Irregular Warfare (Autonomy) Kurdistan: Conflict Analysis, 1961-1975

This report delves into the irregular warfare between the Kurds and the Iraqi government from 1961 to 1975, focusing on the Kurds' pursuit of autonomy. It examines the motivations behind the conflict, the phases of the insurgency, and the strategies employed by both sides. The report highlights the significant role of external actors, including the Soviet Union, Iran, and the United States, and how their involvement influenced the conflict's trajectory. The analysis covers guerrilla tactics, counterinsurgency measures, and the impact of key events like the 1975 agreement between Iraq and Iran, which led to the collapse of the Kurdish movement. The report concludes with recommendations for countering insurgency and emphasizes the importance of understanding the dynamics of external support in such conflicts. This detailed analysis provides valuable insights into the complexities of irregular warfare and the pursuit of self-determination in the context of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Running Head: IRREGULAR WARFARE (AUTONOMY) KURDISTAN
Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961–1975 Irregular warfare (autonomy) Kurdistan
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Contents
Introduction....................................................................................................................................2
Motivation of Kurds......................................................................................................................3
Phase 1 (1961-1970)....................................................................................................................3
Phase 2 (1971-1973)....................................................................................................................4
Phase 3 (1974-1975)....................................................................................................................5
Phase 4 (April 1975)....................................................................................................................6
Analysis...........................................................................................................................................7
Recommendations for Countering Insurgency...........................................................................8
Conclusion....................................................................................................................................10
References.....................................................................................................................................11

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Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961–1975 Irregular warfare (autonomy) Kurdistan
Introduction
The research paper elaborates the underpinnings of insurgency, conflict and irregular
warfare between the Kurds and the government of Iraq for attaining autonomy in their territories.
Irregular warfare is a two-word phrase which became increasingly evident in the 2000s (Jones &
Johnston, 2013). Irregular warfare is considered as war commenced by irregular forces between
different forces among which one of them is not a regular country or a state. Irregular warfare
occurs between a country with the regular army and a group which do not possess a regular war
army. Irregular warfare does not use regular tactics of war, and it is often dragged over the years
without reaching a particular decision due to tenacious and impractical demands of the insurgent
group.
Guerrilla warfare is fought by a group consisting of irregulars who shape their actions to
go against the actions of their rival force (Young & Gray, 2011). This type of warfare takes place
against orthodox police and military forces. They are fought either independently by a specific
group, or they are a part of a larger external strategy of politics and military (Salehyan et al.,
2011). The practitioners of this type of warfare are labelled as rebels, insurgents, irregulars,
terrorists, barbarians, bandits or partisans.
Kurds are a group of indigenous people belonging to the plains of Mesopotamia and
highlands of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Syria, north-western Iran, south-western
Armenia and northern Iraq. Kurd population ranges from 25 to 35 million, and they constitute
the fourth-biggest group on the basis of ethnicity in the Middle East (Ahmedi, 2018). However,
there is no permanent state for the Kurds due to numerous reasons.
The case of COIN explains the insurgency between Iraq and Kurds by categorizing them
in different phases (Paul et al., 2013). It underscores the importance of various factors during the

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insurgent situation, the role of external actors and highlights different approaches of countering
insurgency.
Motivation of Kurds
In 1958, Abdul Karim Qasim invited Barzani to come back from exile, after his military
coup. Barzani and Qasim agreed on a deal and following that deal, Kurds were promised by
Qasim that they would enjoy regional autonomy. The regional autonomy of Kurd's was
conditional to the support of Qasim's policies by Barzani. Meanwhile, Barzani acquired the
position of head for the Kurdistan Democratic Party that attained legal status later in 1960. In
early 1960, it became obvious that regional autonomy promise would not be fulfilled and
repeated violent outbreaks from both sides made the situation worse. It became the underlying
cause of Kurd's motivation that led to their agitation for autonomy. Barzani defeated pro-
governmental forces and ordered to occupy Kurdish territory by expelling governmental officials
(Bengio, 2012). However, this policy created problems in Baghdad, and resultantly military
offensive preparations were called by the government to practice control in the region.
Phase 1 (1961-1970)
The first phase started in 1961, which was predominantly characterized by guerrilla
attacks by the insurgents and conventional counterattack activities. The situation was deeply
rooted in the tensions between the head of Kurdish tribe and the government of Iraq which
initiated small clashes which later emerged as a gigantic issue and mobilization of 'peshmerga'
(guerilla force) was ordered by Barzani. It sparked a forceful revolt between the two parties. The
guerilla force initially consisted of 5000 people who later increased to 20000, but they faced the
issue of scarcity of resources and weapons (Gunter, 2013). The force of COIN was employed to
give collective punishments to the insurrectionary.

