Foundations of the Law of Tort: Negligence and Duty of Care Analysis

This assignment provides a comprehensive analysis of the foundations of tort law, addressing three key questions. The first question examines the issues of liability stemming from an accident involving multiple parties, including Max, Rajinder, Beverley (a nurse), and Nicholas (a Good Samaritan), focusing on the concepts of duty of care, standard of care, causation, and the application of these principles to each individual's actions. The analysis references key case law such as Donoghue v Stevenson, Jones v Bartlett, and Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, among others. The second question critically evaluates arguments concerning tort law, considering both agreeing and disagreeing perspectives. The third question is based on the application of the rules of tort law to a hypothetical scenario. The assignment concludes with a bibliography of cited sources.

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Foundations of the Law of Tort; 3 Questions
By Student’s Name
Code + Course Name
Professor’s Name
University Name
City, State
Date
4000 words

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Table of Contents
Question 1..........................................................................................................................4
Issues.............................................................................................................................4
Rule/ Law.......................................................................................................................4
Duty of Care...............................................................................................................4
Standard of Care........................................................................................................5
Legal duty of Medical Personnel................................................................................5
Good Samaritan act....................................................................................................6
Causation.......................................................................................................................7
Application......................................................................................................................8
To Max........................................................................................................................8
To Rajinder.................................................................................................................8
To Beverley................................................................................................................8
To Nicholas.................................................................................................................9
Conclusion...................................................................................................................10
Question 2........................................................................................................................11
Introduction..................................................................................................................11
Analysis........................................................................................................................11
Agree Critics.............................................................................................................11
Disagree Critics........................................................................................................12
Conclusion...................................................................................................................13
Question 3........................................................................................................................14
Issue.............................................................................................................................14
Rules/ Law....................................................................................................................14
Application....................................................................................................................15
Conclusion...................................................................................................................16
Bibliography.................................................................................................................17
Books, Articles & Reports.........................................................................................17

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Question 1
Issues
(i) Whether Max is liable for the injury that befell Julia.
(ii) Whether the nurse (Beverley) was liable for not taking care of Julia
(iii) Whether Rajinder is liable for damages caused to Julia.
(iv) Whether Nicholas (Good Samaritan) is liable for Julia’s damaged spinal cord.
Rule/ Law
Duty of Care
In negligence torts, the duty of care places the responsibility of care (not causing harm)
to others. One road user owes another road user a duty of care1. All road users are
obliged by law to ensure that they take reasonable care in the actions they take or fail to
take, to prevent damage to another or property2. For drivers, every time they go out in
their cars, they put themselves under certain legal duties. In the case of Donoghue v
Stevenson3 Donoghue’s friend bought her beer contained in an opaque glass bottle at
a cafe. After she had drunk a substantial amount, she poured the beer into a glass only
to realize that there were remains of decomposed snail inside. As a result, Mrs
Donoghue suffered gastroenteritis and shock. She, therefore, sues Stevenson (the
manufacturer) for the damage that had resulted. The court decided that there was a
duty of care owed to Donoghue by Stevenson under the neighbour principle. Lord
Atkins, reading the decision of the 3-2 majority, said that reasonable care must be taken
to prevent acts or omissions that that are reasonably foreseeable to cause injury to a
neighbour. In another case of Jones v Bartlett4, it was decided that the negligent act
must create a risk to the life, health and body of an individual.
A person who creates a danger, however, has to develop precautions to prevent
foreseeable risk or injury from happening. In such cases, the omission is not regarded in
1 Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, Tort Law (7th edn, Pearson Longman 2009).
2 Gilbert Kodilinye, Commonwealth Caribbean Tort Law (Routledge, 2013).
3 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, [1932] UKHL 100, 1932 S.C. (H.L.) 31, 1932 S.L.T. 317, [1932]
W.N. 139
4 Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166.

