Promoting Ethical Judgment in Organisations: Balancing Accountability

This essay argues that individual ethical judgment is crucial for an organization's ethical performance, suggesting that attempts to systematize judgment and over-reliance on accountability systems can be counterproductive. Examples like the State Rail of New South Wales and the auditing profession's response to Enron and HIH failures illustrate how focusing solely on regulations can detract from cultivating individual ethical decision-making. The essay emphasizes the need for organizations to prioritize the development of responsible behavior and ethical judgment, addressing issues like moral negligence, recklessness, and blindness. It suggests using ethical decision-making models to navigate conflicts between public and private morality, ultimately holding individuals accountable for their ethical choices. The author posits that while accountability systems are important, they should not overshadow the cultivation of individual ethical excellence and responsible behavior within organizations.

Promoting Ethical Judgment in an Organisational Context
Stephen Cohen
Received: 5 December 2011 / Accepted: 31 October 2012 / Published online: 8 November 2012
Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012
Abstract The essay argues thatindividualethicaljudg-
ment is a necessary ingredient in an organisation’s ethical
performance. Attempts to systematise judgment, removing
it from individualresponsibility are notsuccessful,and
sometimes can even be counterproductive.Focus on sys-
tems of accountability can actually detractfrom the pro-
duction of ethicalbehaviour.A numberof examples are
provided.Although itis much more difficultto produce,
individualresponsibledecision-makingand individual
judgmentshouldbe the featuresthat an organisation
focuses on in its interestto promote ethicalperformance.
Accountability systems are important;butthey have very
limited applicationtowardproductionof an ethically
excellentenvironment.The essay arguesthatthere has
been too much attention paid to accountability systems
within organisations,and much too little paid toward the
development and cultivation of individual ethical decision
making and responsible behaviour.
Keywords Ethics Business ethics Accountability
Responsibility Judgment Ethical decision-making
Ethical empowerment Ethical authorization
Ethical excellence Ethical leadership
In this discussion,I will directsome commentsat the
organisational and structural level and some at the level of
individuals within an organisation.I will spelloutsome
things, and I will only gesture at others. I confess that there
will be some hyperbole.The centerpiece in allaspects of
the discussion is the importance of judgment:cultivating
good judgment,encouraging and authorising the exercise
of judgment,and calling attention to dangers associated
with failure to do this. The focus is not on minimum ethica
requirements,considering concernssuch as corruption,
fraud,and thedevelopmentof appropriateconstraints.
Rather, the focus is on ethical excellence, which is a matte
of good judgment,responsibility,and high performance.
A first reaction to an ethical failure or breach or short-
coming is often, ‘we need more regulations’. It need not b
literally with trains running off the rails, as it was for State
Rail of New South Wales, where the causes were seen to b
largely ethical for the ill effects that occurred.Train driv-
ers’ lack of judgment and attempts to thwart some proce-
duresresulted in more than one terrible accident.The
response from the organisation was to try to installnew
mechanicaldevices and tougher rules and regulations on
drivers’behaviour.In short,the organisation’s approach
was to try to make the ‘dead man brake’foolproof.Its
approach was to do this,rather than to institute whatever
training and selection processesmightbe desirableto
ensure thatfools do not drive the trains in the firstplace.
This,of course,is an overstatement; and it is a glib char-
acterisation of a very serious and dangerous situation, wit
its attendanthistory.1 The pointis thatrules,regulations,
and mechanical fixes cannot do the job of replacing judg-
mentany more successfully in matters ofethics than in
matters of technical expertise and compliance. They cann
remedyall behaviouraldifficulties.Focusingon such
things fits with a view thatif we can justgetthe proce-
dures,rules,equipment,and hardwiring right,and people
complying with these requirements,then we will not have
difficulties any longer.
S. Cohen (&)
School of History and Philosophy,University of New South
Wales,Sydney,NSW 2502,Australia
e-mail: [e-mail] 1 The Waterfall train crash,January 31,2003.
123
J Bus Ethics (2013) 117:513–523
DOI 10.1007/s10551-012-1535-8

The attraction of such a view is clear.It implies that a
straightforward,often reasonably quick,certain,and mea-
surable remedy can be produced to handle a recognisable
difficulty.It also fits nicely into any accountability or
compliance regime.
The difficulty is that in many types of situations which
are ripe forethicalfailure orin which there are ethical
shortcomingsto be addressed,mechanicalfixes often
simply do not work. And, worse than that, they sometimes
make matters worse. I am certainly not the first to point out
thatgeneralrules cannothandle allcases.This is what
Aristotle had in mind with thenotion of ‘equity’.2 It
amounts to the necessity of judgment making a correction
to a rule—not because there is something wrong with the
rule,butbecause ofthe generality ofa rule,which will
necessarily make itinappropriate to some cases which it
would seem to govern. Trying to accommodate, or replace,
equitable judgmentwith additionalrules simply willnot
work.
Consider this brief,somewhatpotted,story concerning
the role of auditors in the catastrophes of Enron and HIH:
The auditorsin these failureswere eithercomplicitor
astoundingly negligentor inexcusably morally blind in
their behaviour. One result of the collapses was a spotlight
being shined on auditors. Regulatory bodies and lawmakers
on three continents basically told the auditing profession,
‘clean up your act,or else.’ That is,do something so that
the kind of ethicalbreaches which occurred here do not
happen again. So,they were saying,‘either you people do
something to improve yourethicalperformance,so that
shareholders and the public are not misinformed like this in
the future,or else outside regulators are going to come in
and take this self-regulation,with its attendantresponsi-
bility, away from you.’ In responseto the situation,
accountingbodies(like, for instance,the Instituteof
Chartered Accountants in Australia,and also CPA Aus-
tralia (Certified Practising Accountants),as wellas their
counterparts in the U.S.and in the U.K.)addressed the
specific questions of how to improve auditor independence
and accuracy,and provide transparent and understandable
information to shareholders and the public at large.There
were important suggestions about things like peer review,
rotation of auditors,improvementof judgment,and clear
purpose of auditing. In short, the professional bodies began
to seriously consider this ethicaldimension and ramifica-
tions ofthe problem.They understood thatthe problem
was,at root,an ethicalone,and thatit had to do with
appropriate judgmenton the partof auditors.3 Before the
dust had settled, however, new regulations were introduced
both in Australia and in the U.S.The FinancialServices
Reform Act in Australia, and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the
U.S. are aimed atthis.4 In the climate thatpreceded the
introduction of these new pieces of legislation, the auditin
profession knew what the problem was and what they wer
supposed to be looking atto improve the situation.They
were to be focussing on rectifying ethical breaches, ethica
shortcomings,and bad ethicaljudgment,which had con-
tributed to seriously misleading the public.This was the
requirementof the threat,‘clean up youract,or else.’
