nursery:
**1077 the equality of bargaining power of the two parties to the [professional bailment] contract is largely theoretical in nature while actually the
bailor, being in need of the services to be rendered by the bailee and usually being in no position to take his trade elsewhere, is compelled to
agree to the terms stipulated by the bailee.
American Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 231, 797 P.2d 477 (quoting Annot. Liability of Garagemen for Theft or Unauthorized Use of Motor Vehicle, 43
A.L.R.2d 403, 419 n. 2 (1955)); see also Griffin v. Nationwide Moving & Storage Co., 187 Conn. 405, 446 A.2d 799, 805 (1982) (“ ‘professional’
bailees impose predetermined conditions upon bailors whose bargaining power lacks parity with such bailees”);Central Transport, Inc. v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ind.App.1981); *693 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B, comment g (1965); Annot., Liability for
Loss Of Or Damage To Automobile Left In Parking Lot Or Garage, 7 A.L.R.3d 927, 938 (1966).
The bailment created in this case was not a professional one. Generally, Shurgard leased storage space but did not acquire the right to possess
property stored on the premises. For example, it could not generally move property from one storage locker to another, or from one part of the
premises to another, as would be standard in a public warehouse. Shurgard's “principal business” was not that of bailee, and the bailment here
did not satisfy the first element needed for a professional bailment.
This conclusion is fortified by the lease Eifler signed. It expressly notes that Shurgard is “not a warehouseman”; that Shurgard “does nottake
custody of my property”; and that Shurgard is “not engaged in the business of storing goods for hire nor in the warehousing business.”
Although the bailment that was created was not a professional one, it was for mutual benefit. Eifler wanted to obtain space in which to store his
car. Shurgard wanted to lease space and thereby obtain compensation. Delivering a set of car keys to the resident managers, thereby permitting
them to possess and move the car, was “incident to the performance of services for which the bailee receives compensation or to the conduct of a
business from which the bailee derives profit”. American Nursery, 115 Wash.2d at 232, 797 P.2d 477(quoting 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 16, at 239).
Under these circumstances, a bailment for mutual benefit arose.
8The bailment being for mutual benefit, Shurgard's ability to limit its liability for negligence is controlled by the Wagenblast factors set forth above.
In our view, the crucial factor in this case is that Shurgard repeatedly and emphatically offered Eifler the opportunity to purchase insurance from it
or from his own insurance agent. The lease agreement that Eifler signed in May, 1988, said in big, bold letters, “All personal property on or in the
storage unit is at the risk of tenant.” It also said, “Landlord does not have any obligation to carry insurance on tenant's property stored in the
Storage Unit”, and “If tenant wishes to have his property covered by insurance, tenant must obtain separate coverage.” The addendum Eifler
signed at the same time said repeatedly, in large, bold *694 print, that Shurgard would not responsible for loss to his property, that Shurgard was
not providing insurance that would cover loss, and that he could purchase insurance from Shurgard or his own agent.4 It also contained an
application for insurance. It showed, apparently in Eifler's own hand, that he chose not to purchase **1078 insurance, and that part of the form
constituting an application for insurance was left blank. Under these circumstances, we do not perceive a contract of adhesion whereby Eifler was
deprived of a fair opportunity to protect the value of his property, and we hold that Shurgard was not precluded from limiting its liability for
negligence in the way that it did.
In reaching this result, we do not overlook the other Wagenblast factors, i.e., that Shurgard was regulated to some degree by RCW 19.150; that it
was open to the public; and that some members of the public may have a practical need to use self-storage facilities. Nevertheless, we think that
these factors are substantially outweighed by the fact that Shurgard provided Eifler with a reasonable and fair opportunity to decide whether he
wished to insure his own property against loss.
We conclude there was a bailment; that it was for mutual benefit; and that according to the Wagenblast factors, Shurgard was not precluded from
limiting its liability for ordinary negligence. Therefore, the trial court did not err in directing a verdict on Eifler's claims for breach of contract and
ordinary negligence.
