Bioethics: Ethical Comparison of Embryo Research Techniques

This essay delves into the complex bioethical debate surrounding the use of surplus embryos and cloning techniques in research. The author investigates the moral status of embryos, comparing the ethical implications of using embryos left over from in vitro fertilization (IVF) with those created specifically through cloning for research purposes. The essay examines arguments related to the ontological and moral status of embryos, considering whether there is a significant difference between the two methods. It explores the concept of personhood, the potential for sentience, and the intentions behind the creation and destruction of embryos. The author evaluates different ethical perspectives, including those that support and oppose each method, addressing objections and ultimately concluding that there is no significant moral difference between the two methods. The paper also considers the implications of human cloning and its effects on the future of medical research. The essay provides a comprehensive analysis of the ethical challenges in this area, supporting the claim that neither surplus embryos nor cloned embryos designed for research can be given the moral status of a sentient being, and therefore, there is no question of violating the dignity of human life in both the cases.

Running head: BIOETHICS
Bioethics
Student’s name:
University:
Author’s note:

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Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................2
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research- An Overview.............................................................2
Human Embryonic Stem Cells (hECS)..................................................................................2
Importance of hESC research.................................................................................................3
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research- The Moral Dilemma.................................................3
Moral and Ontological Status of Embryos.............................................................................4
Legislative Evaluation of hSE Cell Research............................................................................6
Conclusion..................................................................................................................................6
References..................................................................................................................................8

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Introduction
The discussion on human embryonic stem cells (hESC) have been a burning issue of
debate and dissent among the scholars for the last few decades. Not only the biologists, but
the academicians of ethics, media and medicine are entangled in the discourse. The paper
tries to address a fundamental ethical dilemma of the said field. It contends that there is
indeed no fundamental difference between the status of a surplus embryo and a cloned
embryo. The underlying notion for accepting the similarity is based on moral and ontological
status of these two types of embryos. To establish this claim, the present paper will try to
evaluate the arguments regarding the moral and ontological status of these two types of
embryos. Further, it will mitigate the argued distinction between these two by comparing two
different ethical perspectives. It will also consider the notion of cloning of human beings are
morally unacceptable and evaluate it in the light of the advancements of scientific research.
In conclusion, the paper will try to establish that there is no significant difference between
surplus embryos and cloned embryos on the grounds of moral status.
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research- The Moral Dilemma
Although the hESC research promises major contribution in the future of medical and
biological sciences, it raises some crucial ethical controversies. It is often debated that the
research poses serious threat to human personhood. To elucidate, the embryonic stem cell
research requires destruction of potent embryo that could turn into foetuses and eventually
into potential human beings. However, the use of such embryos in the purpose of research
destroys the possibility in the very onset of that personhood. (Ware et al. 2014)
This argument is often objected on the premise of personhood itself. Some scholars
argue that personhood could only be ascribed to sentient beings. The embryos, however,
lacks this basic necessity of sentience and therefore cannot be subject to this moral objection.

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This claim is further established by the evidence of surplus embryos. Every year, IVF clinics
and research institutes fabricate a number of embryos of which a large amount is not
ultimately used. The supporters of hESC research argue that using the surplus embryos for
the sake of research is far better than throwing them away. They even argue that embryos
specifically designed for research and medical purpose through cloning technology also
evade the conflict, as their sole purpose is to contribute to the research and not evolving into
sentient beings. Therefore, the conflict can be resolved by accepting the claim that only
surplus embryos and embryos cloned for non-reproductive purposes can be used for hSEC
research.
However, this position gives rise to another ethical question: whether surplus embryo
and cloned embryos developed for non-reproductive purposes can both be used for research,
or any one of them is qualified for the purpose. The contention of the said objection is that in
both cases the embryos will have to be destroyed for the stem cell extraction. The difference
between these two types of embryos are conceived by the supporters on the grounds of their
ontological and moral status. (Lai et al. 2015)
Moral and Ontological Status of Embryos
Embryos are given moral status of sentient beings as they contain the potential of
developing into a human life adorned with conscience and unique genetic features. However,
the ontological status of the hES cells are still an issue of moral and philosophical debates.
However, the question still remains whether the individual cell and the following cell line
generated from it would be considered as possessing the moral status of a potential human
life. (Kuhse, Schüklenk and Singer eds. 2015)
There are certain standpoints such as the Conceptionalist view that declares embryos
as persons (McGee 2014). Proponents of this standpoint maintain that the sentience of a