However,with the introduction ofnew legislation,the
focus was removed from matters of judgment,and placed
squarely on the prescriptive requirements of the legislatio
itself.So,the question for accountants,‘how can we rem-
edy the ethical shortcomings?’, was replaced by ‘what doe
it take to satisfy the specific prescriptions of the new leg-
islation?’,or worse,‘how can we getaround the new
requirements?’ In this respect, the initial concern has, to a
greatdegree,becomelost in the legislation—and not
remedied by it.5 The legislation is,of course,trying to
remedy the problem. However, given that the problem has
much to do with the exercise ofgood judgment,by not
focussing on thatimportantaspectof the difficulty,the
solution,at best,works on only partof the problem,
neglecting the rest; but it represents that it is a solution to
the entire difficulty.More than this,it squelches further
developmenttoward remedying whatwas accurately per-
ceived to be the serious difficulty in the first place: ethical
breaches,and the bad exercise of ethical judgment.It has
replaced this with putting the focus on satisfying specific
prescriptions. In this respect, more regulation can function
as a distractor,rather than calling attention to the appro-
priate places to focus attention.To a large extent,this is
whathas happened here.It is, of course,easier to create
specific prescriptions than it is to work on improvement of
judgment.I will have more to say about this later.
Systematic,organisationalattention can,in fact, be
directed at improving moral judgment.It can be focussed
on each of (roughly)four requisiteareasinvolved in
reaching justifiable ethical decisions.
1. Avoidance of‘moralnegligence’.Moral negligence
amounts to a failure to considersomething thatone
should consider.Maybe thisis because oflack of
awareness.
2. Avoidance of ‘moral recklessness’.This amounts to a
failure to give adequate consideration to something;
dealing with itin too hasty a fashion,not paying
2 Aristotle (1968),1137a32–1138a4 (Book v,Chapter 10).
3 See,for instance,Clarke and Dean (2002),p. 71, and (2001),
pp.71–98.
4 In the UK, there is still no legislative move on the Cadbury–Higgs
Report,which recommends legislation along the lines of Sarbanes–
Oxley.
5 Baume (2002) echoed this view,p. 55.
514 S. Cohen
123

enough attention,or notparticularly caring to getit
right,not giving it the care that it deserves.
As a step toward addressing these dangers, a number of
organisations have used ordeveloped theirown ‘ethical
decision-makingmodels’.6 An ethicaldecision-making
model is a set of systematically organised trigger questions,
‘Have you thought about this? … Have you thought about
that?…Have you consideredthesevalues?…’These
instruments are for the purpose of assisting the decision-
makerin navigating through something thatthey have
perceived to be an ethical issue.
Most ethicaldecision-making models take accountof
the differentperspectives thatanyone in an organisation
must be aware of in dealing with ethical issues.In partic-
ular,they typically recognise that the ethical requirements
of the particularorganisation—and theethicalrequire-
ments ofbeing in an organisation perse—mightnot be
identicalwith people’sown individualethicaloutlooks.
There are,in fact,nearly certain to be conflicts in this
context. In any such case, one should certainly be aware of
the conflicts that are present; and must make up their mind
accordingly.Sometimesit will be appreciated thatthe
requirementsfrom within theorganisation should take
precedence over one’s individualview;and sometimes it
will be the other way around. In any case, among the points
that an ethical decision-making model addresses should be
the possibility ofthis tension between public morality
(sometimescalled ‘role morality’)and private morality
(sometimescalled ‘individualmorality’).The ethical
decision-making model should make it clear that whatever
decision is ultimately reached, it will be the reasoner as an
individualwho reachesthatdecision.Perhapsthe best
decision willbe to defer to the ethicalperspective of the
organisation; perhaps it will be to buck the organisation’s
perspective in favour of thatof the individual.Whatever
ethical conclusion one reaches, it is important to appreciate
thatit is the reasoner as an individualwho must make it,
and that it is the reasoner as an individual who must bear
the responsibility for it.This is an important point in rec-
ognising the complexitiesinvolved in conflictsbetween
public and private morality.7 It is also an important facet of
ethical pluralism.
3. Avoidance of ‘moral blindness’. This amounts to a failure
to see that there is an issue at all. As a remedy for this
failure,ethical decision-making models do not go very
far:A person willonly ever think of using an ethical
decision-making modelif they perceive there to be an
ethical issue to reason about. If one is blind to the ethi
dimension of a problem, then one would not consult an
ethical decision-making model at all, and so would get
benefitfrom it. A person mightstare atan ethical
consideration all day long, and simply not get it. They
not negligent or reckless, in that they did, in fact, focus
the relevantconsideration(it did not escapetheir
attention),but when they did think about it,they were
absolutely blind in theircomprehension.8 They might
have looked directly at the problem, and could even ha
asked,‘have you considered this?,this?,and this?’ all
day. But they just did not see it—they did not apprecia
as an ethical problem at all. The person was not neglig
they are morally blind. Maybe ‘moral illiteracy’ would b
a betterfigurethan ‘moralblindness’:illiteracy is
something thatcan be worked on to correct9. But the
correction does not come from merely staring at words
and sentencesand book jackets.It needssystematic
attention. Whether the figure is blindness or illiteracy,
point is the same: someone who looks directly at a mo
situation and does not see it as morally significant at a10
4. Cultivation and exhibition of moral competence.This
is difficult. Partly, this is the cure for moral blindness.