II. RESTITUTION
Eifler argues that he is entitled to a refund of payments attributable to the period after his car disappeared.5 This is *695 true, he says, because
neither he nor Shurgard knew his car was gone when he made such payments, and thus the payments were made under a mutual mistake of
fact. We discuss the December, January and February payments separately from the March payment.
A.
910Although money paid under mutual mistake can be recovered, Pacific Coal & Lumber Co. v. Pierce Cy., 133 Wash. 278, 279-80, 233 P. 953
(1925), Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co. v. Keene, 28 Wash.App. 499, 500, 624 P.2d 742 (1981), the payor has the burden of proving each
element necessary to his or her cause of action. Clark v. Luepke, 60 Wash.App. 848, 851, 809 P.2d 752 (1991). Here, then, Eifler must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that his car disappeared before the date on which he made his December, January and February lease
payments.
At trial, there was evidence that Eifler's car disappeared between December 10 and February 25. However, there was no evidence showing when
within that period it disappeared. Without at least slight evidence as to when the car disappeared, a reasonable juror could not have found by a
preponderance of evidence that the car was taken either before or after Eifler made his December, January and February payments. Thus, the
evidence was insufficient to support a verdict that the car was taken before the date on which those payments were made, and the trial court did
not err in failing to submit to the jury Eifler's claim for a refund.
B.
11Eifler also seems to contend he should have received a refund of money paid for March, 1989. However, Shurgard credited that payment to
rental owed on the interior space that Eifler was leasing for personal property other than the car. There is no evidence that Eifler6 directed
Shurgard to *696 apply the March payment to the outside rather than the inside space, so Shurgard was entitled to credit the payment as it
did. Oakes Logging, Inc. v. Green Crow, Inc., 66 Wash.App. 598, 601, 832 P.2d 894 (1992).
III. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
121314Eifler claims the trial court erred in directing a verdict on his CPA **1079 claim. A directed verdict is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the evidence is insufficient to support one or more facts needed to establish the cause of
action. Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash.2d 251, 271-72, 830 P.2d 646 (1992) (citing Industrial Indem. Co. of Northwest, Inc. v. Kallevig, 114
Wash.2d 907, 915-16, 792 P.2d 520 (1990)). The elements needed to establish a CPA cause of action are (1) an unfair or deceptive act or
practice; (2) occurring in trade or commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her business or property; (5)
causation. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash.2d 778, 780, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
Here, the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that Bremerton Shurgard engaged in an act or practice designed to make the public
think that it operated a safe storage facility. Shurgard placed a yellow pages advertisement stating, “We Have Safe Storage All Locked Up”. It
proclaimed in the same ad that it was “fenced and lighted”, with a “resident manager” and “electronic security and gates”. In a separate flier, it
stated, “Shurgard managers live right on site”, “making sure everything is safe and secure ”. In another flier, it displayed a picture of a padlock
with the Shurgard trademark emblazoned upon it. And last but not least, the name “Shurgard” is obviously meant to imply a degree of diligence
and security.
The evidence was sufficient to support an inference that these acts or practices were unfair or deceptive. Resident managers were not on site
from November, 1988 to February, 1989. According to Ed Reinhart, the facility's fence was weakly constructed *697 and easily breached, and his
superiors, after being so informed, had not corrected the problem. In at least one instance, the security computer system on the gate may not
have been operable.
The evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the unfair or deceptive act or practice occurred in the course of trade or commerce.
Shurgard was engaged in trade or commerce at all material times.
15The evidence was sufficient to support an inference that the unfair or deceptive act or practice affected the public interest. An act or practice
affects the “public interest impact”, when (1) it is part of a pattern or generalized course of conduct, and (2) there is a real and substantial potential
for repetition of defendant's conduct after the act involving plaintiff. Hangman, 105 Wash.2d at 790, 719 P.2d 531;Travis v. Washington Horse
Breeders Ass'n, 111 Wash.2d 396, 407, 759 P.2d 418 (1988). Here, Shurgard disseminated to the entire public its company name, its yellow

pages advertisement, and its fliers. All were part of a generalized course of conduct, and all were capable of repetition with respect to numerous
members of the public.
Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that Eifler was injured “in his or her business or property” and that Shurgard's acts or
practices were a proximate cause of the injury. Eifler testified that he chose to store his belongings at Shurgard because he thought the facility,
due to its distinctive name and advertised qualities, “sounded safe”. It is inferable from the evidence at trial, however, that it was less safe than the
name, advertisements and brochures made it appear, and that that fact was a proximate cause of injury to Eifler's property. Because there was
evidence sufficient to support each element of Eifler's CPA claim, that claim should not have been dismissed as a matter of law.
IV. COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
16In awarding costs and reasonable attorney fees, the trial court relied in part on RCW 4.84.185, which provides *698 for reasonable attorney
fees in a frivolous action. Whether or not this action has merit, it is not frivolous, and RCW 4.84.185 may not be applied on remand.
The trial court also relied on MAR 7.3, which provides that the court may “assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against **1080 a party who
appeals the [arbitration] award and fails to improve the party's position on the trial de novo.” On remand, application of MAR 7.3 will depend on
the outcome of Eifler's CPA claim.
17Shurgard claims that its lease entitles it to costs and reasonable attorney fees. The lease provides:
Tenant agrees to pay all costs and expenses, including attorneys fees and reasonable service fees, of Landlord in enforcing the terms of this
lease.
This language might entitle Shurgard to costs and reasonable attorney fees if it were suing Eifler to enforce the lease.7 However, it does not
entitle Shurgard to costs and attorney fees where Eifler is suing Shurgard to enforce his rights under the common law and the CPA. In such a suit,
the “landlord” is not incurring costs or expenses “in enforcing the terms of the lease,” and the quoted language does not apply.
The judgment dismissing Eifler's claims for breach of contract, negligence, and restitution is affirmed. The judgment dismissing Eifler's CPA claim
is reversed, and that claim is remanded for trial. The judgment awarding costs and reasonable attorney fees is vacated.
SEINFELD, A.C.J., and PETRICH, J. pro tem., concur.
All Citations
71 Wash.App. 684, 861 P.2d 1071
Footnotes
1
CP 155.
2
Incidentally, this result is consistent with Sackett v. Public Storage Mgt., 222 Cal.App.3d 1088, 272 Cal.Rptr. 284, 287 (1990). There, the act of
the landlord in putting an emergency lock on a renter's storage unit did not create a bailment. Rather, the court said, it merely “represents a
simple extension of courtesy to its customers and is totally different than the unequivocal assumption of control of the bailed items found so
important in [the bailment cases].”
3
Central Transport, Inc. v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ind.App.1981); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B, comment g
(1965) (Where the defendant is a common carrier, an innkeeper, a public warehouseman, a public utility, or is otherwise charged with a duty of
public service, and the agreement to assume the risk relates to the defendant's performance of any part of that duty, it is well settled that it will not
be given effect. Having undertaken the duty to the public, which includes the obligation of reasonable care, such defendants are not free to rid
themselves of their public obligation by contract, or by any other agreement); Annot., Liability for Loss Of Or Damage To Automobile Left In
Parking Lot Or Garage, 7 A.L.R.3d 927, 938 (1966).
4
These provisions went well beyond the requirements of the Washington Self-Service Storage Facility Act. That Act states:
Any insurance protecting the personal property stored within the storage space against fire, theft, or damage is the responsibility of the
occupant. The owner is under no obligation to provide insurance.
RCW 19.150.130.
5
Only a few dollars are involved, but the matter may have significance because Shurgard is entitled to reasonable attorney fees if Eifler fails to
improve his position after demanding trial de novo. MAR 7.3.
6
Actually, the March payment was made by Eifler's mother on his behalf, but neither is there any evidence that she directed Shurgard to apply the
payment to rental on the outside rather than the inside space.
7
We note, however, that the quoted language does not refer to reasonable as opposed to statutory attorney fees.