Freedom of Will and Determinism: Concepts and Theories Explored

This essay delves into the philosophical debate surrounding freedom of will and determinism, examining the core concepts of causation, moral responsibility, and compulsion. The paper begins by contrasting soft determinism and libertarianism, highlighting their differing views on how human actions are influenced and the implications for free will. It then explores the compatibility of determinism and free will, discussing compatibilism's perspective that determinism and free will can coexist. The essay also analyzes the concept of responsibility within these frameworks, examining how different theories address moral culpability in light of determined actions. Finally, it addresses the issue of compulsion, contrasting the perspectives of soft determinism and libertarianism on the influence of external factors on human behavior. The essay uses scholarly references to support the arguments presented.

Running Head: FREEDOM OF WILL AND DETERMINISM 1
FREEDOM OF WILL AND DETERMINISM
Name
Institution
Freedom of Will and Determinism

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Question 1
Causation and Determinism
Soft determinism holds that human actions and behavior are influenced by casual events. Further
the theory asserts that free will is existent when it is regarded as the capacity to act according to
an individual’s nature. Likewise, libertarianism states that even though human behavior is
partially influenced by external factors, humans have the freedom to make morally indefinite
choices.
The Incompatibility of Causation and Freedom of Will
According to scholars, soft determinism is incompatible with human freedom or freedom of will.
This is because the theory of determinism holds that human choices are not associated with
common sense rather they are a result of facts about the past and human nature such as
upbringing, society, and heredity. In this case, past occurrences necessitate present and future
events and their outcome will be similar to that of past events (Gonzalez, 2014). Thus,
incompatibilists assert that free will is only possible if determinism is false. Libertarianism, on
the contrary, is incompatible with determinism since it suggests that humans have free will,
hence the future can be determined (Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, & Vargas, 2009).
Freedom of Will
Soft determinism also referred to as compatibilism acknowledges the existence of free will to
some degree. This is specifically true where the individual is seen as the cause of his or her own
actions and is thus said to act freely. Nonetheless, soft determinism advocates for the existence
of determinism and free will where individuals’ actions are dependent on both. Libertarianism
holds that indeterminism is true where occurrence of an event is not influenced by past laws and
occurrences rather a decision is a consequence of free will (Huoranszki, 2010). Specifically, it

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states that humans have control over their actions since they can intentionally and voluntarily
cause events to happen even though they cannot warrant their occurrence.
Responsibility
In general, society affirms that humans are morally responsible for their action whereby
responsibility requires free will. In this case, determinism objects to the concept of responsibility
since an individual cannot be held accountable for an action that could be predicted prior to its
occurrence. Compatibilism or soft determinism in this regard asserts that determinism is a
precondition for moral responsibility, that is, one cannot be held responsible unless his or her
actions are determined or influenced by something (Footh, 2017). Likewise, libertarianism
asserts that undetermined actions are preconceived since they are consequence of functional will,
thus, one should be held morally culpable.
Compulsion
Involuntary compulsion is existence in soft determinism where the cause of human behavior is
external factors, which are contrary to an individual’s desires and wishes (Repetti, 2010). Since
libertarianism asserts that human behavior is as a result of free will, then compulsion is non-
existent since the individual has freedom of choice and is the determinant of his or her behavior.
Question 2
Compatibilism or soft determinism holds that determinism and free will are compatible.
Specifically, the theory contends that casual determinism is true, yet human have the free will to
act as morally culpable agents in the absence of external constraints where decisions are fuelled
by human desires. In this regard, free acts are defined as decisions made by humans in
accordance to the motives of individuals in the absence of constraints from other institutions or
individuals (Footh, 2017). However, the theory further asserts that though free acts are a function

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of human motive, the nature of the motive is determined. Thus, an individual can make decisions
made on one’s own rules without been subjected to external domination by other factors. In this
regard, soft determinism asserts that free acts are avoidable and unavoidable at the same time
depending on the whether the cause for the action is internal or external. In the former case, free
acts are avoidable since the cause of human voluntary behavior is dependent on certain events,
states, and conditions with the agent’s act of volition or will, desires, choice, and motivation
(Repetti, 2010). For instance, an individual would choose to vacation in Paris instead of Italy
because it is their desire. In the case where human behavior is determined by external factors that
are not compatible with one’s desires, then free acts are unavoidable. For instance, one would
migrate from a certain location since the area is marked by the government for demolition.
The problem in soft determinism arises where supporters of the theory assert that free
will coexists with determinism in that to some extent human behavior is both determined and as
a result of free will. Conflict in this case arises when distinguishing situations in which human
behavior is determined as the theory tends to assert that more than been determined, human
decisions are a consequence of free will based on one’s motivation and desires. This is especially
the case since determinism holds that moral choices and all other events are entirely dependent
on previously existing causes or occurrences (Nichols, & Knobe, 2008). This creates conflict in
the interpretation that free will and determinism are compatible. Yet, soft determinists in their
defense argue that free will can be determined where it is influenced by external factors that are
contrary to an individual’s desire. Unlike libertarianism, soft determinism holds that the idea of
possible alternative or acting otherwise is impossible (Stump, 2017). This is primarily the case
since the theory affirms that free will and determinism are compatible. Whereby, it is impossible
to ‘act otherwise’ in a situation that is identical to one that had occurred in the past. In this case,

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the advocates hold that if one is to act otherwise than he or she did, then the cause of the
individual’s actions should be uncaused. To say that an agent ‘could have acted otherwise’
implies that regardless of the person been placed in a certain situation that he or she was placed
in could have performed a different action.

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Reference
Fischer, J. M., Kane, R., Pereboom, D., & Vargas, M. (2009). Four views on free will. John
Wiley & Sons.
Footh, G. (2017). Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility: An Analysis of Event-
Causal Incompatibilism.
Gonzalez, A. (2014). The Incompatibility of Freedom of the Will and Anthropological
Physicalism.
Huoranszki, F. (2010). Freedom of the will: A conditional analysis. Routledge.
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2008). Moral responsibility and determinism. Experimental
philosophy, 1, 105.
Repetti, R. (2010). The counterfactual theory of free will: A genuinely deterministic form of soft
determinism.
Stump, E. (2017). Moral Responsibility without Alternative Possibilities. In Moral responsibility
and alternative possibilities (pp. 151-170). Routledge.