ENGL 102: Exploring the Dichotomy of Humans & Androids

This essay delves into the distinctions between humans and androids in Philip K. Dick's 'Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?', exploring the blurred lines and philosophical implications. It references Descartes' concept of 'cogito ergo sum' to discuss the alienation of androids from their own subjectivity. The essay also touches upon the symbolic status of animals, the role of empathy, and the quest for authentic identity within the narrative. Furthermore, it analyzes the evolution of the 'father figure' in noir and neo-noir films, contrasting Dr. Frankenstein with Tyrell from 'Blade Runner.' The essay examines the test used to identify androids, highlighting the decentered nature of human knowledge. By comparing different versions of 'Blade Runner,' it argues that the human condition itself may be closer to android existence than we realize, emphasizing the importance of recognizing the inherent differences within subjectivity. The essay concludes by referencing Jameson and Heise, noting the self-consciousness achieved by science fiction in exploring the flaw of self-relation through the android figure.

What is the difference between humans and androids in Dick’s
novel? Is this difference always apparent, or consistent? If not,
why not?

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To mould me Man
The in-difference of Human and Android in Philip K. Dick
In his book on the language of science fiction called The Jewel Hinged Jaw Samuel R.
Delany pointed out that it is the metonymic disclosure of the science fiction world in the
mode of reading which imparts the science fiction to it. To give an instance, as we read along
the text the metonymic emergence of absurdity is what makes the text a science fiction i.e., if
we read ‘the red sun is high..’ and go along the statement to find out ‘The red sun is high, the
blue low’ as the finished sentence, it immediately evokes the aesthetic pleasure of science
fiction in mind (Delany and Cheney 7). ‘A merry little surge of electricity piped by automatic
alarm.’ does not read like a science fiction yet but as we proceed through the chapter 1 of Do
Androids Dream of Electric Ship we read the rest of the sentence: ‘‘piped by automatic alarm
from the mood organ..”, we are in science fiction already, in familiar ground (Dick 2). Such
is the function of Android, it creates a secret metonymic excess over humanity which is only

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formally possible in science fiction. In the history of western philosophy Descartes was the
first one to think of this metonymic block in the mode of cogito ergo sum that the thing which
thinks and the thing which is, are not one and the same in ‘I think therefore I am’. The whole
philosophy of android seemingly bases itself on it that one’s own narratives and thoughts are
controlled elsewhere and the supposedly android subject is alienated from the innermost
essence of her/his subjectivity; from Angel Heart to Blade Runner this thematic of the
subject recovering its lost essence and finding itself to be an android, is a frequent one.
Throughout ‘Do Android Dream..’ the difference between utility in disposal of
anthropomorphic subject and symbolic status of animals have been differentiated to the point
that real lives animals have become fashionable status symbol due to the enormous cultural
trend for greater empathy in midst of extinctions and all. In Philip K Dick’s writings, this
particular theme of establishing an identity rooted in deep socio symbolic status is
intermittent as in the concerned text it appeared as the religion named after Wilbur Mercer
which endorses the use of empathy boxes to link users to a virtual reality of collective
suffering, i.e. to the substance of the subject. In one sense the quest of Deckard (strangely
homophonous with Descartes) to gather enough money for being able to buy an animal of
flesh and blood, is also an endeavour to find his own innermost ‘authentic’ substance which
will impart existential stability in the course of his life. Thus this text including the filmic
adaptation kind of points at the irreducible gap between the feeling of apperception of the
subject and ‘the noumenal thing which thinks’ (Zizek 17)ensuing the existence of father in
noir genre who controls the subject’s mind by being the noumenal thing and creating the
effect of subject’s apperception of itself. In neo-noir and this is its own distinction from noir,
this father appears in the guise of a new kind of father which characterizes the ‘post
industrial, corporate late capitalism, a father epitomized by Tyrell in Blade Runner, a lone
figure of uncanny, ethereal, frail materiality, devoid of a sexual partner’ (Zizek18). When the