Partly, it is not a cure for anything.It is the
requirement for engaging in moral recognition, reason
ing,and decision-making well.It involves developing
adequate preparation,sensitivity,awareness,knowl-
edge and conceptualapparatusto dealwith ethical
issues.It is precisely in this area where exercise of
6 Probably the two most widely used (and adapted) ethical decision-
making models (and there are very many indeed) are the American
Accounting Association Model[see,for instance,May (ed.) (1990)
and the Laura Nash Model (Nash (1981)].
7 An excellentcollection ofessaysin this generalarea isStuart
Hampshire (1978). Particularly insightful for an understanding of the
position of the individualin the conflictbetween public and private
morality are Bernard Williams (1978) and Thomas Nagel (1978).
8 Here is an example of something quite like moralblindness.In a
recent Clemenger BBDO television advertisement for Hahn Premium
Light beer,titled ‘Sex Bomb’,a woman sets the relaxed,romantic
mood, and begins to luxuriate in a serene bubble bath. A short while
after she has begun,her male partner enters,sees her,thinks this all
looks pretty inviting and does a ‘bomb’ (a big splash) into the bath,
thus destroying themood.She is clearly annoyed by whathas
happened.As he then pops the top on his Hahn Premium Light,he
notices her expression, and, with a nonplussed look on his face, says,
‘‘whaaaat?’’ He simply has no idea as to how what he has just done
could have been other than enjoyed. He just did not see it. We could
even imagine that he considered the mood,his partner’s enjoyment,
and decided thatthis would be a good thing to do.He was simply
blind to the situation.It is not difficultto imagine thatsomeone
behaves this way in the face of – and with some sort of recognition of
– a serious moral dimension to a situation.So,‘‘did you think about
this? … this?, …this?…’’ The answer is ‘‘yes’’, ‘‘yes’’, and ‘‘yes’’; but
they did not really see those things in any serious way. (I believe this
was the situation in the John Laws cash-for-comment difficulties.)
9 I am grateful to Damian Grace for this suggestion.
10 In a recentresearch projectinvestigating theproduction and
maintenance of,and obstacles to,ethicalexcellence in the public
sector in New South Wales,a commonly cited obstacle to achieve-
ment of excellence was moral blindness (or words to this effect).
Promoting Ethical Judgment in an Organisational Context 515
123

judgment is concerned.This is dealing in areas where
situations are notblack and white,and where judg-
ments are better or worse not because they are correct
or incorrect, but because their justifications paint more
attractive pictures or tell more attractive stories.They
are betteror worse becausethey reveala more
understanding and sympathetic appreciation forthe
situations thatthey are judging;notbecause they are
truer or more correct. These are the characteristics that
are integral to moral competence.Encouraging,culti-
vating,and maintaining them throughout an organisa-
tion are at the core of the creation and maintenance of
an organisationalculture thatpromotes and supports
ethical excellence.
Accountability and Responsibility
I wantto spend some time examining these notions,par-
ticularly with respectto their rolesin an environment
which nurturesethicaljudgment,promotion ofethical
culture,and developmentand maintenanceof ethical
excellence.I will try to indicatethat focussingon
accountability systems is more aimed atrules and proce-
dures,ratherthan at judgment.And in this respect,
accountability systems can, in fact, be counterproductive if
the goal is ethical excellence.
Accountability is a very importantnotion these days.
Serious concerns aboutaccountability have developed in
areas where,not all that long ago, ‘accountability’ did not
receiveeven a mention.People in various roles—
employees,employers,directors,managers,CEO’s, pro-
fessionals,academics,etc.—are held accountable.It used
to be that,for better or worse,people in director or man-
agerial (or academic) positions were simply trusted to get
the job done.This was managerialism (‘letthe managers
manage’) atits height.There were serious problems;and
greateraccountability and robustaccountability systems
were introduced to remedy this.
Accountability systems—and,in general,a focus on
accountability—signala diminution of an environmentof
trust.They do this primarily in the name of transparency
and openness.11 Accountability systems focus on various
elements of job requirements. They identify these and keep
track of performance in these areas.Partly,such systems
are historical,in thatthey keep track ofwho did what
when.People have to sign off.This can make for clearer
lines about where the buck stops, and who will be liable for
what.
Accountability requirements notonly keep accountof
who does what. They also define what activities, decisions
etc.,are to be kept track of.They have to do this.We are
not accountable for everything. Accountability systems no
only keep account;they also declarewhat is to be
accounted for,and what counts.They define those activi-
ties and decisionsfor which peopleare to be held
accountable;and they themselves setstandards:‘You are
expected to do this, this, this, and this; and you are to sign
off after having done them.’ In this respect, accountability
systemsdeclare baselines.They define the problem (if
there is one),and,more importantly,they set the parame-
ters foridentifying the remedy orimprovement,and for
measuring these things:
In the name of X (say,‘satisfying your job require-
ments’, or ‘excellence in performing your function in
the organisation’), it is these things which count. We
are going to countthem,and hold you accountable
accordingly.
Later I will have more to say about declared baselines,
and the need for scepticism aboutthe status of whatthey
actually declare.
To hold people—or institutions—accountable for things,
the things must be declared, the methods of counting mus
be specified,and a timetable must be introduced. ‘Inputs’,
‘outcomes’,‘milestones’,‘key performanceindicators’,
‘metrics’, ‘productivity’,‘quality check’, ‘schedule’,
‘timetable’:These are some ofthe notionsthatapply.
Timeframes become important. For example, the people in
the materialsprocurementsection areaccountablefor
ordering in,paying,and sending outto the appropriate
departmentsthe materialsthatthose departmentsneed.