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isolation but as a substantial act towards the activity as a whole (misfeasance)5. This
was deliberated in the decision of Lee v Lever6.
Standard of Care
In the case of Nettleship v Weston7, there were claims of damages concerning an injury
caused to a passenger in a road accident. The defendant was a learner driver who was
convicted of driving without due care and attention when executing a simple manoeuvre
before panicking and hitting the claimant (the teacher). The court decided that the
standard of the duty of care owed by a learner driver to the public was to be measured
against similar standards as to any other driver.
Legal duty of Medical Personnel
In the United Kingdom, there is no legal duty of care owed by doctors or nurses when
off-duty8. There must be a duty of care first before the liability of giving medical
assistance when they are not on duty. First, they must always be a personal doctor/
nurse to patient relationship before a legal duty is stated. According to the General
Medical Council in the UK, it is important to assess the safety of oneself before
committing to giving help during emergencies9. In that case, nurses do not have a legal
duty of care to provide medical assistance to unfamiliar persons in an emergency10.
These cases are called “pure omissions”. This was decided in the case of Smith v
Littlewoods Organisation Ltd11
5 Dechert for SaveLIFE Foundation, 'Good Samaritan Laws A Comparative Study Of Laws That Protect
First Responders Who Assist Accident Victims' (Dechert for SaveLIFE Foundation
2014)<https://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/7be34cce-ea0d-4c90-8b39-53427acf4c43/file>
Accessed 15th April 2019
6 Lee v Lever [1974] R.T.R. 25.
7 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691
8 Paula Dawson and others, Oxford Handbook of Clinical Skills for Children's And Young People's (OUP
Oxford 2012).
9 Charlotte Cliffe, 'A British Doctor’S Duty to Offer Help in Emergencies Outside Of a Clinical Setting'
(2018) 23 Journal of Patient Safety and Risk Management.
10 Kevin Williams, 'Doctors As Good Samaritans: Some Empirical Evidence Concerning Emergency
Medical Treatment In Britain' (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society.
11 Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] UKHL 18; [1987] AC 241; [1987] 2 WLR 480; [1987] 1 All
ER 710

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Good Samaritan act
This is a medical assistance act that is done in a bona fide medical emergency. The
Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 201512 applies;
“When a court, in considering a claim that a person was negligent or in breach of
statutory duty, is determining the steps that the person was required to take to meet a
standard of care”.
In that case, under social policy, it is the role of the court to regard if the alleged
negligence or breach of duty came about when the person was acting for the society’s
good, or of its members. Moreover, under responsibility, the Act proposes that the court
should determine whether, at the time of an alleged act of negligence or breach of
statutory duty, the person showed a predominantly responsible approach towards
caring for the well-being or the interests of others. Under heroism, the Act provided that
the court should have regard to whether;
“The alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was
acting heroically by intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger13”.
Under case law, in rescue missions, and the absence of special reasons, a private
individual or a one in public service does not owe a duty of care to respond to an
emergency. Once the defendant has taken active steps to effect the rescue, he may
assume an onus to carry it out rationally and capably. The law has distinguished
ineffective rescues (no liability) and damaging rescues (infuriating the situation), the
liability of the defendant, in that case, comes about only when his actions lead to
additional (aggravated) damage over and above that which the plaintiff would have
suffered if the Defendant would have stayed back and not intervened. This was the
decision of Capital and Counties plc v Hampshire County Council14.
12 The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 (SARAH Act 2015)<
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/3/section/1/enacted> Acessed 15th April 2019
13 Ibid (n12)
14 Capital and Counties plc v Hampshire County Council [1997] Q.B. 1004 at 1035

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The House of Lord in the case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman15, made a 3-fold test
for duty of care:
1. Was the damage to the Claimant reasonably foreseeable?
2. Was there a relationship of sufficient proximity between the Claimant and the
Defendant?
3. Is it “fair, just and reasonable” for the law to impose a duty of care in the
situation?
In England and Wales, one who fails to act in a particular situation can only be sued if
there is a preceding duty to act to safeguard the relevant interest of the applicant. A
duty of care can only be invoked if the aforementioned three-fold test is achieved.
Previous cases had already deliberated on the same; Anns v Merton London Borough16,
Murphy v Brentwood District Council17, and, an Australian one; Sutherland Shire
Council v Heyman18. A modern case of Langley v Dray (1998)19, applied the Caparo test
whereby the applicant was a policeman injured in a car crash as he was running after
the defendant. The D was driving a stolen car. The Court held that the defendant had a
duty of care by not creating risks as he knew that by increasing his speed, the
policemen would also increase his hence creating risk of injury.
Causation
In order to establish liability of the defendants, there must be a proof that, because of
the breach of duty of care by the defendant, the claimant suffered damages, and that
the resulting damage is not too remote for the breach. Following the precedent set by
Donoghue v Stevenson20, the case of I lacked the aspect of the reasonable
consequence of Jones action. The “but for test” was unsuccessful in cases involving
multiple acts like in McGhee v National Coal Board (1972)21. The test was not sufficient
15Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605.
16 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1977] UKHL 4, [1978] AC 728
17 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398
18 Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman [1985] HCA 41
19 Langley v Dray [1998] PIQR P314 19
20 [1932] A.C. 562
21 McGhee v National Coal Board (1972) 3 All E.R. 1008, 1 W.L.R. 1,

