Middlesex University: The Euro Crisis and Democracy in Europe

This essay examines the Euro Crisis and its profound impact on democracy in Europe. The analysis begins with an overview of the European integration process, highlighting the inherent challenges and the evolving goals of the EU. It explores how the Euro Crisis, stemming from complex integration dynamics and the actions of member states, has led to unexpected consequences and uncertainties. The essay delves into the rise of Euroscepticism, the decline in trust in EU institutions, and the emergence of populist movements across Europe. It discusses the transformation of European democracy, including the shift away from traditional party systems and the increasing influence of public opinion. The essay references key academic sources to support its arguments, and concludes by emphasizing the enduring impact of the Euro Crisis and the potential for future transformations within the EU, particularly concerning the delegation of powers to key institutions like the European Central Bank and the EU Court of Justice.

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THE EURO CRISIS, AND ITS IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE
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Introduction
There is nothing new about crisis during any process of European Integration. There
have always been multiple challenges central to such processes , but there have also
been multiple benefits out of it. The main motive behind the integration is very clear. The
common goals of all the member states has always been raising their power and
increasing their roles under the EU umbrella, in an effort to resolve any challenges they
might face as individual states .
Discussion
The crisis began with the complex nature of integrating independent states
through a peaceful process , to become one regional system. All actors within the process
had an extreme challenge in acting reasonably because it was challenging to weigh the
benefits for such a course of action. First, due to the range of alternatives it was hard to make
proper choices during the integration processes. Although the policies were considered as
well-intentioned ,once they were implemented, they were bound to produce unanticipated and
most often undesirable consequences .Lastly , if these were not sufficient , the EU had
constantly changed its main goal from the provision of regional security to the promotion of
trade in industrial products , agricultural subsidies as a way of encouraging cross-national
investments, liberalisation of financial flows , and finally Focusing on the competitive forces
of globalisation .1Moreover, there are some of the latest programs that have been established.
This includes: police collaboration among independent states, border control, new visa
asylum necessities, new energy systems and finally new foreign and joint security policies
.
1 Schmitter, P. C. (2004). Will EMU make it easier or more difficult to democratize the EU?. (Florence,
EUI, 2004), 99 110‐

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Every time the EU attempted to expand its competencies, the stakes in the entire
process always involved much more sophisticated sets of policies whose impact and the
outcomes had later proven more sophisticated to solve. However, one of the major
achievements of the European integration has always been the inclusion of new member
states that 21 new states added to the original 6. Every time this has happened, the impact on
the prevailing policies and the possibilities of establishing new ones has become more
unpredictable.
It is important to note that the principal cause of the failure to deal with the Euro crisis
can only be found in the sole actions of the member states. Certainly, the European
institutions did not help that much, with the exception of the ECB. However, the real obstacle
to a strong resolution of the crisis was that the member states simply have not been able to
agree on the way forward.2 The creditors have continuously insisted that the debtor
countries must be responsible for the burden of credit adjustments after the integration ,
arguing that it is the only austerity that would bring them out of their deep depressions.
The Euro crisis and the independent debt of some of its member countries is a clear
case of how underlying complexities, unexpected consequences, and uncertainty during
decision making can have a substantial impact of regional integration. According to Torres in
his journal “The Political and Economic Consequences of European Monetary Integration”,
he attempted to revise the neo-functionalist approach. His analysis can be used to properly
understand the Euro Crisis and the future complexities that may drive the issues much
further. What each member state was intended to do was to try and build upon frustrated
expectations in pursuit of a shared objective 3.This would push the key players to redefine
their tasks or their levels of authority on the strategies of the regional integration, through a
2 “The vices and virtues of populism”, Aspenia, Vol. 12, No. 35 36 (2007), 42 48; also‐ ‐
published as “I populismi: vizi e virtù”, Aspenia, Vol. 12, No. 36 (2007), 71 78.‐
3 F. Torres, A. Verdun, C. Zilioli & H. Zimmermann (eds.), EMU Rules: The Political and Economic
Consequences of European Monetary Integration (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2006), 101 10.‐