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Consequently, insurgents cut down their engagement in large scale operations. They
mostly avoided extensive damaging activity against regular troops which were well-equipped.
The major activities of insurgents revolved around tactics used in guerilla attacks including small
scale attacks, hit and run, sabotage, sniping, IEDs and ambushes. During this phase, the role of
government was critical to employ a considerable number of recruits in military, police forces,
militia and paramilitary. They were majorly recruited from their local operational areas. The
force against guerilla attacks COIN was committed to physically denying the access of
insurgents to populations which were supportive, and a program of reward or amnesty was
utilized.
The Iraqi regime was threatened by the growth of peshmerga in various territories in the
year 1962-1963. The army of Iraq had more funds and better equipment although they were
unprepared; thus, they primarily responded offensives with aerial bombardment. Nonetheless, in
1963 the conflicts between the two parties ended in a stalemate. The Iraqi army gained control in
major cities and towns, but the mountains remained a constrained territory due to the presence of
Kurdish defensive guerilla force. Iraq's government offered a cease-fire agreement along with
extended political rights to Kurdish insurgents which could not be materialized and therefore
fight continued for two more years. In 1970, after many failed attempts of agreements the Kurds
were offered limited autonomy, amnesty of insurgents, Kurdish vice president and equal
language status in the areas administered by Kurds (Özpek, 2012). Peshmerga's future status was
offered to compromise rather than disbanding it. However, these negotiated stipulations did not
promise long-term peace between Kurds and Iraq's government.
Phase 2 (1971-1973)
After the mutual peace agreement between Kurds and Iraq's government, the underlying
issue of autonomy remained unresolved. Kurds accused the government of Iraq for unnecessary

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delay and disinclination to allow the representative of Kurds to reach national government. The
attempt of Barzani's assassination and rumours of aid appeal by Kurdish leadership to the US-
made circumstances hostile. The period of peace was utilized by both parties to reinforce their
forces due to growing suspicion in 1972. Peshmerga had fifty thousand people till 1974 and
Kurdish leadership gained the support of Iran in the form of weapon aid. CIA of the US also
supported the Kurdish movement against Iraq in the Soviet Union (Esty, 2017). Kurds were
provided with funds, warriors and weapons from the US, Israel and Iran.
On the other hand, Iraq gained additional support from external sources after the treaty of
fifteen-year friendship with the Soviet Union in 1972. Moscow was entitled to strengthen the
defense of Iraq by solidification of Iraq's role as the chief supplier of arms in Baghdad. It led to
cancellation of relationships with the Kurds. Owing to the stronger bond between Iraq and Soviet
Union, the US and Iran increased their support to Kurd. Resultantly, the Soviet Union treaty
enhanced stakes of Kurdish insurgents in a wider context of the Cold war and regional conflict.
The developmental programs by Iraq's government in Kurdish areas did not convince Kurds as
their only intractable issue was the need for autonomy. Kurds became stouter due to enhanced
external support and they got engaged in extending their forces by utilizing external aid
(Danilovich, 2018). COIN force received significant support from external bodies that led to
building-up of military forces with end of stalemate.
Phase 3 (1974-1975)
The government of Iraq presented an agreement of increased administrative and political
powers to the Kurds, but the agreement lacked the major clause of autonomy over Kirkuk.
Kirkuk being a substantive region with major reserves of oil, held immense strategic
significance. Upon rejection, Iraq's government tried to clear the area through practicing
government decree. At this stage, Kurds had substantive power and thus they pursued a