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in determining the actual cause in cases of Novus actus interveniens as in the case of
Thompson v Blake-James22.
Application
To Max
Max was the root cause of the whole accident. As a road user, he owed (another user)
Julia a duty of care as by precedent in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson23. But for
Max’s car engine leakage, Julia would not have skidded to her fall off her bicycle, and
consequently, Rajinder’s van would not have hit her. However, this case was a twisted
one because of the subsequent events that follow immediately after the accident. The
preceding acts by third parties, like in the case of McGhee v National Coal Board24
broke the chain of causation. Max, as a road user, he has an automatic duty to prevent
harm from occurring other road users. However, the facts of the case are that the oil
leakage was natural. It was not mentioned that Max knew of the leakage and that might
not meet the first requirements of the Caparo Test; “Was the damage to the Claimant
reasonably foreseeable?” The case of Lee v Lever25 also mandates liability to a
defendant if the consequence was foreseeable same as Donoghue and Stevenson26.
To Rajinder
Rajinder, same as Max, owes a duty of care to other road users. Rajinder confessed not
to pay close attention as he was thinking about work and the pressure he was getting
because of the job. In this case, the damage was foreseeable (Donoghue v
Stevenson27) as it is a duty to concentrate when driving. His action was the substantial
cause of the condition of Julia as he was the one who hit her. This is a breach of duty of
care by facts (because of the confession) and law combined.
22 Thompson v Blake-James [1998] Lloyd's Rep Med 187
23 [1932] A.C. 562
24 (1972) 3 All E.R. 1008, 1 W.L.R. 1,
25 [1974] R.T.R. 25.
26 Ibid (n 23)
27 Ibid (n 24)

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To Beverley
Beverley as a nurse was off duty. In that case, she did not owe Julia a duty of care
despite being a public servant. As in the decision of Capital and Counties plc v
Hampshire County Council28, a private individual or a public servant does not owe a
duty of care to respond to an emergency when off duty. Being a nurse, that was a case
of “pure omissions”, and as it was decided in the case of Smith v Littlewoods
Organisation Ltd that common law does not enforce legal responsibility for what is
called pure omissions.
To Nicholas
Nicholas was acting as a Good Samaritan giving medical assistance in a bona fide
medical emergency. He, however, broke the chain of causation as in the case of
McGhee v National Coal Board29. In the latter case, there was a claim of damages
resulting from the defendant’s negligently not installing showers to the workers to
reduce dermatitis. The showers, however, would not eliminate the risk but reduce it.
Therefore, the lack of showers was not the only cause. The court decided that, where
there was more than one possible cause (like in the Nicholas’ case) causation was
provable only when there was enough evidence showing that out of the negligent act of
the defendant, the risk of injury became materially high and that it was unnecessary to
prove that it was the sole cause. The case of Capital and Counties plc v Hampshire
County Council30 established that when a private individual, who does not owe the
plaintiff a duty of care, decides to act, he takes an obligation to carry out the rescue
competently and reasonably without aggravating the condition of the victim. Nicholas,
however, without having the first aid skills decided to intervene and even makes a false
claim that he has the necessary skills. Even though he was not a substantial cause of
the damages, the standard of duty of care is the same for Nicholas as in the decision of
Nettleship v Weston31. His actions constituted to “damaging rescue” as they aggravated
the damage following the doctor’s statement that Julia by 75% the damage on the spinal
cord was avoidable had the helmet not been removed. The other injuries (leg and cuts)
28 [1997] Q.B. 1004 at 1035
29 (1972) 3 All E.R. 1008, 1 W.L.R. 1,
30 [1997] Q.B. 1004 at 1035
31 Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691