These people can keep records, and can show the incomin
and outgoings over a specified period,say 3 months.We
can see notmerely thatthere was no fraud,butalso that
there is efficiency in the operation, in terms of what and h
much they are ordering and what and how much is being
distributed to the organisation’sdepartments.We might
also have in place an accounting requirement for how the
people are spending their time.The idea is the same:we
need to see evidence of inputs and outcomes,and perhaps
procedures followed, over a specified period of time.
Accountability systems go a fair way toward discover-
ing and helping to weed out freeloaders,or free riders.If
someone is notdoing the job or is doing itinefficiently,
accountability requirements can help to discover this,and
they can help in bringing thatperson back into line.The
periodsof time involvedare usuallyrelativelyshort.
Sometimes, they have to be short-term, because our inter
is in the short-term.Othertimes,they areshort-term,
because we need to have some evidence in the short-term
even if our interest is in the longer term.
11 For an excellentaccountof the (ironic)pitfalls associated with
this—the‘‘cure’’actually exacerbatesthe illness – see O’Nora
O’Neill (2002),particularly chapters 3 and 4,pp.41–80.
516 S. Cohen
123

Under a strong accountability regime within an organi-
sation,there willundoubtedly be many fewer freeloaders
than where there is no such regime. Accountability regimes
make itdifficult,if not impossible,to hide; and they also
make it more difficult to pass the buck. The accountability
system willdiscoverthatthe particularindividualsor
sections within an organisation are not doing their share or
that there are errors or inadequacies.This itself can be an
important consideration for any practice.12 What account-
ability systemsdo not do very well, however,is to
encourage and promote excellence—beyond,say,‘excel-
lence ofprocedure’13 Accountability systems do notsit
very wellwith the creation and nurturing ofgood judg-
ment.They keep track ofand reportwhatpeople are
doing—those declared itemswhich have been specified
and are now countable,the identified itemswhich are
produced, or the identified procedures which are followed.
They establish and then keep track of the norm.By and
large,they failto look at,let alone pay recognition to,
anything else.And it is precisely in the ‘anything else’
basketthat‘excellence’ resides.If we have become pre-
occupied with prescribing,recording,and counting the
ordinary,and defining procedures for doing these things,
then there is little opportunity for even tolerating, let alone
promoting, the extraordinary. This really is my main point.
Here, an argument might extend further: In defining the
norm, declaring what is to be regarded and what is not, the
declaration certainly prescribesthoseactivitiesand,in
effect, proscribesothers(or, at the least,offers no
encouragement or incentive to engage in them).
Your brief is to make widgets.You are to produce
howevermany ofthem you can;and this willbe
recognised.This recognition willplay a part in
whatever promotions, benefits, and remuneration you
are to receive in the organisation.
Under this regime, when you are giving an account of your
achievements,as wellas your job description,within the
organisation, this must all be referable to your widget-pro-
duction. The prescription to make widgets offers incentive to
make them.It also offers disincentive to make orto do
anything else. If the business is simply the manufacture of
widgets, and the accountability regime is aimed only at those
whose jobs are hands-on on the assembly line, then this is
probably not a bad effect. However, let us suppose that the
business is not so clearly defined, or that you are focussing on
those whose job descriptions are not as easily specifiable, or
have a more obviously qualitative aspect to them. Let’s say,
for instance,your business is a university.14 There are a
number of activities that employees of this institution eng
in; and there are, of course, a number of activities for whic
they are accountable. Let’s focus on only one, the researc
activity of academic staff.
Australian universitiesreceivepart of their funding
based on the research that they do: the more research,the
more money. Research is defined in terms of guidelines se
down by the Departmentof Education,Scienceand
Training (DEST)15
—and more recently the Department
of Education,Employmentand WorkplaceRelations
(DEEWR)—and even more recently,the Departmentof
Innovation,Science,Researchand TertiaryEducation
(DIISRTE). A significant portion of funding to universities is
based on research, as defined by the government body.Of
this portion, 80 % is based on ‘research income’ (i.e., gran
received),10 % on ‘publications’(as defined in various
categories by DEEWR), and 10 % on ‘research completion’
(research students completing their degrees). Not only can
there be a list of accepted publishers (i.e., the ones which
figure in the counting for published research) but also a lis
acceptedperiodicals(i.e., which professionaljournals
count—and so,which do notcount—forthe purpose of
ascertaining what—and how much—has been published).
The Department also defines quite specifically what kind o
books count as research publications at all. (As of May, 20
there is be a new government agency to do this: the Tertia
Education Quality and Standards Agency—TEQSA.)
The stimulus for this is clear—and itis laudable.Aca-
demics should not be immune from a requirement for bein
accountable forwhatthey do.And, if they—universities,
faculties, schools, departments, and individuals—are enga
in research, then they should be able to demonstrate that
are. And if this can be quantified, so much the easier.
With Governmentrules and categories of research,we
have a situation like this:
Is the book used asa text? If ‘yes’, then itisn’t
research; it doesn’t count.
Is the book a new edition? If‘yes’, then itisn’t
research; it doesn’t count.
Is the book published by a publisher not on the DEST
list? If ‘yes’,then it isn’t research; it doesn’t count?
Is the essay published in an A-listjournal? If ‘no’,
then it doesn’t count for much, and maybe for nothing
at all.
12 See,for instance,Condren (1988).
13 Deming (1986) was one of the first to notice this.
14 I offer this only as an example—as a striking example—of this
point about the limits of the adequacy of accountability systems. My
suggestionis that the point is not only generalisableto other
organisations,but obviously generalisable to them.In A Question of
Trust,O’Nora O’Neill certainly extends it to an entire public sector,
and,in fact,to the management of anything.
15 See,HigherEducation Research Data Collection:Specifications
for the Collection of 2004 Data (2005).
Promoting Ethical Judgment in an Organisational Context 517
123

These and other similar questionsare, of course,
important,inasmuch asrecognition,reward,encourage-
ment,and funding atall levelsdepend on quantity of
research; and definitions of ‘research’ which easily produce
these answers are being employed to determine whatis
research,how much research is being done,and who are
‘active researchers’. By employing such criteria, it becomes
a relatively easy matter to determine what is and what is not
research forthe purpose ofDepartmentrecognition,and
thus,governmentfunding—equally across alldisciplines.
