Case Study of Emirates Flight 419: Analyzing Information Perception

This case study provides a detailed analysis of the Emirates Flight 419 incident that occurred in Auckland. The incident was attributed to an information perception error where pilots did not diligently check all the standards and procedures. The captain, a highly experienced pilot with over 14,000 flight hours, and the first officer, also a qualified pilot, were both deemed medically fit and adequately rested before the flight. The investigation revealed that a contradiction in the information relayed by the updated ATIS broadcast created a mindset among the pilots that there were no changes in the runway length restriction. This assumption led them to believe that the full-length runway was available as per the updated ATIS, revoking previous ATIS instructions of their departure from Sydney which indicated reduced runway length. The study references external sources to support its findings and emphasizes the importance of adhering to standard procedures to prevent similar incidents in the future. Desklib provides access to similar case studies and solved assignments for students.

Running Head: Emirates Flight 419 Incident Summary
Emirates Flight 419 Incident Summary
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Emirates Flight 419 Incident Summary 2
Emirates Flight 419 Incident Summary
The Fly Emirates is a Dubai based airline with more than 36,000 flights per week
(Morris, 2019). The airline is considered one of the safest since it never had a fatal accident.
Since its inception, it had suffered only one hull loss when it Boeing 777 was written-off after it
crashed during landing at Dubai International Airport. Most air flight consumers are concerned
about which airline is safer, but the fact remains that some are safer than others. Those airlines
considered risky are blacklisted, particularly in EU blacklist to not ever fly over European space.
The incident by Emirates flight 419 in 2007 was a cause of information error (Hradecky,
2007). However, it did not mean the airline hired unqualified pilots. The captain for the flight
was 40 years old at the time of the incident. English was his first language, and hence, the
language barrier was not a limitation in his work. He was a qualified pilot with an Airline
Transport Pilot License which was still valid at that period. His medical condition was up to the
standard requirement and valid. He held experience of flying for over 14 000 hours. Besides, the
captain had been flying Boeing 777 for three and a half years and was the captain for eighteen
months. His previous works included being the captain and first officer when flying Boeing 737,
757 and 767 aircraft. Before the incident, he had qualified for his last pilot proficiency check the
same month. There were no concerns in his previous pilot proficiency checks and were affirmed
as satisfactory. Furthermore, before the incident, the pilot was on duty for six hours had flown
for only three hours on 22nd Match 2007. He was off-duty the day before the incident, and on 20th
, he only flew for 9 hours. Therefore, he was not tired of his daily duties and was fit to work.
The flight captain had used the route for more than 30 times for the last three and a half
years. Thus, he noted having flown under various conditions, including departure and landing
approaches. However, he stated that the routine procedures and standards were followed before
the take-off in Auckland.

Emirates Flight 419 Incident Summary 3
On the other hand, the first officer aged 48 years and was a qualified pilot with a valid
Airline Transport Pilot License. He was also medically fit with a valid certificate. He held
experience of having flown for 12 664 hours before the incident. As the operator, he had
previously flown Boeing 777 for one year. Besides, he had experience in being the captain and
first officer in Boeing 737, McDonnell Douglas MD 82 and others. Furthermore, he had
completed that year pilot proficiency check and hence confirmed qualified. However, his
previous pilot checks were not remarkable.
The first officer had been on duty that day for six hours and had traveled for three hours
only. The previous day was his day off after flying for nine hours the day before 21st Match.
However, he had only a few trips to and from Auckland with only three trips. Like his captain,
he confirmed having checked the verbal ATIS broadcast before take-off. Moreover, on the day of
the incident, the runways were visible up to 50 kilometers. Clouds were few and high at 1800
feet and 2500 feet. Temperatures were recorded at 22 Celsius and winds were blowing at the rate
of 5 knots. Thus, the weather was suitable for flights.
Generally, after close analysis of the event that transpired, it was concluded that the
Auckland incident was caused by information perception error when pilots did not diligently
check all the standards and procedures. However, the contradiction in the information relayed by
updated ATIS broadcast created a mindset to the pilots that there were no changes in the runway
length restriction. By implication, they assumed that since during their landing the full-length
runway was available as per the updated ATIS, it revoked previous ATIS instructions of their
departure from Sydney which indicated reduced runway length.

Emirates Flight 419 Incident Summary 4
References
Morris, H., (2019). The airline that has never had a single plane crash. Retrieved from
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travel-truths/airlines-never-had-a-crash-accident/
Hradecky, S., (2007). Incident: Emirates B777 at Auckland on Mar 22th 2007, flex takeoff
despite reduced runway length. Retrieved from http://avherald.com/h?
article=3f2c1551&opt=1