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caused cannot be attributed to Nicholas action. The provisions of the Social Action,
Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 protect good Samaritans. In this case, even
though Nicholas acted heroically and for the society‘s member good, it is unclear
whether he did so with predominant responsibility towards Julia’s well-being because he
caused more harm.
Conclusion
In determining who bears the damages of Julia’s constant care, house renovations,
physiotherapy & hydrotherapy treatment, and her scars, Julia should be able to prove
the liability of the blamable parties based on these conclusions;
(i) Julia may not have a sustainable civil claim for damages against Max
because of the naturally occurring and unforeseeable consequence.
(ii) Julia may sustain a civil claim against Rajinder for breach of duty of care as
he was driving without due care and attention; absent-mindedly based on his
own confession of the same.
(iii) Julia cannot sustain a legal claim against the nurse (Beverley) as she had to
a legal duty of care towards her
(iv) Julia may succeed in a partial civil claim against Nicholas for aggravating the
damage on the spinal cord. Partial because there were multiple damages and
he only worsened one.

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Question 2
Introduction
The main objective of Tort Law is to help in holding tortfeasors responsible for the
injuries suffered by victims. However, it is without a doubt that with modernization, the
central responsibility of Tort Law has been obscured; that is, it focuses more on
establishing liability than finding fault. A keen look on the essential elements required in
order to prove that one has breached the duty of care that he owes another has an
implication of liability as most of the times the defendant has not formed the tortious
intent or act negligently32. When a tiger escapes from its cage and causes harm the
victim can sue, and the court will find the owner of the tiger liable for the injuries
suffered on the victim. Perhaps the defendant may have built a solid cage and taken all
the precautionary measure (lifting off the element of fault) the court would still find him
strictly liable for the injuries suffered by the victims in the hands of his tiger. In the case
of the tiger, we see that the owner has taken necessary precautionary measures to
ensure that the tiger is kept away from the public, but after the incident, he is still held
accountable33. This research will examine what between fault and strict liability is
established by the rules on breach of duty of care.
Analysis
Agree Critics
In the recent past, new foundations have been developed involving liability in torts. This
development has been catalyzed by social change as the law of torts seeks to remain
abreast during these changing times. To achieve this, a review has been done on
judicial precedence as well as the reinterpretation of the statutes to fit the conventional
cases arising in the modern world. A classic example of a strict liability case is Rylands
V Fletcher.34 In Rylands, Blackburn stated that “when a person decides to keep or
collect anything likely to cause harm when it escapes must be confined failure to which
if it was to escape and cause harm the owner will be held strictly liable for the damage
32John C.P. Goldenberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, 'The Strict Liability in Fault And The Fault In Strict
Liability' (2016) SSRN Electronic Journal
33 Magdalena Tulibacka, Product Liability Law in Transition (Routledge, 2016)
34 [1868] UKHL 1

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caused." To satisfy strict liability claims, it is essential that the victim shows that they
were injured as a result of the action of the defendant or the product of the defender and
that the defendant exercised full control over the item that caused the harm like in
Donoghue v Stevenson.35 Strict liability torts have addressed the issues concerning
dangerous animals, abnormally dangerous acts, and product liability. In dangerous acts,
the case of Miller v Civil Contrustors, Inc.36 where a stray bullet fired from a quarry site
hit the defendant, the court dissented that there was no need to prove negligence and
that the activity in itself was hazardous and caution ought to be exercised. This
dissenting opinion was rooted on the precedence from Rylands V Fletcher and section
519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Disagree Critics
Although strict liability has revolutionized the law of torts, enabling it to address modern
cases, it leaves defences to the defendant that may easily take lift the defendant off the
hook. For instance, one cannot claim for damages if the element of a foreseeable risk in
cases regarding the escape of something. It is vital that the claimant be able to prove
that there was an element of the escape of the said product of the owner. This gave rise
to the principle of the act of God. Instance if one keeps a tiger in his compound, and it is
chained to a steel pole, when the tiger breaks loose as a result of lightning striking the
chain cutting it lose and were to cause harm to any person then the defence of the act
of God will suffice like in the case of Baker V Snell.37 However, through this example, we
can see that the defence of the hand of God has a narrow application. Other acts of
God may include occurrences such as earthquakes, hurricanes or torrential downpour.
Also, strict liability gives the defendant a leeway through the defence of the absence of
fault, like in the matter between Hinckley v La Mesa R.V. Center, Inc.38 in cases of
product liability. The defendant may argue that the defect occurred as a result of the
plaintiff's negligence and not the product.
35 [1932] UKHL 100
36 [1995] 651 N.E.2d 239
37 [1908] 2 K.B 352
38[1984] 158 Cal.App.3d 630