And similarly,it is an easy matter to determine who are
better and who are worse researchers.Arguments,expla-
nations,justifications,and descriptionsbecomelargely
unnecessary (and even inappropriate),and the system can
function smoothly, efficiently, and quickly, according to the
baselines which are declared by the governmentdepart-
ment,and followed by universities,faculties,schools,and
departments. (At any level, of course—University down to
department—a decision could be made to buck the system.
There would,of course,be a price to pay—at least in the
short term.But,‘ethics costs’—doing the right thing does
not always bring with it prudential rewards—and that is the
title of another essay, for another day.)16
It is a well-known phrase—and the title of numerous arti-
cles in management literature—that ‘what gets measured gets
managed’.17If something cannot be—or for whatever reason
is not—measured, then that thing cannot be, or simply is not,
managed. The easier and the clearer the measure, the easier
and the clearer the management and the management strategy.
By and large, other things are simply left by the wayside. They
do not count. The notions of ‘active researcher’ and better and
worse research can be easily and mechanically identified.
It is all measurable and quantifiable. (Lost in this are those in
management—like,say, Deming—whohave staunchly
opposed this maxim as offering a worthwhile prescription. Or,
Albert Einstein, who reputedly had a sign over his desk, which
read,‘Not everything thatcounts can be counted;and not
everything that can be counted counts’.18
)
Of course,there is a rationale here.Some periodicals
really are not of high quality. And some are not academic at
all. It is also true that some self-proclaimed ‘research activ-
ities’ are not really research activities. But any discussion or
argument that we might have over this is reduced to numbers
which sit beside the various categories on the Governmen
list.There is no room for discussion of particular research
efforts,effectiveness,and quality beyond the list.Expert
opinion either is not allowed,or has already been factored
into creation of the list itself. The discussion is closed, and
values are set. The parameters have been declared, and t
is no room for comment on any particular piece of work.
This is certainly an equaliser.It has created a uniform
scale on which performance can be judged. And it provide
a pretty finely grained comparative ability, as well: ‘she is
1.5 better researcher than he is—just look at the points.’ I
the name of accountability and uniformity, this has replac
qualitative judgment. It is very difficult to be a freeloader.
This is a serious move. It is also very dangerous, as well as
invidious.(Never mind thatPaulSamuelson’s Economics
has some importantthings to say.It is, afterall, only a
textbook—not research at all. Besides that, Samuelson wa
really only explaining someone else’s principles.)
If the basis on which an evaluation is made is a setof
quantifiablecriteriawhich apply to a large rangeof
activities,then this is very attractive.The evaluation itself
can become mechanical,and there isno need—and no
room—for the exercise of judgment in evaluating anything
A seriousdifficulty with such evaluationsis thatin
attemptingto evaluatesomething,strongemphasisis
placed on particular specifiable facets of that activity to th
exclusion of allothers.It also—like other accountability
systems—focuses attention solely on those facets.
I believe another good example of this,also from the
world ofeducation,concerns the evaluation ofteaching,
with focuson processand proceduralorientation (e.g.,
comprehensive course outlines as a gauge) and identifica-
tion of ‘teaching and learning indicators’.I offer this as a
separate discussion in the appendix.
There are important questions,largely left unanswered:
For example—
• Are the criteria we are measuring really relevantto
measuring what we are interested in measuring? (This
is a centralaspectof the generalissue of‘concept
validity’,or ‘constructvalidity’,which hasbeen an
importantconsideration in statisticsand the social
sciences.)
• Should we allow them to be the sole criteria—which
they currently are?
• In any particulararea,is it necessary—andis it
possible—to have generic criteria?
• In some particularareas,is it necessary—and isit
possible—to have quantifiable criteria?
• Can we legitimatelydo away with a judgmental
element in the evaluation of these areas?
In identifying which activities or results are to count, an
accountabilitysystem prescribeswhat activities to
16 This brings to mind a claim by Thoreau (1849): ‘if one HONEST
man,in this State ofMassachusetts,ceasing to hold slaves,were
actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the
county jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America.’
Doing the right thing, in this case, would cost; but it would spell the
end ofan utterly objectionable practice.And, mostimportantly,it
would be doing the right thing.
17 Attributed to Peter Drucker, although no one seems to know where
it occurs in Drucker’s work.
18 Cited by R.M.Williamson (2006).
518 S. Cohen
123

undertake.As mentioned earlier,accountability systems
take stock overa shortterm.This, as well,serves as a
prescription: If some activity cannot be done in ways that
have countable outcomes over a short period of time, then,
inasmuch as it falls outside the accountability regime,the
activity itself does not count. It is, in this respect, a waste of
time,and a waste of resources.19
This is the way itis with accountability systems.But,
with possibly some few exceptions,it simply is notpos-
sible to police quality into a productor activity,unless
what we are concerned with is itself a purely mechanical,
assembly line process.20 As I have suggested,account-
ability systems can determine and monitor the norm. They
can become invidious when they are used to define and
evaluate excellence.
I want to go just a little further with this. Satisfaction of
accountability requirements is notall there is to achieve-
ment—and certainly not all there is to high performance, or
excellence.As I have mentioned,such requirements are
more geared toward,in fact,defining the ordinary.And,
they can act as an aid toward preventing corrupt conduct.
This element is, of course, important. But, notice, it is not a
high-end concern. It is not a concern about excellence. It is
conceivable thatsome organisation—ormaybe even an
entire society—is particularly concerned to weed out free-
loaders. This organisation really wants people to pull their
own weight.We could imagine thatin its statementof
values or its mission statement, this point is highlighted—
perhaps in the name offairness orequity:‘NO FREE-
LOADERS HERE!’ If, in fact,we look atorganisations’
values statements,we never—notever—find reference to
‘weeding outfreeloaders’as a value.But we often find
significantstatementsaboutpromotion ofexcellence.It
is a mis-fitto try, as organisationstypically do,to put
accountability systems in the same basket as whatever there
is toward promoting excellence. This, again, is the problem
of concept validity. Accountability systems and promotion
of excellence are different things.21And the worry is that in
the respects I have identified,accountability systems and
promotion of excellence can come into conflict with each
other. Accountabilitysystemsdisplay excellencein
reporting within their terms. They do not show excellence
accomplishment.Accountability systems not only are dif-
ferentfrom excellence-producing systems;they also can
work against promotion of excellence.