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conventional assault rather than tactic of guerilla attacks. The artillery attempt by Barzani's force
failed due to errors of adaptation that led to their voluntary exile from the conflict. The Kurd's
peshmerga was found to be ill-prepared when they were unable to withstand a massive
counterattack by Iraq's army as a conventional assault. The results were in the favor of COIN as
they successfully entered deep into the area of Kurds. The insurgents were left with no other
option but to abandon the conflict as it resulted in establishment of COIN force in the region.
The Kurds had surety of support from the US and Iran, but these countries were not willing to
get directly involved in the war (Byman, 2013). Such interventions would have changed the
scenario, but it was a strategic contingency that was avoided by Iraq and Iran.
Phase 4 (April 1975)
The phase 4 highlights the significance of external support in case of conflict. It is one of
the major factors that could act as game-changer for Kurds when they failed in their attempt to
counter conventional force-to-force assault (Sawyer et al., 2017). In March 1975, Iraq made an
agreement of waterway with Iran and in exchange Iran agreed to withdraw its support from
Kurd's movement. It resulted in the abrupt collapse of the Kurd's movement. The insurgent
forces became powerless as the US also withdrew its support that was primarily due to the Shah
of Iran. The cross-border support of insurgency significantly reduced to minimal. It was followed
by Iraq's assault on peshmerga that killed hundreds of their fighters as well as civilians. The
seventy percent of the forces of Barzani quitted and remaining fled to Iran while others were
imprisoned by the army of Iraq. Barzani left Iraq, pulled out from politics, his forces
surrendered, and Kurdish leadership was virtually destroyed (Hashimoto & Bezci, 2016). The
forces of COIN were able to successfully prevail in huge majority of arrangements.
The defeat of peshmerga was followed by reprisals against the population of Kurds. It
was done mainly done to prevent the possibility of future rebellion in the region. The process

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destroyed over 1500 villages of Kurds, 6 million settlement in camps and development of
security zone along the Iraq-Turkey border. The efforts by Iraq's government to avoid insurgent
activity in future took a toll, particularly on the Kurdish population (Braithwaite & Johnson,
2012). The leadership of Kurdish movement was taken over by the son of Barzani and after
several years, guerilla warfare returned.
Analysis
The phases of Kurds movement in Iraq and the irregular warfare for the gain of autonomy
in Kurdistan explains the integral role of external support. The analysis of conventional
explanation about the whole process exhibits that neither Iraq's government nor the leadership of
Kurds was capable of overcoming each other in the absence of external supporting factors
(Pollack, 2013). The support of external actors played a critical role in this case. The Kurdish
leadership was assured of support in the hours of need which backed the intrepid step by Barzani
to get engaged in force-to-force conventional method of attack rather than their guerrilla attack
tactic. It was reported that Barzani explicitly asked of support of Iran in the form of weapons and
confirmed surrender soon after the support was not provided (Voller, 2014). It was a key error in
the strategy of Kurdish leadership that they excessively relied on the support of Iran. Similarly,
Iraq was unable to contest and wipe out Kurds from their region until the country received
strategic support from Soviet Union (Hashim, 2011). The backing out of Iran and the US from
the whole scenario left Kurds abandoned and thus they were forced to surrender rather than fight.
Kurdish conflict was primarily backed by numerous external support elements that kept
on shifting in accordance with their own interests and gains (Frantzman, 2016). Soviet Union
made Kurds powerful which was later followed by the support of Iran, US and Israel. It was
done merely because these states had interest in fostering situation of insurgency for containing
the power of Iraq in the region. However, none of these external supporting factors showed