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Conclusion
The law of torts has been shaped by advancement in technology, policies, societal
changes, and statutory interpretations aimed at addressing the current tort cases.39
Traditionally, tort law was mainly concerned with matters to do with negligence and
breach of duty of care, however, other fields of developed on their own to address the
challenges that judicial precedence and legislature through legislative reforms were
seen as being insufficient.40 Strict liability torts arose from the interpretation of statutes,
and judicial precedence set out in the case of Rylands.
Although Judicial decision making does very little to address the issues related to the
fault in strict liability applications with regards to torts since they are guided by
legislation, it is crucial that parliament is at the center of coming up with reforms
regarding the laws of torts and the applicability of strict liability.41
Finally, as we have seen, the application of strict liability in torts has been able to
address matters related to product liability, thus making manufacturers focus more on
quality than the usual "colossal profit margin. Besides, strict liability has been able to
bring owners of products or items that when let lose pose a harm to the wellbeing of
others without necessarily having to prove the fault of the side of the defendant.
However, there should not be complete independence between strict liability and the
exercise of due diligence as for one to be able to sue for damages in cases of escape
he must be able to prove that owner was able to foresee the escape and the possible
harm.
39 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923
40 Sarah Green, Causation in Negligence (Bloombury Publishing, 2015)
41Kenneth Abraham, 'Strict Liability in Negligence' (2016) 61 DePaul Review

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Question 3
Issue
Can Emma and Jess (secondary victims) sustain actionable civil claims against Aaron?
Rules/ Law
The issue in law for this case is the duty of care following psychiatric injury. White and
others v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police42 established that if out of a
negligent act by a person, another gets exposed to injury risk, the perpetrator will be
liable for any psychological injury caused to the other person, regardless of non-
occurrence of endangered physical damage.
The case of White and others v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police 43
established three categories of the claimant:
- “Those who are physically injured in the event which the defendant has caused,
as well as psychiatrically injured as a result of it;
- Those who are put in danger of physical harm, but actually suffer only psychiatric
injury. Victims who fall into this, or the previous category, are termed, primary
victims;
- Those who are not put in danger of physical injury to themselves, but suffer
psychiatric injury as a result of witnessing such injury to others; these are called
secondary victims.”
According to the ruling in McLoughlin v O’Brian44, if there lacks proof of physical injury
or illness from the shock, there must be a proof of “a positive psychiatric illness” as was
stated by Lord Bridge. Some of the examples are, “clinical depression, personality
changes, and post-traumatic stress disorder, an illness in which a shocking event
causes symptoms including difficulty sleeping, tension, horrifying flashbacks and severe
42 White and Others v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455
43 [1999] 2 AC 455
44 McLoughlin v O'Brian [1983] 1 AC 410

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depression”. This means that they must be confirmed to have indeed suffered a
recognized psychiatric illness through medical intervention and scrutiny45.
Those who claim damages for psychiatric injury can only claim in negligence if they can
establish that the defendant owes them a duty of care and most definitely prove that the
defendant is the cause of the injury as established in Donoghue v Stevenson46. The
concept of duty of care always has limited applicability in claims for psychiatric damage.
In the case of Alcock v Chief Constable of Yorkshire47, one of the limitations is proximity,
and the other is the relationship of the psychiatric ill defendant with the actual victim of
physical injury. One of the people who can claim for damages is relatives and friends
with only infrequent situations that an accident is so horrific that psychiatric damage to
unrelated bystanders was foreseeable. Again the victim ought to have sufficient
proximity to the scene of the crash. Proximity, in this case, is legal and can only be
physical in determining the neighbour principle as it was decided in Home office v
Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd48, though not an essential requirement.
In the case of Page v Smith49, a man was involved in an accident but was not injured in
it. He, however, suffered a recurrence and worsening of the disease myalgic
encephalomyelitis (ME) as a result of the shock sustained after the accident. The court
ruled that since the actions of the defendants were foreseeable to expose the claimant
to the physical injury risk, there existed a duty of care concerning injury and that it was
not necessary to prove the foreseeability of the psychiatric injury. Another case in 1901
of Dulieu v White & Sons50, established this principle whereby the plaintiff, serving in a
pub, was badly frightened when the defendant drove his van and horses into the
premises of her place of work, a pub. As a result, the claimant suffered a miscarriage,
and the defendant was found liable even though there was lacking physical impact
because the consequence of shock was certainly foreseeable.
45 Catherine Elliott and Frances Quinn, Tort Law (7th edn, Pearson Longman 2009).
46 [1932] UKHL 100
47 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1991] UKHL 5, [1992] 1 AC 310
48 Home office v Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 294, [1970] AC 1004, [1970] UKHL 2
49 Page v Smith [1995] 2 WLR 644, [1995] UKHL 7
50 Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669