I have referredto declaringbaselines,or setting
parameters,and closing off the discussion by the declara-
tion of values. That is, the discussion about what is of valu
and what is not,and what procedure can be used to eval-
uate performance,can be closed once baselines are set.
Baselines are declared starting places, and purport to bou
the discussion.Thatis whatbaselines do.They constrain
the discussion, they close it off with respect to exploration
or argument or discussion in certain areas.Sometimes we
should be leery of declared baselines. Often we are incline
to treat them as more rigid and as having more credibility
than perhaps we should.22 They are presented as givens.
For example,
Because $97,000 of the $100,000 mustbe used for
equipment,only $3000 is available forpaying the
people who will be staffing the event.
This statementdeclares thatthe money willbe (better,
mustbe) partitioned in this way,and itdoes notinvite—
and actually discourages or prohibits—any suggestion tha
say, less than $97,000 might be spent on equipment, so th
more than $3,000 could be spent on paying the staff. It ha
declared that ‘$97,000 on equipment’ is a baseline—not u
for discussion or debate. It declares that the only room for
discussion is how we can possibly staff the eventfor no
more than $3,000;nothing else can be discussed.Some-
times that might really be the case—but not always.
The initialstatementdeclares a baseline.It defines the
problem or difficulty in a particular manner;and itlimits
the scope for resolution.Sometimes there are satisfactory
answers to questions like, ‘why should we see the problem
thatway?’ and ‘why should we treatthatas a baseline?’
But this is notalways the case.Sometimes there is no
satisfactory answer to that question; and still the question
19 Consider this, however: Recently it has been pointed out by some
people in the scientific community thatthe focus on accountability
is a serious obstacle to ‘curiosity research’,or ‘blue sky research’.
This type of research might or might not produce results, and it might
take a very long time. ‘Schedule’, ‘milestones’,‘timetable’ can have
little applicability. Wonderful breakthroughs, elements of genius, and
much pure researchdoes not seem to fit into the mould of
accountability in these respects.Some such work goes on for years
and years before producing anything; and some of it gets nowhere at
all – ever. If we believe that any such research should be promoted –
or even tolerated – then we have to admit that accountability systems
as we have designed them to date should not be applied to it. Perhaps
less dramatic than blue sky research is any book-length projectin
which the author does not also produce interim essays along the way
to its completion.
20 Deming urged this well over twenty years ago.
21 Analogously, it is sometimes argued that this has been exactly the
case with IQ testing.This was initially developed (in 1905,and
revised in 1908,1911,and 1916) in order to identify those who are
intellectually challenged, indicated by falling below a certain number
on the IQ scale.However,it is, after all,a scale with high numbers
as wellas low numbers.So, the testbegan to be used as a way of
discriminating at the higher levels, as well. It was not designed to do
this; and, so the argument goes, it does not do this at all well. It is no
in fact, a tool for this job. This is exactly the issue of‘concept
validity’.
22 In ‘Truisms in BusinessEthics’ (1999),an essay aboutthe
acceptance of some claims notonly as true,butas obviously true,
when,in fact,those claims are nottrue atall, I spend some time
talking about dangers associated with announced baselines.
Promoting Ethical Judgment in an Organisational Context 519
123

doesnot get asked,because we acceptthe baseline as
declared,simply because ithas been declared to be a
baseline.Sometimeswe acceptdeclared baselinestoo
quickly; and sometimes we even unwittingly accept them.
That’s the way it is with baselines.And sometimes,those
presenting the baseline as a baseline are well aware of this
rhetorical feature of declaring a baseline, and can exploit it.
Sometimes their presentation of it as such is inadvertent.
Inasmuch as the Government guidelines do not award
any points at all for the particular activity that you are
undertaking in the name of‘‘research’’,we in this
Faculty simply cannot count it.
It is clearthatwithoutchanging those guidelines,the
Faculty will not receive funding based on that activity. But
maybe this is a price a Faculty should be prepared to pay, if
it thinksthatthe activity isworthwhile,or if it thinks
judgment in evaluating the activity is called for, rather than
a simple and straightforward tallying up of what does and
whatdoesnot get counted according to a Government
formula.It is easy to come up with such examplesof
declared (but, in fact, problematic) baselines. There are lots
of them.I have two points about this:
1. We too easily accept,as though carved in granite,a
declared baseline,when,in fact,sometimes the most
appropriate reaction is to question and debate exactly
that which has been declared to be outside the bounds
of the discussion.
2. Sometimes in the face of such baselines,the response
with the mostintegrity can be to actin the way you
morefirmly believeto be right,using judgmental
criteria which you believe to be appropriate,rather
than accepting the baseline and the benefitsthatit
holds outfor compliance.This is,of course,fraught
with peril.It can involve personalcostor costto the
part of the organisation that decides to behave in this
way. Analogously, this is, of course, the situation with
much ethicaldecision-making,which can be atodds
with decisionsthatare purely prudential.In short,
ethics costs.This is exactly the way it is with serious
and tough ethical decisions.
Responsibility and Ethical Empowerment
I have suggested that,among other things,accountability
systems provide a historical track, in that they identify who
did what,and when they did it.Keeping tabs like this can
reveal liability.Responsibility systems,on the other hand,
are proactive. They provide an instruction that someone or
some part of an organisation is to ‘take responsibility for’
doing something.In this phrase,‘responsibility’ itself has
two facets.On the one hand giving someone the respon-
sibility to do something means that they are to do it, and t
decide how to do it.On the other hand,someone’s taking
responsibilityfor doing something carrieswith it the
requirement that they do it ‘responsibly’—not merely that
they do it.So, an instruction to take responsibility for
something is an instruction to get something done,and to
do it responsibly.Unlike accountability systems,a system
of responsibility is a system ofdelegation—a system of
authorisation,or empowerment.It is a delegationof
authority; not merely a delegation of a task.It is a system
which requires that people exercise judgment.