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collective agreement that would eliminate the unsatisfactory areas of the guiding policies.
Therefore, what has made the Eurozone crisis unique is particularly the capacity of exploiting
consecutive crises positively by constantly infringing its transitory zone of organisational
indifference.4
It is not surprising that among the European public, most do not trust the EU
institutions and democracy has significantly declined over the course of the crisis and has
resulted in the rise of Euroscepticism. An evident indication has already developed. A
majority of voters in most general elections in the past three years have shown unexpected
tendency by voting out incumbents out of office .Earlier, European democracies were made
upon hegemonic parties that often ruled for decades .Nowadays, Europe does not have such
parties, but only the governing ones. 5Whether of the right-wing such as France, Italy and the
Czech Republic or of the Left Wing such as the Spain Hungary, Slovenia, and Ireland, the
tenure of most European government has turned precarious. In addition, the public has shifted
a significant proportion of the votes to eliminate populist parties of either the right-wing or
the left wing.6 Such populism is major temptation in all European democracies.
The governments have become the by-products of sclerotic or oligarch systems that
have turned to be incapable of representing the preferences of the citizens or even articulating
the future plans for the region as a whole. Lindberg indicates that European citizens are not
that anti-democratic as such; they have become less politically liberal, sometimes considered
as “supra constitutionalists” and usually economically irresponsible .Even when they are
unsuccessful at occupying leading positions, they often push for more moderate parties into
4 Kuhn T, Stoeckel F. When European integration becomes costly: the euro crisis and public support for
European economic governance. Journal of European Public Policy. 2014 Apr 21;21(4):624-41.
5 Braun D, Tausendpfund M. The impact of the Euro crisis on citizens’ support for the European Union.
Journal of European Integration. 2014 Apr 16;36(3):231-45.
6 "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration", International Organization, Vol.24, No 4 (Autumn 1970),
836 868.‐

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implementing policies of the choices, thus making it more and more challenging for them to
form coalition governments.7
It is important to note that Democracy in Europe was already transforming prior to the
Euro-crisis .Therefore, it is possible that it will endure, but in doing so it will have to
implement diverse frameworks from the previous societal democracy and Christian
democracy that has been the foundation for quite a long time. Moreover, it will have to seek
new social contracts and a much more controlled political economy as well as the novel
networks of democratic contribution and culpability mechanisms to the citizens.8
Conclusion
The Euro-crisis has not ended yet and its impact will be felt for some years to
come .This implies that there exist new opportunities that would turn such a big crisis into
good fortunes. In addition, the necessary mechanism for doing so already exists in the form
of unparalleled delegation of competencies to the responsible institutions including the
European central bank and the EU Court of Justice. Whatever will make the transformation
will be the determination of these organizations to implement their powers.
7 L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1971), 232 265.‐
8 “Los vicios y virtudes de los “populismos”: un balance general”, El Debate Político. Revista
Iberoamericana de Análisis Político, Año 3, No. 4/5 (Noviembre 2006), 208 14.‐

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Bibliography
"A Revised Theory of Regional Integration", International Organization, Vol.24, No 4
(autumn 1970), 836‐868.
F. Torres, A. Verdun, C. Zilioli & H. Zimmermann (eds.), EMU Rules: The Political and
Economic Consequences of European Monetary Integration (Baden Baden: Nomos,
2006), 101‐10.
L. Lindberg and S. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration: Theory and Research
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 232‐ 265.
Schmitter, P. C. (2004). Will EMU make it easier or more difficult to democratize the EU?.
(Florence, EUI, 2004), 99‐110
“The vices and virtues of populism”, Aspenia, Vol. 12, No. 35‐36 (2007), 42‐48; also
published as “I populismi: vizi e virtù”, Aspenia, Vol. 12, No. 36 (2007), 71‐78.
“Los vicios y virtudes de los “populismos”: un balance general”, El Debate Político. Revista
Iberoamericana de Análisis Político, Año 3, No. 4/5 (Noviembre 2006), 208‐14.
Braun D, Tausendpfund M. The impact of the Euro crisis on citizens’ support for the
European Union. Journal of European Integration. 2014 Apr 16;36(3):231-45.
Kuhn T, Stoeckel F. When European integration becomes costly: the euro crisis and public
support for European economic governance. Journal of European Public Policy. 2014
Apr 21;21(4):624-41.