IRREGULAR WARFARE (AUTONOMY) KURDISTAN 9
willingness to directly engage in war. The fueling and abrupt end of Kurd's conflict were rooted
in the strategic interests of outsiders. Hence, the conventional explanation of conflict indicates
that external support is crucial in conflicts and it is linked to strategic gains of outsiders which
means it does not stay with one party constantly.
The analysis of distinctive characteristics extracted some useful factors. Kurdish
nationalism was led by the differing aspects between the culture of Iraq and Kurds. Although,
both nations were Muslims, but religion could not hold the states together. It shows that cultural
aspects of Kurds nurtured during the regime of Ottoman and British led to development of a
separate nation. The habitat of Kurds was attributed by big mountains and deep rivers that
practically impassable and impenetrable by the government of Iraq. The outside support actors
(Iran and US) wanted to linger the conflict between Iraq and Kurds to derive advantages from
unsolvable issue. The external support of Kurds was meant to weaken Iraq as a state. Their
support added fuel to innate desire of Kurds to practice autonomy over their territory in Iraq
(Monten & Iyengar Plumb, 2020). Nonetheless, the unwanted conventional war led to the
solution of the Kurd's insurgency.
Recommendations for Countering Insurgency
For the purpose of developing useful counter-insurgency recommendations it is necessary
to identify different aspects of insurgency. As insurgency is fought within the boundaries of a
state therefore it can be considered as an internal war. It is necessary for the state to protect its
sovereignty against the challenges posed by insurgents that may include social order overthrow,
power reallocation, breaking away from central control of state and formation of an autonomous
or ungoverned space within a state which is controlled by them. Secondly, it is recommended to
find the underlying motives of insurgents which can be examined to excerpt required information
such as root cause, internal or external supportive forces, basic ideology, use of narrative,

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targeted population or geographical area, commitment depth, availability of weapons, strategic
strength and operational environment. All these aspects play an important role in developing
strategy and collaborations with other actors to cope with insurgency in a country. It is
recommended that the country should analyze approach and motivation of insurgent group that
can lead to effective policymaking. The approach of insurgents may be conspiratorial which is
inherently small-scaled or military-focused to attain autonomy at a larger scale. Urban
insurgency approach also uses domestic warfare or terrorism in urban environment. Insurgency
may occur in coalition with other forces to fulfil composite objectives. Other approaches of
insurgency include protracted popular, or people's war and identity-focused (Amos & Petraeus,
2007). By means of careful analysis, anti-insurgency programs can be developed by states.

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Conclusion
COIN insurgency case highlights the rise and fall of conflict and warfare between Kurds
and the government of Iraq. The history of this conflict is traced back to the time when head of
state of Iraq (Qasim) promised political and regional autonomy to Barzani and later it was
delayed. The presence of mutual suspicion stirred the need of seeking external help. Both Iraq
and Kurds' movement was supported by external actors. There were several attempts of peace
agreements between the two parties, but it could not lead towards prolonged peace in the region.
The Kurds initially fought guerrilla war with the army of Iraq by majorly being confined to
impassable mountains. Later with the support of the US and Iran, Kurds extended their force and
attempted conventional assault against Iraq. Iraq in coalition with Soviet Union delivered a
forceful response and Kurds were unable to withstand. Barzani (leader of Kurds) asked for the
involvement of its supporters including Iran and the US but they showed unwillingness to
directly become a part of the war. Eventually, Iraq made Kurds to surrender and its leadership to
leave the country. The role of external forces is critical as exhibited by the case. The US and Iran
used Kurds for materializing their own goals and after Iran-Iraq waterway agreement, Iran
withdrew its support from Kurds. Similarly, the Soviet Union used Kurds to weaken Iraq in the
region, but after the development of the relationship with Iraq, it helped the country to destroy
the Kurd's force as well as civilians. The case of COIN leaves lessons and important
recommendations to combat insurgency in the country which are included in the last section of
the research paper.

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