In-depth Report: Sydney Light Rail Project - Overruns and Stakeholders

This report provides a critical analysis of the Sydney Light Rail project, focusing on its failure to meet deadlines and budget constraints. It examines the distress caused by delays, poor communication, and inadequate support for businesses affected by the construction. The analysis covers cost and schedule overruns, the project execution team's performance, and the relationship between overruns and stakeholders. It also explores possible actions for success, including mitigation measures and improved communication strategies. The report highlights the impact on businesses, environmental concerns, and the timeline of the project, concluding with recommendations for better planning, stakeholder engagement, and accountability in future infrastructure projects. This document is available on Desklib, a platform that provides students with access to a wide range of study resources, including past papers and solved assignments.

Running head: SYDNEY LIGHT RAIL 1
Sydney Light Rail
Name:
Institution:

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The distress and suffering as a result of the delays has been exacerbated by poor
communication to the residents and businesses and the sluggish response from the NSW
Government, including the department. Indeed, the inquiry heard that at the initial meetings with
businesses about the project, one Transport for NSW employee told business owners to “go on a
holiday to Bali” for six months while construction was underway. We believe that the support for
businesses was inadequate, especially considering the delays that plagued the project (Eagly and
Miller, 2016). Furthermore, we are concerned that support for businesses was not forthcoming
when delays were first identified. It was not until media reports of financial distress became
common that the NSW Government provided meaningful support. I strongly believe that it is
not acceptable for governments to assume or accept as a default position that delays, particularly
long delays, are necessarily a feature of infrastructure building programs. To adopt such an
assumption, or accept this as a default position, virtually normalizes the expectations of all
parties related with the project that delays associated with its completion are ‘just the way it is’.
The truth is that when there are delays, somebody has to pay for them. Indeed, by
accepting delays as inevitable, it sends the message to the private sector that the government will
not hold them accountable for their failures to deliver a project (Lutter, 2015). We find it
particularly concerning that in January 2019, six years and two months after the project was
publicly by Minister for Transport, it is still not possible to obtain from the NSW Government,
an accurate figure of what the CSELR project is going to cost the state. We find this alarming,
because if the NSW Government cannot confirm an accurate figure, nobody else can. Given the
total contingency fund for the CSELR project has been exhausted, it is likely that the cost of the
project will continue to climb. Although we do not take a position on the dispute between

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Transport for NSW and its contractors, we are alarmed that the agency ultimately responsible
was unable to prevent this disaster. The delays and contractor dispute leads us to find that the
project has been mismanaged.
The CSELR is a huge project in Sydney that will enhance transport in the CBD. It aims
to increase carriage capacity, and to reduce the traffic jam all across the city that is becoming
menace each year. It is a complex and large project, with construction occurring on one of
Sydney CBD's most populated streets, and the benefits of the project, once finalized, are
potentially significant. Regrettably though, serious questions have been raised in relation to the
project's timeframes and costs. It has delayed by not less a year, and although Transport for
NSW would like it to be finalized by December 2019, the official completion date is currently
March 2020.
There may also be a further two month delay, according to the evidence provided by
ALTRAC and Acciona. With infrastructure projects of this magnitude, a degree of interruption is
to be expected. However, as this inquiry has shown, the impacts of construction have been
greatly experienced by the dwellers and small businesses located along the route (Powell and
Sang, 2015). There is a lot of pollution and damage along the route. Some of these issues have
resulted to construction delays. It is acknowledges that the level of noise during works
undertaken out of hours has been impinging particularly on residents' lives and that noise has not
been adequately monitored.
The whack of this project on businesses has been particularly significant. It is obviously
seen how much businesses have increased their effort since the commencement of the

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construction of this project, with some having shutdown. Not only have they endured significant
financial losses.
Analysis on cost and/or schedule overruns
The light rail linking the CBD to Randwick and Kingsford was originally meant to cost
taxpayers $1.6bn. The light rail project will receive up to $576m extra from the New South
Wales government under a settlement deal which takes the total cost to $2.7bn.
Analysis of the project execution team
The project required huge manpower and machineries. The execution team had set the timelines
for the conclusion of the project. Poor payment on the extended days resulted to the go slow thus
leading to poor execution of the job.
Analysis of relationship between overruns and the stakeholders
That considering contractual issues that have arisen in relation to the Central Business
Division and South East Light Rail project, need for review in Private Partnership contracts for
important state infrastructure projects. That, once the CBD and South East Light Rail service
becomes operational, Transport should be closely monitored by the service's patronage to ensure
that it can respond to future demand effectively. Public, on at least a quarterly basis, patronage
data. That Transport for NSW publicly releases the outcomes of modeling in relation to journey
times between Randwick /Kingsford and the Sydney CBD, upon finalization of the designs for
each junction along the CBD and South East Light Rail route. That the NSW Government
undertakes a review of the exemptions provided to projects declared 'Critical State Significant
Infrastructure. That Transport for NSW to initiate committee to regulate noise pollution and
strategic measures undertaken to regulate it. That Transport for NSW review the effectiveness of