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Application
Aaron owes Jess a duty of care in that the consequence of the accident was
foreseeable in normal cases of negligence as a precedent of Donoghue v Stevenson51
establishes and the fact that psychiatric injury is confirmed regardless of whether
foreseeable or not as in the case of Page v Smith52 and regardless of the absence of
physical injury (White and others, 199953). Foreseeable in the sense that Jess satisfies
the limitation of by Alcock v Chief Constable of Yorkshire54 and Page v Smith55 as there
exist bond (ties) of love and affection between Jess and Lisa (the fact is that Jess is so
dear to Lisa and Jess is said to have enriched the lives of the couple a great deal). Jess
suffered post-traumatic stress disorder which is a characteristic of positive psychiatric
illness as putting in McLoughlin v O’Brian56. Jess was also in proximity falling under the
third category of victims as in the aforementioned case of White and others57 v Chief
Constable of South Yorkshire; she suffered psychiatric injury from witnessing harm
befalling on Lisa even though she was not at risk of being hit.
Aaron owes Emma a duty of care as in the neighbour principle; Home office v Dorset
Yacht Co. Ltd58. In the case of White and others59, victims of psychiatric injury not
physically injured or in danger of physical injury are considered as secondary victims.
Emma, in this case, suffers severe depression for one year because of witnessing injury
on her dear partner Lisa (bonds of love established; Alcock case). Moreover, Emma
does not satisfy the factual proximity requirement. Emma is however in the realms of
legal proximity (subjected to court examination) and this leads to uncertainty as to the
rule in McLoughlin v O’Brian60 and Alcock v Chief Constable of Yorkshire61, is that
secondary victims who claim for psychiatric injury have limited chances of success in
doing so. Regardless of not witnessing the actual incident, she arrives at the hospital
sometime after the scene and what she sees triggers a depression.
51 [1932] UKHL 100
52 [1995] 2 WLR 644, [1995] UKHL 7
53 [1999] 2 AC 455
54 [1991] UKHL 5, [1992] 1 AC 310
55 [1995] 2 WLR 644, [1995] UKHL 7
56 [1983] 1 AC 410
57 [1999] 2 AC 455
58 [1970] 2 All ER 294, [1970] AC 1004, [1970] UKHL 2
59 [1999] 2 AC 455
60 [1983] 1 AC 410
61 [1991] UKHL 5, [1992] 1 AC 310

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Conclusion
(i) Jess will most certainly succeed in the civil claim for damages caused by
Aaron
(ii) Emma may succeed in a civil claim for damages from her depression on the
preponderance of the evidence.

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Bibliography
Books, Articles & Reports
Abraham, K. 'Strict Liability in Negligence' (2016) 61 DePaul Review
Cliffe C, 'A British Doctor’S Duty to Offer Help in Emergencies Outside Of a Clinical
Setting' (2018) 23 Journal of Patient Safety and Risk Management
Dawson P and others, Oxford Handbook of Clinical Skills for Children's And Young
People’s (OUP Oxford 2012)
Dechert for SaveLIFE Foundation, 'Good Samaritan Laws A Comparative Study Of
Laws That Protect First Responders Who Assist Accident Victims' (Dechert for
SaveLIFE Foundation 2014) ) <https://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/7be34cce-
ea0d-4c90-8b39-53427acf4c43/file> (Accessed 15th April 2019)
Elliott CF Quinn, Tort Law (7th edn, Pearson Longman 2009)
Goldberg JB Zipusrky, ' The Strict Liability in Fault And The Fault in Liability' (2016)
SSRN Electronic Journal
Green, S. Causation in Negligence (Bloombury Publishing, 2015)
Kodilinye G, Commonwealth Caribbean Tort Law (Routledge, 2013)
Tulibacka, M. Product Liability Law in Transition (Routledge, 2016)
Williams K, 'Doctors as Good Samaritans: Some Empirical Evidence Concerning
Emergency Medical Treatment In Britain' (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society