Ethical empowerment,or authorisation,within an
organisation isa top–down notion,involving a delega-
tion of authority forethicaldecision-making (Fig.1). It
authorises,or empowers,members of the organisation to
exercise judgmentin decision-making.Increasingly,or-
ganisations have recognised that they—and their manage
and supervisorsthrough the ranks—cannotafford to be
‘risk averse’.They cannot afford for their people in man-
agerial or supervisory roles to avoid making decisions or to
be rule-bound in ethically charged situations. Organisation
must recognise that the alternatives to ethical authorisatio
are simply not very good:
• To try to eliminate the possibility of the occurrence of
situations where judgment must be exercised is impos-
sible. I have indicated that such attempts simply do not
work,and can,in fact,make situations worse.
• To pass all ethically charged decisions up the line, so as
not to make the decision oneselfin this ethically
problematic environment,is a recipe for inefficiency.
• To simply avoid making decisions in ethically charged
situations is a recipe for stagnation.
• To go ahead and do something,whateveryou want
in situations where there are no specific prescriptions, i
cavalier,and almost certainly a recipe for disaster.
trust
trust
responsibility
responsibility
trust
responsibility
Top-Level
(General Manager, CEO)
Next Level
(Directors, Supervisors, Managers, …)
Next Levels
Business, Organisation
Fig. 1 Ethical empowerment
520 S. Cohen
123

It is dangerous to an organisation notto investin sys-
tems thatequip managers to systematically exercise good
judgmentin such situations (e.g.,training in ethicaldeci-
sion-making,clear job descriptions,ethicalleadership
training,and robustcodes of ethics).To trustto common
sense (or something like this),or to replace italtogether
with apparentlycomprehensiverules, regulations,and
accountability regimes is a common error.Charging man-
agerswith responsibilityto makeethicallydefensible
decisions is a matterof authorisation,or empowerment.
Ethical decision-making can be approached and dealt with
specifically,seriously,and systematically,while not being
rule-bound.
Appropriatedecision-making discretion can be dele-
gated downward through an organisation.Those receiving
the responsibility are to recognise thatthey mustmake
decisions and thatthey mustexercise demonstrably good
judgment in making them. Trust goes downward. From the
top downward,those authorising people below them must
trust that those receiving the delegation are up to the task.
Of course, this should not be simply a matter of luck—the
person who receives the delegation needs the ability, skills,
and resources to exercise it. And they must believe that this
is what is expected of them.
Not everything is appropriate for delegation;and dele-
gation is notappropriate to everyone orjustto anyone.
(This itself—whatand why some roles are mostsuitable
for assignmentof responsibility—isworth more discus-
sion; but I will not enter into it here.) Whatever provisions
are made,it is a matter of trusting that the person who is
empowered can do the task.Now—and this is atleastas
important—it is necessary that those who receive the del-
egation actually trust that the people who purportedly gave
it to them actually meantwhatthey said—thatthe dele-
gation and the responsibility are real.We all know people
who, when they say ‘exercise yourdiscretion’actually
mean something like,‘you had better do this exactly as I
would if I were in your position; otherwise, I’ll come down
on you like a ton of bricks.’ This is not trust or delegation.
It is self-deception or fraud or some such thing.It is cer-
tainly not a recipe for authorising ethical decision-making
in ethically charged situations.It is, rather,a recipe for
second-guessing and looking overone’sshoulder—and
doing the minimum.It is notempowermentat all. It is,
rather,instilling fearand distrust.In an environmentof
ethical authorisation, responsibility is delegated downward,
and trust must go in both directions. By and large, this is an
important,probably indispensable,notion for an organisa-
tion that is concerned to promote ethical performance.
Authorising someoneto engagein ethicaldecision-
making does notmean being prepared to license,or sup-
port, whateverthey decide—andit does not mean
attempting to passthe buck.It meansrecognising that
specific prescriptions do notcoverall cases,and allow-
ing—oreven insisting—thatin those areas,people can
make decisions which willbe supported,or at leastnot
have untoward repercussions on them,if they can demon-
strate thattheir decisions are reasonable.A fair modelof
what I have in mind is this,which is quite different from
evaluation in terms of accountability measures: It is com-
monly the case that when an appeal court hears a case, it
job is not to simply decide whetherthe courtof first
instance made the corrector incorrectdecision on the
evidence.Rather,what is required in order for the appeal
courtto overturn the originalverdictis a finding thatthe
decision wasunreasonable on the evidence.An appeal
court can well think (and even say), ‘that verdict is not the
one thatwe would have reached if we had been hearing
the case in the first place; but nevertheless, we do not find
the decision unreasonable,and hence we do not(cannot)
overturn the verdict.The decision mustbe accepted’.23
Perhaps a law or some other rule can be created so that th
is not tolerated in the future;butthis decision mustbe
accepted.It is evaluated as being at an acceptable level.
Another,similar,modelworth considering is the Busi-
ness JudgmentRule.24 The Business JudgmentRule pro-
videsa shield for company directorsfrom chargesof
personal liability if they can show that
1. they have made theirjudgmentin good faith fora
proper purpose,
2. they did nothave a materialpersonalinterestin the
subject matter of the judgment,
3. they were reasonablyinformedaboutthe subject
matter,
4. they rationally believed thatthe judgmentwas in the
best interests of the corporation.
This—or something likeit—would bea reasonable
model, or test, for whether or not acceptable judgment ha
been exercised in areas involving ethically charged deci-
sion-making. Maybe in this area more should be required;
higher bar should be set for ‘reasonable ethical judgment’
But, the idea is clear;namely,thatthere can be a non-
formulaic,non-mechanical,non-algorithmicgaugeof
limits of organisationally tolerable ethical decision-making
in an environment of ethical empowerment.