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human being start at conception only. Therefore, the human dignity and reverence for life
should be considerable aspects for naturally evolved embryos. Cloned embryos, on the other
hand, are fabricated under laboratory conditions. Hence, they are destined for utilized in
research and thus, are not considered under the scope of human dignity or personhood. This
distinction based on their ontological status marks the difference between the two types of
embryos.
Professor Peter Singer argues against this claim and remarks that it is an absurd claim,
for the development of any embryo requires the destruction of other potential beings (Sagan
and Singer 2007). Other scholars such as Devolder and Harris argue in the favour of
Professor Singer’s claim (Harris 2003). McMahan additionally argues that human beings
identify themselves as sentient beings, not as mere bodies (Sagan and Singer 2009). Hence,
the moral status of being a person cannot be given to an embryo, let alone stem cells, for the
sheer lack of conscience in them. Therefore, he remarks, that use of embryos in scientific
research cannot amount to moral wrongdoing. In this sense, surplus embryos and cloned
embryos are given equal moral status as non-sentient entities.
The Distinction Based on the Purpose the Embryos
Another difference in the moral status of these two types of embryos is raised with
regard to their purpose. It is argued that surplus embryos are ethically qualified for being used
in the hSEC research, whereas the use of cloned embryos are not all permissible from the
perspective of morality. Ethicists claim that the embryos developed during IVF process are
intended for being developed into foetuses. Although, not all the embryos are used for
fertilization. Thus, they become ‘surplus’ and can be used for research. Embryos cloned for
the non-reproductive purposes, on the other hand, are solely intended for research. Hence, the
intention behind the creation of these embryos are to use them the in research purposes and
thus, they are subject to destruction since their inception (Harris 2003). The scholars argue

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that this latter intention is not morally acceptable. Therefore, using surplus embryos is a
better practice in this context.
Defenders of hSEC research object this argument by stating that the destruction of
embryos are never the ultimate goal of any research, rather both kinds of embryos are used
for the development and refinement of the scientific procedure. Therefore, the embryos may
differ due to their development process, morally they are not different (Emanuel 2000). They
emphasize that the nature of surplus embryos is to be destroyed eventually. (Harris 2003). On
the other hand, surplus embryos too could be developed with the sole intention of being used
in research purposes.
The Moral Conflict in Human Cloning
Some scholars argue that cloning is essentially an ethical concern, for the practice of
cloning disrupts the natural process of biological reproduction. Holm (1998) claims by the
merit of his “the life in the shadow” argument that the cloned individual will be limited in his
or her genetic features and reduces the possibility of living a unique life, which is morally
unacceptable. Kaas (1997) further proceeds to assert that cloning violates the anthropological
and natural process of sexual reproduction, resulting to delimit the potential of the future
human being. Additionally, he claims that this attempt of fabricating an individual based on
someone else’s whims or preferences violates consent of becoming or even freedom of will.
Moreover there is a risk of deformities and genetic mishaps in the process. Surplus embryos,
on the other hand, are not subject to these allegations, as it is derived from biological and
natural process of sexual reproduction.
At the same time, scholars argue that cloning cannot be regarded as completely
unethical, as it facilitates both individuals and the larger society with greater benefits. The
planned fabrication may also be useful to avoid hereditary disorders, battle infertility issues,

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as well as provide scopes for organs or tissue transplant (Brock 1998). Moreover, cloning
provides the moral choice of reproductive freedom as well. Hence, this moral distinction is
not viable either.
Conclusion
Upon considering all the presented arguments, it can be concluded that neither surplus
embryos nor cloned embryos designed for clinical research can be given the moral status of a
sentient being. Hence, there is no question of violating the dignity of human life in both the
cases. Some may argue that the difference between these two lies in their purpose.
Developing embryos solely with the intention of destruction is not ethically acceptable.
Neither the arguments regarding the process of cloning can be considered as a viable threat to
biological reproduction and subsequently as unethical. Rather, to achieve the greater good,
embryos are to be destructed nevertheless. The paper contends that there is no fundamental
difference between these two types of embryos, since neither these two types of embryos
cannot be regarded as morally or ontologically distinct, nor there is any moral conflict in
choosing between them.

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References
Brock, D.W., 1998. Cloning human beings: an assessment of the ethical issues pro and
con. Clones and clones: Facts and fantasies about human cloning, p.160.
Emanuel, E. (2000). What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?. JAMA, 283(20), p.2701.
Harris, J., 2003. Stem cells, sex, and procreation. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics,
12(4), pp.353-371.
Holm, S., 1998. A life in the shadow: one reason why we should not clone
humans. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 7(2), pp.160-162.
Kass, L.R., 1997. The wisdom of repugnance: Why we should ban the cloning of
humans. Val. UL Rev., 32, p.679.
Kuhse, H., Schüklenk, U. and Singer, P. eds., 2015. Bioethics: an anthology. John Wiley &
Sons.
Lai, D., Wang, Y., Sun, J., Chen, Y., Li, T., Wu, Y., Guo, L. and Wei, C., 2015. Derivation
and characterization of human embryonic stem cells on human amnion epithelial cells.
Scientific reports, 5, p.10014.
Legislation Review Committee. Legislation Review: Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002
and Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002, Reports, Canberra. June 2011.
McGee, A., 2014. The potentiality of the embryo and the somatic cell. Metaphilosophy, 45(4-
5), pp.689-706.
Sagan, A. and Singer, P., 2007. The moral status of stem cells. Metaphilosophy, 38(2‐3),
pp.264-284.

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Sagan, A. and Singer, P., 2009. Embryos, stem cells and moral status: a response to George
and Lee. EMBO reports, 10(12), pp.1283-1283.
Trounson A, DeWitt ND. Pluripotent stem cells progressing to the clinic. Nature reviews
Molecular cell biology. 2016 Mar;17(3):194.
Ware, C.B., Nelson, A.M., Mecham, B., Hesson, J., Zhou, W., Jonlin, E.C., Jimenez-Caliani,
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