Pols 223: Iraq War Mistakes by Bush Administration and Stabilizatio

This report analyzes the mistakes made by the Bush Administration during the occupation of Iraq, as highlighted in the documentary "No End in Sight." The report identifies key errors, including flawed intelligence leading to the war, inappropriate diplomacy, the disbandment of the Iraqi army, and the exclusion of Ba'ath party members from the successor government. These mistakes contributed to the destabilization and insurgency in Iraq. Furthermore, the report explores alternative strategies the Bush Administration could have employed to stabilize and rebuild the nation after the war, drawing on the documentary and class discussions on terrorism and war. The analysis emphasizes the importance of thorough diplomacy, strategic planning, and a nuanced approach to post-conflict governance to avoid chaos and foster stability.

Running head: WAR AND TERRORISM 1
War and Terrorism
Name
Institution
Author’s Note

WAR AND TERRORISM 2
War and Terrorism
The United States invasion of Iraq brings out the aim of the U.S. to help the Middle East
come out of the Iraqi Saddam Hussein. This invasion of Iraq occurred under the regime of Bush
in a grand strategy of the United States-led coalition to counter-attack against the Islamic
terrorist group al-Qaida in September 2001. Because of this, they wanted to overthrow the
Saddam’s government (Abdel-Razek & Puttick, 2016). Due to the invasion of the U.S., Iraq
became a victim of chaos that led to several deaths of majorly the civilians. There was
insurgency over the entire Iraq that resulted to a lot of destructions. During the period of the
invasion of Iraq, the U.S. administration made several mistakes that led them to lose the battle.
Some of these mistakes were not have been made in the first place. Some of these mistakes
include; firstly, the decision to go to the war was made out of fault intelligence (Al-Ali & Pratt,
2016). The U.S. and the entire administration made a rush decision without thorough diplomacy
being put in place to confirm that the condition of Iraq was as they have had. So many
assumptions were involved in the intelligence works and much more in the planning and setting
of the strategies.
Secondly, the announcement by the U.S. administration about the failure of their
diplomacy and calling for the coalition of the willing was not appropriate. Several states may
have taken this call lightly following the U.S. mindset that every state which is not with them in
the war against terror as being against them. To Saddam’s Iraqi army, it appeared as inferiority,
and this gave them much courage to be ready even to handle the U.N (Doeser & Eidenfalk,
2016).
On the third point, it was vivid to many that there could be an eruption of chaos in the
case that Saddam's iron grip was removed. With all the clarity, the U.S. administration still goes

WAR AND TERRORISM 3
ahead to plan for the disbandment of the Iraqi army. This was a step that could have been taken
by this administration (Hasan, 2016). With the apparent reasons, the Iraqi military, just like any
other army, could not be disbanded without any form of resisting. There had to be war, and the
disbandment could only happen after the U.S. defeated the Iraqi army.
The fourth mistake that was made by the Bush administration was the plan to stop all the
members from Saddam’s Ba’ath party from being in the successor government. There were
several consultations and planning that this administration could have done before considering
this decision. There are no doubts that in such a scenario, the first option that any party can do is
to resist, and a very chaotic state can be witnessed. This administration could have bared some
and allowed a few to avoid chaos since Saddam's Ba'ath party could not withstand that.
These many mistakes that were made by the United States administration could be
avoided if the United States were able to carry careful and thorough diplomacy and plan
strategically.

WAR AND TERRORISM 4
References
Abdel-Razek, O., & Puttick, M. (2016). Majorities and minorities in post-ISIS Iraq.
Contemporary Arab Affairs, 9(4), 565-576.
Al-Ali, N., & Pratt, N. (2016). Positionalities, intersectionalities, and transnational feminism in
researching women in post-invasion Iraq. In Researching War (pp. 76-91)
Doeser, F., & Eidenfalk, J. (2016). Ignoring public opinion: The Australian and Polish decisions
to go to war in Iraq. Cambridge review of international affairs, 29(2), 562-580.
Hasan, Q. (2016). The Impacts of Iraq’s Invasion on the Politics in the Middle East.
International Journal of Social Sciences & Educational Studies, 46.