Iraqi Kurdistan Conflict: Insurgency, External Support, and Outcomes

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the Iraqi Kurdistan conflict spanning from 1961 to 1975, focusing on the dynamics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The study examines the initial guerrilla attacks by Kurdish peshmerga forces and the subsequent responses from the Iraqi government. It details the phases of the conflict, including the periods of intense fighting, attempts at negotiation, and the critical role of external support from nations such as Iran, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The report explores the tactics employed by both sides, the impact of external alliances, and the ultimate outcome of the conflict, highlighting the significance of the Iran-Iraq waterway agreement and the eventual decline of the Kurdish insurgent force. It also analyzes the factors that influenced the Kurds' pursuit of autonomy, the challenges faced, and the recommendations for countering insurgency, drawing from various scholarly sources to provide a well-rounded perspective on this complex historical event.

IRAQI KURDISTAN,
1961–
1975 IRREGULAR
WARFARE
(AUTONOMY)
KURDISTAN

INTRODU
CTION
Irregular warfare: commenced by irregular forces,
one of them is not a regular country, do not possess
a regular war army, Does not use regular tactics of
war, dragged over years without reaching a
particular decision due to impractical demands of the
insurgent group.
Guerrilla warfare is fought by irregulars who shape
their actions to go against the actions of their rival
force, against orthodox police and military forces.
either independently by a specific group or they are a
part of larger external strategy of politics and military
Rebels. Insurgents, irregulars, terrorists, barbarians,
bandits or partisans.
Kurds belongs to the plains of Mesopotamia and
highlands of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern
Syria, north-western Iran, south-western Armenia and
northern Iraq, 25 to 35 million and fourth biggest
ethnic group the Middle East

MOTIVATION OF KURDS
In 1958, Barzani and Iraq’s government agreed on a deal and Kurds were
promised regional autonomy.
Meanwhile, Barzani acquired the position of head for the Kurdistan Democratic
Party.
In early 1960, it became obvious that regional autonomy promise would not be
fulfilled
Repeated violent outbreaks from both sides made the situation worse.
Kurd’s agitation for autonomy.
Barzani defeated pro-governmental forces and ordered to occupy Kurdish
territory by expelling governmental officials
problems in Baghdad and resultantly military offensive preparations were called
by government to practice control in the region.

PHASE 1 (1961-1970)
Predominantly characterized by guerrilla attacks by the insurgents and conventional counterattack
activities.
initiated small clashes which later emerged as a gigantic issue and mobilization of ‘peshmerga’
(guerilla force) was ordered by Barzani.
It sparked a forceful revolt between the two parties.
Growth of Guerilla force of Kurds
collective punishments to the insurrectionaries.
. The major activities of insurgents revolved around tactics used in guerilla attacks including small
scale attacks, hit and run, sabotage, sniping, IEDs and ambushes.
Iraqi regime was threatened by the growth of peshmerga in various territories in year 1962-1963.
The army of Iraq had more funds and better equipment, aerial bombardment.
In 1970, after many failed attempts of agreements the Kurds were offered limited autonomy, amnesty
of insurgents, Kurdish vice president and equal language status in the areas administered by Kurds
Peshmerga’s future status compromised

PHASE 2 (1971-1973)
Underlying issue of autonomy remained unresolved.
Kurds accused the government of Iraq for unnecessary delay and disinclination to allow the
representative of Kurds to reach national government.
The period of peace was utilized by both parties to reinforce their forces due to growing suspicion
in 1972.
Kurdish leadership gained support of Iran in the form of weapon aid. CIA of the US also supported
Kurdish movement against Iraq
Kurds were provided with funds, warriors and weapons by the US, Israel and Iran.
Iraq gained additional support from external sources after treaty of fifteen-year friendship with the
Soviet Union in 1972
Cancellation of relationships with the Kurds.
The developmental programs by Iraq’s government in Kurdish areas did not convince Kurds as
their only intractable issue was the need of autonomy.
Kurds became stouter due to enhanced external support

PHASE 3
(1974-
1975)
Conventional assault against
Iraq
Kirkuk autonomy issue
Failed attempt against well-
equipped Iraq’s army
Stronger position of COIN due
to withdrawal of external
support

PHASE 4 (APRIL
1975)
Significance of external support in case of conflict
game changer for Kurds when they failed in their
attempt to counter conventional force-to-force assault
Waterway agreement (Iran-Iraq)
Powerless insurgent force of Kurds
Iraq’s assault on Peshmerga
Kurdish leadership left Iraq

ANALYSI
S
Support of external forces for insurgents
Support of external forces for the
country (Iraq)
Cultural differences of Kurds and Iraqis
External forces (US, Iran and Israel)
fueled conflicts
Weaken Iraq
Restrict Iraq from Soviet Union Treaty
Withdrawal of support from Kurds in
time of war

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
COUNTERING INSURGENCY
Insurgency
aspects
Analysis of
insurgency
approach
Motives of
insurgent group
Coalition to seek
external support
Careful analysis
before developing
counter-
insurgency plan

CONCLU
SION
Irregular warfare, Guerilla warfare,
History of Kurds, COIN
Guerilla attacks by Kurds
Failed attempts of agreement
External support of Kurd and failed
attempt of Conventional war
Soviet Union and Iraq Treaty
Role of external support of Iraq and
Kurds

REFERENCES
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