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its communication strategy for the CBD and South East Light Rail project, taking in to account
concerns raised in this report, and report back to the relevant ministries improvements that can be
implemented for future infrastructure projects across New South Wales. That small business
affected should be provided with funds to improve their business. Ways should be structured to
compensate those directly affected by the infrastructure (Hodgson and Paton, 2016).
Analysis of possible actions for success
ALTRAC discussed the approach to mitigating delays, noting that that it is obliged to consider
mitigation measures under the contract. Mr Bramley, when asked about whether there was any
issue from Transport for NSW about the works program or concern around lack of mitigation on
delays (Savelsbergh, Havermans and Storm, 2016).
Perceived go slow
There were some media reports early in 2018 about Acciona 'going slow' with their
construction work on the project.83 2.24 In relation to whether this was the case, the committee
asked Mr Bramley about whether there were enough workers allocated on the project. He
responded by stating: 'The information we have from the earlier part of the year does not support
the notion of a go-slow. That is the data that we have'.84 2.25 Transport for NSW were also
questioned about the perception of a 'go slow' by Acciona, and whether the department monitors
productivity on sites. Mr Troughton stated.
Project budget

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As at 4 October 2018, the company's costs had exceeded this amount and were about
$1.45 billion. Mr Noonan estimated that the cost to complete their construction work on the
project would be approximately $1.8 billion.
Removal of trees
Trees were removed along CSELR route. This raised concern on environmental impact among
the key players. Dwellers on this route were extremely disappointed on the move. Some claimed
that there was only one tree left.
Timeline of the project
Transport Minister formally announced plans for the construction of the Sydney CBD Light Rail
service to the southeastern suburbs of Sydney. On May 17, 2013, Brad Hazzard, Minister of
Planning, released the Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment (Light Rail Project)
Order 2013 to declare the Critical State Significant Infrastructure Light Rail Project under the
State. In June 2014, Transport for NSW acquired the planning approvals needed for the project.
A State Significant Infrastructure application was approved by the Minister for Planning, Pru
Goward, on condition that the CSELR project adhere to specified design principles and
standards, including environmental and heritage, urban design, sustainability, community
amenity and privacy and other considerations.
The NSW govt also announced that project modifications had increased capital expenses to $2.1
billion. The project and financial contract between ALTRAC and NSW Transport was signed in
February 2015 (called ' financial closure '). Building on the project started in October 2015.

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Completion date
At least one year has postponed the CSELR project. The initial date of completion was M
arch 16, 2019. Mr. Stephen Troughton, the former Deputy Secretary for Transport for NSW, stat
ed at a hearing in August 2018 that the project's expected completion date was March 2020.How
ever, in early October 2018, Mr Bede Noonan, the Managing Director of Acciona
The cause of the additional two-month delay is in Anzac Parade at the south end of
Anzac Parade where we are being delayed by having overhead wires that need to be brought
down and that is part of the project that we are unable to do. It can only be done by Ausgrid. In a
subsequent hearing, Mr Troughton advised that this extra two month timeframe to project
finalization was 'rejected' by Transport for NSW, and that the completion date was still officially
March 2020.
Planning of work in each zone and delays
The original schedule for work on the project set out starts and finishes dates for each of the 31 zones
along the CSELR route. Ms Margaret Prendergast, Coordinator General, Transport Coordination Office,
Transport for NSW, explained that the schedule of works proposed 'concurrent work in multiple zones'.
Impacts on business owners
Many businesses, particularly small businesses, have financially struggled or even been
forced to close, since the commencement of construction on the CSELR. There were financial
and environmental impacts to the business owners. It is important to note that there was a
significant amount of evidence from business owners located close to the CSELR route,
particularly by way of providing concrete written submissions. Information from small business

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owners including the owners of Ouroboros Wholefoods Café on Devonshire Street, Optical
Illusions on Anzac Parade and Mondial Pink Diamond Atelier on George Street in Sydney. The
former owners of The Book Kitchen and Vivo Café also shared with the committee their
experience, both having since closed their business due to the impacts of the CSELR project on
revenue for their business (Ben-Amar, Chang and McIlkenny, 2017).
Each of these business owners reported on how their business has financially suffered as
a result of construction work on the project. Mr Tzirtzilakis one of the businessman said 'it is
heartbreaking to step out of your business and see all your former customers elsewhere, and I do
not blame them', as the business is surrounded by noise suppressing materials and a major pit
that has been opened several times (Bassi, 2016).
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is important to say that as NSW government enhance its infrastructure
need for quality and properly planned, built to high standard and delivered in a timely way. To
ensure that this is done so the benefits of such large investments are shared by all, it falls to
governments to show leadership in planning and managing infrastructure development. The
government delegate ways and should involve all stakeholders. The government should be held
accountable for what, how and when of these developments. Furthermore, how is all the co-
lateral damage that has been done to businesses, particularly small businesses and residents along
or near the light rail lines going to be satisfactorily resolved? In the over view the content,
findings and recommendations of this report could and should have been far stronger and robust.
It is my opinion that this report would stand as a far more rigorous critique of the CSELR
project. A key cause of the ongoing distress to residents and businesses has been the significant

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and lengthy delays of the CSELR project. Construction on the project commenced in October
2015 and the final zone was to be completed by December 2017. Most zones were projected to
be completed within six to nine months. A table of the proposed construction dates appears at
Appendix 2 of the report. Not one of these completion dates was met. The Secretary of Transport
informed the committee in November 2018 that there was still 99 metres of track left to be laid.
At a previous hearing, the committee was informed that testing on the track would take six
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL Impacts of the CBD and South East Light Rail Project 190 Report 2
- January 2019 months. The Secretary for Transport also advised at the final hearing of the
committee that he did not know when the project would be completed or how much it would
cost. The lack of certainty, in particular for businesses, was devastating for their finances, but
also for the mental health of the owners.

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