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subject is constituted as if it is deprived of its own symbolic knowledge and its own symbolic
knowledge is being ordained by ‘The thing which thinks’, we get the notion of Android
which can be traced back to Dr. Frankenstein’s creature whose essential knowledge i.e.
substance was at the hand of Frankenstein only but also exceeded his grasp creating the
moving contradiction of the literary text. In this context, Dr. Frankenstein can be compared to
the classical father figure in noir film while on the other hand Tyrell in ‘Blade Runner’ can be
compared to the post noir father figure par excellence who is not in the position of master but
in the position of symbolic knowledge itself. The Proto Jungian idea of finding a substantial
connection to tfhe collective symbolic order is also prevalent in Dick’s other oeuvres as in
Man in the high castle this appeared as the guarantee of originality to pre war artefacts; how
can it be symbolically guaranteed that a piece of antique jewellery is original and not a
replica?: this question surrounds the whole book in itself (Dick and parker 12).
Comparatively, the question posed in ‘Do Androids dream…’ is between human and
androids and concerns the problem of authentic distinction which can formally separate
human from android, a real flesh and blood animal from an electric sheep. Thus the question
which the text raises is simply where is the position of knowledge which can guarantee the
originality of the human subject? In this contemplative venture Deckard repeats the gesture of
Descartes.
The answer to what makes an artefact an original and not a replica is read in ‘Man in
the high castle’ to be simply a piece of paper which is sold with the original and thus
guarantees its historicity. In ‘Do androids dream’ this problem appears with an additional
twist due to absence of such a piece of paper guaranteeing historicity and originality to the
human subject, what makes someone human and not an android, is nowhere to be discerned
in reality; not in the body, not in the flesh, even all the authentic memories and fantasies have
been meddled with and controlled. This radical non place of substance and absence of

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innermost knowledge create subjectivity out of it; the hysterical subject who asks who she is.
Interestingly the test which was devised to identify any android posing as humans in the text
was a kind of question-answer empathy test which functions by stimulating the parts of the
collective memory by short circuiting subject’s thought to the preordained repository of
knowledge; this test in terms of the text itself is based on the supposedly humane drive
towards collective empathy in Mercerism which androids are not supposed to react to when
linked to the virtual reality of collective suffering, triggered by questions. The text, disclosing
humanity’s own knowledge of itself as decentred, points out the necessary human fantasy of
their being androids. Between the two versions of ‘Blade Runner’ i.e. the 1982 version and
the director’s cut of 1992, we discern a very nuance difference in ending and compilation
with the former one making Deckard’s realization of being an android explicit enough and
while the later one just hinting at the possibility of Deckard being a replicant. In
contradistinction to the first ending, the second one blurs the human/android distinction in
many ways, for instances in the Tyrell building when Deckard proves to Rachael that she is
an android by quoting her most intimate child-recollections she did not share with anyone,
the camera provides a brief narration of Deckard’s own past memories and childhood
memories of a piano and an unicorn, hinting that Deckard’s own innermost memories are
always already in the locus of Other; though without explicitly drawing the conclusion (Scott
15). This second version seems more subversive as it clearly states the human condition is
itself deprived of its innermost knowledge that the price for the access to reality is that
something must remain un-thought and unknown which delineates the stepping stone of
human subjectivity itself; in the sense before wondering about the existence of androids out
there, we should ask the question how we ourselves are in any way something more than
androids. In this sense the idea endorsed by Peter Singer in his book can be referred to,
instead of grounding universal equality for each and every human subject, the irreducible

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difference within them must be invoked. If there needs to be an universal moral guideline
besides being inclusive, it must base itself on the difference which is immanent in
subjectivity itself. (Singer 9). Interestingly quoting Jameson, Heise in this context reminds us
of the self consciousness achieved by science fiction at this particular juncture of its history
where the traditional robot has been substituted by the Android-cogito, in this new
imagination of the other the emphasis is placed on the flaw of self relation itself; the way the
android asks question about its own self certainty.
Work Cited
Delany, Samuel R, and Matthew Cheney. The Jewel-Hinged Jaw. Wesleyan University Press,
2011.
Dick, Philip K, and Tony Parker. Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep?. BOOM! Studios,
2015.
Dick, Philip K. The Man in The High Castle. Penguin books, England, 2016.
Scott, Ridley. Blade Runner. Cronenweth, Jordan. The Ladd Company, Warner Bros. 1982
Zizek, Slavoj. “Tarrying with the negative”. Duke university press, Durham, 2014, pp.16-19
Singer, Peter. Speciecissm and moral status, 2016, pp. 9-12
K.Heise, Ursula. PMLA volume:124, No. 2 (Mar., 2009), pp. 503-510