Those who are authorised to make decisions should be
able to expectthatif they can offer justification which is
23 Robert Nozick (1974) makes basically the same point in arguing
about the limits of one society having to accept the legal decisions of
another being enforced against its own citizens on foreign soil, when
it disagrees with them. If those decisions are appraised as being with
the scope of what is ‘fair’ and ‘reliable’,even if not the same or as
good as the society sees its own,then it should be obliged to accept
the decisions.
24 Section 180(2) of the Corporations Act 2001.
Promoting Ethical Judgment in an Organisational Context 521
123

appreciated as being reasonable,then they will not suffer.
To thatextent,the decision willbe recognised as being
licensed by the organisation,and the person making the
decision will be supported, or at least not made to suffer. It
is, of course,possible to retract authorisation in particular
areas; and there can be good reasons for doing this. Laws,
rules, regulations, and codes of conduct are all mechanisms
for doing this. But, if it is admitted that an environment of
ethicalauthorisation is importantand valuable,then rea-
sons for diminishing authorisation should be made clear,
and should be created with appropriate hesitancy.
There is much more that can be said about creation and
limitation of systems of ethical responsibility.The central
pointfor here,however,is to distinguish accountability
systems from responsibility systems, and to call attention to
serious limitations and misconceptions of the former and
the necessity ofdevelopmentof the latter,with their
insistence on the cultivation and exercise ofgood indi-
vidual judgment. Establishing such systems is not easy, but
it is critically important for the promotion and maintenance
of ethical excellence.
Appendix: Accountability in the Evaluation of Teaching
In 1975,Donald Kirkpatrick produced a modelof mea-
suring the effectiveness ofworkplace training,the Kirk-
patrick Model25
. This consists of four levels:
Level1 Reaction:Whatwas the attendees’ reaction to
the training? Did the attendeeslike it? How did the
trainees evaluate the effectiveness of the training?
Level 2 Learning: Did the trainees learn anything?
Level3 Behaviour:Did the training change the behav-
iour of the attendees?
Level 4 Results:Does the changed behaviourhave
implications for business success?
In 1996,Jack Phillips suggested a fifth level26
,
Level 5 Returnon investment(ROI): In termsof
business,was the training worth the cost? Whatis the
ROI? For this,Phillips suggested a formula designed
to show the percentreturn on the costsinvolved for
delivering a training program.
An amazing factaboutall this is thatin the world of
education,as wellas in the world oftraining programs
provided forbusinesses and otherorganisations,there is
very little done beyond Level1 to evaluate any training.
And this,despite the factthatthe Kirkpatrick modelis
widely recognisedand applauded.Student/attendee
evaluations are handed out; and that is pretty well that. W
the relatively recentdevelopmentof ‘workplace training
and assessment’,with its identification of‘elementsof
competence’, and ‘performance criteria’ and the like in the
area of vocational training,at least that sector of the pro-
vision of training has made a serious effort at focussing on
Level 2. But it is true that for nearly all education program
the measure of their quality and their success—as well as
the measure of the quality of the provider—is atLevel1
only.27Why is this? A reasonable suggestion for an answer
is, ‘because it’s easily measurable’. Attendee evaluations—
‘tick a box’, or ‘evaluate this statement on a scale of 1–5’—
are not difficult data to collect,the same questions can be
asked of almost all types of training groups, and the result
can be compared pretty well across the board of education
and training. There has been only little work done, howeve
in terms of investigating any correlation between attendee
satisfaction and any other important criteria for evaluating
the effectiveness of training or education (again, the issue
conceptvalidity);and in particular,there have been no
systematic attempts to evaluate effectiveness atLevels 2,
and particularly 3,4, and 5.This is all the more amazing,
given the amount of resources spent on training programs
at all levels.
So,what does this have to do with accountability? The
state ofaffairswith the Kirkpatrick modelis both an
example and an analogy.It is an example in thatit is an
attempt to call trainers and training programs to account t
measure their effectiveness in terms of the articulation of
the things thatmatter.It is an analogy in thatthe current
situation accepts whatever criteria itdoes acceptbecause
thosecriteriaare easily measurable;they areeasy to
quantify.If the basis on which an evaluation is made is a
set of quantifiable criteria which apply to a large range of
activities,then this is very attractive.The evaluation itself
can become mechanical,and there isno need—and no
room—for the exercise of judgment in evaluating anything
As mentioned earlier,a seriousdifficulty with such
evaluations is that in attempting to evaluate something (in
this case, training), strong emphasis is placed on one face
of that thing—or better,on one result of the training (viz.
25 Kirkpatrick (1975).
26 Phillips (1996).
27 Of course a numberof programs have elements oftesting the
attendees;examining them overthe contentof the course.Do not
confuse this, however, with evaluating the success of the training. In
holding trainers accountable,student evaluations are often collected.
If we actually viewed whether or not trainees learned anything in the
training as an indicator of the success of the training (i.e.,Level 2),
we would at least also ask trainers to provide data on something like
the pass-rates in their courses and percentages of grades awarded at
all levels. We don’t. We do use exams; but we do not use them as any
part at all of an accountabilitysystem oras any part of the
measurementof the effectiveness of the training.At most,they are
used to evaluatethe students;but not at all to evaluatethe
effectiveness of the training itself or the individual trainer.
522 S. Cohen
123

attendee satisfaction)—to the exclusion of allothers.An
attendee at an ethics workshop once mentioned to me,
I like physicalthings.So, give me a rope-climbing
course for‘team-building’or anything else,and of
course I’llrate ithighly.If we getto do the rope-
climbing and other activities, then I’m happy. I don’t
even really think about anything else that might result
from it.
Whatwe are interested in measuring,and the tools we
use to measure it, simply do not fit together. And, as in this
case,sometimesthe mis-fitstandsas a seriousbar to
development and promotion of excellence,which was the
rationale for those tools in the first place.
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