Analysis: Management of Stage 1 of Havelock North Water Outbreak

This case study examines the management of Stage 1 of the Havelock North drinking water outbreak that occurred in August 2016, causing widespread campylobacteriosis among residents. The analysis identifies several contributing factors, including protozoa risk, poor working relationships between the Regional Council and the District Council, a history of transgressions, an unconfined aquifer, and failures to learn from a similar outbreak in 1998. Specific causes are categorized into systems, leadership, processes, and organizational culture, highlighting issues such as contaminated drinking water sources, inadequate monitoring by the Regional Council, lack of effective supervision by mid-level managers, failure to implement high standards of care by the District Council, and a hands-off approach by the DWAs in applying drinking water standards. The case study emphasizes the importance of safe drinking water, effective collaboration between governing bodies, and robust contingency planning to prevent future outbreaks.

Management of Stage
1 of Havelock North
Drinking Water
Outbreak
NAME OF THE STUDENT:
STUDENT ID:

Introduction of the Outbreak
Safe Drinking water is very important for the health of human
beings
The outbreak of the gastroenteritis in Havelock North took place on
August 2016 (Moore et al., 2017)
It shook the confidence of the public in fundamental service
About 14000 residents and more than 5000 towns became ill with
the campylobacteriosis; 45 people were hospitalised
Stage 1 address the causes in relation to the 2016 outbreak
The outbreak resulted in three deaths and health complications
among huge number of public.

Possible Causes
Protozoa Risk
Poor Working Relationships
High Transgression History
Aquifer Not Confined
1998 Outbreak

Causes of the Outbreak-
Systems
 The main source of campylobacter was the contaminated drinking water, which
caused “gastrointestinal illness campylobacteriosis” among the residents of
Havelock North.
Heavy rain overloaded the paddocks in the neighboring Brookvale Road caused
the polluted water to flow into the pond present within 90 meters from
Brookvale Road bore 1 (Little, 2016)
 “The Regional Council imposed a generic condition on the water related to the
safe and serviceable state of the Brookvale Road bores. It failed to meet the
required standard and adequately monitoring the compliance with the
conditions of permits”

Causes of the Outbreak-
Leadership
 “The Regional Council failed in meeting its responsibilities, as it was set out in
Resource Management Act 1991” (“RMA”).
 “The Regional Council inflicted some generic condition on the water in-take
permits that it granted to the District Council in relation to safe and serviceable
state of Brookvale Road bores. It failed in meeting the required standard and
monitoring the compliance with conditions of permits.”

Continuation..
The mid-level managers assigned the tasks but did not effectively
supervised and ensured their implementation in proper manner. It
resulted in unacceptable delays in preparation of Water Safety Plan
(Hales, 2019).
It was found that the Regional Council and the District Council did
not work effectively together

Causes of the Outbreak-
Processes
“The District Council did not implement high standard of care that
was required of public drinking-water supplier, especially in the light
of the experience of similar outbreak in 1998.”
“The Regional Council failed to meet its responsibilities, as set out
in the Resource Management Act 1991” (“RMA”), “to act as guardian
of the aquifers under the Heretaunga Plains. Protection of the water
source, in this case the aquifer, was the first and a critical step in the
multi-barrier approach to ensuring safe drinking water”
There was lack in Contingency planning by the District Council.

Causes of the Outbreak-
Organisational Culture
The DWAs were hands-off in applying the standards of Drinking-
water (Hawkins, 2016).
“It failed to press the District Council regarding the shortage of risk
assessment, the analysis of key risks of aquifer catchment, including
the relation in between Brookvale Road bores and in nearby ponds.”
There was lack of collaboration and liaison among the Regional
Council and the District Council. This resulted in many missed
opportunities which might have prevented the then outbreak.

Continuation..
 Also, it appears that nothing was learned by the outbreak of 1998.
“Water Supplier and the District Council did not take the outbreak
of 1998 seriously and have not implement systematic and enduring
changes. “

References:
Hawkins, M. (2016). Local Government Mediation-The Ugly Duckling of RMA
Resolution. NZJ Envtl. L., 20, 239.
Hales, S. (2019). Climate change, extreme rainfall events, drinking water and
enteric disease. Reviews on environmental health, 34(1), 1-3.
Little, Y. (2016). Coping with the outbreak of campylobacter. Kai Tiaki: Nursing
New Zealand, 22(10), 25.
Moore, D., Drew, R., Davies, P., & Rippon, R. (2017). The Economic Costs of the
Havelock North August 2016 Waterborne Disease Outbreak. Sapere Research
Group Limited.

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